Beitzah 37a (לז.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

It is necessary!

For

he already

has a wife

and children

and has already fulfilled the mitzva of procreation; nevertheless, this prohibition is not called a shevut, because there is some mitzva involved, as we learned from the verse: “In the morning sow your seed, and in the evening do not withhold your hand.”

We learned further in the Mishna among the prohibitions that are classified as matters of personal choice:

One may not perform ḥalitza, nor perform yibbum:

And we raise an objection:

But he is performing a mitzva;

why, then, does the Mishna call it “a matter of personal choice”?

And we answer:

It is necessary where there is an elder

[the deceased’s oldest brother is alive]

and it is a mitzva for the elder to perform yibbum.

And all of them—

not judging, nor betrothing, nor performing ḥalitza, nor performing yibbum—

what is the reason

the Sages prohibited them on a Festival? Because of

a decree lest one write

a ruling concerning litigation, a document of betrothal for betrothal, a document of ḥalitza for the woman undergoing ḥalitza, or a marriage contract for the yevama.

We learned in the Mishna:

And these are matters involving a mitzva: One may not consecrate, nor valuate, nor declare an item ḥerem:

And we explain the reason for their prohibition:

A decree due to commerce,

since these resemble commerce, as he removes the item from his own domain into the domain of the Temple treasury; and perhaps he will come to engage in commerce, which is prohibited by the verse in Isaiah 58: “If you restrain your foot because of Shabbat… from pursuing your business and speaking words,” [first explanation in Rashi

]. We learned in the Mishna:

And one may not lift terumot and tithes:

And we raise an objection:

Isn’t this obvious?!

Rav Yosef taught: It was necessary

for our Mishna to teach the prohibition against lifting terumot and tithes

only

in order to prohibit it even with the intention

of giving it to a koen that same day,

for one might have permitted it, since his actions do not demonstrate that he intends to make his tevel fit so that he can eat it, and the matter might appear as though all his actions are solely for the sake of the koen’s Festival joy, as the koen needs his teruma.

And this applies

when the Sages prohibited lifting terumot and tithes even when he gives them to a koen that same day, only with regard to

produce that became tevel the previous day

[produce that became tevel the previous day], which was fit from the previous day for the separation of terumot and tithes.

But produce that became tevel today

[produce that became tevel on the Festival],

such as dough from which one must separate ḥalla, one separates and gives it to the koen

that same day.

Here the Gemara returns to explain the beginning of the Mishna, in which it was explained that some prohibitions are called “shevut,” some are called “matters of personal choice,” and some are called “matters involving a mitzva.”

And we raise an objection:

And

is it to say that

these

prohibitions that are called “matters of personal choice,”

“matters of personal choice”

is all that

there is, but there is no shevut—yet since they are prohibited, they necessarily involve shevut?!

And likewise, this difficulty may be raised:

And is it to say that

and

these

prohibitions

that are called “matters involving a mitzva,”

“matters involving a mitzva”

is all that

there is, but there is no shevut?!

He said

and explained:

Rabbi Yitzḥak: It is stating a case that is not necessary: It is obvious that an isolated shevut is prohibited; rather, even a shevut involving a matter of personal choice is prohibited. And it is obvious that a shevut involving a matter of personal choice is prohibited; rather, even a shevut involving a mitzva is prohibited.

We learned in the Mishna:

All these were stated with regard to a Festival;

all the more so on Shabbat; the only difference between a Festival and Shabbat is food preparation:

And we raise a contradiction

to what we learned: There is no difference between a Festival and Shabbat except food preparation, from the previous Mishna—which taught an additional distinction between Shabbat and a Festival—

one may lower

produce

through a skylight on a Festival, but not on Shabbat;

so there is another distinction between a Festival and Shabbat?!

Rav Yosef said: It is not difficult,

because:

This

Mishna, from which it is evident that one may not lower produce on a Festival—that every shevut decreed with regard to Shabbat was also decreed with regard to a Festival, and the only distinction between them is food preparation—

is Rabbi Eliezer’s

opinion, as will be explained below.

This

the first clause of our Mishna, which taught that it is permitted to lower produce on a Festival, because on a Festival exertion that is not needed for the Festival is permitted when financial loss is involved [Rashi, Shabbat 124a],

is Rabbi Yehoshua’s

opinion, as will be explained below.

As it was taught in a beraita: If a cow and its offspring,

which are prohibited to be slaughtered on the same day,

fell into a pit,

and he wishes to save them.

Rabbi Eliezer says: He raises the first one on the condition that he will slaughter it, and he slaughters it; and for the second he provides sustenance in its place so that it will not die,

but he is not permitted to take the trouble to raise it from the pit, since this is exertion not needed for the Festival, as he will not slaughter it, even though financial loss is involved.

