Beitzah 10b (י:) — the Talmud in English

But

if he did not state on the eve of the Festival that he was designating “this one and that one,” but intended to select them

on the Festival

on the basis of his statement, “From here I will take,”

it is forbidden

to handle them on the basis of the principle of berera.

This is because

sometimes the fat ones are found:

perhaps those that he first took in his hands, assuming that they were fat, will, upon examination, be found to be

lean, and the lean ones

will be found

to be fat, and he will handle something that is unfit for him—with the result that by examining all of them he has handled muktze that he does not need. Moreover, he had intended to designate only as many doves as he needed for the Festival. Therefore, he must designate specific doves on the eve of the Festival, and he will not come to examine the others.

Thus, by examining all of them, he will have handled items set aside from use, even though he does not need them. Moreover, he had intended to designate only as many doves as he needed for the Festival. Therefore, he must designate specific doves before the Festival, the ones he will use, so that he will not examine the others.

Alternatively,

even if Beit Hillel rely on their view that berera applies, one must say, “This one and that one I will take,” since

sometimes they are found

to be

all lean, and

then

he will abandon them,

because, in his great disappointment at finding no fat doves at all, despite having thought that there were several fat ones in the dovecote, he will leave them all and take no fledgling for his meal.

And he will come to refrain

and will come to refrain

from rejoicing on the Festival.

But if he already knows on the eve of the Festival that he may take fat doves only from among those he verbally designated, he will not be disappointed, and he will take the lean ones. Therefore, on the eve of the Festival he must select “this one and that one,” which he recognizes as they are.

Mishna:

A. If he

de

signated

doves

on the eve of the Festival—

black

doves—and there were no additional doves there,

and he found

on the Festival that all the doves present there were

white,

it is clear that the designated black doves had departed, while those he now found were doves that had newly arrived at the dovecote. The Gemara will explain what the Mishna’s novel element is in this ruling.

Or if he designated

white and found black.

Or if he designated

two and found three,

and he does not recognize the ones he designated—

in all these cases, they are all

forbidden!

In the first two cases, those found certainly came from elsewhere and are muktze, since they were not designated. In the case where he designated two, the third is muktze, and since he cannot distinguish among them, they are all forbidden.

But if he designated

three and found

only

two,

they are

permitted,

because it is reasonable that one of them departed and that two of the designated ones remained. We need not fear that both designated doves departed, just as the third departed, and that those present are new ones; so long as no uncertainty has arisen concerning them, we assume that they remained in their place.

B. If, when he designated them, they were

inside the nest, and

now, when he came on the Festival to take them, he

found

doves on the shelf [Rashi, 11a] projecting from the dovecote

in front of the nest,

and he found no doves inside the nest, since they are not in their place he must be concerned that these are different doves, and since they were not designated, they are

forbidden.

And if there are no

other doves in the vicinity of the nest on the eve of the Festival

except them—

these are permitted,

even though he found them on the shelf in front of the nest and not inside it, because since there are no other doves in the vicinity, we may attribute it to the designated doves having gone out to breathe fresh air on the shelf.

Gemara:

We learned at the beginning of the Mishna that if one designated black doves and found white ones, or designated white ones and found black ones, they are forbidden.

And we wonder:

Is it obvious

that this is the law? Their color proves that they are not the same doves that he designated for the Festival.

Rabba said:

The two cases in the Mishna occurred in a single incident, for

what are we dealing with here?

For example, he de

signated

black doves

in one nest

and

designated

white doves

in a second nest.

And he arose early

on the Festival

and found

the

black ones in the place

of the nest of the

white ones, and

the

white ones he found

in the

place

of the nest of the

black ones.

Lest you say: These

doves—

they are the very ones

that he designated,

and

only

they exchanged places,

from one nest to another.

It teaches us

that

those

that he designated

departed

and went

elsewhere, and these—

are different ones.

The Gemara now leaves aside the fact that one might permit them on the basis of the principle “follow the vicinity”: one could say that the black doves found in the white doves’ nest—and vice versa—came from the nearby nest, where they had been, and that these are the designated doves. Nevertheless, they are not permitted on the basis of “follow the vicinity,” because against it we have the principle “follow the majority.”

Since the majority of doves in the world are not the designated doves, we attribute these doves to having arrived from elsewhere.

