Beitzah 2b (ב:) — the Talmud in English

But

with regard to

muktzeh

on a Festival, where the anonymous tanna

in an anonymous Mishna

is Rabbi Yehuda

who forbids an item that a person consciously set aside, even if it is fit for use.

As we learned [below 31a]:

there is no chopping of wood

One may not chop wood

for kindling on a Festival

from beams

that were prepared for construction, as they are muktzeh because of financial loss [and are forbidden even according to Rabbi Shimon],

nor from a beam

of a house

that broke on the Festival,

despite the fact that it is now fit to be used as firewood, since the person had consciously set it aside the previous day, as it was not then designated for kindling “and since it was set aside during twilight, it was set aside for the entire day.”

The prohibition of muktzeh with regard to a beam from a house that broke applies only according to Rabbi Yehuda. According to Rabbi Shimon, the person’s conscious setting aside does not take effect, since a person does not completely set aside a beam in his mind: if the beam broke on the Festival, it was certainly already weak on the previous day, and he was therefore “sitting and anticipating” the possibility that he might use this beam as firewood. Consequently, according to Rabbi Shimon, the designation of muktzeh does not take effect with regard to it .

Since with regard to a Festival we find that the anonymous tanna stated in the Mishna that “we hold that there is muktzeh”—that is, there is a law of muktzeh based on a person’s conscious designation even with regard to an item fit for use—the same applies to an item fit for eating, such as a chicken on a Festival, when a person consciously sets it aside for producing eggs rather than for eating.

Therefore

he establishes it

Rav Naḥman

as

the words of

Beit Hillel, in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

who forbid an egg laid on a Festival because of muktzeh.

And Rav Naḥman establishes our Mishna as referring to a chicken that is muktzeh because it is designated for producing eggs, and the egg laid by the muktzeh chicken is likewise forbidden because of muktzeh, just like the chicken that laid it.

For according to Rav Naḥman, on a Festival the halakha follows Rabbi Yehuda with regard to such muktzeh!

And Rabbi Shimon also agrees with the basic law of muktzeh on a Festival; he disputes only with regard to this type of muktzeh, which a person consciously sets aside without setting it aside absolutely.

And we inquire

Granted,

it is so;

who is the one who states an anonymous Mishna,

who is the tanna who stated the Mishnayot anonymously, and when the teachings of one of the tannaim appeared correct to him, did not mention his name, so that it would appear as though many had said this and the halakha would be decided in accordance with him?

Rabbi

is that tanna, as he is the tanna who arranged all the Mishnayot!

If so, one must examine Rabbi’s reasoning: why did he distinguish between the laws of muktzeh on Shabbat and on a Festival, despite the fact that the prohibition of muktzeh fundamentally applies to both?

What is different with regard to Shabbat, where Rabbi stated anonymously

Rabbi

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, and what is different with regard to a Festival, where Rabbi stated anonymously

Rabbi

in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda?

They say

to resolve the difficulty:

Shabbat, which is stringent,

as its punishment is stoning,

and people will not come to treat it lightly,

so that they will not come to introduce further leniencies into it if they are lenient with regard to the laws of muktzeh [by ruling in accordance with Rabbi Shimon]; therefore

he stated anonymously

Rabbi

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, who is lenient.

But

a Festival, which is lenient,

as it involves only a prohibition of a positive and a negative commandment ,

and people may come to treat it lightly,

so that they will introduce further leniencies into it if we are lenient with regard to the laws of muktzeh [when we rule in accordance with Rabbi Shimon]; therefore

he stated anonymously

Rabbi

in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who is stringent .

.

Now the Gemara discusses Rav Naḥman’s establishment of our Mishna as referring to an egg laid by a muktzeh chicken, the chicken having been designated for producing eggs, and the egg being muktzeh by virtue of its mother chicken having been set aside.

And the Gemara challenges this:

How have you established it,

in what manner did Rav Naḥman establish our Mishna? —

As referring to a chicken designated for producing eggs, and because of muktzeh.

