Beitzah 4a (ד.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Eliezer

says:

Even though the dried figs found inside the containers are not subject to doubt—for it is certainly known to us that the teruma is found only at the opening of the container and not inside it—and anything that is not included in the doubt cannot join the measure of the mixture that nullifies the prohibition through a majority, here the Sages were lenient because the teruma of figs is only rabbinic.

But do we not

“regard” the

figs

at the top as though they were separated

from the opening of the container? That is, the figs found at the opening of the container are not considered a separate entity; rather, they are regarded as mixed together with all the figs in the container. And if we join all the figs in all the containers, there will be a majority of one hundred against the litra of teruma figs at the opening of the container.

And

therefore, the figs

at the bottom [which according to the fundamental law were not included in the doubt] join the figs at the top, which are subject to doubt, at the openings of the round containers and barrels, to create a majority of one hundred against the litra of teruma; and thereby they

dried figs—which according to the basic law were not part of the doubt—are added to the doubtful upper dried figs at the openings of the round stacks and barrels, to create a majority of one hundred against the pound of teruma; thereby they

render permissible

by the law of nullification through a majority

the

figs

at the top,

which by themselves do not contain a majority of one hundred?

Rabbi Yehoshua says:

The Sages were not lenient with regard to such a joining.

Rather, only

if there are

at least

one hundred openings

of the one containing teruma,

they render it permissible.

And if not—

all

the openings are prohibited.

And

only

the bottoms,

all the figs found beneath the opening of the container, are

permitted,

for they are certainly permitted.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree in the manner stated by Rabbi Meir. Rather, this is how they disagreed:

Rabbi Eliezer says: If there are one hundred openings, they render it permissible, and if not—

the openings are prohibited, and the bottoms are permitted.

Rabbi Yehoshua says: Even if there are three hundred openings

of non-sacred produce—

they do not render it permissible!

Since the figs at the opening of the round container are an important entity, one that is sold by number and not by estimation, they are not nullified, even though the teruma of figs is only rabbinic.

And Rabbi Yehuda concludes: But if one

pressed

the litra of teruma

into a round container, and he does not know into which round container he

pressed it—

everyone agrees that they render it permissible.

As the Gemara will explain immediately.

And we raise a difficulty concerning Rabbi Yehuda’s statement at the end of the beraita:

But if he pressed it into a round container,

everyone

says that they render it permissible? Is that not

the very subject of their dispute, since according to Rabbi Yehoshua a round container is an important entity that is not nullified?

for according to Rabbi Yehoshua, a round stack is an important item that is not nullified!

Rav Pappa said: This is what

Rabbi Yehuda

is saying: If he pressed it into a round container, and he does not know in which place

of the

round container he pressed it—whether in its northern part or in its southern part—

everyone agrees that they render it permissible.

For from this point onward, the litra is not located in a specific place where it is sold as an item sold by number. Rather, it is an unknown part of the entire round container. Therefore, although the round container itself is sold by number, the litra mixed into it does not independently possess the status of an item sold by number, and therefore, according to everyone, it is nullified.

According to Rabbi Yohanan, it is possible to establish what we learned in the beraita—that an egg that is possibly a tereifa is not nullified by a majority—as referring to Rabbi Yehoshua according to Rabbi Yehuda: Anything that some people customarily sell by number is an important entity and is not nullified by a majority, even when the prohibition is rabbinic, as in the case of a litra of figs that is teruma only by rabbinic law.

Rav Ashi said

to offer a different resolution to the Gemara’s earlier difficulty concerning the beraita, which states that an egg of uncertain status is prohibited—for according to those who say that an egg laid on a Festival is prohibited only by rabbinic decree, due to fallen fruit or liquids that flowed, if so, in a case of doubt one should rule leniently: -

Actually,

the latter clause of the beraita does not deal with an egg that is possibly a tereifa; rather, it continues to discuss the law of an egg laid on a Festival. The doubt concerning the egg in the beraita is:

it is uncertain whether the egg was laid on

the egg was laid on a

the Festival, or it is uncertain whether it was laid on

it was laid on an ordinary

a weekday. Nevertheless, it is prohibited, despite the fact that it is a case of uncertain rabbinic prohibition, because

this egg

this egg is

an item

“an item that has a permitted time,”

since it can be eaten lawfully after the Festival, without resorting to the principle that “in a case of uncertain rabbinic prohibition, one rules leniently.”

And every

uncertain prohibition that is

an item that has a permitted time—

even in the case of

a rabbinic

prohibition it is not nullified!

