Beitzah 39b (לט:) — the Talmud in English

And if Reuven said:

“You are to me under a ban,”

his words are understood as follows: Shimon’s property shall be forbidden to me like something subject to a ḥerem ban. Therefore

the one who takes the vow

(Reuven)

is forbidden

to derive benefit from Shimon’s possessions.

And if he said:

“I am to you”

under a ban,

“and you are to me; both are forbidden to one another”

to derive benefit.

But they are permitted

both

to

derive benefit from objects

belonging to the people of Babylonia

listed below, and their deriving benefit from these objects is not considered deriving benefit from one another.

But they are forbidden

both

to

derive benefit from objects

belonging to that city,

since they are partners with regard to these objects, and partners who vow not to derive benefit from one another are forbidden to derive benefit from whatever they jointly own.

And the Mishna explains:

And these are objects belonging to the people of Babylonia:

The Temple Mount, the chambers and the courtyards, and a well in the middle of the road

which is the well belonging to the people of Babylonia mentioned in our Mishna.

And these are objects belonging to that city: the town square, the bathhouse, and the synagogue.

We have therefore learned that one who derives benefit from the well in the middle of the road does not have benefit equivalent to deriving benefit from all Israel; therefore, he is permitted to benefit from it.

And if you say

that the well belonging to the people of Babylonia

is a well jointly owned by partners,

in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman,

why is it permitted

for one who is forbidden to derive benefit from his fellow to benefit from the well?!

But

since they are partners,

did we not learn: Partners who vow not to derive benefit from one another are forbidden to enter the courtyard

belonging to both of them and

to bathe in the well?

And we answer:

With regard to bathing in the well, here too

they are forbidden, even in the well belonging to the people of Babylonia, since they are partners.

But here,

in the Mishna’s case of “I am to you under a ban,”

with what are we dealing?

That they bathe in the well only

to fill

from the well belonging to the people of Babylonia, and they were permitted only for this use, because this is not one partner deriving benefit from the other. This is because we apply the principle of retroactive designation and say of each person who fills:

“One is filling from his own, and the other is filling from his own,”

each one fills from the portion of the well that is designated for him by Heaven, and neither one fills from his fellow’s portion.

The Gemara objects to this resolution according to Rav Naḥman’s opinion, which distinguishes between filling and bathing on the basis of retroactive designation:

But

does

Rav Naḥman hold that there is retroactive designation?!

But did we not learn:

A. Partnership among brothers with regard to property that they inherited together is possible in two ways:

The first: They entered into a partnership after dividing their father’s inheritance.

The second: They have not yet divided their father’s inheritance and are partners in it; this is called “the estate in common” (tefusat ha-bayit).

Our Mishna explains the distinctions between these types of partnership with regard to the kelbon payment on the half-shekel and the obligation of the partners’ animals in animal tithe.

B. It is a Torah mitzva to give a half-shekel every year for the communal offerings. The Sages required one to add a kelbon, a small coin, to the half-shekel, both when each person gives a half-shekel and when two people give one whole shekel together.

C. A father who contributes one whole shekel on behalf of his two sons is not obligated to pay a kelbon at all.

D. Brothers who have not yet divided their father’s inheritance are exempt from the kelbon.

E. If they divided it and then entered into a partnership again, they are obligated to pay a kelbon.

F. A person must separate animal tithe from the animals born to him each year.

G. A herd belonging to partners is not subject to animal tithe.

H. If brothers inherited property from their father and have not yet divided it, and are partners in it, they are obligated in animal tithe.

I. If they divided it and then entered into a partnership again, they are exempt from animal tithe.

It follows that the law concerning

brothers who are partners is as follows:

When they are obligated in the kelbon,

that is, when the nature of their partnership is such that they are obligated in the kelbon—namely, when they entered into the partnership after dividing their father’s inheritance—they are

exempt from animal tithe.

And when they are obligated in animal tithe,

for example, when they have not yet divided the inheritance, they are

exempt from the kelbon.

And Rav Anan said: They taught this only

with regard to the Mishna’s statement that if they entered into a partnership again after dividing the inheritance, their partnership does not revert to being “the estate in common,” so as to exempt them from the kelbon and obligate them in animal tithe:

Rather,

when

they divided kids in exchange for lambs and lambs in exchange for kids,

since one cannot say that at the time of the division each received the portion appropriate to him, for it is impossible that one inherited lambs and the other inherited kids. Consequently, from the outset they are purchasers from one another, and their partnership is an ordinary partnership.

But if they divided kids in exchange for kids and lambs in exchange for lambs, one says: “This is the portion that was destined for him from the outset,”

since Rav Anan holds that there is retroactive designation, and even after the division they retain the status of “heirs.” When they entered into a partnership again, “the estate in common” returned to its place; they are therefore exempt from the kelbon and obligated in animal tithe.

And Rav Naḥman said: Even if they divided kids in exchange for kids and lambs in exchange for lambs—

one does not say

“This is the portion that was destined for him from the outset,”

because there is no retroactive designation. It follows that from the time of their division they do not have the status of “heirs,” but rather of “purchasers,” and when they entered into a partnership again, this is merely an ordinary partnership. They are therefore obligated in the kelbon and exempt from animal tithe.

We have thus learned that according to Rav Naḥman there is no retroactive designation, and the Gemara’s resolution according to Rav Naḥman has been refuted.

As a result of this difficulty, the Gemara retracts the explanation previously given of the dispute between Rav Sheshet and Rav Naḥman concerning one who filled water and gave it to his fellow.

Rather—

this is the explanation of their positions:

Everyone agrees that it is a well that has been declared ownerless.

this is the explanation of their positions— everyone agrees that it is a well that was rendered ownerless.

But here,

[Bach]

they disagree with regard to one who lifts a lost object for his fellow,

that is, whether we say that since the person for whom it was lifted did not acquire it—for one who lifts a lost object for his fellow does not thereby acquire it for his fellow—the one who lifted it consequently acquired it himself, or not [Rashi]:

One

—Rav Sheshet—

holds: He acquired it,

the one who lifted it acquired it, and here too the one who filled the water acquired it; therefore, the water has the boundaries of his feet.

And the other

—Rav Naḥman—

holds: He did not acquire it,

the one who lifted it did not acquire it, since he did not intend to acquire it for himself [but rather for his fellow]. Here too, the one who filled the water did not acquire it. Since the one who filled it did not acquire it, when the water reached the person for whom it had been filled, he acquired it, and the water has the boundaries of his feet.

Mishna:

One whose produce was in another city

outside his boundary,

and the residents of that city established an eruv

of Shabbat boundaries in order

to come to him

[Bach],

may not bring it to him,

for the produce has the boundaries of its owner, and he can go only within the boundary of his home. Consequently, produce that is outside his home boundary may not be moved at all, in accordance with the law governing produce that left its boundary.

And if he too established an eruv

also

he

in order to go to that city,

his produce is like him,

so that it may be carried between the two cities, and the residents of that city may bring it to him.