Beitzah 3b (ג:) — the Talmud in English

Ravina said: Actually, do not reverse

the positions in the Mishna of “One may not squeeze,” and in fact Rabbi Yehuda permits liquid that flowed from fruits designated for eating, because it is food that has separated (ukhla de-ifrat); and according to his view, the egg that was laid is permitted even on the first day.

And

what

Rabbi Yehuda

said—“An egg laid on the first day may be eaten on the second”—

he said this according to the view of the Rabbis

and was telling them as follows:

According to my view, the egg is permitted even on the first day

as well, and just as it is permitted to drink liquids that flowed from fruits designated for eating, since

the

liquid that flowed from such a fruit, and likewise an egg that was laid, is

food that has separated!

But according to you,

according to your view, that you maintain that it is a liquid and not food that has separated, and likewise that the egg is not considered food that has separated but is prohibited under the decree concerning liquids that flowed ,

at least concede to me that on the

second

day

of Rosh HaShana

it is permitted,

because

the two days have two separate sanctities,

and if yesterday was sacred, today is an ordinary weekday and there is no prohibition; while if today is sacred, the egg was laid yesterday, on an ordinary weekday, and was not prohibited.

And the Rabbis said to him: No,

not as you say, that the two days of Rosh HaShana have two separate sanctities; rather, the sanctity of the two days

is one sanctity,

and since liquids that flowed are prohibited on Yom Tov, on Rosh HaShana the egg laid on the first day remains prohibited until the conclusion of the second day, since the two days are regarded as one day.

The Gemara presents another resolution of the contradiction between Rabbi Yehuda’s statements:

Ravina, son of Rav Ulla, said: Here,

in the Mishna concerning an egg laid on the first day of Rosh HaShana, the case is

a chicken designated for laying eggs, and Rabbi Yehuda

who prohibited the egg on the first day did so

in accordance with his own view;

he follows his position

that he holds of muktze,

and therefore the egg that was laid is likewise muktze. It must be prohibited by virtue of the law of muktze, and not because of the decree concerning liquids that flowed.

The Gemara raises an objection—against the amoraim who maintain that the prohibition of an egg laid on Yom Tov is due to the decree concerning fallen fruit or liquids that flowed—from what we learned in a beraita:

against the amoraim who hold that an egg laid on a Festival is prohibited because of the decree concerning fruit that fell from a tree or liquids that flowed, from what we learned in a beraita,

For it was taught:

Both an egg laid on Shabbat and an egg laid on Yom Tov—

a.

may not be moved,

not

in order

to cover a vessel with it, nor to support with it the legs of a bed

that is wobbling, by placing the egg beneath one of its legs.

b.

But one may place a vessel over it

to protect it

so that it will not break.

This teaches us that it is permitted to take a movable vessel even for the sake of something that may not itself be moved.

c.

And the uncertainty

concerning this egg

is prohibited.

d.

And if it became mixed

the prohibited egg even

with a thousand

permitted eggs, it is not nullified by the majority; rather,

all of them are prohibited .

The Gemara discusses this beraita based on the assumption that the uncertainty mentioned in it is whether the egg was laid on Yom Tov or on an ordinary weekday:

Granted, according to Rabba, who said

that an egg laid on Yom Tov is prohibited by Torah law

because of

the lack of

preparation

from the weekdays for Shabbat or Yom Tov, it is well that an egg of uncertain status is prohibited, since according to Rabba this egg

is

an

uncertainty concerning a Torah prohibition, and every uncertainty concerning a Torah prohibition

is treated

stringently .

But according to Rav Yosef and Rabbi Yitzḥak, who said

that the prohibition of this egg is only

because of a decree,

the difficulty is: after all,

it is a rabbinic uncertainty, and every rabbinic uncertainty

is treated

leniently!