If so, instead of their disputing,

instead of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputing

with regard to the egg,

let them dispute with regard to the chicken

itself, whether it is permitted to eat it when it has been set aside for producing eggs.

And we answer: The reason we established the dispute as referring to the egg was in order

to demonstrate the strength of Beit Shammai, that

even

with regard to “nolad” it is permitted,

as Beit Shammai permitted it, despite the possibility that it should be more forbidden than muktzeh, since it had not been known at all, as explained on the previous amud. If they had disputed only with regard to a chicken that is muktzeh, we would not know that Beit Shammai also permit an egg laid on a Festival, even though it is “nolad.”

And we challenge this: Why should the Mishna’s law preferably be established as referring to an egg, in order to teach that Beit Shammai permit even nolad?

Let them dispute

rather, they should establish their dispute with regard to a

chicken,

in order

to demonstrate the strength of Beit Hillel, that

even

with regard to muktzeh

alone, which is not “nolad,”

they forbid it!?

And if you would say that the power of the lenient ruling is preferable

to teach us, since one who permits “relies on his tradition and is not afraid to permit” [Rashi’s wording, meaning that he is confident in his ruling], whereas one who is stringent can be stringent even when he is not entirely certain of his position , and therefore the tanna preferred to state their dispute with regard to an egg, to teach us that Beit Shammai permit even nolad.

And let them dispute both,

and let us say:

A chicken designated for producing eggs, it,

the chicken,

and its egg —

Beit Shammai say: It may be eaten,

the chicken and its egg,

and Beit Hillel say: It may not be eaten,

neither the chicken nor its egg. And we do not resolve the difficulty, and this is difficult for Rav Naḥman! Since the challenge to Rav Naḥman’s explanation remains unanswered, the Gemara presents another explanation:

The second opinion:

Rather, Rabba said: Actually,

our Mishna is discussing

a chicken designated for eating,

which itself is not muktzeh,

and we are dealing with a Festival that occurs immediately after Shabbat.

And because of

the prohibition of

“preparation”

from an ordinary weekday, Beit Hillel said that the egg may not be eaten, as this is a Torah prohibition, and not because of the prohibition of muktzeh, which is a rabbinic prohibition.

And Rabba holds: Every egg that is laid today,

every egg that was laid now, on a Festival that falls on Sunday,

was completed yesterday,

on Shabbat,

it was completed,

the egg was completed and became prepared in the hen’s womb at that time.

According to Rabba, anything that was not prepared for Shabbat or a Festival from an ordinary weekday, but was prepared on the Shabbat preceding a Festival, or was prepared on the Festival preceding Shabbat, is forbidden to eat, since the Torah said that all food for Shabbat and Festivals must be prepared and made ready while it is still daytime, specifically on ordinary weekdays .

And Rabba follows his own reasoning,

that there is a prohibition against eating something that is “lacking preparation” on weekdays, even when its preparation is at the hands of Heaven.

As Rabba said: What

is

this

[Exodus 16:5]

that is written: “On the sixth day,

they shall prepare what they bring”?

If this is meant to teach that one should bake and cook on Friday for the Shabbat meals, we have already learned this from another verse.

For the verse says [in verse 23]: “A holy Shabbat to the Lord is tomorrow. What you bake—you shall bake [today, on Friday, and not tomorrow, on Shabbat]. And whatever you cook—you shall cook [today, on Friday].”

Rather, the verse “they shall prepare” comes to teach you even concerning preparation that takes place at the hands of Heaven: it is permitted only if it was already prepared on a weekday for Shabbat. For the Torah regarded the Shabbat meal as significant and required that it be prepared and designated from the weekday.

Therefore, only a

weekday prepares for Shabbat, and

only a

weekday prepares for Yom Tov.

Yom Tov does not prepare for Shabbat, and Shabbat does not prepare for Yom Tov.

