Bekhorot 10b (י:) — the Talmud in English

Rather, it is the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis concerning a firstborn donkey that one slaughtered but did not decapitate. Since an Israelite slaughtered it, the slaughter renders it fit to be considered food [as explained in the Mishna in Chullin 117b], and this is the reasoning of the Rabbis—

And Rabbi Shimon, too, would not have deemed it pure from tum’at okhlin when slaughtered through a proper slaughter by an Israelite. Rather,

here,

in the beraita in which the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon dispute whether a firstborn donkey transmits tum’at okhlin,

what are we dealing with:

with

a case where one slaughtered it

—an Israelite slaughtered the firstborn donkey—so as

to study through it

the laws of slaughter, and it was not a proper slaughter.

And

Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disputed the matter

in the dispute between Nimos and Rabbi Elazar,

as will be explained. Rabbi Shimon holds that this is not a proper slaughter that renders it fit to be considered food, and therefore he does not concede that a firstborn donkey transmits tum’at okhlin. According to the Rabbis, however, even this slaughter renders the firstborn donkey fit to be considered food, and it transmits tum’at okhlin.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yosei said: Nimos, the brother of Yehoshua HaGarsi, told me that one who slaughters a raven in order to study through it,

its

blood

that fell on seeds

renders

them fit to become impure, as is the law with slaughter blood, which renders produce fit to contract impurity.

Rabbi Elazar says: Slaughter blood always renders produce fit.

But this is difficult:

Is Rabbi Elazar not identical to the first tanna!?

Rather, their difference is whether its prohibition constitutes its designation.

That is, their dispute is indeed not concerning the law of rendering produce fit, but concerning whether a slaughtered raven is food capable of contracting impurity. They dispute whether a slaughter performed only for study and not for the purpose of eating is effective in designating it as food:

The first tanna holds: Its blood renders others fit

[if it fell on other seeds],

but with regard to itself

[the raven itself], it does not render it fit, because since it was slaughtered only in order to study through it,

it requires an intention

to eat it in order for it to become impure.

And Rabbi Elazar came to say: Slaughter blood always renders produce fit, even with regard to itself

[the raven itself];

it likewise does not require an intention.

It follows that these tannaim dispute whether slaughter performed for the purpose of study is sufficient for the object to contract tum’at okhlin, or whether an explicit intention to eat is required. Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disputed the status of a firstborn donkey on the basis of this dispute.

And we raise an objection to this:

From where

do we know that Rabbi Elazar’s reason for deeming it food with regard to its own impurity is that slaughter is effective even when performed for study?

Perhaps Rabbi Elazar’s reason there is that a raven is different, since it possesses

some of the

signs of ritual purity

of birds, and therefore, with regard to this matter, its status is like that of the carcass of a ritually pure bird, which does not require an intention.

The Gemara adds an explanation:

And from where do we know that signs of ritual purity are significant

[that because it possesses signs of ritual purity, although it is not pure, its status with regard to tum’at okhlin is like that of a pure creature]?

And we explain:

For

this

is what that

earlier beraita taught concerning the hyrax and the pig [as cited in the Gemara on page 10a]:

Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason

that these animals transmit tum’at okhlin even though they are impure?

Since they possess

it

them

in part

the signs of ritual purity.

And if you would say

to reject this:

If

Rabbi Elazar’s reason

is because of signs of ritual purity,

then

why specifically

“one who slaughters a raven”

in order to study

through it, which contracts tum’at okhlin?

Even

if one slaughtered it

to practice

—which is a lesser form of slaughter than slaughter for study—

also

the raven should contract tum’at okhlin, since it contracts impurity by virtue of its signs of ritual purity!?

And we answer:

Indeed, it is so:

According to Rabbi Elazar, the raven contracts tum’at okhlin even when one slaughtered it to practice.

But

nevertheless,

because of Nimos

the beraita stated the case of slaughter for study, to teach us that according to his view even slaughter for study, which is superior to merely practicing, is not effective in designating it as food capable of contracting tum’at okhlin.

