Beitzah 3a — the Talmud in English

Is it not on account of

the decree: lest he climb up and detach

attached fruits and violate the Torah prohibition of harvesting.

And since

it itself

, the decree concerning fallen fruits itself, is a

decree

of the Sages, and is not a matter of the fundamental law—

and

shall

we come and decree a decree upon a decree

, that we should decree concerning eggs born on a Festival on account of the decree concerning fallen fruits?!

Rav Yosef said to Abaye:

It is all one decree!

That is, the Sages did not initially establish the enactment concerning fallen fruits and afterward establish that an egg born on a Festival should also be forbidden, so that people would not err concerning the enactment of fallen fruits. Rather, from the outset the Sages established that every fallen fruit, including an egg in which there is no prohibition of detaching, is forbidden to eat on a Festival.

And such an enactment is one decree, and is not considered a decree upon a decree, even though some of the components of the decree are only intended to reinforce the decree.

The fourth opinion:

Rabbi Yitzḥak said:

The Sages forbade an egg born on a Festival

as a decree on account of “juices that flowed out.”

For the Sages decreed [in Tractate Shabbat [143b]] not to drink on Shabbat juices that flowed on their own from fruits on Shabbat or on a Festival, lest one come to squeeze them.

And Abaye understood that, so that people would not come to compare juices that flowed out to eggs that are born, which likewise emerge from a place in which they had been enclosed, and permit themselves to drink juices that flowed out, the Sages therefore also forbade eggs born on Shabbat and on a Festival.

Abaye said to him:

Behold,

what is the reason for juices that flowed out

that they are forbidden? Is it not because of

the decree lest one squeeze

the fruits?

And since

it

, the decree concerning juices that flowed out,

itself is a decree, and

since

shall we come and decree a decree upon a decree?

Rav Yitzḥak said to him: They did not decree concerning juices that flowed out and then return and decree concerning an egg that was born, but rather

it is all—

one decree.

They decreed concerning all juices that flowed out, and included an egg born within it as well, since it too resembles juices that flowed out.

The Gemara now explains why each of the four amoraim did not accept the reason of his three colleagues.

It is straightforward for us to understand that

all of them

, Rabba, Rav Yitzḥak, and Rav Yosef—

according to Rav Naḥman

, who established the prohibition as being because of muktzeh,

did not say

because of

our question

, that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel should have disagreed concerning both the hen and its egg, so that we would establish their dispute both concerning muktzeh and concerning nolad. And likewise it is straightforward for us to understand why

according to Rabba

, who established the prohibition as being from the Torah and because of the absence of preparation from a weekday—

the others also did not say

all this, since the prohibition of the absence of

preparation, they do not hold.

Rather,

this is difficult for us:

1.

Rav Yosef,

who established the prohibition as a decree on account of fallen fruits—

what is the reason that he did not state [the explanation] of Rabbi Yitzḥak

, that the decree is because of juices that flowed out? And we answer:

he will say to you

Rav Yosef:

An egg

is

food-like, and fruits

are

food-like,

and therefore they are included in one decree concerning fallen fruits [and one should decree concerning eggs on account of fallen fruits, so that people will come to compare them to eggs that were born].

To exclude liquids, which are not food-like

they are. Therefore the eggs cannot be included in the decree concerning juices that flowed out. 2.

And Rabbi Yitzḥak,

who explained the prohibition of an egg as being because of the decree concerning juices that flowed out—

what is the reason that he did not state [the explanation] of Rav Yosef

, that the decree is because of fallen fruits?

And we answer:

he will say to you

Rabbi Yitzḥak:

An egg

is

enclosed

inside the hen and it “flows out” to the outside,

and

likewise

enclosed juices

are inside fruits. Therefore it is possible to include the egg within the decree concerning juices that flowed out.

To exclude fruits—

which are exposed and remain

, which exist and are exposed on the tree as they are exposed after they are detached; therefore it is impossible to include eggs in the decree concerning fallen fruits.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan as well held

that the prohibition of eating an egg born on a Festival is because of

the decree on account of juices that flowed out.

And the proof is:

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised

a contradiction from the

w

ords of

Rabbi Yehuda against the

words of

Rabbi Yehuda, and resolved it

, as follows. On the one hand,

we learned: One may not squeeze fruits

on Shabbat

to extract juices from them.