Just as we are stringent concerning a mixture, so that mixing does not suffice to nullify and permit an item that has a permitted time, so too we are stringent concerning its uncertain status, and even when it is only a rabbinic uncertainty, one does not rule leniently.

A. Tzelach explained this according to Tosafot in Hullin [99b], who wrote that with regard to rabbinic prohibitions everyone agrees that one species mixed with the same species is nullified. Therefore, Rav Ashi said that if we find that even in the case of a rabbinic prohibition, where Ran’s reasoning does not apply, an item that has a permitted time is nevertheless not nullified, it necessarily follows that we are stringent with regard to it also for the reason that rather than eat it in prohibition, one should eat it in a permitted manner. Consequently, we should also be stringent concerning an uncertain rabbinic prohibition when the item has a permitted time. B. Zekher Yitzhak [46:3] wrote that since the statement “one species mixed with the same species is not nullified” was said only with regard to liquid mixed with liquid, whereas dry matter mixed with dry matter is nullified [Tosafot, Yevamot 82, Zevahim 73a, and elsewhere], Ran’s reasoning does not apply to an egg that became mixed with other eggs. It must therefore be prohibited according to Rashi’s reasoning, which prohibits even in a case of doubt. Ran’s reasoning applies only to the nullification of liquid mixed with liquid, where Rashi’s reasoning does not apply, since the prohibition becomes mixed in and transformed into permitted matter [and therefore, when it becomes mixed with a different species, it is nullified because it loses its identity]; it is not nullified only because it is considered one species with the same species. Simhat Yom Tov wrote similarly. C. Responsa Penei Aryeh [1:3] and Shalmei Nedarim [52a] wrote that Ran concedes to Rashi’s reasoning. However, Ran found it difficult that every nullification immediately transforms the prohibited matter into permitted matter. Therefore, he formulated his reasoning that with regard to nullification it is considered one species with the same species, whereas in a case of uncertain prohibition he prohibits it based on Rashi’s reasoning. D. Rashash explained in this passage that even according to Rashi, the prohibition of an item that has a permitted time is due to Ran’s reasoning that one species mixed with the same species is not nullified. However, it is seemingly difficult: Every portion of the mixture should be permitted because it is uncertain whether it is the prohibited part, and in the case of an uncertain rabbinic prohibition one rules leniently. Regarding this, Rashi explained that even an uncertain status is prohibited when the item has a permitted time, and therefore his reasoning is necessary: Rather than eat it in prohibition, one should eat it in a permitted manner. As above. [See below, on page 4b, note 8, Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s words on this matter.] E. Kovetz Shiurim wrote that Ran did not disagree with Rashi concerning the reason for the prohibition, but rather concerning its legal category. That is, both agree that by Torah law it is nullified by a majority, and that the Sages prohibited it because of Rashi’s reasoning—that rather than eat it in prohibition, one should eat it in a permitted manner. However, every rabbinic prohibition must be compared to the laws of the Torah: An uncertain rabbinic prohibition was likened to an uncertain Torah prohibition, whereas with regard to an item that has a permitted time, Ran explained that the Sages likened it to one species mixed with the same species, which is not nullified. F. Avnei Ezer [Keriat Shema 1:9] wrote that Ran concedes that the reason for being stringent is Rashi’s reasoning—that rather than eat it in prohibition, and so on. However, he holds that one is stringent only when the prohibition remains present. In a mixture of one species with another, the prohibition is nullified, and there is no reason to be stringent on that account. But according to the Sages, who held that even one species mixed with the same species is nullified, nevertheless, in the case of an item that has a permitted time they were stringent and treated the prohibition as though it remained present; consequently, one is stringent because rather than eat it in prohibition, one should eat it in a permitted manner. In a case of doubt, where there is no nullification, it is obvious that one is stringent for this reason. This is similar to the reasoning of Penei Aryeh. See further in the responsa of Rabbi Akiva Eiger [189] and in Ahiezer [part 2, 12:5]. And in Ha'amek She'elah of the Netziv [47] it was explained that the questioner and Rav Ashi disagreed concerning Rashi’s and Ran’s rationales. The questioner followed Ran and therefore understood that one should be stringent only with regard to nullification, but not with regard to doubt. Rav Ashi came and said that one should be stringent even in a case of doubt, because of the reasoning that rather than eat it in prohibition, one should eat it in a permitted manner. This is difficult, since Rashi had already stated this reasoning in the words of the questioner. According to the explanations of Zekher Yitzhak, Rashash, and Kovetz Shiurim, there is no practical difference between Rashi and Ran concerning an egg of a tereifa laid on a Festival that became mixed with other eggs, unlike Tzemah Tzedek [cited above, 3b, note 8]. All his words are understandable only according to the explanations of Tzelach, Penei Aryeh, and Avnei Ezer. Therefore, an egg concerning which it is uncertain whether it was laid on a Festival or on Shabbat is prohibited, even according to the amoraim who say that its prohibition is only due to a rabbinic decree.

