Beitzah 39a (לט.) — the Talmud in English

And Rav Ashi said

nothing prohibited by the prohibition of teḥumim is nullified by a majority,

because it is a matter that has a permitted way of becoming permissible;

it has a possibility of becoming permissible by having it carried there tomorrow or by eating it here [Rashi] ,

and anything that has a permitted way of becoming permissible is not nullified even in a thousand [

as explained above, at the beginning of the tractate]. We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda exempts water:

The Gemara infers from what we learned, “exempts with regard to water,” that

water does not—

Rabbi Yehuda indeed exempts with regard to water, and the dough is not prohibited from being carried outside the place where the water had established its residence. But

salt

that was placed in the dough

does not—

Rabbi Yehuda does not exempt with regard to salt, and the dough may not be carried outside the place where the salt established its residence.

And we raised an objection:

But wasn’t it taught

in a beraita that, according to Rabbi Yehuda, there is no distinction between water and salt, as it was taught:

Rabbi Yehuda says: Water and salt are nullified both in dough and in a pot?!

And we answered:

It is not difficult;

for:

This

beraita, which states that even salt is nullified, is speaking

of Sodomite salt,

which is fine and unnoticeable, and therefore it is nullified like water.

That

our Mishna, which states that Rabbi Yehuda does not exempt with regard to salt, is speaking

of astruknite salt,

which is coarse salt and is noticeable.

Here the Gemara raises a difficulty concerning the beraita we learned: Water and salt are nullified in dough “both in a pot”:

But wasn’t it taught: Rabbi Yehuda says: Water and salt are nullified in dough, but are not nullified in a pot because of its gravy, meaning that the water is noticeable in it, since it has become gravy?!

that is, the water can be recognized in it, since it has become gravy?!

And we answered:

It is not difficult;

for:

This

beraita, which states that water is nullified even in a pot, is speaking

in a

thick

stew,

whose gravy is not noticeable, since it is mixed into the stew, and therefore Rabbi Yehuda exempts with regard to it.

That

beraita, which states that water is not nullified, is speaking

in a

thin

stew,

in which the gravy is noticeable.

Mishna:

1.

A coal

is

like the feet of its owners,

and it may not be carried outside the teḥum in which its owners established residence.

But

a

flame,

for example, when one lit his lamp with another person’s flame, may be carried

anywhere,

since it has no substance.

The early authorities disagree about the interpretation of the Mishna: The Rambam’s view is that it may be carried anywhere that the person who lit it goes.

The Meiri’s view is that it may be carried literally anywhere, and there is no prohibition of teḥumim at all.

And apropos of the distinction mentioned between a coal and a flame with regard to teḥumim, our Mishna adds further distinctions in law between a coal and a flame:

2.

A consecrated coal:

those who derive benefit from it

commit misuse of consecrated property,

by Torah law, and must bring a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property.

But

a

flame

of consecrated property:

one may not derive benefit from it

by rabbinic decree,

but one does not commit misuse of consecrated property;

one does not bring a guilt-offering for deriving benefit from it, because since it has no substance, deriving benefit from it does not constitute misuse of consecrated property by Torah law.

3.

One who carries

on Shabbat

a coal into the public domain

is

liable

to bring an offering if he did so unwittingly, and is liable to the death penalty if he did so intentionally.

But

one who carries a

flame

is

exempt,

and the Gemara will explain how he carried it.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: Five matters were stated with regard to a coal,

meaning, five distinctions were stated between a coal and a flame:

1.

A coal

is

like the feet of its owners,

and it may not be carried outside the teḥum of its owners;

but

a

flame

may be carried

anywhere.

2.

One commits misuse of consecrated property with a consecrated coal

when one derives benefit from it;

but

a

flame—one may not derive benefit from it

by rabbinic decree,

but one does not commit misuse of consecrated property

with it.

3.

A coal of idolatry is prohibited

for benefit,

but

a

flame

of idolatry

is permitted,

and it is not prohibited even by rabbinic decree.

4.

One who carries a coal into the public domain

is

liable, but

one who carries a

flame

into the public domain is

exempt.

5.

One who is prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from another person

is

prohibited from

deriving benefit from the

coal

of the other person,

but is permitted to

derive benefit from the

flame, and.

And we raised a difficulty:

What is different about the flame

of

idolatry, which is permitted—

it is permitted for benefit even by rabbinic law—

and what is different about consecrated property, which is prohibited

by rabbinic law, as we said: “One may not derive benefit from it”?!