And if they emerged

the juices

on their own—

they are forbidden

to drink them on Shabbat, as a decree lest one squeeze them by hand.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If

the fruits were designated

for foods

, to eat them as they are, there is no concern lest one come to squeeze them; therefore the juice

that emerges from them

on its own on Shabbat is

permitted

to drink on Shabbat.

And if

the fruits were designated

for

squeezing them for drinking

juices—the juice

the liquid

that emerges from them

on its own is

forbidden

to drink on Shabbat, as a decree lest one come to squeeze them.

It follows

that from Rabbi Yehuda’s statement, “If [they were designated] for foods—the juice that emerges from them is permitted,” it is implied that in

all

fruits designated for

foods

, the law of the juices that emerge from them,

according to Rabbi Yehuda

, is the law of

food separated from food.

For the juice is considered food that was separated from mere food, and not juice that flowed out from food; therefore they did not decree concerning it because of juices that flowed out.

And he raised an objection

, and Rabbi Yoḥanan challenged this from Rabbi Yehuda’s words in the Mishna in Tractate Eruvin [39a]:

For we learned: The two Festival days of Rosh HaShana, according to the Sages, are like one long day, and the sanctity of the two days is definite sanctity [by rabbinic law], whereas according to Rabbi Yehuda they are two separate days, each of them having doubtful sanctity, because there is a possibility that it is an ordinary day.

The practical difference is that according to Rabbi Yehuda a person may establish two different eruvei teḥumin, one for each day, whereas according to the Rabbis it is possible to establish only one eruv for the two days.

And furthermore

several laws

Rabbi Yehuda said,

as a consequence of his view that the two days of Rosh HaShana are two separate days. A. It is forbidden to separate teruma on a Festival from untithed produce. But if it happened that on the first Festival day of Rosh HaShana a person had untithed produce, he may rectify it conditionally and eat it on the second day. This is what he does:

He stipulates

, a person

separates

terumot and tithes conditionally

for a basket

, a basket

of fruits

untithed,

on the first Festival day

, by designating a place for the teruma and tithe produce and applying their sanctity to them on the condition that the day is an ordinary day. And if not—that the day is sacred—he declares that his words have no validity.

Then he may stipulate again on the second day and say: If today is an ordinary day, I am now separating the terumot and tithes. And if not, that today is sacred, then yesterday was an ordinary day, and the separation that I performed yesterday has taken effect.

And

it can

be eaten

for the consumption of the fruits that were prepared on the holiday

second

of Rosh Hashanah.

b.

And likewise, an egg that was born on the

holiday

first

of Rosh Hashanah, since it is doubtful sacred, doubtful weekday,

may be eaten on the

holiday

second

in either event: if it is sacred, then the egg was prepared yesterday, on a weekday. And if it is weekday, then there is no prohibition whatsoever against eating, on a weekday, an egg that was born on a holiday.

And Rabbi Yohanan proves

on

holiday

second

of Rosh Hashanah:

Indeed,

only on it is it permitted to eat the egg that was born on the first holiday, but the egg that was born

on

holiday

first

is not

permitted to be eaten on the first holiday itself! And it is proved that the egg, despite its being food, is included in the general decree concerning liquids that flowed out, and therefore it is prohibited on the first day.

But the egg emerges from the hen, and both are foodstuffs, and it should have been considered okhla de-ifrat, according to the words of Rabbi Yehuda, and it should have been permitted!

And he answered,

and

Rabbi Yohanan

resolves this contradiction in the words of Rabbi Yehuda:

Reversed

is

the position.

For the position of those who maintain, in the Mishna “One may not squeeze the fruits,” must be reversed: Rabbi Yehuda prohibits liquids that flowed out for foodstuffs, and the Sages permit.

And the Gemara derives precisely from the words of Rabbi Yohanan:

And from the fact that he cast them against one another,

and from the fact that Rabbi Yohanan raised the contradiction between Rabbi Yehuda’s words in the two Mishnayot,

against one another

learn from it

that the two Mishnayot

have one reason,

and the egg, too, is prohibited because of the decree concerning liquids that flowed out.