And the Gemara cites a beraita, in which we learned that Rabbi Eliezer too, although he was among the students of Beit Shammai, taught the law of an egg laid on a Festival in accordance with their view.

It was taught in a beraita: Others say in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: An egg

laid on a Festival

may be eaten, both it and its mother.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this:

What are we dealing with?

If you say

it is a hen designated for eating—

it is obvious

that even according to Beit Hillel, both it and its mother may be eaten,

as

indeed

both it and its mother are permitted.

And if Rabbi Eliezer intended to say that he follows Beit Shammai, he should have taught his statement with regard to the egg alone, and not with regard to its mother, since no one disputes that a hen designated for eating is permitted.

Rather,

the beraita must necessarily be dealing with

a hen designated for laying eggs.

And raise an objection: Does Rabbi Eliezer not hold of muktze [below 34a]?

If so,

it and its mother should be prohibited!

Rabbi Zeira said:

This is what Rabbi Eliezer said: An egg that was laid on a Festival—

may be eaten

only together with the egg-laying hen,

because of its mother.

We investigate this matter:

What are the circumstances?

Abaye said: It is a case where one purchased

a hen

without specification,

without designating it at the time of purchase either for eating or for raising egg-laying hens. Therefore:

If it

was slaughtered

on the Festival—

it is thereby established that it was intended for eating,

and its egg may also be eaten.

But if it

was not slaughtered—

it is thereby established that it was intended for laying eggs,

and it is muktze, and its egg has the same status. [

According to the amoraim who say that the prohibition of the egg is due to a rabbinic decree, and that Beit Hillel prohibit even an egg laid by a hen designated for eating, it is evident that Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Beit Shammai. But according to Rav Naḥman, Beit Hillel prohibit the egg on a Festival because of muktze, while permitting one from a hen designated for eating.]

And concerning this Rabbi Eliezer said that the egg and its mother may be eaten. His intention is that when one slaughters the mother in order to eat it, it becomes clear that from the beginning of the Festival it had been designated for that purpose, and both it and its egg are permitted.

Rav Mari said

a different explanation: In fact, the case concerns a hen designated for eating. And the fact that Rabbi Eliezer taught that its mother may also be eaten is an expression of

exaggeration.

In order to reinforce his position, he stated that everything may be eaten—both the mother and its egg—and he intended thereby to disagree with Beit Hillel.

The proof that he used an expression of exaggeration is from the following:

As it was taught: Aḥerim say in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: An egg

that was laid on a Festival

may be eaten, it and its mother, and

the

chick and its shell may likewise be eaten.

We investigate this matter:

What

is meant by the statement, “It may eat

its shell”?

If you say that it means an actual shell—

surely

is a shell fit to be eaten?!

Rather,

the meaning must be that the

chick may be eaten while it is still

inside

its shell,

before it has been born and emerged from the egg. But this is impossible, because

the only point on which they disagree

[below 6b] is whether

the Sages disagree with Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov,

who prohibits eating a chick that has been born as long as its eyes have not opened, while the Sages permit it immediately;

rather, it is specifically when it has emerged

from the egg

into the air of the world; but when it has not emerged into the air of the world—

they do not disagree,

but agree that it is prohibited to eat it!

Rather,

Rav Mari explains that when Rabbi Eliezer said

“a chick and its shell”—

he used an expression of

exaggeration,

adding superfluous words, as though the shell itself were permitted to be eaten, even though it is unfit for eating. He said this emphatically to convey that there is no prohibition whatsoever against eating an egg laid on a Festival—to the extent that even a chick in its shell would have been permitted [were it not subject to the prohibition of a creeping creature].

If so,

here too,

in the beraita, when Rabbi Eliezer said, regarding a hen designated for eating, that

“it and its mother may be eaten”—

he used an unnecessary expression of

exaggeration

with regard to permitting the mother.

It was stated: Shabbat and the Festival

that are adjacent to one another.

Rav said:

An egg that

was laid on this day—

is prohibited on that day.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

An egg that

was laid on this day—

is permitted on that day.

We investigate this matter:

Shall we say that Rav holds

that Shabbat and the Festival

are one sanctity

of extended duration,

they

and therefore the prohibition of an egg laid on one of the two days continues on the second day?