The rule “follow the majority” therefore overrides the rule “follow the vicinity”!

And we analyze this:

Shall we say that this law of our Mishna—that if he found the white doves where the black ones had been and the black ones where the white ones had been, they are forbidden—

that this law of our Mishna—that if one found the white doves where the black ones had been, and the black ones where the white ones had been, they are prohibited—

supports the

law stated by

Rabbi Hanina?

For Rabbi Hanina said:

If two rules confront us, one saying “follow the

majority,”

and

the other saying “follow the

vicinity,”

and they conflict with one another—

follow the majority!

For were it not for his statement, we would follow the vicinity, and it would have been appropriate to permit the doves, attributing them to the nearby nest and considering them designated for the Festival.

And we reject this: There is no proof from here. For even if, in a case of “majority and vicinity,” one follows the vicinity, it is possible to interpret our Mishna

as Abaye said

below [11a] in another context,

with regard to the

shelf projecting from the dovecote.

Here too,

the case

concerns the shelf.

Many doves arrive from elsewhere onto the shelf projecting from the dovecote. They do not enter the nests inside the dovecote, because the doves occupying the nests prevent them from entering. But when the doves in the nests leave their nests, the doves from elsewhere that are on the shelf enter them in their place.

Consequently, all the doves—both the designated ones that had been in the nearby nests and the doves that came from elsewhere and are on the shelf—are equally near the nest. Since the rule “follow the vicinity” gives us no determination, because all the sources are equally near, we follow the rule “follow the majority.”

Therefore, we must say that when the black doves departed, doves from elsewhere entered the nest; they belong to the majority, rather than the white doves from the neighboring nest, which belong to the minority.

We further learned in our Mishna: If one designated

two and found three

—they are forbidden.

The Gemara explains the reason for the prohibition:

In any event,

if

all three

are others

, and not the designated ones—

then they are indeed others.

And if they are not others

—then there is one

from elsewhere

mixed with them,

and because of it all three are forbidden.

The one that is forbidden is not nullified by the majority of two permitted ones, because it is “a matter that has a permitted route,” since it can be eaten after the conclusion of the Festival without resorting to the leniency of nullification by a majority. Also, living creatures are significant, and by rabbinic law they are not nullified by a majority because of their significance. [Tosafot] We further learned in the Mishna: If one designated

three and found two

—they are permitted.

And we explain:

What is the reason?

Since it is reasonable that

these

two that remain

are themselves

the designated ones,

indeed

and one of them went

away

elsewhere.

And we raise the following question:

And we inquire:

Shall we say that our Mishna,

which states that the two found in the place of the three are the same two that had been there and remained,

is the view of Rabbi, and not

the view of

the Rabbis,

who disputed this matter concerning money of ma'aser sheni:

As it was taught:

One who

left a maneh

[one hundred] coins of ma'aser sheni in a box

and found

in the place where he had left them

two hundred

—it is reasonable that he had placed another maneh of non-sacred money there and forgot that he had added it. Therefore, the money is deemed

non-sacred money and ma'aser sheni mixed with one another,

and he must take the better maneh of the two and say: “If this is the ma'aser money, it is good; and if it is non-sacred money, let the other maneh be redeemed upon it,”

the words of Rabbi.

And the Rabbis say: They are all non-sacred,

because it is not a person’s practice to mix coins of ma'aser sheni with non-sacred coins. Therefore, we presume that he took the maneh of ma'aser sheni coins that had been here and placed it elsewhere, and these two hundred coins are non-sacred. And likewise they disputed the case in which one

left two hundred

coins of ma'aser sheni

and found

only

a maneh

—what is its status:

The maneh

of ma'aser money remains

in place

here, in its location,

and the other maneh

that had been here is

removed [

taken from here].

The words of Rabbi.

And the Rabbis say:

Since this person did not go up to Jerusalem, we cannot presume that he divided his ma'aser money, leaving some here and transferring some elsewhere. Rather, it is reasonable to say that he took all two hundred and placed them elsewhere, and these one hundred that were found where the money had been left—

they are all non-sacred

[money].

The same applies to the case in our Mishna: When there were three fledglings and only two were found, according to the Rabbis we should presume that all three went together, whereas the two that were found are new ones. According to Rabbi, the two that were found are the two that had been there and remained.