And we answer:

The final clause

of the beraita, which deals with an uncertainty, does not concern a prohibition arising from Yom Tov; rather,

we have arrived at the uncertainty concerning a tereifa,

that there was uncertainty whether this egg was laid by a tereifa chicken , and this is a Torah uncertainty, so it is treated stringently and the egg is prohibited.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

that the latter clause now turns to dealing with the uncertainty whether the egg is from a tereifa and is no longer discussing the uncertainty of prohibition due to Yom Tov, raise the following objection, for

come and hear the latter clause

of the beraita:

If it became mixed

the egg

with one thousand—

all of them are prohibited.

Granted, if you say

that the beraita is still dealing, as at its beginning, with an egg whose prohibition is due to the

uncertainty that it was laid on

Yom Tov,

uncertainly or was laid on

a weekday,

uncertainly—

the reason is understandable

why it is not nullified even in a thousand, since

it is

the egg

“an item that will become permitted,” for it will be permitted for consumption after Yom Tov without needing the permission provided by nullification in a majority.

The Sages imposed stringency and prohibited

every

item that will become permitted—

and it is not nullified even in a thousand.

Since one can eat it later under an entirely valid permission, the Sages imposed a stringency that one may not eat it now in a prohibited manner through nullification in a majority, even though by Torah law it would be permitted to eat it because it was nullified in the majority .

But if you say

that the beraita is now dealing with an egg that is

possibly from a tereifa—

then it is

an item that does not

have a future permission, and

if so,

it should be nullified in the majority,

like all prohibitions of the Torah! Why, then, does the beraita state that all of them are prohibited?

And if you will say

to answer that

an egg

is

“significant” and is not nullified, according to the law of a “significant item,” concerning which the Sages instituted that it is not nullified in a majority .

as is the law regarding a “significant item,” concerning which the Sages enacted that it is not nullified in a majority —

But this answer does not accord with everyone!

For we find that Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish disputed the meaning of Rabbi Meir’s statement in tractate Orla, that a significant item [which is not nullified in a majority] is one that “is customarily counted,” meaning that it is sold by number and not by estimation.

According to Rabbi Yohanan, only an item that all people are particular to sell by number is a significant item. According to Resh Lakish, however, it is sufficient that some people are particular to sell it by number for it to be considered a “significant item.”

Therefore, the Gemara raises the following question:

This works well according to the one who says, “All

items

that are customarily counted, we learned,”

in the Mishna in tractate Orla, according to Rabbi Meir, are significant items.

That is, any item concerning which there are people who, because of its significance, are particular to sell it not by estimation but only by “counting”—counting each individual unit separately—is a “significant item” that is not nullified in a majority [by rabbinic law], even though there are people who sell it by estimation. Therefore, an egg from a tereifa is not nullified in a majority, since there are people who consider eggs significant and sell them specifically by number rather than by estimation.

But according to the one who says

that only

“the

item

that is customarily counted, we learned,”

meaning that only an item that is not nullified in a majority because of its significance is included—namely, only a distinctive item that all people customarily count is called a significant item [that is, “the item distinctive for this, which no one sells by estimation,” as Rashi explains], but not an item that some people sell by estimation—

what is there to say

how can we answer, according to his view, the question of why an egg from a tereifa is not nullified in a majority!?

After all, eggs are also sold by estimation and are not considered significant items. Why, then, should they not be nullified in a majority!?

The Gemara now explains where Rabbi Meir’s statement concerning the definition of a significant item is found, and where the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish concerning his view is found:

As we learned

in tractate Orla [3:6–7]:

One who had bundles of fenugreek

[a type of legume used to sweeten a cooked dish; Rashi]

from prohibited mixtures of a vineyard—

they shall be burned.

Their status is that they must be burned, as is the law with prohibited mixtures of a vineyard.

And if

they became mixed

these bundles

with

other permitted bundles,

and

even if some of the

other

bundles that had become mixed [with which the bundles of prohibited mixtures had become mixed]

with

other permitted bundles

again became mixed—

all of them shall be burned; these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

As the Mishna will explain his words immediately.

And the Sages say: They shall rise,

meaning they are nullified in a majority, and the prohibited bundles of fenugreek become permitted,

in

a ratio of

one

prohibited part to

two hundred

permitted parts, as is the law concerning prohibited mixtures of a vineyard, which are nullified in one to two hundred .

