Bekhorot 11a (יא.) — the Talmud in English

We explain the reason of

the Sages

who did not derive from there that the lamb must be worth a shekel: Because

that

verse

speaks of the means available

to the evaluator, as

it is written: The Torah says: “According to what the hand of the one who vows can afford—the one who says, ‘My valuation is upon me’—the priest shall value him.” This teaches that if his means do not suffice for the valuation prescribed by the Torah, he gives only according to what his means can afford. And the Torah adds: “And every valuation of yours shall be according to the sacred shekel,” to teach that if his means do not suffice even for one shekel, nevertheless, the priest does not value him at less than one shekel.

meaning that the Torah says: “According to whatever the means of the one who makes the vow—who said, ‘My valuation is upon me’—can afford, the priest shall value him.” This teaches that if he cannot afford the valuation fixed by the Torah, he gives only according to his means. And the Torah added: “And every valuation of yours shall be according to the sacred shekel,” to teach that if he cannot afford even one shekel, nevertheless the priest may not value him at less than one shekel.

Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Sages

: one may redeem with a lamb of any value.

And how much?

Rav Yosef said: Even a patruza

[a lean sheep]

worth a danka

[which is worth only a ma’a, one-sixth of a dinar].

Rava said: We too have learned this

: one may redeem even with a patruza worth a danka, for we learned in our Mishna that one redeems “with a lamb from the sheep …

large or small.”

And we raise an objection: Is it not

obvious

that according to the Sages one may redeem even with a patruza worth a danka? After all, they said that one may redeem with a lamb of any value!?

And we answer:

Lest you say that such an extremely cheap lamb

[a lamb so cheap that it is worth only a ma’a] is not acceptable for redemption;

alternatively

, I might have said: A

patruza

[a lean sheep]

may not

be used for redemption—

it teaches us

that according to the Sages one may redeem even with a patruza worth a danka. There was an incident involving

There was an incident involving

Rabbi Yehuda Nesia

when he

had a firstborn donkey. He sent it before Rabbi Tarfon and said to him

[Rabbi Yehuda sent him to ask Rabbi Tarfon]:

How much must I give the priest

, that is, what should be the value of the lamb with which I must redeem it and give it to the priest?

He said to him

—Rabbi Tarfon said to Rabbi Yehuda Nesia—:

The Sages have said

:

One with a generous eye

redeems

with

a lamb worth

a sela; one with a begrudging eye, with a shekel

[two dinars, half a sela];

the average one, with a ragya

[as will be explained, this means three dinars].

Rava said: The halakha

is that one redeems

with a ragya.

And we explain:

And how much

is a ragya?

Three zuz

, and it is called a “ragya” because

it is balanced here and balanced there

, that is, it is less than a sela and more than a shekel.

And we raise an objection:

There is a contradiction between one halakha and another halakha

, for Rav Naḥman said that the halakha follows the Sages, who say that one may redeem with a lamb of any value, whereas Rava said that one redeems with a ragya!?

And we answer:

This is not difficult:

Here

—where they said that the halakha is to redeem with a ragya—it is

when one comes to consult

about how much the lamb should be worth, and they tell him that it should be worth a ragya.

Here

—where it was said that one may redeem with a lamb of any value—it is

when he acts on his own

: If he does not ask us and gives of his own accord even a patruza worth a danka, we do not compel him to redeem with a more valuable lamb.

Reish Lakish said:

One who has a firstborn donkey but does not have a lamb with which to redeem it

,

may redeem it for its value

, with whatever he wishes.

And we challenge this:

According to whom

[according to whose approach did Reish Lakish say this]!?

If you say it is according to Rabbi Yehuda, he said

—Ulla explained earlier, on 9b, the reason for Rabbi Yehuda’s prohibition against deriving benefit from a firstborn donkey: “There is an item that

the Torah was particular about redeeming with a lamb

, and it is permitted.” Thus, according to Rabbi Yehuda, the Torah was particular specifically about a lamb, and not about its value.