Here the Gemara returns to the essence of Rabba’s statement, that Rabbi Shimon concedes that after decapitation it is prohibited:

Abaye raised an objection to him

from what we learned:

If he did not wish to redeem it, he decapitates it with a cleaver

[a long knife]

from behind it, and buries it, and it is prohibited to derive benefit from it; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon permits it.

It is explicitly stated that Rabbi Shimon permits deriving benefit from it even after decapitation, contrary to Rabba!?

And we answer:

Say

that the beraita means:

While it is alive, it is prohibited

to derive benefit from the firstborn donkey,

and Rabbi Shimon permits it;

but after decapitation, Rabbi Shimon too concedes that it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.

And we raise an objection to this:

But since the latter clause deals with while it is alive, the first clause must not deal with while it is alive,

as

the latter clause teaches:

One may not kill it

the firstborn donkey

with a reed, a sickle, an ax, or a saw

[a saw],

nor may one place it in a room and lock the door before it so that it will die

of starvation. Rather, he decapitates it with a cleaver from behind it—

And it is prohibited

for the firstborn donkey

with regard to shearing and labor; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon permits

shearing and labor, which constitute benefit while it is alive.

It is thus clear that the latter clause deals with deriving benefit from a firstborn donkey while it is alive. If so, it follows that the first clause deals with deriving benefit from the firstborn donkey after decapitation, and nevertheless Rabbi Shimon permits it. This is contrary to Rabba!?

And we answer: Not as you precisely inferred. Rather,

the first clause and the latter clause

of the beraita both deal with deriving benefit from the firstborn donkey

while it is alive,

but they dispute two different types of benefit while it is alive:

In the first clause,

they dispute

benefit from its monetary value:

if he rents it to others, the rental payments are prohibited.

But

the latter clause concerns benefit from its body,

as we learned: “And it is prohibited with regard to shearing and labor.”

And it was necessary

to state their dispute both with regard to benefit from its body and with regard to benefit from its monetary value, because

if it had taught only benefit from its monetary value,

I would have said:

In that case

alone

is it that Rabbi Shimon permits, but with regard to benefit from its body, say that he concedes to Rabbi Yehuda

that it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. Therefore, the latter clause teaches that Rabbi Shimon permits even shearing and labor, which are benefits while it is alive.

And if it had taught

their dispute

with regard to benefit from its body

alone, I would have said:

In that case

it is that

Rabbi Yehuda prohibits it, but with regard to benefit from its monetary value, say that he concedes to Rabbi Shimon

that it is permitted—

Therefore,

it was necessary

to state their dispute both with regard to benefit from its body and with regard to benefit from its monetary value.

And likewise—

as did Rabba—

Rav Naḥman said that

Rabba bar Avuha said: Rabbi Shimon concedes that after decapitation it is prohibited

to derive benefit from it.

And Rav Naḥman said,

in the name of Rabba bar Avuha:

From where do I say this

[where did I learn this]?

As it was taught:

It is written concerning the firstborn donkey: “And if you do not redeem it,

you shall decapitate it.”

Here it is stated

with regard to the firstborn donkey, the term

decapitation, and there it is stated

with regard to the calf whose neck is broken, the term

decapitation:

“And they shall decapitate the calf there in the valley.”

Just as there

with regard to the calf whose neck is broken, it is

prohibited

to derive benefit from it after decapitation,

so too here

with regard to the firstborn donkey, it is

prohibited

to derive benefit from it after decapitation. But:

Whose

beraita is this?

If you say it is Rabbi Yehuda’s,

that cannot be said, since:

even while it is alive it is certainly prohibited,

whereas the beraita prohibits it only after decapitation;

rather, is it not

necessarily

Rabbi Shimon’s?

We have thus learned that after decapitation Rabbi Shimon too concedes that it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.

