Beitzah 40a — the Talmud in English

his produce is like him, so that it is permitted to transport it between the two cities, and the inhabitants of that city can bring it to him. One who prepared [food] for himself with guests

who live outside the city’s Shabbat limit, but who came by means of a Shabbat-limit eruv—these guests

may not carry portions in their hands

from the host’s house to their city, for the portions are like the feet of the host, and it is forbidden to take them outside his limit.

Unless he granted them possession of

the host granted to the guests

their portions

[by means of another who performed an acquisition for them]

before the Festival,

and the portions acquired a place of residence like the feet of the guests, for they are theirs.

Gemara:

It was stated: With regard to one who deposits produce with another: Rav said:

the produce

is like the feet of the one with whom it was deposited.

And Shmuel said:

the produce

is like the feet of the depositor.

The Gemara now assumes that they disagreed in a case where he did not explicitly accept responsibility for safeguarding it. Their disagreement is whether one who brings his produce into another’s possession with permission causes the householder to accept responsibility for safeguarding it or not. Therefore we say:

Shall we say that Rav and Shmuel—

went according to

they disagreed here because they proceed

according to their principles:

For we learned

in tractate Bava Kamma, concerning one who brought his ox into another’s courtyard:

If he brought

the owner of the ox brought his ox

with permission

of the owner of the courtyard—

the owner of the courtyard is liable

for damages in which the ox was damaged, and the owner of the ox is exempt for damages that his ox caused the owner of the courtyard. For we say that when the owner of the courtyard permitted the owner of the ox to bring in his ox, he thereby accepted responsibility for safeguarding the ox.

Rabbi says: He is never liable

for safeguarding it,

until the householder accepts upon himself to safeguard it.

But if he merely agreed to its being brought in, included in his agreement to bring in the ox is not an agreement to accept responsibility for safeguarding it.

And

concerning this

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with the words of the Sages.

And Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi.

Shall we say that Rav,

who said concerning Shabbat limits, “like the feet of the one with whom it was deposited,”

said

as he ruled

in accordance with the Rabbis

concerning safeguarding an ox that was brought to him without specification, ruling like them that ordinarily he accepts responsibility for safeguarding it; and then, according to everyone, the status of the deposited object is like the feet of the guardian.

And Shmuel,

who said concerning Shabbat limits, “like the feet of the depositor,”

said

as he ruled

in accordance with Rabbi,

who does not accept responsibility for safeguarding it without specification; and therefore the place of residence of the object is also like the feet of the owners.

The Gemara rejects the connection to the disagreement between Rav and Shmuel. It explains that the disagreement of Rav and Shmuel concerning Shabbat limits is not in a case where the householder did not accept responsibility for safeguarding it; rather, it concerns a case where he explicitly accepted responsibility for safeguarding it.

Rav could say to you: I stated my ruling even in accordance with Rabbi.

For

Rabbi said there only this far

concerning the obligation of safeguarding,

but

because

ordinarily he did not accept safeguarding upon himself

[as long as he did not say so explicitly, he does not accept responsibility for safeguarding it].

But here—

he has accepted safeguarding upon himself

[for he explicitly accepted responsibility for safeguarding it], and whenever one accepts responsibility for safeguarding it, the objects’ Shabbat limit is like his feet.

And Shmuel said: I stated my ruling even in accordance with the Rabbis,

who say that even without specification he accepts responsibility for safeguarding it.

And

the Rabbis said there only this far

that the recipient becomes a guardian without specification,

but

because it is also agreeable to the depositor that the recipient safeguard it,

for it is agreeable to a person that his ox should stand in the domain of the owner of the courtyard

[the owner of the ox wishes that the ox should be in the domain of the owner of the courtyard with regard to safeguarding the ox], since

by

means of this,

if it damages him,

the ox damages the owner of the courtyard,

he is not liable,

the owner of the ox.

But here,

concerning one who deposited produce with another, although he placed it in the guardian’s possession with regard to safeguarding it, nevertheless, with regard to Shabbat limits—

is it also agreeable to a person that his produce should stand in the domain of another!?

Does the depositor wish that the produce should be in the depositary’s possession also for the purpose that the produce be like his feet?!

The Gemara raises an objection from our Mishna against Rav:

We learned:

One whose produce was in another city.

And if he made an eruv

[the owner of the produce made a Shabbat-limit eruv such that he can reach the place where his produce is located]—

his produce is like him,

and he may take it within the limit acquired by his eruv. The Gemara assumes that this concerns produce deposited with another person.