Rather

, the statement of Reish Lakish is

in

accordance with the approach of

Rabbi Shimon

, who permits deriving benefit from a firstborn donkey, because according to him the Torah was in fact not particular that the redemption be specifically with a lamb. Therefore, one cannot infer from this that deriving benefit from a firstborn donkey is prohibited.

Rav Aḥa taught it in this manner

, explaining the statement of Reish Lakish as stated.

But

Ravina found a difficulty

with Reish Lakish according to Rav Aḥa’s interpretation, that his statement follows Rabbi Shimon, for it is established that whenever

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon

disagree,

the halakha follows Rabbi Yehuda—

Furthermore,

the anonymous tanna

of our Mishna

follows Rabbi

Yehuda

—for our Mishna requires one to set aside a lamb for the redemption of a doubtful firstborn donkey, and this applies specifically according to Rabbi Yehuda; according to Rabbi Shimon, one need not set one aside, as explained in the discussion above, on 9b—

and you say that the halakha follows Rabbi Shimon!?

Rather, you may even say

that the statement of Reish Lakish follows

Rabbi Yehuda

, and nevertheless one may redeem it for its value even with an item other than a lamb, because

the firstborn donkey should not be

more stringent

than consecrated property

, which is redeemed for its value—

And the Torah did not say

to redeem

with a lamb

in order

to impose a stringency upon it

that it may not be redeemed with any other item at all,

but to be lenient with it

, so that one may redeem it even with a lamb whose value is less than that of the donkey. But if he wishes to redeem it for its value with another item, he may redeem it.

Rav Neḥemya, son of Rav Yosef, redeemed his firstborn donkey

[with boiled herbs]

for its value.

Rabbi Shizvi said in the name of Rav Huna:

One who redeems another person’s firstborn donkey

, even without his knowledge,

his redemption is valid.

They raised a dilemma: If another person redeemed his fellow’s firstborn donkey, is

If another person redeemed his fellow’s firstborn donkey, is

its redemption

[that is, the redeemed firstborn donkey]

for the redeemer

?

Or perhaps: Its redemption is for the owners.

And we explain:

According to Rabbi Shimon, you need not raise the dilemma

[according to Rabbi Shimon there is no room for uncertainty], because

since he said

Rabbi Shimon that a firstborn donkey is

permitted for benefit,

then

it is the property of the owners.

When you raise the dilemma, it is according to Rabbi Yehuda, who says: Deriving benefit from it is prohibited;

and the sides of the dilemma are:

Does one

compare it to consecrated property, and the Merciful One

has

said

concerning consecrated property:

“And he shall give the money, and it shall be established for him”

, teaching that the consecrated property belongs to the one who redeems it; and so too, the same law should apply when one redeems another’s firstborn donkey.

Or perhaps: Since the owners acquire

the firstborn donkey

with regard to this intermediate difference

[the difference between the value of the donkey and that of the lamb of any value with which it may be redeemed], then

it is not comparable to consecrated property,

and its redemption belongs to the owners.

Rav Naḥman said:

Come and hear

that we do not compare it to consecrated property, from what was taught in a

beraita:

One who steals his fellow’s firstborn donkey

must pay double payment to the owners,

for even though

it does not belong to them

—the owners have no authority over it—

now,

since deriving benefit from it is prohibited,

it will belong to them afterward

[after redemption], and therefore it is considered as though it belongs to them now.

But

who is

the tanna of this

beraita?

If you say that

why

does the

beraita say “it does not belong to them now,” when it is permitted for benefit?

when it is permitted for benefit?

Rather, it is obvious

that this

beraita follows

Rabbi Yehuda, and if so the dilemma is resolved, for

if it enters your mind that we compare it to consecrated property,

why must he pay double payment? The Torah

“And one who steals from a person’s house

shall pay double if the thief is found,”

said

[Exodus 22:6]:

“And if the thief is found, he shall pay double” , and we learn: “But not from the house of consecrated property.”

We should therefore exempt one who steals a firstborn donkey from double payment as well. Rather, evidently we do not compare it to consecrated property, and consequently its redemption belongs to the owners.

There is nothing further.

We learned in the Mishna:

Whether one had already given birth and whether one had not yet given birth

, and they gave birth to two males, he gives one lamb to the priest; if they gave birth to a male and a female, he sets aside one lamb for himself, as it is stated…. It then entered the pen to be tithed:

The Sages taught: How did they say that it enters the pen to be tithed

, that is, concerning which lamb did they say that it enters the pen to be tithed?

You cannot say that it is one that came

—the redemption lamb—

into the possession of a priest,

and concerning it they said that the priest, or an Israelite who purchased it from him, tithes it,

for we learned: One who purchases an animal, and one who receives it as a gift, is exempt from the animal tithe

, and with regard to the priest, he is considered a purchaser.

That is, the latter clause of the Mishna is dealing with a case in which a male and a female, or something similar, were born—cases involving uncertainty, for which one sets aside one lamb for himself. Concerning those lambs, if there were ten of them, they said that the Israelite tithes them and they belong to him.

Rather, when we learned that it enters the pen to be tithed, we are dealing

with an

Israelite who had ten doubtful firstborn donkeys in his house and set aside ten lambs for them

in order to remove their prohibited status.

And he tithes

those ten lambs,

and they belong to him

—meaning that the other nine belong to him, since in a case of uncertainty we say that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. This lamb as well, which he designated for the tithe, is eaten by him as an offering whose meat is eaten by its owners.

And

this supports Rav Naḥman, for Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: In the case of an Israelite who had ten donkeys of uncertain firstborn status, he separates ten lambs on their account, tithes them, and they are his.

And

further

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha:

In the case of an Israelite who had ten definite firstborn donkeys in his house, which fell to him by inheritance

from

his mother’s father, a priest—

who was not required to give the redemption lamb to another priest, since he himself was a priest—

and that maternal grandfather, the priest,

had not had these firstborn donkeys born in his possession, in which case they would have been entirely exempt from the laws of the firstborn, but rather

the firstborn donkeys fell to him

from

his mother’s father, an Israelite,

and sanctity had already taken effect upon them while they were in his possession; even a priest who inherits them must remove their sanctity through redemption, except that he does not give the lambs to a priest—

Thus, the owner of the firstborn donkeys

separates ten lambs on their account, tithes them, and they are his,

since, once he inherited them from a priest, and the priest would have taken the lambs for himself and had no need to seek another priest, the heir likewise acts in this manner. For it is as though the priest bequeathed the lambs to him.

In the case of an Israelite who had tevel whose produce had been smoothed

[The leveling of the surface of the grain heap is called miruach; it constitutes the completion of the processing of the produce, rendering it liable for tithing]

in his house, which fell to him from the house of his mother’s father, a priest,

who was required only to separate the teruma and take it for himself, since he was a priest,

and that maternal grandfather, the priest, had the tevel fall to him

from

the house of his mother’s father, an Israelite,

the owner of the tevel tithes it

and

it is his,

just as his maternal grandfather, the priest, would have done.

And it was necessary for Rav Naḥman to teach us this both concerning redemption of the firstborn donkey and concerning the separation of terumot and tithes, that the Israelite’s law is like that of his maternal grandfather, the priest, who separates but does not give:

For if Rav Naḥman had taught us

only concerning the

first case,

namely, redemption of the firstborn donkey, where the Israelite takes the redemption lamb for himself, I might have said that this is

because it is already separated and standing,

meaning that the lamb is one species and the donkey is another, and no further act is required. Therefore, this is like a case in which lambs fell to him from the priest’s house separately and donkeys fell to him separately.

But here,

concerning teruma, we should say:

“Gifts that have not been separated are considered as though they had not been separated, and say that it is not so”;

meaning that concerning produce requiring separation, I might have said that this is not like teruma that had already been separated in the priest’s house [so that his daughter’s son would acquire it], but rather that he must give the teruma to a priest.

And if he had taught us

only

here,

concerning teruma,

“because it is possible to tithe from it itself, since it is lying here,”

it is possible to take the teruma from the produce itself that is lying before us,

but there, since one must bring a lamb from elsewhere,

[since he must bring a lamb from another place]

“it is already separated and standing”

we do not say—

therefore

it was necessary to teach both cases.