This assertion—that our anonymous Mishna follows Rabbi and is contrary to the Rabbis—is difficult to make, because wherever Rabbi and the Sages disagree, the halakha follows the Rabbis who dispute him; while, on the other hand, the halakha follows an anonymous Mishna.

And we answer:

You may even say

that our Mishna can also be explained according to the view of

the Rabbis.

For

this was stated concerning it:

Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar both say: Doves differ

from money,

since

doves

are capable of moving about

from their place one by one, and the departure of one is no proof concerning the two that remained. Money, however, is not ordinarily taken in part, with some of the ma'aser money being placed elsewhere; it is reasonable that he took all of it, and that the maneh found was subsequently brought to this place.

We nevertheless inquire:

Why need

Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar force the matter and

reinterpret it

by distinguishing between money and doves, and say:

“Doves differ, since they are capable of moving about”?

But was it not stated concerning that

dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi regarding ma'aser sheni money, when one left two hundred and found only one hundred, that the

w

ords of

Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar

were said in explaining their dispute?

One

of them

said:

The dispute applies only when the two hundred were

in two pouches,

with one maneh in each pouch.

The dispute

is that in this case Rabbi maintains that it is possible that he took only the contents of one pouch, while the other maneh remains in its place.

But

if the two hundred were

in one pouch,

and now only one hundred were found in it,

according to everyone

they are

non-sacred,

and Rabbi concedes that had he taken money from it, he would not have separated the manayot, and certainly the maneh found in it is non-sacred.

And one

of them

said

the opposite: The dispute applies only when all two hundred were

in one pouch.

But

if the two hundred were

in two pouches,

one hundred in each separate pouch, and afterward only one pouch containing one hundred was found,

according to everyone

even the Rabbis concede

that one hundred

of ma'aser

remains in place

in this pouch,

and the other hundred

—

has been removed [

taken away] together with its pouch to another place.

Granted, according to the one who says, “The dispute is with two pouches”, \-

this is why it was necessary to reinterpret the matter here: “Doves differ, since they are capable of moving about”

in order to distinguish between ma'aser money, where according to the Rabbis all the money is non-sacred because we presume that he took both pouches, and doves, where according to our Mishna we presume that only one fledgling moved away and the two found are the original two. Without this distinction, we would compare two coins in two pouches to two doves, since in both cases it is probable that both were not taken together.

But according to the one who says

that the dispute applies only

to one pouch,

but with two pouches

“according to everyone, one maneh remains in place and one maneh has been removed,”

the same distinction can be made with three doves, which are like separate pouches.

And

now

the difficulty arises:

Why need we reinterpret the matter

“Doves differ, since they are capable of moving about,” when

you said that with “two pouches” they do not disagree,

that one remained and the other went away?

If so, with two doves as well we should presume that one went away and the two remained in their place; why is another reason needed to distinguish between them?

Rav Ashi said: Here,

in our Mishna, the case is even

of doves that are tied

to one another,

and

likewise, in the beraita, the case is

of pouches that are tied

to one another;

we are dealing

with this case. That is, when Rabbi Yohanan or Rabbi Elazar established the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi as applying to one pouch, his intention was to refer to two pouches tied to each other, which are like one pouch. The rule that “one maneh remains in place and one maneh has been removed” applies only to two separate pouches.

Correspondingly, the Mishna too is speaking of doves tied to one another. Apparently, the ruling stated in the Mishna, permitting those remaining in the nest, accords only with Rabbi’s position, who maintains that when the money found is in tied pouches, we presume that one maneh remains in place and one maneh has been removed.

Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between the law of the pouches and the law of the doves as follows:

Doves

are accustomed to

separate from one another,

by breaking the tie between them. Therefore, we may presume leniently that one fledgling went away and one fledgling remained. Whereas

pouches

do not separate from one another.

Therefore, according to the Rabbis, if one pouch is found, it necessarily is not one of the two that had been left, since we presume that a person came and took both of them together.

And Rabbi,

who holds that here too we say that the remaining pouch is one of the two that had been there ,

can say to you: The pouches too

become detached, like fledglings. For

sometimes

their ties digest away,

the bond between them becomes detached on its own, and a person comes and takes one of them, leaving the other.