And if you say

in accordance with Rav’s view, that one who deposits produce with another has it

like the feet of the one with whom it was deposited,

then

when he made an eruv—

what of it!?

Why should his produce be like him, when the status of the produce depends not on him but on the depositary in the other city?

Rav Huna said: The members of Rav’s academy say

[they answered]: Our Mishna speaks

for example, when he designated for him

the depositary designated for the depositor

a corner

in which to place his produce. And since he lent him a place in his house for placing his produce, it is in the depositor’s possession.

But an ordinary depositary, where the produce is in the depositary’s possession, indeed has it like the feet of the depositary.

Come and hear

from the continuation of our Mishna, a proof against Rav’s words:

For we learned:

One who invited guests to his home—

they may not carry portions in their hands unless he granted them possession

the householder granted

their portions before the Festival.

And if you say,

like Rav,

“like the feet of the one with whom it was deposited”,

when he granted possession

the one who invited the guests

to them

their portions

by means of another—

what of it!?

For from the moment that he granted them possession of their portions, and he continues to hold them in his possession until they come to him, he becomes a depositary and the guests become depositors, until they come and take their portions.

And why should the guests, who are the depositors, be permitted to carry the portions with them like their feet, when according to Rav the portions deposited with him are like his feet?!

And we answer:

Here too, since he granted them possession

the depositary

by means of another, it is considered like when he designated a corner for him.

And if you wish, say: When he granted possession, it is different.

Since everything that he did, he did only in order to remove the portions from his place of residence and establish them in the place of residence and possession of the guests.

The Gemara brings an incident that occurred, and at first the Gemara thought that it concerned our matter:

Rav Hana bar Hanilai

arrived on the eve of Shabbat to stay at another person’s house, in another city outside his city’s limit. Rav Hana made a Shabbat-limit eruv in order to return to his city on Shabbat. And he

hung meat on the outer side of the door

[he hung the meat—which the city’s butchers had given him during the day—on the door].

Rav Hana bar Hanilai came

before

Rav Huna and he said to him

Rav Huna:

If you are the one who hung it—

go and take it!

If you are the one who hung the meat there, you may take it with you when you return to your city.

And if they hung it for you,

if you deposited the meat with the hosts and they hung it there—

do not take it!

Do not take the meat with you to your city.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Huna’s words:

And if he himself hung it—

may he take it?

Is it the case that if Rav Hana hung the meat, he is permitted to take it with him?!

But Rav Huna was Rav’s student,

and ruled like him,

and Rav said: It is like the feet of the one with whom it was deposited.

If so, how could Rav Hana take the meat with him outside the limit of the hosts, who were the depositaries?!

And we answer:

It is different

the law of one who hangs the meat on the

outer side of the door—

for it is considered as one who designated

the depositary designated for the depositor

a corner

in his house;

it is considered so.

That is to say: Here it is different, since he was the one who hung the meat, and the hosts did not receive it from him in order to safeguard it; its status is like that of a depositary who designated a corner in his house for the depositor, where the deposit is not in the depositary’s possession with regard to Shabbat limits.

He said

in astonishment

to Rav Ashi, Rav Hillel: And if they hung it for him—

may he not take it?

Is it the case that if they received it from him and hung it for him, the meat is not like his feet?!

But Shmuel said

above, on folio 38a:

An ox belonging to a fattener

[one who fattens animals in order to sell them]

is like the feet of anyone

who purchased it from him, since in his thought the selling fattener had already placed it, when the day became sanctified, in the possession of whoever would purchase it.

And all the more so here, since the meat is in Rav Hana’s possession, as they explicitly placed it in his possession, and they hung the meat for his sake?!

And further,

he said

in astonishment

Ravina to Rav Ashi: And

is it the case that

if they hung it for him—

may he not take it?!

But Rabba bar bar Hana said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Dosa,

who said: An ox that the inhabitants of a city customarily entrust to a shepherd is like the feet of the shepherd, even though it reached his possession only on the Festival. This is because “we have clear knowledge” that anyone who owns an animal intends that it be like the feet of the shepherd. And all the more so here: it should be placed in Rav Hana’s possession, since they hung the meat so that it would be in his possession?!

And further,

he said

in astonishment

Rav Ashi to Rav Kahana: And

is it the case that

if they hung it for him—

may he not take it?!

But we learned: An animal and utensils—

are like the feet of the owners!

