Beitzah 39a — the Talmud in English

And Rav Ashi said

nothing that is forbidden through the prohibition of teḥumin is nullified by a majority,

because it is a matter that has a permitted means:

it has a possibility of permission by bringing it tomorrow or eating it here [Rashi] ,

and every matter that has a permitted means is not nullified even in a thousand [as explained above at the beginning of the tractate].

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda exempts [in the case of] water:

The Gemara infers from what we learned, “exempts [in the case of] water,” that

water does not—

indeed Rabbi Yehuda exempts in the case of water, and they do not prohibit taking the dough outside the place of their dwelling—but

salt

that was placed in the dough

does not:

Rabbi Yehuda does not exempt in the case of salt, and the dough may not be taken outside the place of the salt’s dwelling.

And we raise a difficulty:

but it was taught

in a beraita that according to Rabbi Yehuda there is no distinction between water and salt, for it was taught:

Rabbi Yehuda says: Water and salt are nullified both in dough and in a pot?!

And we answer:

it is not difficult,

for:

this

beraita, in which they said that even salt is nullified, is speaking

of Sodomite salt,

which is fine and is not recognizable; therefore it is nullified like water.

This

our Mishna, in which Rabbi Yehuda does not exempt in the case of salt, is speaking

of astrukנית salt,

which is coarse salt and is recognizable.

And here the Gemara raises a difficulty concerning the beraita that we learned: water and salt are nullified both in dough “and in a pot”:

But it was taught: Rabbi Yehuda says: Water and salt are nullified in dough, but are not nullified in a pot because of its gravy, meaning that the water is recognizable in it, since it became gravy?!

that is, the water can be recognized in it, since it has become gravy?!

And we answer:

it is not difficult,

for:

this

beraita, in which they said that water is nullified even in a pot, is speaking

in a

thick

cooked dish,

in which its gravy is not recognizable, for it is mixed within the cooked dish; therefore Rabbi Yehuda exempts in its case.

This

beraita, in which they said that water is not nullified, is speaking

in a

cooked dish

that is thin,

in which the gravy is recognizable.

Mishna:

a.

The coal

is

like the feet of its owners,

and it may not be taken outside the teḥum of its owners’ dwelling.

But

if it is

a flame, for example, if one lit his lamp with the flame of another, it is permitted to carry it

such as when one lights his lamp with another person’s flame, may be carried

to every place,

since it has no substance.

The early authorities disagreed in the interpretation of the Mishna: the view of Maimonides is that it is permitted to carry it to every place to which the one who lit it goes.

The view of the Meiri is: literally to every place, and there is no prohibition of teḥumin at all.

And incidentally to the distinction mentioned between a coal and a flame with regard to teḥumin, our Mishna adds further distinctions of law between a coal and a flame:

b.

A consecrated coal,

those who derive benefit from it

misappropriate it,

by Torah law, and they bring a guilt-offering for misappropriation.

But

if it is

a flame

of consecrated property,

they may not derive benefit

from it by rabbinic law,

but they do not misappropriate it:

they do not bring a guilt-offering for benefit from it, because since it has no substance, there is no misappropriation in it by Torah law.

c.

One who carries

on Shabbat

a coal into the public domain

is

liable

for an offering if unwitting, and death if deliberate.

But

if one carries

a flame,

he is

exempt,

and the Gemara will explain how he carried it.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: Five things were said concerning a coal,

meaning, five legal distinctions were stated between a coal and a flame:

a.

The coal

is

like the feet of its owners,

and it may not be taken outside the teḥum of the owners;

but

if it is

a flame,

they carry it

to every place.

b.

A consecrated coal: one misappropriates it

when one derives benefit from it;

but

if it is

a flame, they may not derive benefit

by rabbinic law,

but they do not misappropriate it

.

c.

A coal of idolatry is forbidden

for benefit,

but

if it is

a flame

of idolatry, it is

permitted,

and there is no prohibition in it even by rabbinic law.

d.

One who carries a coal into the public domain

is

liable, but

if one carries

a flame

into the public domain, he is

exempt.

e.

One who is a mudar hanaa from another

is

forbidden to

derive benefit from

his coal

of the other,

but is permitted to

derive benefit from

a flame, and.

