Beitzah 39b — the Talmud in English

And if Reuben said:

“Behold, you are to me under a ban”,

his words are understood to mean: Simeon’s property shall be forbidden to me like a ban; therefore

the one who vows

[Reuben]

is forbidden

to derive benefit from Simeon’s possessions.

And if he said:

“I am to you”

a ban

“and you are to me; both are forbidden to one another”

to derive benefit.

And both are permitted

both of them

to

derive benefit from the objects

belonging to those who came up from Babylonia

listed below, and their benefit from them is not considered benefit from one another.

And they are forbidden

both of them

to

derive benefit from objects

belonging to that city,

for they are partners in these objects, and partners who vowed not to derive benefit from one another are forbidden to derive benefit from that in which they are partners.

And the Mishna explains:

And these are the things belonging to those who came up from Babylonia:

The Temple Mount, the chambers and the courtyards, and the well in the middle of the road,

which is the well belonging to those who came up from Babylonia mentioned in our Mishna.

And these are those belonging to that city: the open square, the bathhouse, and the synagogue.

We have thus learned that one who derives benefit from the well in the middle of the road does not have benefit considered as benefit from all Israel; therefore, he is permitted to derive benefit from it.

And if you say

that the well belonging to those who came up from Babylonia

is a well of partners,

and this is in accordance with Rav Naḥman’s opinion,

why is it permitted

for one who is forbidden to derive benefit from his fellow to derive benefit from the well?!

And

since they are partners,

did we not learn: Partners who vowed not to derive benefit from one another are forbidden to enter the courtyard

belonging to both of them and

to bathe in the well.

And we answer:

To bathe in the well, here too

they are forbidden, even in the well belonging to those who came up from Babylonia, since they are partners.

And here,

in the Mishna of “I am to you a ban,”

with what are we dealing?

That they do not bathe in the well, but

to fill

from the well belonging to those who came up from Babylonia; and only for this use were they permitted, for this is not the benefit of one partner from his fellow, since we say by the principle of berera regarding each one who fills:

This one fills from his own, and this one fills from his own,

each one fills from his share, which is clarified for him from Heaven, and one does not fill from his fellow’s share.

And the Gemara is astonished at the answer according to Rav Naḥman’s position, that there is a distinction between filling and bathing on the basis of the principle of berera:

And

does

Rav Naḥman hold that there is berera?!

And did we not learn:

A. Partnership between brothers in what they inherited together is possible in two ways:

The first: They formed a partnership after dividing their father’s inheritance.

The second: They have not yet divided their father’s inheritance, and they are partners in it; this is called “the estate in the house’s possession.”

And our Mishna explains the differences in law between these partnerships with regard to the kalbon of the half-shekel and the obligation of the animal tithe from the animals of the partners.

B. There is a mitzva from the Torah to give a half-shekel every year for the communal offerings; and the Sages required one to add a kalbon, which is a small coin, both when each one gives a half-shekel and when two give one complete shekel together.

C. A father who weighed one complete shekel on behalf of his two sons is not liable for a kalbon at all.

D. Brothers who have not yet divided their father’s inheritance are exempt from the kalbon.

E. If they divided it and then formed a partnership again, they are liable for a kalbon.

F. A person must separate the animal tithe from the animals born to him each year.

G. A herd belonging to partners is not liable for the animal tithe.

H. If the brothers inherited an inheritance from their father and have not yet divided it, and they are partners in it, they are liable for the animal tithe.

I. If they divided it and then formed a partnership again, they are exempt from the animal tithe.

It follows that the law of

the brothers who are partners is:

When they are liable for a kalbon,

meaning: when the type of their partnership is such that they are liable for a kalbon—that is, when they formed a partnership after dividing their father’s inheritance—they are

exempt from the animal tithe.

And when they are liable for the animal tithe,

such as when they have not yet divided the inheritance, they are

exempt from the kalbon.

And Rav Anan said: They taught this only

in the Mishna, that if they formed a partnership again after dividing it, their partnership does not revert to being “the estate in the house’s possession,” so as to be exempt from the kalbon and liable for the animal tithe:

But

when

they divided kids corresponding to lambs and lambs corresponding to kids,

since you cannot say that at the time of the division each one received his proper share, for it is impossible that one inherited lambs and the other inherited kids, if so, from the outset they are purchasers from one another, and their partnership is found to be an ordinary partnership.

But if they divided kids corresponding to kids and lambs corresponding to lambs, he says: This is his share that reached him from the outset for this purpose,

since Rav Anan holds that “there is berera,” and even after their division the designation “heirs” applies to them; and when they formed a partnership again, “the estate in the house’s possession” returned to its place. They are therefore exempt from the kalbon and liable for the animal tithe.

And Rav Naḥman said: Even if they divided kids corresponding to kids and lambs corresponding to lambs—

one does not say

that this is his share that reached him from the outset for this purpose,

because “there is no berera.” It follows that from the time of their division the designation “heirs” does not apply to them, but rather “purchasers”; and when they formed a partnership again, this is only like any other ordinary partnership. They are therefore liable for the kalbon and exempt from the animal tithe.

We have thus learned that according to Rav Naḥman “there is no berera,” and the Gemara’s answer according to Rav Naḥman’s position is refuted.

As a result of this difficulty, the Gemara retracts the explanation previously given of the dispute between Rav Sheshet and Rav Naḥman concerning one who filled water and gave it to his fellow.

Rather—

As a result of this difficulty, the Gemara retracts the explanation we gave of the dispute between Rav Sheshet and Rav Naḥman concerning one who filled water and gave it to his fellow.

Rather—

this is the explanation of their positions— everyone agrees that it is a well that was rendered ownerless.

But here,

[Bach]

they disagree with regard to one who lifts a lost object for his fellow,

And here

[Bach]

they disagree concerning one who lifts a found object for his fellow,

meaning: whether we say that since the one for whom he lifted it did not acquire it—for one who lifts a found object for his fellow does not acquire it for his fellow—the one who lifted it consequently acquired it himself, or not [Rashi]:

One—

Rav Sheshet—

held: He acquired it,

the one who lifted it acquired it, and here too the one who filled the water acquired it; therefore, they are like his feet.

And the other—

Rav Naḥman—

held: He did not acquire it,

the one who lifted it did not acquire it, since he did not intend to acquire it for himself [but for his fellow]; here too, the one who filled the water did not acquire the water. And since the one who filled it did not acquire it, when the water reached the hands of the one for whom it had been filled, he acquired it, and they are like his feet.

Mishna:

One whose produce was in another city,

outside his teḥum,

and the inhabitants of that city made an eruv

of teḥumei in order

to come to him

[Bach], they

may not bring him

his produce,

for it is like his feet, and he is able to walk only within the teḥum of his home; the produce that is found outside the teḥum of his home is consequently forbidden to be moved in any manner, like produce that went outside its teḥum.

And if he also made an eruv

in order to walk to that city,