And since they hung the meat for his needs, Rav Hana is the owner?!

Because of these objections, the Gemara retracts its previous assumption that the issue in Rav Hana’s incident concerned Shabbat limits.

Rather,

Rav Hana himself had to hang it, because otherwise the meat would have been forbidden on account of Rav’s ruling. Rav said: Meat that was out of sight is forbidden to eat, lest it have been exchanged for meat that is not kosher. And Rav Huna, who was Rav’s student, forbade the meat to Rav Hana on this account.

Even though the meat had been hanging in the house of an Israelite, it was nevertheless forbidden to Rav Hana.

For

Rav Hana bar Hanilai is different

from all other people,

for he is a great man and is occupied with his learning

[he is a great man and is preoccupied with his learning], and he diverts his attention from the meat, and there is concern that perhaps it was exchanged.

And this is what he said to him

Rav Huna to Rav Hana:

If you are the one who hung it—

you have a distinguishing mark in it, and you did not divert your attention from it.

That is to say: If you yourself hung the meat, and you recognize it, we may assume that you did not divert your attention from the meat, for something that a person himself does with an object that he recognizes, he does not forget and does not divert his attention from. Therefore

go and take it

[you are permitted to take it and eat it].

And

however,

if they hung it for you

[if they hung the meat for you], there is concern that perhaps

you diverted your attention from it,

and did not safeguard it,

and

therefore

do not take it

to eat from it.

Mishna:

One does not give drink

before slaughter,

and

one does not

slaughter

on the Festival

the

animals

of the wilderness,

which graze in the wilderness, as it explains and proceeds, for ordinarily he has not set his mind on them, and they are muktzeh and forbidden for eating and handling. And in the Gemara it will be explained what the matter of “giving drink” has to do here.

But one may give drink and slaughter

the

domesticated

animals, which graze in the city, as it explains and proceeds.

Our Mishna explains what the animals of the wilderness are and what the domesticated animals are:

These are the domesticated animals:

the animals

that spend the night in the city,

which return from grazing outside the city to spend the night in the city.

These are

the animals of the wilderness:

the animals

that spend the night in the pasture,

the place of grazing, even at night. They remain in the place of grazing and do not return to the city at night, and these are forbidden even if it happened that they came to the city before the Festival.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna: One may give drink and slaughter the domesticated animals.

The Gemara is astonished at the language of the Mishna:

Why do I need it to say, “one may give drink,” and [then] slaughter?

For here the issue is only slaughter, whereas with regard to giving drink there is no prohibition even with an animal that is muktzeh. If so, why did the Mishna mention giving drink before slaughter?!

And we answer:

It teaches us a matter incidentally, in the course of its wording,

the Mishna used the expression “one may give drink” in order to teach us a novel matter concerning proper conduct, namely:

A person should give his animal drink and afterward slaughter it

[a person should give the animal drink before slaughter]

because of the adhesion of the hide

[the hide’s adherence to the animal] when it has not been given drink beforehand, and the animal is not easy to skin.

The Sages taught: These are the animals of the wilderness, and these are the domesticated animals. The animals of the wilderness: Any that go out

from the city

on Passover and graze in the pasture,

and remain there throughout the summer

and

do not

enter

the city except at

the first “rainfall”,

which is what the descent of rain in the month of Marcheshvan is called.

And these are the domesticated animals: Any that go out and graze outside the limit, and come and spend the night

every night, even in the summer,

within the limit

of the city.

Rabbi says: Both these and those are domesticated animals,

even those animals that return only in Marcheshvan.

Rather, these are the animals of the wilderness: Any that go out and graze in the pasture, and do not enter a settlement either during the summer days or during the rainy season.

The Gemara is astonished at Rabbi’s words, since he involved himself in explaining this matter, whose prohibition is on account of muktzeh:

And does Rabbi hold of muktzeh

—does Rabbi hold that there is a law of muktzeh with regard to something intrinsically fit for eating, except that a person set it aside in his mind?!

But Rabbi Shimon bar

the son of

Rabbi asked

his father,

Rabbi:

Unripe dates,

which are a type of dates that do not fully ripen on the tree, but are picked and placed in baskets made from palm fronds, and when they remain inside them their ripening is completed—

according to Rabbi Shimon,

who disagreed with Rabbi Yehuda and does not hold that there is a law of muktzeh with regard to anything fit for eating or use,

what is

the law concerning eating them on the Festival?