And we raise a difficulty:

what is different about a flame

of

idolatry, which is permitted,

being permitted for benefit even by rabbinic law,

and what is different about consecrated property, which is forbidden,

by rabbinic law, as we say: “They may not derive benefit”?!

And we explain the reason for the distinction:

idolatry,

since it

is repulsive

in people’s eyes

and people keep away from it [the way of Israel is to keep away from it] because of its repulsiveness, therefore

it is the way of the Jewish people to distance themselves from it] because of its repulsiveness, therefore

the Sages did not decree concerning it,

for the Sages did not fear that people might come to be lenient even concerning other benefits from idolatry.

But

consecrated property, which is not repulsive, and people do not keep away from it,

as they keep away from idolatry, since they keep away from it only because of its prohibition, therefore

the Sages decreed concerning it,

lest they come to be lenient concerning other benefits as well.

Again we raise a difficulty concerning what was said in the Mishna and in the beraita:

One who carries a coal into the public domain is liable, while for a flame he is exempt.

But it was taught

in another beraita:

One who carries any amount of flame [without a measure]

into the public domain is

liable?!

Said

the one who answered,

Rav Sheshet:

The beraita that makes one who carries a flame into the public domain liable is speaking

for example, that he carried it

the flame

on a splinter.

That is to say: our Mishna and the first beraita are speaking where the flame is not attached to anything, and therefore it is not significant enough to make him liable for carrying it; but the second beraita is speaking where the flame was attached to something, and therefore it is significant enough to make him liable for carrying it.

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning Rav Sheshet’s answer:

According to you, that the beraita is speaking of a flame attached to a splinter, why do we need to discuss making him liable because of the flame,

when

surely

it follows that he should be liable for carrying

because of the carrying of the

splinter,

for even if no flame had been attached to it, he would be liable for carrying the splinter?!

And we answer: the beraita is speaking

of

a flame attached to a splinter

that does not have

the splinter

a measure

that makes one liable for carrying it.

For we learned: One who carries wood

into the public domain, the measure for which one becomes liable for carrying it is:

enough to cook

with the wood that he carried

a small egg,

that is, a hen’s egg that cooks easily.

Abaye disagrees with the words of the Gemara that one who carries a flame on a splinter is liable for it, because according to his view the flame is not sufficiently significant when it is attached to a splinter, and it quickly goes out [Rashi, in his first explanation].

Therefore

Abaye said,

answering: the second beraita, which makes one liable for carrying a flame into the public domain, is speaking:

for example, when he smeared a vessel with oil and lit a fire in it [he smeared a vessel with oil, lit the oil, and carried the flame together with the vessel]. A flame of this kind, which does not quickly go out, is significant enough to make one liable for it.

he smeared a vessel with oil, lit the oil, and carried out the flame together with the vessel]. A flame of this kind, which is not quick to go out, is significant enough to make one liable for carrying it.

And we raise a difficulty even against Abaye:

then let him be liable because of the vessel [let us make him liable even without the flame, for carrying the vessel].

he should be liable even without the flame, because he carried out the vessel].

And we answer: for example, he carried the flame while it was attached

to a shard [pottery] smeared with oil, as he proceeds to explain.

clay] smeared with oil, as will be explained.

But we still raise a difficulty:

then let him be liable

for

the shard [let us make him liable because of the pottery].

he should be liable because of the earthenware]?

And we answer:

where it does not have

the pottery

a measure.

For we learned:

the measure of

pottery

for which one becomes liable for carrying it on Shabbat is:

enough to place between one doorpost and another [wooden doorposts of entrances and windows, which are arranged above and below and on two sides [like the frame of our window]; sometimes they are narrow in width and two are set side by side, and it is necessary that one not be lower than the other and that they not be crooked. When one inclines, one places pottery or a stone beneath it to level it, Rashi],

the wooden frames of doorways and windows, which are arranged above and below and on two sides [like the frame of a window today]. Sometimes they are narrow, and two are placed side by side. They must be level with each other and not crooked; when one leans, a piece of earthenware or a stone is placed beneath it to make it level, Rashi],

the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

And we raise an objection:

but [if so],

if so],

that which we learned

in our Mishna and in the first beraita:

one who carries a flame

into the public domain is

exempt—

which necessarily speaks of a flame not attached to anything, for one attached to something makes one liable—

how can you find it [how is it practically possible] to carry a flame without its being attached to anything at all?!

a practical case] in which he carries a flame without it being attached to anything at all?