And we explain the reason for the distinction:

Idolatry,

since it

is repulsive

in people’s eyes

and people distance themselves from it [

it is the way of Jews to distance themselves from it because of its repulsiveness], therefore

the Sages did not issue a decree concerning it;

the Sages did not fear that people might come to be lenient with regard to other forms of benefit from idolatry.

But

consecrated property, which is not repulsive, and people do not distance themselves from it

as they distance themselves from idolatry, since they distance themselves from it only because of its prohibition, therefore

the Sages issued a decree concerning it,

lest people come to be lenient with regard to other forms of benefit as well.

We further raise a difficulty concerning what was stated in the Mishna and in the beraita:

One who carries a coal into the public domain is liable, but one who carries a flame is exempt.

But wasn’t it taught

in another beraita:

One who carries any amount of flame [

without a minimum measure] into the public domain is

liable?!

Rav Sheshet said

in response,

Rav Sheshet:

The beraita that holds one liable for carrying a flame into the public domain is speaking

in a case where he carried it—

the

flame—

on a splinter.

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning Rav Sheshet’s answer:

According to your statement, that the beraita is speaking of a flame attached to a splinter, why must we consider holding him liable because of the flame,

when

he could

be liable for carrying it

because of the

splinter?

Even if there had been no flame attached to it, he would be liable for carrying the splinter?!

And we answered: The beraita is speaking

of a

flame attached to a splinter

that does not have

the splinter

the requisite measure

for liability for carrying it.

As we learned: One who carries wood

into the public domain—the measure that creates liability for carrying it is

enough to cook

with the wood he carried

a light egg,

that is, a chicken egg that cooks easily.

Abaye disagrees with the Gemara’s statement that one who carries a flame on a splinter is liable for it, because in his view the flame is not sufficiently significant when attached to a splinter and quickly goes out [Rashi, in his first explanation].

Therefore,

Abaye said

in response: The second beraita, which holds one liable for carrying a flame into the public domain, is speaking

in a case where he rubbed a vessel with oil and kindled a fire in it [

he smeared a vessel with oil, ignited the oil, and carried the flame together with the vessel]. A flame of this kind, which does not quickly go out, is sufficiently significant to create liability for carrying it.

And we raise a difficulty concerning Abaye as well:

Then let him be liable because of the vessel [

he should be liable even without the flame, because of carrying the vessel].

And we answered: It is speaking of a case where he carried the flame while it was attached

to a potsherd [

a piece of pottery] smeared with oil, as he proceeds to explain.

We nevertheless raise a difficulty:

Then

let him be liable

because of the potsherd [

he should be liable because of the piece of pottery].

And we answered:

When it does not have

the potsherd

the requisite measure.

As we learned: The measure of a

The measure of

potsherd

that creates liability for carrying it on Shabbat is enough

to place between one doorpost and another [

wooden doorposts of entrances and windows, which are arranged above, below, and on the two sides [like the frame of a window today]. Sometimes they are narrow in width and two are placed side by side; they must be equal in height and not crooked. When one tilts, one places a potsherd or stone beneath it to level it, Rashi],

the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

And we challenge this:

But [

if so],

with regard to that which we learned

in our Mishna and in the first beraita:

One who carries a flame

into the public domain is

exempt—

which must refer to a flame that is not attached to anything, since one is liable for carrying a flame that is attached to something—

how can you find it [

how is it practically possible] to carry a flame without its being attached to anything at all?!

And we explain:

In a case where he flung it [

he threw the flame]

into the public domain,

where it had been attached in the private domain to something, however insubstantial, and he blew on it, detached the flame, and sent it flying into the public domain.

Mishna:

A well

of water

belonging to an individual:

the water drawn from that well is

like the feet of the individual;

it may not be carried outside the teḥum of the owner of the well.

And

a water well

belonging to the people of that [

Rashi does not have the word “people of”]

city:

it may be carried only within the city’s domain, which is two thousand cubits in every direction from the city’s ibur [seventy cubits and fractions] outward; and even if the person who drew the water established an eruv in one direction from the city, he may not carry the water outside the city’s teḥum.

And

a water well

belonging to the Jews of Babylonia,

which were made for travelers in the middle of the road, and which the Jews of Babylonia made in order to drink from them when they ascended to Jerusalem—the water drawn from them is

like the feet of the person who drew it,

since he acquired it from ownerless property.

The reason is that we say, “There is retroactive clarification,” to be stringent [Rashi]. From the time the day became holy, this water was fit to belong to the person who would draw it, and therefore it acquired his place of residence.