Beitzah 37a — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

it is necessary! ![](pamud.bmp "

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for

already

has a wife

and children

and has already fulfilled the mitzva of being fruitful and multiplying; nevertheless, this prohibition is not called “a shevut,” because there is some mitzva in it, as we learned from the verse: “In the morning sow your seed, and in the evening do not withhold your hand.”

We learned further in the Mishna among the prohibitions that are because of an optional matter:

one may neither remove a shoe nor perform levirate marriage:

And we raise a difficulty:

But he is performing a mitzva,

and why does the Mishna call it “because of an optional matter”?!

And we explain:

It is necessary where there is an elder

[the elder brother of the deceased is alive]

and the mitzva is for the elder to perform levirate marriage.

And all of them—

one may neither judge, nor betroth, nor remove a shoe, nor perform levirate marriage—

what is the reason

that the Sages prohibited them on Yom Tov? Because of

a decree lest he write

a ruling for the cases being judged, a document of betrothal for betrothal, a document of halitza for the woman undergoing halitza, and a marriage contract for the levirate wife.

We learned in the Mishna:

And these are because of a mitzva: one may neither consecrate, nor assign valuations, nor place under a ban:

And we explain the reason for their prohibition:

a decree because of buying and selling,

for these resemble buying and selling, since he removes [the object] from his domain to the domain of the consecrated property, and perhaps he will come to perform buying and selling, which is prohibited by the verse in Isaiah 58: “If you restrain your foot because of the Shabbat … ‘from pursuing your affairs and speaking words’” [the first explanation in Rashi].

We learned in the Mishna:

And one may not raise terumot and tithes:

And we raise a difficulty:

Is it obvious!

Rav Yosef taught: It was necessary

for our Mishna to teach the prohibition against raising terumot and tithes

but

in order to prohibit it even with the intention

of giving it to a koen on that very day,

for there was room to permit it, since his actions do not demonstrate that he intends to make his untithed produce fit in order to eat it, and the matter appears as though all his actions are only for the sake of the koen’s Yom Tov joy, as he requires his teruma.

And this applies

that the Sages prohibited raising terumot and tithes even when he gives them to a koen on that very day, only with

produce that became untithed produce yesterday

[produce that became untithed produce yesterday], which was fit yesterday for the separation of terumot and tithes.

But produce that became untithed produce today

[produce that became untithed on Yom Tov],

such as dough, to separate from it the hallah, we separate and give it to the koen

on that very day.

Here the Gemara returns to explain the beginning of the Mishna, in which it was explained that there are prohibitions called “a shevut,”” some of which are called “because of an optional matter,” and some of which are called “because of a mitzva.”

And we raise a difficulty:

And

is it so that

these

prohibitions called “because of an optional matter,”

because of an optional matter

is what

there is, but because of a shevut there is not,

yet since they are prohibited, they contain the element of a shevut?!

And likewise it is difficult:

And

is it so that

these

prohibitions called “because of a mitzva,”

because of a mitzva

is what

there is, but because of a shevut there is not?!

He said

and explained:

Rabbi Yitzhak: It states the matter by way of “it is not necessary”: It is not necessary to say that a mere shevut is prohibited; rather, even a shevut involving an optional matter is also prohibited. And it is not necessary to say that a shevut involving an optional matter is prohibited; rather, even a shevut involving a mitzva is also prohibited.

We learned in the Mishna:

All these they said with regard to Yom Tov,

and it follows by a kal va-chomer that they apply on Shabbat; the only difference between Yom Tov and Shabbat is food preparation:

And we raise a contradiction

against what we learned: There is no difference between Yom Tov and Shabbat except food preparation, from the previous Mishna—in which we learned an additional distinction between Shabbat and Yom Tov—

one may lower

produce

through a skylight on Yom Tov, but not on Shabbat,

so it follows that Yom Tov differs from Shabbat in another respect?!

Rav Yosef said: It is not difficult,

for:

This

our Mishna, from which it is evident that one may not lower produce on Yom Tov—for every shevut that they decreed with regard to Shabbat they also decreed with regard to Yom Tov, and there is no distinction between them except with regard to food preparation—

is Rabbi Eliezer,

as he explains and proceeds.

This

the first part of our Mishna, in which we learned that lowering produce on Yom Tov is permitted, because on Yom Tov exertion not needed for Yom Tov is permitted when there is monetary loss [Rashi, Shabbat 124a],

is Rabbi Yehoshua,

as he explains and proceeds.

As it was taught: “The one and its offspring,”

which it is prohibited to slaughter on one day,

that fell into a pit,

and he wishes to save them.

Rabbi Eliezer says: He raises the first with the intention of slaughtering it, and slaughters it; and for the second he provides sustenance in its place, so that it should not die,

but he may not trouble himself to raise it from the pit, since this is exertion not needed for Yom Tov, since he is not slaughtering it, even though there is monetary loss here.