But if they were considered two sanctities, Rav should not prohibit the egg on the second day, since Beit Hillel prohibited the egg only on the day on which it was laid, and not on the following day.

But

it cannot be that this is Rav’s view.

For

Rav said: The halakha follows the Four Elders

[whom Rav mentions there], who said that it is possible to establish two different eruvei teḥumin for Shabbat and for an adjacent Festival—one eruv for Shabbat and a separate eruv for the Festival—since they are considered two sanctities.

But

this is because those Four Elders follow

the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says:

Shabbat and the Festival

are two

separate

sanctities!

Rather, here—

Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree concerning “Rabba’s preparation.”

The question is whether one should follow Rabba’s view above [2b], that an item lacking preparation from a weekday for Shabbat or a Festival has a deficiency.

Rav accepts Rabba’s preparation,

and since the egg was not prepared on a weekday but only on a sacred day, it is prohibited to eat even on the second day.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan—

does not accept Rabba’s preparation,

and therefore permitted the egg on the second day, even though it had not been prepared on a weekday.

This dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan is

like the

dispute between

tannaim.

As it was taught: An egg that

was laid on Shabbat—

may be eaten

the following day,

on the Festival,

and an egg that was laid

on the Festival—

may be eaten on the following Shabbat, since the egg is prohibited only on the day on which it was laid and need not be prepared from a weekday. This is due to the decree concerning liquids that flowed from fruit. But

Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi

Eliezer: Still,

even such an egg—one laid on a Festival and eaten on the following Shabbat—

is

itself

a subject of

dispute

between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel in our Mishna, where they disputed the status of an egg laid on a Festival following Shabbat, whose formation was completed on a sacred day:

For Beit Shammai say: It may be eaten.

And Beit Hillel say: It may not be eaten,

and this dispute also applies to an egg laid on a Festival followed by Shabbat, since the egg’s preparation on the Festival prohibits eating it on the following Shabbat.

The host

of

Rav Adda bar Ahava had these eggs

that had been laid

on the Festival

that occurred

before

the

Shabbat,

and he wished to eat them on the following Shabbat.

The host came

The innkeeper

before him,

before Rav Adda bar Ahava on the Festival, and

said to him: May I roast them today

—is it permitted for me to roast them now, on the Festival—

and eat them tomorrow,

in order to eat them on Shabbat?

His question was whether the entire prohibition applied only to eating them, or whether it was prohibited even to move them.

He said to him,

Rav Adda bar Ahava:

What is your position,

what do you think? That is, your question proves that you are certain that tomorrow it will be permitted to eat them, and you came only to ask about moving them today, because regarding the dispute between

Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan—

the halakha follows Rabbi Yoḥanan.

And indeed you are correct in this, that the halakha follows Rabbi Yoḥanan, who did not prohibit the egg because of the lack of preparation; it is permitted to eat them tomorrow, on Shabbat.

But concerning your question whether you may move them today and roast them in order to eat them tomorrow, the answer is: No!

For

even Rabbi Yoḥanan permits only

merely

to swallow it tomorrow,

on Shabbat, while it is a raw egg,

but

to move it and roast it

on its day,

on the Festival on which it was laid—

he did not

permit.

And

the proof that an egg laid on Yom Tov is also forbidden to be moved is from the fact that

it was taught:

Whether an egg laid on Shabbat or an egg laid on Yom Tov—

one may not move it, neither to cover a vessel with it nor to support the legs of a bed with it.

The host

of Rav Pappa,

and some say, that man—

another ordinary person—

who came before Rav Pappa, had these eggs

that had been laid

on Shabbat

and wanted to eat them

on Yom Tov.

He came before

Rav Pappa.

He said to him: What is the ruling regarding eating them

these eggs that had been laid on Shabbat

tomorrow

on Yom Tov?

He said to him: Go now and come tomorrow.

Go now, and come tomorrow.

Rav Pappa did not answer him immediately because he had drunk wine, and one who is intoxicated with wine is forbidden to issue a ruling.

Rav Pappa explained to him that he was refraining from issuing a ruling that day, in accordance with Rav’s practice.

For Rav would not have an amora stand before him

Rav would not have an amora stand before him to proclaim his discourse aloud

from

the time he ate his meal on

Yom Tov

and drank wine with it, until

the

day of

his fellow,

that is, until the next day,

because of intoxication.

Rav would refrain from delivering discourses to the public because he included practical halakhot in his discourse, and since he had drunk wine on Yom Tov, he refrained from delivering a discourse and issuing halakhic rulings.

When

that man

came the next day

before Rav Pappa to hear the answer to his question: