Beitzah 37b — the Talmud in English

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Dosa says—and some say that it was Abba Shaul who says:

One who purchases an animal from another person on the eve of a Festival, even though he did not receive it until the Festival—

the animal is considered to be at the purchaser’s feet.

And one who gives an animal to a shepherd, even though he did not give it to him until the Festival—

the animal is considered to be at the shepherd’s feet.

Since he intended to give it to the shepherd, at the time the day became sanctified he intended that the animal acquire its place of rest in accordance with the shepherd’s place of rest.

The Gemara, the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna, rejects the necessity of concluding that our Mishna does not follow Rabbi Dosa:

Even if you say

that our Mishna is the opinion of

Rabbi Dosa

—

there is no difficulty:

Because

here,

in Rabbi Dosa’s statement, it is referring

to a

city in which there is

only one shepherd, and everyone places his animals with him. Therefore, it is certain that the owner intended that the animal acquire its place of rest in accordance with the shepherd’s place of rest.

and everyone entrusts their animals to him. Therefore, it is certain that the owner’s intention was that the animal establish its place of residence like the feet of the shepherd.

Here,

in our Mishna,

it is referring to a

city in which there are

two shepherds,

and when the day became sanctified it was not known to which shepherd the animal would be given on the Festival. Therefore, the animal acquires its place of rest in accordance with the feet of its owners.

The Gemara supports this explanation precisely:

This is also precise, as it teaches

in our Mishna: “one who gives his animal

to his son or to a shepherd.”

This shows that even his son could herd the animal, and it was not determined before the Festival whether he would give it to his son or to a shepherd.

And we conclude:

Learn from this!

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Dosa.

And we ask:

Did Rabbi Yoḥanan really say this?!

But Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha follows an unattributed Mishna.

And we learned

in our Mishna:

“An animal and vessels are considered to be at the feet of their owners,

and one who gives his animal to his son or to a shepherd—the animal and the vessels are considered to be at the feet of the owners.”

This proves that if he did not give the animal to the shepherd before the Festival, the animal is not considered to be at the shepherd’s feet; and this is not in accordance with Rabbi Dosa?!

And we answer:

Did we not establish

that we may interpret our Mishna even in accordance with Rabbi Dosa, namely, that

here it is referring to one shepherd, and here to two shepherds?!

The Sages taught: Two people who borrowed

during the day before the Festival

one garment in partnership,

for both of them to use:

one

—Reuben—borrowed it in order

to go with it in the morning

of the Festival

to the house of study, and the other—

Simon—borrowed it in order

to enter with it in the evening

at the approach of the Festival

into the banquet hall.

This one,

Reuben,

made an eruv for it

—he established an eruv in order to carry the garment—

to the north, but he did not place his eruv at the end of the boundary. Rather, for example, he placed it one thousand cubits away. Consequently, he did not entirely forfeit his ability to walk south: he is still permitted to walk one thousand cubits south, meaning until a total distance of two thousand cubits from the place where he acquired his place of rest by placing the eruv.

The city itself is considered to be only four cubits.

And this one,

Simon,

made an eruv for it to the south,

and he too left himself the possibility of walking to the north.

The law of the garment is therefore that it may be taken only as far as both of them may go, since they are partners in it.

Accordingly,

the one who made an eruv for it to the north

not only may not take it as far as two thousand cubits from his eruv to the north, since his partner did not establish an eruv to the north; he may not even take it two thousand cubits north from his home. His partner is permitted to walk only one thousand cubits north.

Therefore he

walks

with the garment

to the

side of

the north—

according to the feet of the one who made an eruv for it to the south—

only as far as the place to which his partner, who established an eruv to the south, is permitted to walk; that is, only one thousand cubits north.

And the one who made an eruv for it to the south may walk south—

according to the feet of the one who made an eruv for it to the north,

only one thousand cubits, since that is the distance to which even his partner, who established an eruv to the north, is permitted to walk.

