Beitzah 38b — the Talmud in English

And just because the portion belonging to the woman who lent the ingredients is small, will you say that her portion is nullified within the portion belonging to the woman who borrowed them, because the latter is the majority of the dough?!

And

But

who

had one kav of his own wheat become mixed

of his

with ten kav of wheat belonging to another person—

would it be said that his ownership of the small quantity is nullified by the majority of the wheat belonging to someone else, and

may the other man eat—

the owner of the larger quantity of wheat—

and rejoice

eating and rejoicing over another person’s wheat, for which he did not labor]?!

The Gemara, the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna, analyzes his words.

The sages laughed

the sages who had questioned our Mishna laughed

at

Rabbi Abba and at his answer!

Rabbi Abba said to them:

Did I perhaps

take your cloaks [

a gulta is a fine wrapped garment worn beneath one’s prayer shawl; when one sits down, he removes the prayer shawl, and the wrapped garment becomes visible]

that you are mocking me?

In other words: Did I take your clothing, that you are making fun of me?!

They laughed at him again,

the sages once again laughed at him!

Rav Oshaya said: They did well to laugh at him [

they rightly laughed at Rabbi Abba]!

For

what difference is there—

why did Rabbi Abba phrase the case as one in which a kav of “wheat” became mixed with ten kav of “wheat”—

wheat with

a kav of wheat with ten kav

of barley—

that Rabbi Abba did not say to them

?

The reason is clearly that in this mixture ownership of the smaller quantity would indeed be nullified, since

it would be

a mixture of

one type with another type, and one type mixed with another type

is

nullified.

And if so,

in the case of wheat mixed with wheat—

as well

he should not have raised his objection.

For

although according to Rabbi Yehuda, one type mixed with the same type is not nullified

in the context of all prohibitions, nevertheless

according to the Sages, it is nullified. [

As their disagreement was explained in Menahot 22a].

The early authorities disagree about how to explain this discussion:

The view of the Ran [Nedarim 52a], in the name of the early authorities, is that water and salt in dough are considered one type mixed with the same type, since dough cannot be made without them. This is why the Gemara compared the law of our Mishna to the rule of one type mixed with the same type. The Meiri explained: At first, they thought that Rabbi Abba’s reasoning was that one type mixed with the same type is not nullified. Therefore, they laughed at him, since the case in our Mishna is one type mixed with another type.

When they saw that he was not retracting his statement, they added to their argument: Even if the case in our Mishna were one type mixed with the same type, Rabbi Abba’s answer would still be inappropriate. For only according to Rabbi Yehuda is one type mixed with the same type not nullified; according to the Sages, even one type mixed with the same type is nullified.

Rav Safra exclaimed

in astonishment

to Rav Oshaya

to Rav Oshaya:

Moshe [

an oath invoking the honor of Moses our teacher]! Did you really

say correctly [

you said well by justifying the words of those who laughed]?!

Rabbi Abba’s intention was not that one type mixed with the same type is not nullified. And when he said “wheat mixed with wheat,” he did not mean that wording specifically; the same applies to wheat mixed with barley.

Rather, Rabbi Abba’s reason is that the rule of nullification applies only to a prohibited substance that became mixed with a permitted substance. But whenever one person’s property becomes mixed with another person’s property, the first person does not lose what belongs to him. Therefore, it is proper to say that the first person’s resting-place restriction does not cease to apply to his property.

And if you say that when such a small amount of property—water and salt in dough—becomes mixed with one’s property, he is not liable to repay its value—

and

then is it possible that

the sages who raised the difficulty about our Mishna had not heard

the following statement?

“This is what Rabbi Hiyya of Kattusfa said in the name of Rav!”

Wheat sellers customarily do not remove pebbles from the wheat, and the wheat is sold as it is. Therefore:

One who removes pebbles from another person’s grain pile

without his knowledge

must pay him the value of wheat,

because if he had not removed them, the other person would have sold them together with the wheat, and he has caused him to lose the value of wheat corresponding to the amount of the pebbles.

Evidently, he diminished a measure [

a measure],

and here too, he diminished a measure [

a measure]

for him.