Therefore, any food on Shabbat or Yom Tov that was not prepared on the preceding weekday is muktzeh, even if it was prepared on the preceding Shabbat. Consequently, the egg that was laid on the Yom Tov immediately following Shabbat was prohibited.

Abaye said to

Rabba:

If so—

according to you, that the prohibition is because the preparation of the egg was completed yesterday, on Shabbat—

an ordinary Yom Tov,

which falls on one of the weekdays that is not adjacent to Shabbat, and on which an egg is laid,

should be permitted,

the egg being permitted to eat, since its preparation was completed yesterday, on a weekday!?

Rabba said to him: Indeed, by Torah law it is permitted, but the Sages prohibited it,

as a decree because of a Yom Tov

that

follows Shabbat.

Abaye said to Rabba: If so,

an ordinary Shabbat

that is not preceded by Yom Tov, on which an egg is laid—

it should be permitted,

the egg being permitted to eat raw, without cooking, since its preparation was completed on Friday! -

For according to your words, the prohibition is only on account of preparation, and the egg is not muktzeh because it was laid by a hen [which is muktzeh on Shabbat], since the prohibition against slaughter applies only to the hen and is not necessary as preparation for the egg that emerges from it; there is no need to violate the prohibition against slaughter in order to permit the egg!?

Rabba said to him: The Sages also prohibited eating an egg laid on an ordinary Shabbat,

as a decree because of Shabbat following Yom Tov.

And Abaye challenged him:

Do we issue a decree

that is, did they decree against an egg that was prepared on a weekday and laid on Shabbat, out of concern that people might come to violate the prohibition of lacking preparation, by eating an egg that was prepared on a Yom Tov occurring on the eve of Shabbat?

But it was taught in a beraita: One who slaughters a hen

on Yom Tov

and finds fully formed eggs inside it—

they are

permitted to eat on Yom Tov.

This implies that the beraita is speaking even of a Yom Tov that follows Shabbat, and even if the eggs were completed on Shabbat, they are not prohibited because of lacking preparation. For as long as they are in their mother’s womb, they are part of its body, and the hen itself was “prepared” from the preceding day, during the daytime [and the absence of the act of slaughter is not considered a deficiency in its preparation].

And if it is so,

that they decreed against an egg laid on a Yom Tov that follows a weekday, out of concern that people might come to permit an egg laid on a Yom Tov that follows Shabbat,

let them also decree

against eggs found inside a hen, which are permitted according to the basic law, even when it was slaughtered on a Yom Tov that follows Shabbat, since as long as they have not been laid they are like one of its limbs, but if the decree is issued out of concern that people will eat another egg that is prohibited, here too let them decree

because of those

eggs

that are laid on their respective days,

those laid today, which are prohibited because of lacking preparation.

He said to him,

Rabba:

Fully formed eggs inside their mother—

this is an uncommon matter,

and with regard to

an uncommon matter—

the Sages did not issue a decree.

But Yom Tov following Shabbat, or Shabbat following Yom Tov, are common occurrences. Therefore, they decreed against an egg laid on Yom Tov or Shabbat that followed a weekday, because of an egg laid on Yom Tov or Shabbat for which there had been no preparation.

The third opinion:

Rav Yosef said:

The prohibition against eating an egg laid on Yom Tov always concerns a hen designated for eating, and the egg is prohibited neither because of muktzeh, nor because it is nolad, nor because of lacking preparation on a weekday.

Rather, the prohibition is due to

a decree because of “fruit that falls,”

the fruit that falls from a tree on Shabbat and Yom Tov, which is prohibited to eat, for the reason that will be explained. The Sages also issued a decree concerning an egg laid on Yom Tov, because it too resembles fruit that falls, and they prohibited it in the same manner.

Abaye understood that Rav Yosef had said that they decreed against an egg lest one come to eat fruit that falls. Therefore

Abaye said to him:

But

fruit that falls

on Yom Tov—

what is the reason

that it is prohibited to eat?