And if they reduced the boundary,

that is,

they reduced the boundary

so that there was a full boundary of two thousand cubits in each direction, with the two eruvs situated opposite one another—meaning that each placed his eruv at the end of two thousand cubits, one to the north and one to the south—and there were four thousand cubits between the two eruvs,

since the one who established an eruv to the north can walk only north and forfeited all ability to walk south, while his partner, who established an eruv to the south, forfeited all ability to walk north, therefore

he may not move it from its place,

because there is no place to which both of them are permitted to walk, and the garment is governed by the feet of both of them.

It was stated: Two people who jointly acquired a barrel and an animal

or an animal

as partners

before the Festival, intending to divide it on the Festival, and they divided it on the Festival: the amoraim, Sages of the Gemara era, disagreed whether each one may take his share to any place to which he himself may go, or whether they are treated like objects belonging to partners, which may be taken only to a place to which both partners may go.

Rav said: The barrel is permitted,

and each person may take his portion to any place to which he is permitted to go.

But the animal is prohibited

from being taken to any place except within the boundary common to both of them.

And Shmuel said: The barrel is also prohibited

from being taken to any place except within the boundary common to both of them.

The law governing the taking of the animal and the water depends on the issue of whether “there is retroactive clarification”: Do we say that through the division it is clarified retroactively that the portion which came into each person’s possession had already belonged to him when the day became sanctified and the animal acquired its place of rest? Or do we say that the matter is not clarified retroactively, and that when the day became sanctified, the portion that eventually came into one person’s possession may have belonged to the other, and acquired its place of rest accordingly?

The Gemara therefore questions Rav’s position:

What does Rav hold?!

If he holds that “there is retroactive clarification”—

even the animal should be permitted!

Each person should be permitted, even in the case of an animal, to take the portion that came to him, since it is clarified retroactively that from the time the day became sanctified, each person’s portion already belonged to him and acquired its place of rest accordingly?!

And if he holds that “there is no retroactive clarification”—

even the barrel should also be prohibited!

For when the day became sanctified, it was possible that the portion that ultimately came into Reuben’s possession belonged to Simon, and acquired its place of rest accordingly?!

And we explain Rav’s position:

Rav always holds

that

there is retroactive clarification,

and therefore the barrel is permitted. But

the animal is different,

because retroactive clarification is ineffective for it, and it remains subject to its prohibition.

Since

the boundaries draw sustenance from one another,

as all of the animal’s limbs draw nourishment from one another throughout the Festival, the limb that came into one person’s portion and acquired its place of rest during the day before the Festival also contains some of the portion that acquired its place of rest with the other person, since it drew nourishment from it. Therefore, each limb may be taken only to a place to which both purchasers are permitted to go.

Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to him,

they were puzzled

at Rav

by his position that the drawing of nourishment creates a prohibition with regard to the Shabbat boundaries:

But if

they were not concerned about the prohibition of set-aside objects,

and did not prohibit the animal because of the nourishment it drew, should we say that

they were concerned about the prohibition of boundaries,

and the Sages prohibited it because of the nourishment it drew?!

For if you apply the legal status of one limb to another because it drew nourishment from it, you should have said that this animal may not be carried at all. Each person’s portion is a set-aside object with regard to the other person, since he certainly had mentally set it aside from his use. If so, even after they divided it and each person received his portion, you should prohibit carrying it, since it had drawn nourishment from his partner’s portion, which was set aside.

And since you do not say this with regard to the prohibition of set-aside objects, why should you say it with regard to the boundaries?!

Rav remained silent

and did not answer Rav Kahana and Rav Asi’s question.

And we inquire about the matter:

What is the conclusion?

Rabbi Hoshaya said: There is retroactive clarification,

and therefore both the animal and the barrel are permitted; the Sages were not concerned about the limbs drawing nourishment from one another.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There is no retroactive clarification,

and both the barrel and the animal are prohibited.

The Gemara questions the statement attributed to Rabbi Hoshaya that there is retroactive clarification:

But

how could

Rabbi Hoshaya hold

that there is retroactive clarification?!

This cannot be said. For we find that, with regard to the rabbinic impurity of a tent, Beit Hillel holds that there is retroactive clarification, whereas Rabbi Oshaya explains their words in a manner that proves that he holds that there is no retroactive clarification:

“Impurity of a tent” in Torah law is the impurity imparted by a corpse to everything located with it beneath one roof.