That is: Even though the property is of little value, he must return its value. Likewise here, it is not proper for even property such as water and salt in dough to be nullified. The law is that property is not nullified; and since property is not nullified, the resting-place restriction of the property’s owner is also not nullified.

Abaye exclaimed

in astonishment

to Rav Safra,

saying: What kind of answer is this?!

Does the master not distinguish between property that has a claimant

which is not nullified,

and property that has no claimant

which is nullified?! In the case of our Mishna as well, the property has no claimant “today,” since she lent it to the owner of the dough, and the boundary prohibition applies only today, so it is nullified [Meiri]. [

He said to him,

deleted, since these are a continuation of Abaye’s words, Meiri]:

But according to your reasoning,

that is: even if you say that you do not distinguish between property that has a claimant and property that has no claimant, and even property that has no claimant is not nullified, [Meiri].

Rather,

this is what Rav Hisda said,

according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that one type mixed with the same type is not nullified:

A minority of

an animal carcass

that became mixed with a majority of slaughtered animals is

nullified by the slaughtered animals,

because this is one type mixed with another type,

since a slaughtered animal cannot become an animal carcass,

that is: a slaughtered animal cannot become prohibited in the same way as an animal carcass.

But a minority of

slaughtered meat is not nullified by a

majority of

animal carcass, since an animal carcass can become slaughtered meat,

that is: it can become permitted like the slaughtered meat if it decomposes and is no longer called an animal carcass; therefore, it is considered the same type as the slaughtered meat.

We have learned that an animal carcass is nullified by slaughtered meat.

Will you likewise

say:

that when it has an owner

the animal carcass

is not nullified?!

]]You have therefore learned that, since an ordinary animal carcass has no claimant, it is nullified [according to the Meiri].

And if you say that this is indeed so?!

But it was taught in a beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said: Ownerless objects acquire a resting-place restriction even though they have no owners; they are treated as though they had owners.

The meaning of this, in the wording of the Meiri, is as follows:

According to Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri, ownerless objects acquire a resting-place restriction where they are located. Thus, the person who finds them may take them two thousand cubits in every direction, if he himself can walk there. But if the finder established an eiruv in one direction, he may not take these objects more than two thousand cubits from the place where he found them, even if they have owners, since they have no claimant, evidently, the determining factor is the existence of claimants, not ownership; and anything that has no claimant is nullified, even if it has an owner.

If so, the difficulty still remains: The water and salt should be nullified within the dough, since they have no claimant during the time when the boundary prohibition applies.

Rav Safra said to Abaye,

in order to uphold Rabbi Abba’s answer:

Can you compare a prohibition with property?!

A prohibition is nullified,

but

property is not nullified.

The meaning, according to the Meiri, is as follows:

That is: In the case of an animal carcass mixed with slaughtered meat, and similar cases, the essential nature of the mixture is a prohibition mixed with a permitted substance. Thus, when one describes the mixture, one does not say that one person’s property became mixed with another person’s property; rather, one says that a particular prohibited substance became mixed with a particular permitted substance, and it is proper to say that the prohibited substance is nullified.

That is: The matter depends not on ownership or claimants, but on whether the mixture is defined as a prohibition and a permitted substance, or as property. In the case of water and salt, the mixture is primarily defined as property, even though the boundary prohibition follows from that property. Therefore, it is not proper to say that it is nullified. [

And what is the reason,

a phrase that the Meiri did not have in his version—the answers of the Gemara are explained according to the method of Tosafot.

Abaye said

another answer explaining why the water and salt are not nullified within the dough:

It is a decree, lest one prepare dough in partnership,

that is: lest this lead her to permit carrying the dough according to her own movement limits even when she is a full partner in the dough together with another woman. For the same reason, a spice is not nullified in a pot.

Rava said:

Therefore, a spice is not nullified in a pot because

spices are intended to impart flavor, and flavor is not nullified [

a spice is intended to give flavor to the pot, and in such a case the rule of nullification does not apply]. The same applies to water and salt in dough: Salt is not nullified because it too imparts flavor, while water is not nullified because it is significant, since dough is primarily made from water.