Beitzah 2a (ב.) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

Our Mishna deals with three matters concerning a Festival, regarding which Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree, with Beit Shammai being lenient and Beit Hillel stringent.

Therefore, all three are taught together here, since in most disputes between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, Beit Hillel are lenient and Beit Shammai stringent.

a.

An egg that was laid on a Festival —

Beit Shammai say: It may be eaten

on that same Festival day, and the Sages did not decree any prohibition concerning it.

And Beit Hillel say: It may not be eaten

on that day, but only on the following day.

Several different explanations were given in the Gemara as to the subject of their dispute: whether it concerns the prohibition of muktzeh, the prohibition of nolad, the law of preparation for Shabbat and Festivals, or other decrees.

b.

Beit Shammai say: Leaven

on Passover [which is dough placed inside flour and which, after fermenting within the flour, becomes hard dough called “leaven,” with which dough is made to ferment]—the measure of its prohibition is

an olive-bulk, while

whereas

unfermented dough

has a prohibited measure of

the size of a dried fig,

which is a date.

And Beit Hillel say: Both this and that,

the unfermented dough and the leaven, have a measure of

an olive-bulk .

c.

One who slaughters a wild animal or a bird [

for there is a mitzva to cover their blood]

on a Festival,

when the earth is muktzeh, and it is also prohibited to perform labor on a Festival in order to fulfill the mitzva of covering the blood—what should he do?

Beit Shammai say: He should dig with a spade and cover

the blood, as their reasoning will be explained in the Gemara.

And Beit Hillel say: He may not slaughter

a wild animal or a bird on a Festival,

unless he has

loose [soft

prepared

earth

from the day before]],

so that he can cover the blood with it.

And they concede

Beit Hillel to Beit Shammai,

that if

he did not prepare earth but nevertheless

slaughtered—

he should dig with a spade and cover.

The Gemara explains that this means that the spade had been stuck in loose earth from the day before; although the earth was not prepared for use, no decree was issued in this case, because the mitzva of covering the blood had already presented itself to him .

The meaning of the following passage will be explained in the Gemara:

The ash of a stove—

is prepared,

and is not prohibited either on account of muktzeh or because it was not prepared.

Gemara:

The Gemara assumed that the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel concerns whether the egg is prohibited on account of muktzeh.

There are two possible reasons for considering an egg muktzeh: either because it was not designated for eating from the day before, since it was inside a hen intended for laying eggs and not for eating; or because the egg itself did not yet exist from the day before and is prohibited on account of nolad.

And we raised a question:

With regard to what,

which type of hen’s egg

are we dealing,

does the tanna in our Mishna discuss?

If you say it concerns

an egg of a

hen designated for eating,

meaning that the hen is intended for slaughter, [even if he leaves it so that it will grow fatter in the meantime, since it remains intended for eating whenever he wishes], then the hen is not muktzeh on a Festival.

If so,

what is the reason of Beit Hillel

who prohibit the egg?

After all, the egg that emerges from the hen is

“food that has separated”,

it is!

For the change in the egg’s present state, when it is outside the hen’s body, is merely like “food that separated from food”; the egg is not now considered a new entity that can be defined as “nolad.”

After all, the egg had already been completed inside its mother from the day before, and if the person had wished, he could have slaughtered the hen and eaten it together with the egg inside it. Thus, the egg’s emergence from the hen does not create a new reality that would make it prohibited under the law of nolad.

Likewise, the egg is not muktzeh on account of the hen that laid it, because the hen itself is not muktzeh on a Festival, since it is intended for eating .

Rather,

it must be that the case is

a hen designated to lay eggs,

which is not intended for eating and is itself muktzeh, because it was designated for laying eggs. Therefore, the egg laid by it is also prohibited, like the hen, under the prohibition of muktzeh.

If so, this is difficult:

What is the reason of Beit Shammai,

who permit it to be eaten? After all, the egg

is muktzeh,

like the hen that laid it!

The Gemara challenges the questioner:

But what difficulty

do you have with the words of Beit Shammai?

Perhaps Beit Shammai do not hold of “muktzeh”!

After all, this hen is intrinsically fit for eating; it is not muktzeh in itself, but only because of the purpose for which the person designated it, namely laying eggs. Perhaps Beit Shammai follow Rabbi Shimon, who does not recognize muktzeh when an object is fit for eating and use, merely because of a person’s intention, since a person’s designation is not absolute. Since his designation is ineffective and the hen itself is permitted and fit for eating, why should the egg not be considered “food that has separated,” which involves neither muktzeh nor nolad?

The Gemara explains that the questioner raised this objection because

it entered our minds

that

even one who permits muktzeh,

namely Rabbi Shimon, who does not recognize muktzeh with regard to something fit for eating [see the introduction], and the hen itself is not muktzeh, permits this only because a person does not completely remove it from his mind. Here, however, it is different:

the

egg is

“nolad” [

of such a nature], and

he prohibited it.

Thus, even according to Beit Shammai, if their position is to permit muktzeh like Rabbi Shimon, it remains difficult for them, since the egg should be prohibited as nolad .

