Beitzah 37b (לז:) — the Talmud in English

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Dosa says—and some say that Abba Shaul says:

One who purchases an animal from another before the Festival, even though he did not receive it from him until the Festival—

it is considered like the feet of the purchaser.

And one who entrusts an animal to a shepherd, even though he did not entrust it to him until the Festival—

it is considered like the feet of the shepherd.

Since he intended to entrust it to the shepherd, at the onset of the day his intention was that it establish its place of residence like the residence of the shepherd.

The Gemara rejects the proof that our Mishna does not follow Rabbi Dosa:

You may even say

that our Mishna

follows Rabbi Dosa;

that is,

and it is not difficult:

Because

here

in Rabbi Dosa’s statement, it is referring

to

a city in which there is

only one shepherd,

and everyone entrusts their animals to him. Therefore, it is certain that the owner’s intention was that the animal establish its place of residence like the feet of the shepherd.

Here,

in our Mishna,

the case is

a city in which there are

two shepherds,

and at the onset of the day it was not known to which shepherd the animal would be entrusted on the Festival. Therefore, the animal establishes its place of residence like the feet of its owners.

The Gemara further infers in accordance with this explanation:

This is also precise, as it teaches in our Mishna:

in our Mishna: “One who entrusts his animal

to his son or to a shepherd.”

It follows that even his son may tend it, and before the Festival it was not determined whether he would entrust it to his son or to a shepherd.

And we conclude:

Learn from this!

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Dosa.

The Rashba wondered: and is it difficult for you: "the halakha" from among those who disagree, and we do not find there one who disputes Rabbi Dosa on this. And he answered: this is what is implied, that they are different because we learned here with one shepherd and here with two shepherds they are different.

And we challenge this:

Did Rabbi Yoḥanan really say this?

But Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha follows an unattributed Mishna.

And we learned

in our Mishna:

“An animal and vessels are like the feet of their owners,

one who entrusts his animal to his son or to a shepherd: these are like the feet of the owners.””

This proves that if he did not entrust it to the shepherd before the Festival, the animal is not like the shepherd’s feet, which is not in accordance with Rabbi Dosa?!

And we answer:

Did we not establish,

did we not establish that our Mishna can even follow Rabbi Dosa, but

here it is referring to one shepherd, and here to two shepherds?

The Sages taught: Two people who borrowed

before the onset of the day

one garment in partnership

for the use of both of them,

this one [Reuven]

borrowed it in order

to go out in it in the morning

of the Festival

to the study hall, and this one [Shimon]

borrowed it in order

to enter in it in the evening [toward evening]

of the Festival

to a banquet.

This one,

Reuven,

made an eruv for it [he made an eruv in order to transport the garment]

—he established an eruv in order to carry the garment—

to the north,

but he did not place his eruv at the end of the boundary. Rather, for example, he placed it one thousand cubits away, with the result that he did not entirely forfeit his ability to walk south: he may still walk one thousand cubits south, that is, up to a distance of two thousand cubits from the place where he established his residence by placing the eruv [and the city is considered only four cubits].

And this one,

Shimon,

made an eruv for it to the south,

and he too left himself the possibility of walking north.

The law governing the garment is therefore that it may be transported only in accordance with the feet of both of them, since they are partners in it.

Therefore:

the one who made an eruv for it to the north,

it goes without saying that he cannot transport it as far as two thousand cubits from his eruv to the north, since his fellow did not make an eruv to the north; rather, he cannot transport it even two thousand cubits north from his home, for his fellow is permitted to walk only one thousand cubits north.

Therefore

he walks

with the garment

to the

side of

the north—

in accordance with the feet of the one who made an eruv for it to the south.

This is only as far as the place to which his fellow [who made an eruv to the south] is permitted to walk—namely, only one thousand cubits to the north.

And the one who made an eruv for it to the south walks south—

in accordance with the feet of the one who made an eruv for it to the north,

only one thousand cubits, since that is the distance to which even his fellow, who made an eruv to the north, is permitted to walk.

And if they reduced

the boundary

of the boundary,

meaning that there was a full boundary of two thousand cubits in each direction, extending between the two eruvin; that is, each placed his eruv at the end of two thousand cubits, one to the north and one to the south, leaving four thousand cubits between the two eruvin.