The Sages added a rabbinic impurity of a tent, decreeing impurity upon all vessels located beneath the lintel of an entrance through which the corpse might eventually be taken out.

If the entrance was open, the vessels become impure by Torah law, since the lintel is considered an extension of the tent. The rabbinic decree applies only when the entrance is closed and locked and the vessels are outside the door, beneath the lintel.

If the house in which the corpse is located has several entrances, all of them are impure, since it is possible that the corpse will be taken out through any one of them.

But if a particular entrance was designated for taking out the corpse, the Sages did not decree impurity upon the other entrances, provided that their doors are closed and locked, so that they will not become impure by Torah law.

And even if no particular entrance was designated for removing the corpse, but one of the house’s entrances was open while the other entrances were closed by locked doors, the other, closed entrances do not render objects impure.

Those standing at the open entrance, however, become impure by Torah law,

because the open entrance is considered the entrance designated for taking out the corpse through it. Therefore, the Sages did not decree impurity upon those beneath the lintels of the other entrances.

And we learned

in tractate Oholot [7:3]:

A.

If the corpse

was

in a house, and

the house

had

several

entrances, and all the entrance doors were open, or all of them were closed and locked—

all of them are impure.

If all the doors were open, everyone standing there becomes impure by Torah law. If they were all closed, those standing there become impure by rabbinic law, since it is possible that the corpse will be taken out through any one of the entrances.

B. If, after the corpse died,

one

of

them

was opened—only

it,

the open entrance,

is

impure

The entrance renders the vessels now standing beneath its lintel impure by Torah law through the impurity of a tent.

And if

all of

them,

all the other closed entrances, are

pure

and do not render anything impure even by rabbinic law, because the open entrance is the one designated for taking out the corpse.

There is no disagreement that vessels placed in the other entrances after the one entrance was opened are pure, since from that point onward there is an entrance designated for taking out the corpse.

However, the Sages disagreed about the status of vessels that were lying in the other entrances between the time of the corpse’s death and the opening of the entrance: Are they impure, since at that time all the entrances were included in the uncertainty as to whether the corpse would be taken out through them, or are they not impure? This will be explained below.

C. If all the entrances were closed, and he

intended

with regard to the corpse

to take it out through one of them,

or

he intended to take the corpse out

through a window that had

an opening of

four

handbreadths

by four

handbreadths—the minimum measurement of an “entrance” through which a corpse can be taken out—

his intention saves

the other entrances from impurity: his intention to take the corpse out through one of the entrances

saves all

the remaining

entrances, protecting them from rabbinic impurity of a tent, as though he had actually opened that entrance to take out the corpse.

This applies provided that the doors of all the other entrances are closed and locked. If they are open, everyone present becomes impure by Torah law.

D. According to the Gemara’s initial understanding, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree about the status of the vessels that were in the other entrances between the time of death and the time when he intended to take the corpse out through a particular entrance:

Beit Shammai say:

The purification of the vessels that were in the other closed entrances is conditional:

And that is,

on the condition

that he

intended

with regard to the corpse

to take it out

through that particular entrance while he was still alive,

before the corpse died. Thus, there was never a time when there was uncertainty about taking the corpse out through the other entrances.

And Beit Hillel say: Even

if he thought of the particular entrance only

after the corpse died,

the vessels that were in the other entrances are nevertheless pure, even those that were there at a time when he had not yet thought of a particular entrance.

According to the Gemara’s present understanding, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree about the law of retroactive clarification:

Does deciding on a particular entrance clarify retroactively that this entrance had been designated for removing the corpse all along? This is the opinion of Beit Hillel, and therefore the Sages did not decree impurity upon vessels that had previously been in the other entrances.

Or do we not say that it is clarified retroactively that this entrance was the one designated for taking out the corpse? This is the opinion of Beit Shammai, and therefore all vessels that were in the other entrances between the time of the corpse’s death and the time when he decided on the particular entrance are impure.

And it was stated concerning this,

this Mishna:

Rabbi Hoshaya said:

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree only

—

to purify the entrances from that point onward.