The same applies: it is not permitted to lower produce on a Festival because of financial loss, and this is the ruling of our Mishna.

Rabbi Yehoshua says: He raises the first one on the condition that he will slaughter it, but he does not slaughter it, and he then employs a ruse

and raises

the

second; whether he wishes, he slaughters this one, and whether he wishes, he slaughters that one, and therefore they permitted this ruse because of financial loss.

According to his opinion, it is likewise permitted to lower produce because of financial loss, and this is what we learned in the previous Mishna.

Abaye said to him: From where

is this derived? There is room to distinguish and say:

Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer stated his ruling there only

that the animal may not be raised from the pit

because it is possible to provide it with sustenance,

and there is no financial loss here;

but here, where it is impossible to provide it with sustenance, no,

that is, it is permitted to take the trouble to save it because of the financial loss.

Alternatively,

one can distinguish according to Rabbi Yehoshua and say:

Rabbi Yehoshua stated his ruling there only because it is possible to employ a ruse,

so his actions do not demonstrate that he intends to save his property, for an observer can say that the first animal he raised was lean, and therefore he is raising the second, which is better than it.

But here, where it is impossible to employ a ruse,

as everyone knows that he is acting solely to save his property,

no,

the Sages did not permit it, lest people come to treat the prohibitions of a Festival lightly.

Rather, Rav Pappa said: It is not difficult,

to reconcile the previous Mishna with our Mishna, because:

This—

our Mishna, which did not permit lowering produce even on a Festival—

is the opinion of

Beit Shammai,

as will be explained below.

This—

the previous Mishna—

is the opinion of

Beit Hillel, as will be explained below.

As we learned: Beit Shammai say: One may take out neither a child, nor a lulav, nor a Torah scroll into the public domain.

And Beit Hillel permit,

and since taking something out for a nonessential purpose is permitted by Torah law, the Sages likewise did not decree against carrying it, [Rashi].

And we raise an objection:

Perhaps this is not so; Rabbi Shammai’s school stated its ruling there only with regard to taking out, but

not with regard to carrying.

And we answer: Is it to say that

carrying is not a need of taking out?

The beginning of taking an item out is by means of carrying it, and everything that they decreed was only because of taking it out, [Rashi].

Mishna:

It is prohibited for a person to leave on Shabbat beyond the boundary within which he was located when Shabbat began, or from a place where he acquired residence when Shabbat began by means of an eruv; and it is established that the prohibition of תחומין is rabbinic. Not only is he himself prohibited from leaving beyond the boundary, but—

an animal and utensils

belonging to a person are

like the feet of their owner,

and they may be taken only within the boundary in which their owners are permitted to walk.

One who entrusts his animal to his son or to a shepherd

on a Festival,

these are like the feet of the owner,

because when the day began the animal was in its owner’s domain. But if he gave it to him on the eve of the Festival, it is like the feet of his son or the shepherd, [Rashi in the Gemara].

Utensils that

belong to all the members of the household and are

designated

for the use

of one of the brothers in the household are like his feet,

and even though all of them automatically have a share in it, the resting of the one for whom it is designated takes effect upon it, and the brothers have no power to impose their residence on it and prohibit him from taking it to a place where he made an eruv, [Meiri].

And if they are not designated

for one of them, but are jointly owned by all of them,

they are like the place to which they all may go,

that is, the utensil may be taken only within the overlapping boundary shared by all the brothers.

One who borrows a utensil from his fellow on the eve of the Festival,

the utensil is

like the feet of the borrower,

because when the day began, the utensil acquired residence at the borrower’s location.

But if he borrowed it

on the Festival

itself, and when the Festival began the utensil was in the lender’s domain, it is

like the feet of the lender,

because the utensil acquired residence with its owner.

And similarly, a woman who borrows from another woman

on a Festival

spices

for her pot,

and water and salt for her dough, these

the pot and the dough

are like the feet of both of them

[the lender and the borrower]; that is, they may be taken only within the overlapping boundary shared by both of them.

The reason is that the spices, water, and salt in them acquired residence with the lender, and are therefore like her feet, whereas the remainder of the pot and the dough acquired residence with the borrower, and are therefore like her feet.

Rabbi Yehuda exempts water,

that is, it is permitted to take the dough even beyond the boundary of the woman who lent the water,

because it has no substance,

that is, it is not discernible in the dough.

Gemara:

The Mishna

that we learned concerning one who gives his animal to a shepherd on a Festival, that it is like the feet of the owners and not like the feet of the shepherd, since when the day began it was in the owners’ domain, is

not in accordance with Rabbi Dosa,

for according to Rabbi Dosa, even if he gives it to a shepherd on the Festival, it is like the feet of the shepherd.