Since the one who made an eruv to the north can walk only north and forfeited all ability to walk south, while his fellow, who made an eruv to the south, forfeited all ability to walk north, therefore:

he may not move it from its place,

for there is no place to which both of them are permitted to walk, and the garment has the status of the feet of both of them.

It was stated: Two people who jointly purchased a barrel and an animal [or an animal]

or an animal

as partners

before the Festival in order to divide them on the Festival, and divided them on the Festival: the amoraim disputed whether each may take his share to any place to which he himself may go, or whether they have the status of property belonging to partners, which may be transported only to a place to which both partners may go.

Rav said: The barrel is permitted,

and each one may transport his share to any place to which he is permitted to go.

But the animal is prohibited

from being transported to every place; it may be transported only within the area common to both of them.

And Shmuel said: The barrel is also prohibited

from being transported to every place; it may be transported only within the area common to both of them.

The law governing the transport of the barrel and the animal depends on the issue of “there is retroactive clarification”: do we say that through the division it becomes clear retroactively that the portion which came into each person’s possession had already been his when the day began and had established its place of residence? Or do we say that the matter is not clarified retroactively, and that when the day began the portion that ultimately came into one person’s possession may have belonged to the other and established its place of residence?

The Gemara therefore challenges Rav’s opinion:

What does Rav hold?!

If he holds that “there is retroactive clarification”

even the animal should be permitted!

Each person should be permitted, even with regard to the animal, to take his portion to the place he reached, since it becomes clear retroactively that when the day began each person’s portion already belonged to him and established its place of residence?!

And if he holds that “there is no retroactive clarification,”

even the barrel should also be prohibited!

For when the day began, it was possible that the portion that ultimately came into Reuven’s possession belonged to Shimon and established its place of residence?!

We explain Rav’s position:

In fact, he holds

Rav

that there is retroactive clarification,

and therefore the barrel is permitted. However,

an animal is different,

for retroactive clarification is ineffective with regard to it, and it remains prohibited.

Since

the boundaries draw nourishment from one another,

as all of its limbs draw nourishment from one another throughout the Festival, the limb that came into one person’s share and had established its place of residence before the day began also contains something from the portion acquired by the other, since it drew nourishment from it. Therefore, each limb may be transported only to a place to which both purchasers are permitted to go.

Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to him,

expressing their astonishment

to Rav Kahana and Rav Asi concerning Rav,

about his position that the nourishment renders the animal prohibited with regard to boundaries:

But if

they did not take the nourishment into account with regard to the prohibition of muktzeh,

to prohibit the animal on account of nourishment, is it conceivable that

they did take it into account with regard to the prohibition of boundaries,

and that the Sages prohibited it on account of nourishment?!

For if you are going to give each limb the status of the other because it drew nourishment from it, you should have said that this animal may not be moved at all. For each person’s portion is muktzeh with respect to the other, since he certainly removed it from his mind. If so, even when they divided the animal and each person’s portion came to him, you should have prohibited moving it, since it drew nourishment from his fellow’s portion, which was muktzeh.

And since you do not say this with regard to the prohibition of muktzeh, why should you say it with regard to boundaries?!

Rav remained silent,

and did not answer Rav Kahana and Rav Asi’s challenge.

We inquire concerning this

: What was the conclusion?

Rabbi Oshaya said: There is retroactive clarification,

and therefore both the animal and the barrel are permitted; the Sages did not take into account the limbs’ drawing nourishment from one another.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There is no retroactive clarification,

and both the barrel and the animal are prohibited.

The Gemara questions the statement that we report in the name of Rabbi Oshaya, that there is retroactive clarification:

But

if

Rabbi Oshaya holds

that there is retroactive clarification?!

This cannot be said. For we find, with regard to the rabbinic law of impurity imparted by a tent, that Beit Hillel holds the principle of retroactive clarification, while Rabbi Oshaya explains their words in a manner that demonstrates that he holds that there is no retroactive clarification:

“Impurity imparted by a tent” according to Torah law is the impurity that a corpse imparts to everything located with it beneath one roof.

The Sages added a rabbinic form of impurity imparted by a tent, decreeing impurity upon all vessels located beneath the lintel of an entrance through which the corpse is eventually to be removed.

