Beitzah 38a (לח.) — the Talmud in English

And we raised a difficulty concerning this: What is different about “to here and to there,” that it

does not constitute an eruv, since

there is no retroactive clarification?”.

If so, even when he said

“east and west,” there is likewise no retroactive clarification,

to say: The matter became clear at the time when the day became sanctified, that the Sage was destined to come from the side from which he arrived the next day. For it is possible that the Sage would come neither here nor there; and if the Sage would not come at all, he stipulated and said: “I am like the members of my city.” It follows that at the time when the day became sanctified, it was not known whether his eruvin would take effect, and their taking effect depends on clarification that would occur on the following day. But this is a case of “there is no retroactive clarification”?!

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said

to explain: Even with regard to east and west, one cannot say, “If a Sage comes to the east, my eruv is to the east; and if he comes to the west, my eruv is to the west.” The eruv is effective only if

the Sage had already arrived

at the time when the day became sanctified, although he does not know it. Therefore, he may stipulate his eruv on the basis of a circumstance that was clear at the time of acquiring the eruv.

Evidently,

we have learned

that Rabbi Yoḥanan does not hold that there is retroactive clarification.

How, then, can you say that it was Rabbi Yoḥanan who said—with regard to the animal and the barrel—that there is no retroactive clarification?

As a result of this difficulty, the Gemara retracts its reversal of the statements of the amoraim who disagreed with regard to the barrel and the animal belonging to partners, in order to resolve the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Hoshaya, who holds that with regard to the barrel and the animal belonging to partners there is retroactive clarification, whereas with regard to the openings of a house containing a corpse Rabbi Oshaya held that there is no retroactive clarification. Instead, it resolves the matter in another way:

Rather, actually, do not reverse

the statements. Indeed, it was Rabbi Hoshaya who said that with regard to the barrel and the animal belonging to partners there is retroactive clarification; nevertheless, the case of the openings of a house containing a corpse is not difficult:

And does Rabbi Oshaya not hold that there is retroactive clarification in a matter of Torah law,

such as with regard to the openings of a house containing a corpse?

But with regard to rabbinic law,

such as with regard to teḥumin,

he does hold

that Rabbi Oshaya holds that there is retroactive clarification.

Mar Zutra expounded: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Oshaya.

Shmuel said:

An ox belonging to a fattener

[one who fattens oxen in order to sell them]

is like the feet of anyone,

meaning that anyone who purchases it may lead it anywhere that he himself may go. Since it is the practice of a fattener to sell, the fattener had already, on the previous day, placed it in the possession of the purchaser who would come to buy it, and when the day became sanctified, the animal acquired the future purchaser’s place of residence.

But

an ox belonging to a shepherd

[one who raises his own animals and sometimes sells some of them]

is like the feet of

the

Rashi]

people of that city.

That is, if one of the residents of the city purchased it, he may lead it within the city’s teḥum, even though the shepherd himself had made an eruv in another direction and is not permitted to lead his possessions throughout the city’s entire teḥum. This is because, on the previous day, the shepherd had placed it in the possession of a prospective purchaser who was one of the city’s residents, since the residents of the city regularly bought from him.

But if someone from another city purchased it, he may not lead it according to his own feet, since the shepherd does not have the reputation of being a livestock merchant known to the residents of another city, so that they would buy from him [but he may lead it within the city’s teḥum, Ran]. We learned in the Mishna:

One who borrows a utensil from another on the eve of a Festival

is like the feet of the borrower:

And we raise a difficulty:

Isn’t this obvious?!

And we answer:

It is necessary

for our Mishna to teach a novel point, but only in a case

where he did not hand it over to him until the Festival,

and on the eve of the Festival he lent it to him only verbally, without the borrower having taken possession of it.

And this is a novel point, because

it might enter your mind to say that he did not place it in his possession

[the lender did not place the load in the borrower’s possession] before the day, since the borrower had not taken possession of it; therefore, it should be like the feet of the lender, in whose possession it was when the day became sanctified.

It teaches us

our Mishna that nevertheless it is like the feet of the borrower, for once the lender had promised it to him, he had already, on the eve of the Festival, placed it in his possession.

This supports

[our Mishna supports]

the

words of

Rabbi Yoḥanan, for Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who borrows a utensil from another on the eve of a Festival, even if he was not given it until the Festival, it is like the feet of the borrower.

We learned in the Mishna: One who borrows a utensil from another, etc.,

on the Festival, it is like the feet of the lender:

And we raise a difficulty: Since there was not even a mere verbal agreement on the eve of the Festival—for had there been such an agreement, this would be the first clause, where we said that it is like the feet of the borrower—if so,

it is obvious

that the utensil acquires the place of residence of the lender, in whose possession it was when the day became sanctified?! And we answer:

It is necessary

for our Mishna to teach a novel point, but only in a case

where he regularly borrows from him

[where the borrower regularly borrows from him].

And this is a novel point, because

it might enter your mind to say that he places it in his possession

[the lender places it in the borrower’s possession before the day], since this is his regular practice.

It teaches us

our Mishna that, since the borrower did not tell the lender before the day that he wished to borrow the utensil,

he says

[the lender says to himself]:

Perhaps the person found someone else and went and borrowed from him

[perhaps the borrower found someone else who would lend it to him]; therefore, he does not place it in the borrower’s possession.

We learned in the Mishna:

And similarly, a woman who borrowed from her fellow

spices, water, and salt for her dough: these are like the feet of both of them:

The Kehillot Yaakov wrote concerning the following passage that it is one of the obscure passages in the Talmud. According to the version of the Me’or and the interpretation of the Meiri, the passage is more readily understood; the passage is explained here on the basis of that version and the Meiri’s interpretation.

When Rabbi Abba ascended

[when Rabbi Abba ascended from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael],

he said: May it be the will that I say a matter that will be accepted,

meaning: May it be the will that I say a matter of Torah that will be accepted by the scholars of the place, and that I will not be embarrassed before them.

When he ascended, he found

[when he ascended to Eretz Yisrael, he found]

Rabbi Yoḥanan, Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappi, and Rabbi Zeira—and some say: Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Shimon ben

Pazzi and Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa—and they were sitting and saying

[sitting and raising a difficulty concerning our Mishna]:

Why

may the dough be led only according to the feet of the owner of the water and salt,

and let the water and salt be nullified with regard to the dough,

that is, why should the prohibition of the teḥum pertaining to the water and salt not be nullified in the rest of the dough—for most of the dough belongs to her, and she borrowed only a small amount of water and salt from her fellow—and every prohibition is nullified in a majority?!

Rabbi Abba said to them,

does nullification apply here at all?!