The Mishna explains that Rabbi Meir prohibits all of them because

Rabbi Meir used to say: “The item that is customarily counted”—

any item whose significance derives from the practice of selling it by number and not by estimation—

sanctifies,”

meaning that it prohibits its mixture if it is prohibited mixtures of a vineyard or Orla and requires the entire mixture to be burned, in accordance with the wording of the verse concerning prohibited mixtures of a vineyard: “Lest the yield be sanctified”; and we expound: it shall be consumed by fire.

But

if

the Sages say:

Even an item that is customarily counted

is not

significant enough to

sanctify,

meaning it is not excluded from nullification in a majority and does not prohibit the entire mixture or require it to be burned because of its significance,

but

only

six items

that are especially significant

alone .

Rashi explained that all produce in the world is nullified in a majority except for these six items listed here, which are extremely significant. Meiri explained that these items include many species, and the species mentioned here is the most significant among them. The same law applies to any item of which there are many species: the most significant species among them is not nullified. Thus, Rabbi Akiva and the Sages did not dispute at all. Maimonides [( Forbidden Foods 16:9)] wrote that any item considered significant by the people of its place and time prohibits a mixture according to its significance in that place and at that time. These items were mentioned only because they prohibit a mixture in any amount everywhere, and the same applies to anything similar. Kesef Mishne wondered: If so, what did Rabbi Akiva add? The Sages also agree with regard to loaves if they are significant. Moreover, why did the Sages mention six items, all of which belong to the category of produce, rather than suffice with a single example? He explained that since Rabbi Meir spoke about produce of the land and the Sages disputed him, they mentioned six items, since only these are not nullified, while everything else is nullified, even householders’ loaves [concerning which Rabbi Akiva disputed them and held that they are as significant as the six items]. Only these are significant everywhere; in truth, however, anything as significant as they are is not nullified, as is anything that is not produce of the land but is significant everywhere and at all times. They mentioned only produce of the land because their dispute with Rabbi Meir concerned such produce. See the Prisha [( Yoreh De'a 110, subsection 2)], who wrote that the stringency of an item sold by number applies only to a prohibition that is permanent. But for a time-bound prohibition, such as the prohibition of muktzeh, there is no stringency of an item sold by number. With this he explained why the Tur [there] wrote that an egg laid on Yom Tov is prohibited, whether whole or beaten, because it is an item that will become permitted. Seemingly, a whole egg should be prohibited because it is an item sold by number [see the Taz and the Biur HaGra, who explained that this reason applies only to a beaten egg, and this is also the position adopted in the glosses of the Ashri here]. Therefore, he wrote that an egg does not have the stringency of an item sold by number, because its prohibition is not permanent. See Pri Megadim there, who agreed with him. But Rabbi Akiva Eiger disputed him in the margin of Pri Megadim [and in his responsa], and see further below [10b, in note 1 to Tosafot, s.v. ikka].

Rabbi Akiva says: There are

seven

particularly significant

items.

And these are

the six significant items:

Perekh nuts

[a place-name],

and Badan pomegranates

[a place-name],

and jars

of wine when they are

sealed, and bundles of

[stalks of]

beet greens, and cabbage stalks

[in the Land of Israel, cabbage was extremely large],

and Ionian squash.

Rabbi Akiva adds

a seventh item:

also loaves

of bread

belonging to a householder,

which are not those of a baker but are made in a special manner and are significant because of their distinctiveness.

The Mishna adds the following explanation:

Any item

fit

among these seven items

to

be

Orla,

that is, an item that grows on a tree, such as nuts, pomegranates, and wine—is considered to prohibit the entire mixture with the prohibition of

Orla.

And any item

fit to

be

prohibited mixtures of a vineyard, such as vegetables, beet-green stalks, cabbage stalks, and Ionian squash—prohibits the entire mixture because of

prohibited mixtures of a vineyard.