Rav Sheshet said to

Rav Naḥman:

Your colleague, Rav Safra,

[your colleague, Rav Safra]

translated it

[interpreted] that beraita differently, and you cannot infer from it that Rabbi Shimon concedes that after decapitation it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. This is how he interpreted it:

It is always Rabbi Yehuda’s

beraita. And concerning your difficulty—that it is already prohibited even while alive—do not raise it, because the beraita comes to teach that it is prohibited to derive benefit from it even after decapitation.

And it was necessary

to teach us this, because

it might enter your mind

to say

that although it had already become prohibited to benefit from it, nevertheless:

Since decapitation takes the place of redemption, just as redemption permits

the firstborn donkey to benefit from,

so too decapitation permits

it to benefit from—

It teaches us

the beraita that decapitation does not remove the prohibition against deriving benefit from the firstborn donkey. Therefore, one cannot infer from here that Rabbi Shimon, who permits benefit while it is alive, prohibits it after decapitation.

Rav Naḥman said: From where do I say this

that Rabbi Shimon concedes that after decapitation a firstborn donkey is prohibited to benefit from?

From what the school of Levi taught

concerning the reason the Torah commanded that a firstborn donkey that was not redeemed with a sheep be decapitated:

He caused the koen to lose his money

by failing to redeem it;

therefore, his money shall be made to suffer loss

by his decapitating it and rendering it prohibited to benefit from.

But:

Whose

beraita is this?

If you say it is Rabbi Yehuda’s,

that cannot be said, since:

it is already suffering loss

[the firstborn donkey has already suffered loss even before he decapitates it], since it was already prohibited to benefit from while alive—

Rather, is it not

necessarily

Rabbi Shimon’s?

It is thus explicit that Rabbi Shimon concedes that after decapitation it is prohibited to derive benefit from.

The Gemara rejects the proof:

If you wish, say that it is Rabbi Yehuda’s

beraita, and certainly you cannot prove from it that Rabbi Shimon concedes that after decapitation it is prohibited to benefit from;

and if you wish, say that it is Rabbi Shimon’s

beraita, but nevertheless you cannot prove from it that Rabbi Shimon concedes that after decapitation it is prohibited.

The Gemara explains:

If you wish, say that it is Rabbi Shimon’s

beraita. However, the loss does not consist of its becoming prohibited to benefit from, since in truth the carcass is permitted to benefit from. Rather, the monetary loss is

the loss resulting from death,

the loss in value caused by decapitation: beforehand it was a donkey, and now it is a carcass.

And if you wish, say that it is Rabbi Yehuda’s

beraita. And concerning your difficulty—what loss did he cause, since it was already prohibited to benefit from while alive—I can say to you:

the loss of the difference between them,

meaning that through decapitation its owner lost the difference between the value of a donkey and the value of a sheep of any amount. Before decapitation, he could have redeemed it with a sheep of any amount, retaining the difference; now that he decapitated it, he lost everything.

And Reish Lakish likewise said—

like Rabba and like Rav Naḥman in the name of Rabba bar Avuha:

Rabbi Shimon concedes that after decapitation it is prohibited

to derive benefit from.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan, and some say Rabbi Elazar, said: It is still

—even after decapitation—

a dispute:

According to Rabbi Yehuda, it is prohibited to benefit from, whereas Rabbi Shimon permits deriving benefit from it even after decapitation.

There are those who teach this statement of Rav Naḥman

—that Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha that a firstborn donkey is prohibited to benefit from after decapitation even according to Rabbi Shimon—not as an independent statement, but

in relation to this,

in connection with the Mishna in Kiddushin 56b, where we learned:

One who betroths a woman with a firstborn donkey

that is prohibited to benefit from

has not betrothed her.

And the scholars said:

Let us say that the Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

since according to Rabbi Shimon the firstborn donkey is permitted to benefit from, so why has he not betrothed her? And concerning this

said

[interpreted]

Rav Naḥman, who said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha:

This Mishna is referring to a woman betrothed with a firstborn donkey

after decapitation, and it is the view of everyone,

since even Rabbi Shimon concedes that it is prohibited to derive benefit from.

who says that the lamb, too, must be worth at least one shekel; and if so, the woman gains nothing at all through the redemption.