According to Beit Hillel, from the moment he decided on a particular entrance, all the entrances became pure. According to Beit Shammai, once the entrances acquired rabbinic impurity from the time the corpse died, that impurity remains even when he decided to take the corpse out through a particular entrance; it is removed only when one of the doors is actually opened.

It follows from Rabbi Hoshaya’s words that only vessels brought into the entrances

from that point onward—

not

indeed, are pure.

But

retroactively,

with regard to purifying vessels that had already been in an entrance before he formed his intention,

not

did his intention help. We do not say that it is clarified retroactively that from the beginning he intended to take the corpse out through the entrance that he chose only later.

It follows that according to Rabbi Hoshaya there is no retroactive clarification. How, then, can we say that according to Rabbi Hoshaya there is retroactive clarification?!

And on the basis of this objection, the Gemara reverses the opinions of the amoraim concerning the animal and the barrel:

Reverse it;

and thus you should teach:

Rabbi Hoshaya said: There is no retroactive determination

and both are forbidden;

and Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There is retroactive determination,

and both are permitted.

And the Gemara is astonished at the reversal of the opinions of the amoraim:

And does Rabbi Yoḥanan hold that there is retroactive determination?!

But Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: As for brothers who divided

the landed property that they received in the inheritance of their father—as

“purchasers”

they are considered

to be,

as though they purchased from one another, for it is possible that this one’s portion came into the possession of that one’s brother and he acquired it by means of a purchase and not by way of inheritance.

And

since they are like purchasers—

they return

to

one another

their portions

at the Jubilee,

like the other purchasers of ancestral fields, whose land returns to its owners at the Jubilee.

It follows that we do not say that the matter was retroactively clarified, when they divided, that the portion coming to each of the brothers is precisely the portion that he inherited from his father, and an inheritance does not return at the Jubilee.

And if you say

that perhaps you will say, to resolve this:

that Rabbi Yoḥanan does not hold that there is retroactive determination

only

in matters from the Torah,

such as with regard to return at the Jubilee, for it is a law of the Torah that the lands return to their owners at the Jubilee, and retroactive determination does not stand against the law of return at the Jubilee, which is from the Torah.

But in matters of rabbinic enactment

such as the prohibition of תחומין, which is only rabbinic,

he does hold

retroactive determination. I will still raise an objection to you: Perhaps the portion that came to this one was not his, and behold, they exchanged their portions.

We learned in the Mishna in Eruvin: “

A person may stipulate concerning his eruv”—a person may, if he wishes, place two eruvei תחומין, one at the end of two thousand cubits to the east of his house, and one at the end of two thousand cubits to the west of his house, and stipulate and say:

If a Sage will come tomorrow from the east, I wish that my eastern eruv should acquire for me at the time when the day was sanctified, so that I may hear his discourse; and if he will come from the west—my western eruv.

And if two Sages will come, one from the east and one from the west—to whichever place I wish, I will go!

And if he came neither here nor there—I am like the people of my city.

For we say, “There is retroactive determination,” and the matter was clarified at the time when the day was sanctified which eruv he would ultimately want, and that eruv is the one that acquired for him when the day was sanctified.

And in matters of rabbinic enactment, does he hold that there is

retroactive determination? For even with regard to the rabbinic prohibition of תחומין, we find that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that there is no retroactive determination:

And Ayyo taught

[a Sage’s name] in a

beraita:

Rabbi Judah says: A person may not stipulate concerning two things simultaneously,

he cannot place two eruvei תחומין on the two sides of the city [when he does not know from where the Sage will come] and stipulate and say: If two Sages come, “to whichever place I wish, I will go.”

Rather,

it is concerning one Sage that he stipulates and says:

If a Sage comes to the east, his eruv is to the east,

and if a Sage comes

to the west, his eruv is to the west; but

if a Sage comes

here and there

and I will go to whichever place I wish—

not.

Because “there is no retroactive determination,” and at the time when the day was sanctified it was not known with which eruv he would ultimately be satisfied, and we do not know which eruv acquired for him when the day was sanctified.