And it was stated

and the following statement was made

concerning this Mishna, in explanation of the words of Rabbi Meir:

Rabbi Yohanan said: “The item that is customarily counted”

we learned

in Rabbi Meir’s statement. That is, only an item that no one sells by estimation, but everyone sells by number because of its significance, is called a significant item that is not nullified in a majority.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: “All items that are customarily counted, we learned,”

meaning that it is sufficient that some people sell it by number because of its significance. Even though not everyone considers it significant in this manner, it is significant according to Rabbi Meir and is not nullified in a majority .

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: “Every item that is customarily counted is what we learned,”

meaning that it is sufficient for some people to sell it by number because of its significance, even though not everyone regards it this way, for it to be significant according to Rabbi Meir and not be nullified in a majority .

And now the Gemara explains the objection:

This works well according to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish,

as it can be explained that the beraita prohibiting an egg that is possibly from a tereifa follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and according to him, an egg from a tereifa is not nullified in a majority, since there are people who consider it important and sell it not by estimation but by number.

But according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who holds that an item is considered important only when no person sells it by estimation but rather by number, whereas there are people who sell an egg by estimation—

what can be said?

How can we explain according to him the ruling that an egg from a tereifa is not nullified even in a thousand? After all, according to him, even in the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the egg is not considered important!

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said: This tanna

who prohibits an egg from a tereifa even when it becomes mixed with a thousand is not Rabbi Meir; rather, it is

the tanna

of the beraita

of “Litra of Dried Figs.”

This

tanna

said: Anything that

some people sell

by number—

it is considered important, and

even in

a rabbinic

prohibition

it

is not nullified

in a majority,

and all the more so in

a prohibition

by Torah law,

such as an egg from a tereifa.

Any prohibited item [including teruma, which is forbidden to non-kohanim] that became mixed with a majority of permitted items is nullified in the majority by Torah law, and it is permitted to eat the entire mixture.

Included within the category of a “mixture” are all items whose status is uncertain, whether they are from the permitted items or from the prohibited ones. But items that we know with certainty are permitted are not included in the “mixture,” and they do not combine to create a majority of permitted items that would nullify the prohibition mixed with them.

There are items with regard to which the Sages were stringent, so that they are not nullified in an ordinary majority, such as teruma, which is not nullified in an ordinary majority. The entire mixture is permitted to non-ko hanim only if the mixture contains a ratio of one part teruma to one hundred parts non-sacred produce.

On the other hand, with regard to rabbinic teruma, the Sages disputed whether permitted items may be combined to create the ratio of one to one hundred, and whether they were lenient enough to include in the mixture even items that we know with certainty are permitted, provided that they have some connection to the mixture.

As it was taught: A litra [

a certain measure] of

ketziot

dried figs, which were sanctified with the sanctity of teruma, and whose sanctity is only rabbinic, since by Torah law teruma applies only to dagan, tirosh, and yitzhar [grain, wine, and oil]],

that was pressed [

that is, it was customary to compress the dried figs and attach them into large masses by pressing them in designated utensils, such as an “igul,” a round utensil into which the ketziot were compressed until a solid mass was formed in the shape of an “igul,” or by compressing them in a barrel or a vat]: If the litra of ketziot sanctified with the sanctity of teruma was pressed:

on top of a circular mold,

on the upper part of the round utensil, rather than being compressed inside it, while non-sacred ketziot were inside it, and there were many other circular molds containing non-sacred ketziot, and the circular mold at whose mouth the litra of teruma ketziot was located became mixed among them,

and he does not know

the person who pressed the litra of teruma ketziot

in which circular mold he pressed it

the litra of teruma.

Or he pressed the litra of teruma ketziot

on top of a barrel, and he does not know in which barrel he pressed it.

Or he pressed it

on top of a vat, and he does not know in which vat he pressed it.

And there are not one hundred mouths of utensils containing non-sacred ketziot, so that we could say that the mouth of the circular mold containing teruma is nullified among one hundred mouths of non-sacred circular molds.

Rabbi Meir says:

This is how Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disputed this matter: