Bekhorot 10a — the Talmud in English

And we challenge the reason of Rabbi Yohanan:

If so,

that because it is prohibited to derive benefit from it, it does not contract food-tumah according to Rabbi Shimon, let there be a difficulty from what we learned in a beraita:

meat with milk

which, according to Rabbi Shimon, does contract food-tumah because it had a time when it was fit. For

why particularly

because

it had a time when it was fit?

And

let it emerge for me that

meat with milk

is food that you can feed to others,

and why should it not contract food-tumah?

For

this

was taught: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: Meat with milk is prohibited for eating but permitted for deriving benefit, as it is stated

concerning meat with milk [Deuteronomy 14]: “

For you are a holy people to the Lord

your God;

you shall not cook a kid in the milk of its mother,”

and below

[Exodus 22:30]

it says: “

And you shall be holy men to Me,

and flesh torn in the field you shall not eat; you shall cast it to the dog.”

Just as there it is prohibited for eating but permitted for deriving benefit,

for the Torah said, “you shall cast it to the dog,”

so here,

concerning meat with milk,

it is prohibited for eating but permitted for deriving benefit—

and since according to Rabbi Shimon himself meat with milk is permitted for deriving benefit, it consequently contracts food-tumah, even if it did not have a time when it was fit!?

And we answer:

He states one [reason] and another [reason],

meaning, the reason taught in the beraita is an additional reason, and this is what he says:

One [reason]

[the first reason that meat with milk contracts food-tumah]

is that it is food that you can feed to others,

and it is like other food that contracts food-tumah.

And another [reason],

because

for him also

[for the Israelite himself]

it indeed had a time when it was fit.

And once the reason of the beraita has been clarified as being because of the prohibition against deriving benefit, we have learned that a firstborn donkey after its neck has been broken is prohibited for deriving benefit even according to Rabbi Shimon, for:

And if it is so that

a firstborn donkey even

after its neck has been broken Rabbi Shimon permits

for deriving benefit,

let him teach

in the beraita:

And Rabbi Shimon concedes

to the Rabbis

regarding a firstborn donkey and meat with milk—

which are mentioned in the beraita according to the view of the Sages as contracting food-tumah—

that they contract food-tumah,

since a firstborn donkey is in fact permitted for deriving benefit, and Rabbi Shimon concedes this regarding it!? Rather, certainly, after its neck has been broken it is prohibited for deriving benefit; and if so, Rabbi Shimon does not concede regarding a firstborn donkey, for food-tumah in a firstborn donkey is possible only after its neck has been broken, when it is no longer alive, and it has already become prohibited for deriving benefit even according to Rabbi Shimon.

And we reject this: Rabbi Shimon may always hold that a firstborn donkey is permitted for deriving benefit even after its neck has been broken, and

if he had designated it

to eat the firstborn donkey,

so too

according to Rabbi Shimon it contracts food-tumah, since it is permitted for deriving benefit.

However,

here,

in the beraita,

with what are we dealing? With a firstborn donkey

that

he did not designate

for eating, as is the case ordinarily; and although the Sages cause it to contract food-tumah, Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that it is not considered food and does not contract tumah, and therefore we did not teach, “And Rabbi Shimon concedes regarding a firstborn donkey.”

And we explain:

And what is the reason that the Rabbis cause

the firstborn donkey to contract food-tumah even though he did not designate it for eating, for it is not food!?

The Rabbis said before Rav Sheshet: Since its prohibition is its designation.

The prohibition by which the Torah prohibited its eating, because of an animal carcass and because of an impure animal, proves that the designation “food” applies to it, and it is fit for the food of a gentile.

And Rabbi Shimon

holds:

We do not say that its prohibition is its designation,

and according to his view a firstborn donkey does not contract food-tumah; therefore we did not teach in the beraita that he concedes regarding it that it contracts food-tumah, even though it is food that you can feed to others.

And

we challenge

the Rabbis: Do we say that its prohibition is its designation!?

But we learned

in tractate Tohorot [1:1]:

Thirteen matters were stated concerning the carcass of a kosher bird,

as to under what circumstances it has the law of food-tumah, so that if a creeping animal touched it and it touched other food, they became impure; and among them:

It requires thought

to eat it; and

it does not require preparation

with water in order to be fit to receive tumah like other food.

And now there is a difficulty:

And if

according to the Rabbis

its prohibition is its designation, why do I need

in the carcass of a kosher bird

thought,

for it is prohibited because of an animal carcass, and the prohibition makes it food even without thought, as the Sages said regarding a firstborn donkey!?

And we answer:

Whose opinion is this,

this Mishna in Tohorot?

It is Rabbi Shimon’s,

for he disagrees and holds that its prohibition is not its designation.

Come and hear

a challenge to the notion that its prohibition is its designation according to the Sages, from what we learned in tractate Uktzin 3:3:

The carcass of an impure animal everywhere

[whether in cities or in villages]—

and the carcass of a bird

even

a kosher one, and the fat

[the fat] of the carcass of an animal, even a kosher one,

in villages—

all these

require thought

to make them considered food so that they can contract food-tumah, for ordinarily they are not designated for eating,

and do not require preparation

like other food that requires preparation with water in order to receive tumah.

And now there is a difficulty:

If you say that its prohibition is its designation, why do I need thought

in all these, when all of them are prohibited because of an animal carcass, and it should be said, “its prohibition is its designation”!?

And we answer:

Whose opinion is this,

this Mishna?

It is Rabbi Shimon’s,

for he does not hold that “its prohibition is its designation.”

Come and hear

from what we further learned in the Mishna in Uktzin there:

The carcass of a kosher animal everywhere

[whether in villages or in the marketplaces of the cities],

and the carcass of a kosher bird and the fat in the marketplaces do not require thought and

also

not preparation;

and it implies:

here

the carcass of an animal

is impure and requires thought,

and there is a difficulty: its prohibition is its designation!?

And if you would say

to resolve it:

Whose opinion is this? It is Rabbi Shimon’s,

who does not hold that “its prohibition is its designation”; but this cannot be said, for:

Since the latter clause

of that Mishna in Uktzin

is Rabbi Shimon’s, the first clause is not Rabbi Shimon’s

!?

For

this

is what it teaches in the latter clause

of that Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon says: Even

the carcasses of

the camel, the hare, the hyrax, and the pig do not require either thought or preparation,

even though they are impure animals.

And Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason?

Since they possess

some

signs of purity,

for some of them chew their cud although they do not have split hooves, and some of them have split hooves although they do not chew their cud, and therefore they are considered like the carcass of a kosher animal, which does not require thought.

It is thus clear that the latter clause is Rabbi Shimon’s; and if so, it follows that the first clause is specifically not according to Rabbi Shimon, and there is a difficulty: its prohibition is its designation, and even the carcass of an impure animal should not require thought!?

Rather,

by virtue of this proof, that we do not say that its prohibition is its designation,

Rava said

to resolve the difficulty raised above: Since Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis, who disagreed regarding a firstborn donkey whether it contracts food-tumah, disagreed regarding a firstborn donkey that he did not designate for eating, if so, what is the reason of the Rabbis, who cause it to contract food-tumah, when it is not food:

Everyone

even the Rabbis,

does not say that its prohibition is its designation,

and the reason of the Rabbis is:

And if it is slaughtered by cutting its neck

[if the firstborn donkey’s neck has already been broken]

so too,

even the Rabbis would not cause it to contract food-tumah, since he did not designate it for eating—