Beitzah 2a — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

Our Mishna deals with three matters of the festival, concerning which Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed, with Beit Shammai being lenient and Beit Hillel stringent.

Therefore all three were taught here together, since in most of the disputes between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, Beit Hillel are lenient and Beit Shammai stringent.

1.

An egg that was laid on a festival —

Beit Shammai say: It may be eaten

on that festival, and the Sages did not decree any prohibition concerning it.

And Beit Hillel say: It may not be eaten

on that day, but only on the next day.

Several different explanations were stated in the Gemara concerning the matter of their disagreement: whether it is the prohibition of muktzeh, or the prohibition of nolad, or the law of preparation for Shabbat and a festival, or other decrees.

2.

Beit Shammai say: Leaven

on Passover [which is dough that was hidden within flour, and after it leavened within the flour it becomes hard dough, called “leaven,” with which dough is made to leaven] — the measure of its prohibition is

an olive-bulk, and

whereas

unleavened bread

the measure of whose prohibition is

the bulk of a date,

which is a date.

And Beit Hillel say: This and that,

the unleavened bread and the leaven, their measure is

an olive-bulk.

3.

One who slaughters a wild animal or a bird [

for which there is a mitzva to cover its blood]

on a festival,

when the earth is muktzeh, and it is also forbidden to perform labor on a festival in order to fulfill the mitzva of covering the blood — what shall he do?

Beit Shammai say: He shall dig with a shovel and cover

the blood, as their reason will be explained in the Gemara.

And Beit Hillel say: He shall not slaughter

a wild animal or a bird on a festival,

unless he had soft earth

soft

prepared

for use

from before the day,

with which he can cover the blood.

And they agree

Beit Hillel with Beit Shammai

that if

he did not prepare earth, but nevertheless

slaughtered —

that he shall dig with a shovel and cover.

And it is explained in the Gemara that this means that the shovel had been stuck in soft earth from before the day, and although the earth was not prepared for use, they did not decree, because the mitzva of covering the blood had already come before him.

The meaning of the following passage will be explained in the Gemara:

The ashes of a stove —

they are prepared,

and are not forbidden either because of muktzeh or because they are unprepared.

Gemara:

The Gemara assumed that the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel is whether the egg is forbidden because of muktzeh.

There are two possible reasons for considering the egg muktzeh: either because it was not designated for eating from before the day, since it was in the belly of a hen designated for producing eggs and not for eating; or because the egg itself did not exist from before the day and is forbidden because of nolad.

And we raise the problem:

With what

egg of a hen

are we dealing,

with which the tanna deals in our Mishna?

If you say with

an egg of a

hen designated for eating,

where the hen is designated for slaughter [even if he leaves it so that it will grow fat in the meantime, since it is designated for eating whenever he wishes], then the hen is certainly not muktzeh on a festival.

And if so,

what is the reason of Beit Hillel

who prohibit the egg?

For the egg that emerges from the hen is

“food that has separated,”

it is!

For the change in the state in which the egg is now, outside the body of the hen, is nothing more than like “food that separated from food,” and the egg is not now considered a new thing that we could define as “nolad.”

For the egg was already completed in the belly of its mother from before the day, and had the person wished, he could have slaughtered the hen and eaten it together with the egg inside it. It follows that the egg’s emergence from the hen does not constitute a new reality such that it should be prohibited by the law of “nolad.”

Likewise, the egg is not muktzeh by virtue of the hen that laid it, because the hen itself is not muktzeh on a festival, since it is designated for eating.

Rather,

necessarily, the case is

of a hen designated to produce eggs,

which is not designated for eating, and it itself is muktzeh, because it was set aside to produce eggs; therefore, the egg laid by it is likewise forbidden, with the prohibition of muktzeh.

And if so, this is difficult:

What is the reason of Beit Shammai

who permit it to be eaten? For the egg is

muktzeh,

like the hen that lays it!

The Gemara is astonished at the questioner:

And what difficulty

do you have concerning the words of Beit Shammai?

Perhaps Beit Shammai do not hold of “muktzeh”!

For this hen is fit in itself for eating, and is not muktzeh in itself, but only because of the designation with which the person designates it for laying eggs. Perhaps Beit Shammai hold like Rabbi Shimon, that there is no law of muktzeh concerning something fit for eating and use merely because of a person’s thought, since the person’s setting aside is not absolute; and since his setting it aside is ineffective, and the hen itself is permitted and fit for eating, why should the egg not be considered “food that has separated,” in which there is no prohibition of muktzeh or nolad?

And the Gemara explains that the questioner asked this because

it entered our minds

that

even one who permits muktzeh

—namely, Rabbi Shimon, who does not hold of muktzeh concerning something fit for eating [see the introduction], and the hen itself is not muktzeh—all this is only because he does not completely remove his mind from it; but here it is different:

with

an egg, which is

“nolad” [

of such a kind],

he prohibited it.

And likewise according to Beit Shammai, even if their view is to permit muktzeh like Rabbi Shimon, it would nevertheless be difficult for them that the egg should be forbidden because of nolad.