And we explain:

for example, when he cast it [he threw the flame]

he threw the flame]

into the public domain,

where it had been attached in the private domain to something and he blew upon it, detaching the flame and sending it flying into the public domain.

Mishna:

A well

of water

belonging to an individual,

the water drawn from that well is

like the feet of the individual,

and it may not be carried outside the teḥum of the owner of the well.

But

a water well

belonging to the people of that city is like the feet of the people [Rashi does not have “the people”]

of [Rashi does not read the word “people”]

of that city,

and it may be carried only within the teḥum of the city, which is two thousand cubits in every direction from the boundary of the city [seventy cubits and remnants] and outward; and even if the one who drew the water established his eruv toward one side of the city, he may not carry the water outside the teḥum of the city.

But

a water well

belonging to those who came up from Babylonia,

which were made for travelers in the middle of the road and which the people of Babylonia made in order to drink from them when they went up to Jerusalem, the water drawn from them is

like the feet of the one who drew it,

since he acquired it from ownerless property.

The reason is that we say, “there is legal retroactive determination” to be stringent [Rashi], and from the time the day became sanctified, these waters were fit to belong to the one who would draw them, and therefore they acquired his dwelling.

Gemara: The Gemara, the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna,

challenged

that is, he asked

Rava challenged Rav Naḥman: We learned

in our Mishna:

A well belonging to an individual follows the limits of that individual,

so we have learned that water acquires a place of residence.

And they raise a contradiction

from a beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna: Water from

flowing rivers

that emerge in one place and continue flowing away from their source, as is generally the case with rivers.

And

likewise, water from

springs that flow

from underground, but do not flow beyond the pools at their source, since they are flowing water, does not acquire a place of residence. Water acquires a place of residence only when it is rainwater that has collected, where there is neither a spring nor flowing water [the view of Rashi].

It follows the limits of every person,

meaning: It did not acquire a place of residence at all—not its own, not that of its owners, and not that of the person who draws it; rather, one may take it wherever one wishes [Rashi].

The reason is that since the water is moving and drifting, it does not acquire a place of residence. But this raises a difficulty from our Mishna, where we learned that water does acquire a place of residence?!

He said

in response:

Here

in our Mishna,

what are we dealing with? With

water that is

collected

in a well. Since it is not moving and drifting, it acquires a place of residence; and since it has owners, it acquires the place of residence of its owners.

And it was likewise stated: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin said in the name of Shmuel:

Our Mishna is speaking

of collected water.

We learned in the Mishna:

And the well of the exiles of Babylonia follows the limits of the person who draws it. It was stated: If he filled

the water from the well intending to give it to his fellow

and gave it to his fellow,

the amoraim disagreed whether the water acquired the place of residence of the person who drew it or the place of residence of the person for whom it was drawn:

Rav Naḥman said:

The water

follows the limits of the person for whom it was drawn,

because the person who drew it became his agent to acquire the water for him, and the water was acquired for him. Therefore, the water acquired his place of residence.

But

Rav Sheshet said:

The water

follows the limits of the person who drew it,

and he proceeds to explain their disagreement.

What is the basis of their disagreement

what is the reason for their dispute?

And we explain:

One sage

Rav Sheshet

holds: It is an ownerless well

the well is ownerless, because the exiles of Babylonia made it available to anyone who wished to use it. And we have an established principle: One who lifts a found object on behalf of another person does not acquire it for that person. Therefore, when someone draws water for another person from an ownerless well, that other person does not acquire the ownerless property; rather, the person who draws it acquires it.

And the other

Rav Naḥman

holds: It is a jointly owned well,

the people of Babylonia did not make the well ownerless; rather, they gave it to all of Israel so that they would be partners in it. “When this person said to his fellow to fill it for him from his share and he went as his agent, he became his agent, and this is not a case of one who lifts a found object on behalf of another person” [Rashi’s wording].

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman:

Reuven said to his fellow, Shimon:

I am prohibited to you as a sacred offering,

then

the one prohibited by the vow

Shimon

is prohibited

from deriving benefit from Reuven’s property, because Reuven’s words are understood as follows: My property is prohibited to you as an offering dedicated to the Temple treasury.