If the entrance was open, the vessels become impure by Torah law, since the lintel is considered an extension of the tent. The rabbinic decree applies only when the entrance door is closed and locked, and the vessels are outside the door, beneath the lintel.

And if the house in which the corpse is located has several entrances, all of them are impure, since it is possible that the corpse will be removed through any one of them.

However, if they designated a particular entrance through which to remove the corpse, the Sages did not decree impurity upon the other entrances, provided that their doors are closed and locked, so that they will not become impure by Torah law.

Likewise, even if they did not designate a particular entrance for removing the corpse, but one of the house’s entrances was open and the other entrances were closed with locked doors, the other, closed entrances do not impart impurity.

Those standing at the open entrance become impure with Torah impurity.

This is because the open entrance is considered the entrance designated for removing the corpse, and therefore the Sages did not decree impurity upon those located beneath the lintels of the other entrances.

And we learned

in tractate Oholot [7:3]:

a.

A corpse

that was

in a house, and

there

were

for the house

many entrances,

and all the entrance doors were open, or all of them were closed and locked—

all of them are impure.

If all the doors were open, everyone standing there becomes impure by Torah law. If they were all closed, those standing there become impure by rabbinic law, since there is a possibility that the corpse will be removed through any one of the entrances.

b. And if, after the death of the corpse,

one

entrance

of them was opened—

only

it,

the open entrance,

is impure [this entrance imparts Torah impurity through tent impurity to the vessels now standing beneath its lintel].

The entrance renders the vessels now standing beneath its lintel impure by Torah law through the impurity of a tent.

But

if

all of them,

all the other closed entrances,

are pure

from imparting impurity, and do not impart impurity even by rabbinic law, since the open entrance is the one designated for removing the corpse.

As for vessels placed at the other entrances after one entrance was opened, there is no dispute that they are pure, since from that point onward there is an entrance designated for removing the corpse.

However, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed the status of vessels that had been placed at the other entrances between the time of the corpse’s death and the opening of the entrance: are they impure, since at that time all the entrances were included in the uncertainty as to whether the corpse might be removed through them, or not? As will be explained below.

c. And if all the entrances were closed, and one

intended

with regard to the corpse

to remove it through one of them.

Or

he intended to remove the corpse

through a window containing

an opening of

four

handbreadths

by four

handbreadths [which is the smallest measurement of an “entrance” for removing a corpse]—

he thereby saves

by his intention to remove the corpse through one entrance,

all

the other

entrances,

saving them all from rabbinic impurity imparted by a tent, as though he had actually opened that entrance for removing the corpse. [ [ובתנאי שתהיינה הדלתות של שאר הפתחים הללו סגורות ונעולות, שאם יהיו פתוחות - נטמאים כל הנמצאים שם מן התורה]]And this is provided that the doors of all the other entrances are closed and locked; if they are open, everyone located there becomes impure by Torah law].

D. According to the Gemara’s initial understanding, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree about the status of the vessels that were in the other entrances between the time of death and the time when he intended to take the corpse out through a particular entrance:

d. According to the Gemara’s premise, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed the status of the vessels that were at the other entrances between the time of death and the time when he intended to remove the corpse through a particular entrance:

Beit Shammai say:

the purity of the vessels that were at the other closed entrances is conditional upon the following:

And this is so,

provided that

he intended

with regard to the corpse

to remove it

through the particular entrance while it was still alive,

before the corpse died.

Thus, there was never a time when there was uncertainty concerning removing the corpse through the other entrances.

And Beit Hillel say: even

if he intended to use the particular entrance only

after the corpse died,

nevertheless, the vessels that were at the other entrances are pure, even those that were there at the time when he had not yet designated a particular entrance.

According to the Gemara’s present premise, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed the law of retroactive clarification.

Do we say that once he designated a particular entrance, it becomes clear retroactively that this entrance had been designated for removing the corpse, which is the view of Beit Hillel, and therefore the Sages did not decree impurity upon the vessels that had previously been at the other entrances?

Or do we not say that it becomes clear retroactively that this entrance was the one designated for removing the corpse, which is the view of Beit Shammai? Therefore, all the vessels that were at the other entrances between the time of the corpse’s death and the time when he decided upon the particular entrance are impure.