And this is because the egg that was born now had not been known to him beforehand, and his mind had not been upon it. And since this hen is not designated for eating, and he had not thought to slaughter it and eat also the egg inside it, the egg, of which he had no knowledge, is therefore considered a new thing that was “born” only now and had not been prepared beforehand; and it is forbidden by the decree of nolad, and is not considered merely “food separated from food” .

And therefore the questioner asked:

What is the reason of Beit Shammai

who permit eating the egg that was born on a Festival?

And the Gemara brings the position of four amoraim in explaining the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel:

The first position:

said

Rabbi Nahman, as an answer:

in every case

our Mishna is speaking

of a hen designated for producing eggs,

which itself is muktze.

And

the answer to the question of why Beit Shammai permitted the egg for eating is that Beit Shammai hold like Rabbi Shimon, and according to him the egg is not to be forbidden.

For only Rabbi Judah

holds

the prohibition of

muktze

even with something that in itself is not muktze, such as food, but the person sets it aside in his mind and forbids it—

he holds

also the prohibition of muktze with something that is

“nolad.”

And

if Rabbi Shimon,

who does not hold

the prohibition of

muktze

with something fit in itself, and a person does not forbid it even if he sets it aside in his mind—

does not hold

also the prohibition of

“nolad,”

with something that was in the world, even though he did not know of it, since it had not been set aside absolutely .

And the Gemara explains the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel according to Rabbi Nahman:

Beit Shammai

hold

like Rabbi Shimon,

who does not hold of the prohibition of muktze or nolad with something that can be designated for eating or use; therefore, the egg born on a Festival is permitted for eating.

And Beit Hillel

hold

like Rabbi Judah,

who holds of muktze even with something that can be designated for eating or use, and therefore they forbid the egg under the law of “nolad.”

And we challenge this:

But

is it so that

Rabbi Nahman said this,

that Beit Hillel are stringent concerning muktze and nolad like Rabbi Judah?

But did we not learn

in the Mishna in tractate Shabbat [143a] the opposite—that Beit Hillel are lenient in this matter!

For this is what we learned there:

Beit Shammai say: One may lift

on Shabbat

from upon the table

with his hands

the bones and

the

shells

that are not fit for eating, and we are not concerned with the prohibition of muktze in their case .

And Beit Hillel say:

It is impossible to lift them with one’s hands, because they are muktze, as they are not presently fit for eating or for any use.

Rather,

he removes the tray,

the surface upon the table or the tablecloth,

entirely,

because the tray is not muktze, since it has the status of a vessel ,

and shakes it

free of the bones and shells.

And

concerning this

Rabbi Nahman said: We—we do not have this,

we do not teach the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel in this manner.

Rather,

we teach it in the opposite manner: Beit Shammai are stringent and Beit Hillel are lenient, and this is how we teach it:

Beit Shammai

forbid lifting them by hand because of the prohibition of muktze,

like Rabbi Judah.

And Beit Hillel

permit it,

like Rabbi Shimon,

who does not hold of muktze.

And if so, Rabbi Nahman contradicts himself: here he established Beit Hillel as following Rabbi Judah, whereas in tractate Shabbat he established Beit Hillel as following Rabbi Shimon.

And we answer:

Rabbi Nahman could say to you:

One must distinguish in the laws of muktze and nolad between Shabbat and a Festival. For whereas on Shabbat Beit Hillel hold that one should be lenient, like Rabbi Shimon, on a Festival they are stringent, like the view of Rabbi Judah .

And the source for this distinction is what we find in two “anonymous Mishnayot,” which distinguish between Shabbat and a Festival concerning muktze and nolad.

And since the halakha is according to an anonymous Mishna, and the halakha is also according to Beit Hillel, it is necessarily the case that one must distinguish in the words of Beit Hillel between Shabbat and a Festival, so that the words of Beit Hillel conform to the words of the “anonymous Mishna” of the two Mishnayot, in which we find a distinction between Shabbat and a Festival. Therefore:

Regarding

muktze on

Shabbat, where the anonymous tan[nay] taught

his view in an anonymous Mishna

like Rabbi Shimon,

in this matter,

as we learned

in tractate Shabbat [156b]:

a.

One may cut

on Shabbat

the pumpkins

that have been detached [which are not muktze, but cutting them involves exertion], so that they will be ready

before the animal

for eating, and this is not forbidden as exertion without need on Shabbat .

b.

And

likewise one may cut

the animal carcass

that died on Shabbat

before the dogs,

so that they can eat it; and the carcass is not forbidden as muktze, as something that “is not prepared,” although during its life the animal was not “prepared” from the eve of Shabbat for the dogs’ eating, but was designated for human consumption.

And this law is only according to Rabbi Shimon, for according to him, the lack of “preparedness for dogs’ eating” does not forbid the object as muktze. For Rabbi Shimon “does not hold of muktze” with something that in itself is fit for dogs’ eating, and only because of the person’s thought it is designated for human eating and not for dogs’ eating.

And since the halakha follows an anonymous Mishna, therefore

he establishes it

Rabbi Nahman establishes

the

words of

Beit Hillel

in the Mishna dealing with lifting bones and shells as referring to muktze on Shabbat—

like Rabbi Shimon,

and he teaches that Beit Hillel permitted lifting them by hand, while Beit Shammai forbade it.