And this is because the egg that was laid now had not been known to him beforehand, and he had not had it in mind. Since this hen is not designated for eating, he had not considered slaughtering it and eating the egg inside it as well, the egg, of which he had no prior knowledge, is considered a new entity that has “come into being” only now and was not prepared beforehand. It is therefore prohibited by the decree concerning nolad, and is not considered merely “food separated from food” .

Therefore the questioner asked:

What is the reason for Beit Shammai’s position

in permitting the egg laid on a Festival to be eaten?

The Gemara presents the opinions of four amoraim in explaining the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel:

The first opinion:

Rabbi Nahman said:

He explains:

Actually,

our Mishna is speaking

of a hen designated for producing eggs,

and it itself is muktze.

And

the answer to the question of why Beit Shammai permitted the egg to be eaten is that Beit Shammai follow Rabbi Shimon, and according to him the egg should not be prohibited.

For only Rabbi Yehuda

maintains

the prohibition of

muktze

even with regard to something that is not inherently muktze, such as food, but that a person sets aside in his mind and thereby prohibits

he also maintains

the prohibition of muktze with regard to something that is

“nolad.”

But

Rabbi Shimon,

who does not maintain

the prohibition of

muktze

with regard to something intrinsically fit for use, which a person does not prohibit even if he sets it aside in his mind,

does not maintain

the prohibition of

“nolad”

with regard to something that already existed in the world, even if he had not known of it, since it had not been absolutely set aside .

The Gemara explains the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel according to Rabbi Nahman:

Beit Shammai

maintain

like Rabbi Shimon:

He does not recognize the prohibition of muktze or nolad with regard to something that can be designated for eating or use. Therefore, an egg laid on a Festival may be eaten.

And Beit Hillel

maintain

like Rabbi Yehuda:

He recognizes muktze even with regard to something that can be designated for eating or use, and therefore they prohibit the egg under the law of “nolad.”

The Gemara challenges this:

But

does

Rabbi Nahman really say this,

that Beit Hillel are stringent with regard to muktze and nolad, like Rabbi Yehuda?

But did we not learn

in a Mishna in tractate Shabbat [143a] the opposite—that Beit Hillel are lenient in this matter?

For this is what we learned there:

Beit Shammai say: One may lift

on Shabbat

from the table

by hand

the bones and

the

peels

that are not fit for eating, and we are not concerned about the prohibition of muktze with regard to them .

And Beit Hillel say:

They may not be lifted by hand, because they are muktze, as they are currently unfit for eating or for any use.

Rather,

one removes the tray,

the surface of the table or the tablecloth,

in its entirety,

because the tray is not muktze, since it has the status of a utensil ,

and shakes it

of the bones and shells.

And

concerning this

Rabbi Nahman said: We do not have

this version of the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel.

Rather,

we teach it in the opposite manner: Beit Shammai are stringent and Beit Hillel are lenient, as follows:

Beit Shammai

prohibit lifting them by hand because of the prohibition of muktze,

like Rabbi Yehuda.

And Beit Hillel

permit it,

like Rabbi Shimon,

who does not recognize muktze.

If so, Rabbi Nahman contradicts himself. Here he identified Beit Hillel with Rabbi Yehuda, whereas in tractate Shabbat he identified Beit Hillel with Rabbi Shimon.

The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Nahman could say to you:

There is a distinction in the laws of muktze and nolad between Shabbat and a Festival. On Shabbat, Beit Hillel are lenient, like Rabbi Shimon; on a Festival, they are stringent, like Rabbi Yehuda .

The source for this distinction is that we find in two anonymous Mishnayot a distinction between Shabbat and a Festival with regard to muktze and nolad.

Since the halakha follows an anonymous Mishna, and the halakha also follows Beit Hillel, it is necessarily the case that Beit Hillel’s position must be distinguished between Shabbat and a Festival, so that their words accord with the anonymous ruling of the two Mishnayot, in which we find a distinction between Shabbat and a Festival. Therefore:

With regard to

muktze on

Shabbat, where the tanna stated anonymously

in an anonymous Mishna

the position of Rabbi Shimon,

as in the Mishna that

we learned

in tractate Shabbat [156b]:

A.

One may cut

on Shabbat

the pumpkins

that have been detached [they are not muktze, although cutting them is laborious], so that they will be prepared

for the animal

to eat; this is not prohibited as unnecessary exertion on Shabbat .

B.

And

likewise, one may cut

the animal carcass

that died on Shabbat

for the dogs,

so that they can eat it. The carcass is not prohibited as muktze, as something “not prepared,” even though while alive the animal had not been “prepared” on the eve of Shabbat for the dogs’ consumption; it had been designated for human consumption.

This law follows only Rabbi Shimon, according to whom the lack of “preparation for dogs’ consumption” does not prohibit the object as muktze. Rabbi Shimon does not recognize muktze with regard to something intrinsically fit for dogs to eat, and it is only because of the person’s intention that it is designated for human consumption rather than for dogs.

Since the halakha follows an anonymous Mishna,

he establishes it

Rabbi Nahman

as

the position of

Beit Hillel

in the Mishna concerning lifting bones and shells—that it is speaking with regard to muktze on Shabbat

like Rabbi Shimon,

and he reads the Mishna as stating that Beit Hillel permitted lifting them by hand, whereas Beit Shammai prohibited it.