And the same applies: it was not permitted to lower produce on Yom Tov because of monetary loss, and this is our Mishna.

Rabbi Yehoshua says: He raises the first with the intention of slaughtering it, but does not slaughter it, and then uses a ruse

and raises

the

second; whether he wishes, he slaughters this one, and whether he wishes, he slaughters that one,

and because of this they permitted this ruse on account of monetary loss.

And likewise, according to him, it is permitted to lower produce because of monetary loss, and this is what we learned in the previous Mishna.

Abaye said to him: From where [do you infer this],

for one can distinguish and say:

Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer stated his ruling only there

that one may not raise the animal from the pit,

because it is possible to provide sustenance,

and there is no monetary loss here,

but here, where it is impossible to provide sustenance, it is not so,

that is, it is permitted to trouble oneself to save it because of the loss of his money.

Alternatively,

one can distinguish according to Rabbi Yehoshua and say:

Rabbi Yehoshua stated his ruling only there, because it is possible to use a ruse,

and it is not evident from his actions that he intends to save his money, for the observer says: The first one he raised was lean, and that is why he is raising the second one, which is better than it.

But here, where it is impossible to use a ruse,

for everyone knows that he is doing it only to save his money,

they did not

the Sages permit it, lest people come to treat the prohibition of Yom Tov lightly.

Rather, Rav Pappa said: It is not difficult

to reconcile the previous Mishna with our Mishna, for:

This—

our Mishna, which did not permit lowering produce even on Yom Tov—

is the view of Beit Shammai,

as he explains and proceeds.

This—

the previous Mishna—

is the view of Beit Hillel,

as he explains and proceeds.

As we learned: Beit Shammai say: One may carry out neither the child, nor the lulav, nor a Torah scroll into the public domain.

And Beit Hillel permit,

and since carrying out something not needed is permitted by Torah law, they also did not decree against carrying an object, [Rashi].

And we raise a difficulty:

Perhaps it is not so; Beit Shammai stated their ruling only there, concerning carrying out,

but concerning carrying an object, no.

And we explain: And is it so that

carrying an object is not a need of carrying out?

The beginning of carrying out is through carrying an object, and everything that they decreed was only because of carrying out, [Rashi].

Mishna:

It is prohibited for a person to go out on Shabbat beyond the boundary within which he was dwelling when the day became sanctified, or from the place where he acquired residence when the day became sanctified through an eruv; and it is established for us that the prohibition of boundaries is rabbinic. And not only is he himself prohibited from going beyond the boundary, but—

the animal and the utensils

of a person are

like the feet of the owners,

and one may lead them only within the boundary in which their owners were permitted to walk.

One who entrusts his animal to his son or to a shepherd

on Yom Tov,

these are like the feet of the owners,

because when the day became sanctified the animal was in its owners’ domain. But if he gave it to him on the eve of Yom Tov, it is like the feet of his son or the shepherd [Rashi in the Gemara].

Utensils that

belong to all the members of the household and are

designated

for the use

of one of the brothers in the household, these are like his feet,

and even though all of them automatically have a share in it, the residence of the one to whom it is designated takes effect upon it, and the brothers do not have the power to confer their residence upon it and prohibit this one from taking it to the place where he established an eruv [Meiri].

And when they are not designated

for one of them, but are jointly owned by all of them,

these are like the place to which they all go,

that is, one may lead the utensil only within the overlapping boundary of all the brothers.

One who borrows a utensil from his fellow on the eve of Yom Tov,

the utensil is

like the feet of the borrower,

because when the day became sanctified, the utensil acquired residence with the borrower.

But if he borrowed it

on Yom Tov

itself, and when Yom Tov became sanctified the utensil was in the lender’s domain, it is

like the feet of the lender,

because the utensil acquired residence with its owner.

And likewise, a woman who borrows from her fellow

on Yom Tov

spices

for her pot,

and water and salt for her dough, these

the pot and the dough

are like the feet of both of them

[the lender and the borrower], that is, one may lead them only within the boundary overlapping for both of them.

And the reason is: The spices, water, and salt in them acquired residence with the lender and are therefore like her feet, whereas the rest of the pot and the dough acquired residence with the borrower and are therefore like her feet.

Rabbi Yehuda exempts water,

that is, it is permitted to lead the dough even beyond the boundary of the woman who lent the water,

because they have no substance,

that is, they are not discernible in the dough.

Gemara:

The Mishna

that we learned concerning one who gives his animal to a shepherd on Yom Tov, that it is like the feet of the owners and not like the feet of the shepherd, since when the day became sanctified it was in the owners’ domain, is

not according to Rabbi Dosa,

for according to Rabbi Dosa, even if he gave it to the shepherd on Yom Tov, it is like the feet of the shepherd.