And it was stated concerning this,

concerning this Mishna:

Rabbi Oshaya said:

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed only

with regard to purifying the entrances from that point onward.

According to Beit Hillel, from the moment he decided upon a particular entrance, all the entrances became pure. According to Beit Shammai, however, once rabbinic impurity took effect upon the entrances from the moment the corpse died, it remains even when he intended to remove the corpse through a particular entrance, and it is removed only by the actual opening of one of the doors.

It follows from these words of Rabbi Oshaya that only vessels that entered the entrances

from that point onward—

no,

indeed, they are pure.

But

retroactively,

to purify vessels that had already been at the entrance before his intention—

no,

his intention was ineffective, and we do not say that it becomes clear retroactively that from the outset he intended to remove the corpse through the entrance that he designated only afterward.

It follows that according to Rabbi Oshaya there is no retroactive clarification. How, then, can we say that according to Rabbi Oshaya there is retroactive clarification?!

And on the basis of this objection, the Gemara reverses the opinions of the amoraim concerning the animal and the jug:

Reverse them,

and teach as follows:

Rabbi Hoshaya said: There is no retroactive determination,

and both are prohibited;

and Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There is retroactive determination,

and both are permitted.

The Gemara raises an objection to the reversal of the opinions of the amoraim:

And does Rabbi Yoḥanan hold that there is retroactive determination?!

But Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: When brothers divide

the landed property that they received as an inheritance from their father—they are considered

“purchasers”

and

—,

as though they purchased from one another, since it is possible that each one received his brother’s portion through a sale and not through inheritance.

And,

since they are considered purchasers,

they return

to

to one another

their portions

in the Jubilee,

like all purchasers of ancestral land, whose land returns to its owners in the Jubilee.

It follows that we do not say that the matter was retroactively clarified when they divided, such that the portion that came to each brother was in fact the portion that he had inherited from his father, in which case an inheritance would not return in the Jubilee.

And if you would say,

perhaps one might resolve this as follows:

Rabbi Yoḥanan does not hold that there is retroactive determination

only

by Torah law,

such as with regard to the return of land in the Jubilee, for Torah law requires that the land return to its owners in the Jubilee, and retroactive determination cannot override the law requiring return in the Jubilee, which is of Torah origin.

But with regard to rabbinic law,

such as the prohibition of תחומין, which is only rabbinic,

he does hold

that there is retroactive determination. I will still raise an objection against you: Perhaps the portion that came to this one was not his, and they exchanged their portions.

We learned in a Mishna in Eruvin: “

A person may stipulate regarding his eruv”—a person may, if he wishes, establish two teḥum eruvin, one at the end of two thousand cubits to the east of his home and one at the end of two thousand cubits to the west of his home, and stipulate, saying:

If a Sage comes tomorrow from the east, I wish that my eastern eruv should acquire residence for me at the time that the day was sanctified, so that I can hear his lecture; and if he comes from the west, my eruv is for the west.

And if two Sages come, one from the east and one from the west—I will go wherever I wish!

And if neither one comes here nor there—I am like the residents of my city.

This is because we say that there is retroactive determination: at the time that the day was sanctified, it was clarified which eruv he would ultimately wish to use, and that was the eruv that acquired residence for him when the day was sanctified.

And with regard to rabbinic law, does he hold that there is retroactive determination?

For even with regard to the rabbinic prohibition of תחומין, we find that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that there is no retroactive determination:

And didn’t Avyo

a Sage—teach in a beraita:

Rabbi Yehuda

says: A person cannot stipulate regarding two matters simultaneously,

he cannot place two teḥum eruvin on the two sides of the city [when he does not know from which direction the Sage will come] and stipulate, saying: If two Sages come, “I will go wherever I wish.”

Rather,

it is with regard to one Sage that he stipulates and says:

If a Sage comes from the east, his eruv is for the east,

and if a Sage comes

from the west, his eruv is for the west; but

if a Sage comes

from here and there,

and I will go wherever I wish—

no.

This is because there is “no retroactive determination”: at the time that the day was sanctified, it was not known which eruv he would ultimately wish to use, and we do not know which eruv acquired residence for him when the day was sanctified.