Beitzah 11a (יא.) — the Talmud in English

We learned in our Mishna: If one designated pigeons from the eve of a Festival

within the dovecote, and

on the Festival

found

pigeons

before the dovecote—

on a small shelf projecting before each compartment, which is a continuation of the floor of the dovecote—

they are forbidden.

And we raise a difficulty:

Can our Mishna support

the opinion of

Rabbi Ḥanina?

As Rabbi Ḥanina said: When there is a majority and a nearest possibility,

follow the majority.

As explained on the preceding page].

There is also proof for his statement from here, since the designated pigeons in the compartment are the closest pigeons to the small shelf before it, and nevertheless the pigeons found on the shelf are forbidden, because we follow the majority of forbidden pigeons that came from elsewhere.

Abaye said:

Here we are dealing with a dovecote in which pigeons are sitting

on the shelf

that is large and before the dovecote, and pigeons from other places reach it. Therefore, it is impossible to assume that the pigeons found on the small shelf are the pigeons from the nearest compartment and permit them, since all of them are equally near, including the pigeons on the large shelf, which are forbidden.

It follows that our Mishna provides no proof for Rabbi Ḥanina, because all the pigeons are considered equally near, and in such a case everyone agrees that we follow the majority.

Rava said:

Here it is impossible to interpret the Mishna, as Abaye did, as referring to a case in which there were forbidden pigeons on the large shelf. In such a case, it is obvious that the pigeons are forbidden regardless of which possibility one considers, since both the majority and the nearest possibility indicate that they are forbidden. The Mishna would not need to teach that one does not follow the nearest possibility of the permitted pigeons from the compartment in opposition to the forbidden pigeons on the large shelf, since the latter are both the majority and the nearest possibility.

Rather,

we are dealing with two compartments,

which were

one above the other.

He designated the pigeons in one of the two compartments. When he came on the Festival to take them, he found nothing in the compartment whose pigeons he had designated, but found pigeons only before it; and he found nothing in the other compartment.

The reason for forbidding the pigeons found before the compartment is not the majority of pigeons in the world. Rather, it is the concern that perhaps those he found before the compartment that had been designated came from the compartment that had not been designated, since he found nothing in the designated compartment and nothing in the non-designated compartment. We must therefore be concerned that these pigeons came from the non-designated compartment, while the pigeons from the compartment he designated went elsewhere.

And it is not necessary

for the Mishna to teach us this concern

in the case

where he

d

esignated

the doves in the

lower

nest and did not designate those in the upper

nest, and found doves in the lower nest but found none in the upper nest,

that they are forbidden,

because we say: These

the designated fledglings

went

elsewhere,

and these

found in front of the nest

crawled down,

meaning that they moved downward by crawling,

and descended

below. [This refers to fledglings that have just been born.] In such a case, it is obvious that they are forbidden, because we assume that the doves from the lower nest left, and that the forbidden doves from the upper nest came to the ledge in front of the lower nest.

Rather,

the Mishna comes to teach that

even

if he

d

esignated pigeons in the upper compartment but did not designate pigeons in the

upper but not d

ower compartment, and he came and found pigeons in the upper compartment but none in the lower compartment,

the pigeons are likewise forbidden,

because

the doves designated in the upper nest

we say: These

designated in the upper compartment

went elsewhere, and these

that were found

crawled

crawling upward from the lower compartment,

and ascended

—and they are the ones found before the upper compartment. They are forbidden because they were not designated.

We learned in the Mishna:

And if there are no others there

in the vicinity of the compartment on the eve of the Festival

except these,

those that he designated—even though on the Festival he found pigeons only before the compartment—

these are permitted.

And we raise a difficulty:

What are the circumstances

? What kind of fledglings is the Mishna discussing?

If you say it is referring to flying fledglings,

which are already capable of flying a distance,

why are they permitted on the Festival when there are no other fledglings in their vicinity?

It can be said: These

designated

went

flying

elsewhere, and these

found before the compartment

are others?

Rather,

necessarily, the Mishna is discussing

c

hicks

that crawl,

which cannot fly except a short distance. Therefore, the matter depends on whether or not there is another compartment in the vicinity.

For if there is no other compartment in the vicinity, these fledglings could not have crawled here from a distance, and it is clear that these fledglings are the designated fledglings.

And we raise a difficulty: In either case:

If there is a compartment

in addition

within fifty cubits

[the limit within which they can crawl]—

they crawled

fifty cubits, and it is possible that these are not the designated ones!

And if there is no compartment

in addition

within fifty cubits,

then it is

obvious that they are permitted!

For Mar Ukva bar Ḥama said: Any

fledgling

that crawls

and cannot fly

does not crawl more than fifty cubits!

And we resolve the difficulty:

Actually,

we are speaking of a case

where there is a compartment within fifty cubits, and where

the other compartment

stands around a corner,

beyond the corner of the house. Thus, if the fledgling wishes to move from one compartment to the other, when it reaches the corner of the house it must turn right or left, and it can no longer see its compartment.

Lest you say

that since the distance between the compartments is within fifty cubits,

they crawled

—this teaches us

that a fledgling behaves as follows:

Whenever it crawls and then

as long as, while crawling, it can turn its head and

see its compartment,

it continues

to crawl.

But if not,

if it cannot see its compartment when it turns its head behind it,

it does not crawl

any farther. Therefore, when the other compartment is beyond the corner, the fledgling does not crawl toward it.

In this manner, the Mishna teaches us that the fledglings that were in the compartment are permitted, even though they left it and were found before it, since there is no concern that fledglings from the second dovecote within fifty cubits came there, as they do not pass the corner of the house between the dovecotes.

Mishna:

1.

Beit Shammai say: One may not take

on the Festival

the pestle,

which is a heavy, thick wooden log used to pound wheat in a mortar, in order

to cut meat upon it,

since it is an object whose primary use is for a prohibited activity: it is designated for pounding wheat, which can be done on the eve of the Festival.

And Beit Hillel permit it.

2.

Beit Shammai say: One may not place the hide

before those who tread upon it.

One may not spread it out in a place where people will tread upon it as they walk, since this is the beginning of the process of tanning the hide, and it is forbidden to do so on the Festival.

And

yes,

he may not lift it

the flayed hide—to place it in a guarded location or move it from its place so that it will not spoil—because it is muktze,

unless there is an olive-bulk of meat attached to it,

in which case it is considered attached to the meat and is not muktze. [But even in this manner, he may not place it before those who trample it] .

And Beit Hillel permit it.

Gemara:

The tanna taught: And Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai agree

that

if

already

he cut meat upon it,

it is prohibited to move it

in any other manner not required for the needs of the Festival .

Abaye said: The dispute

between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel applies only

to the pestle,

which is not designated for cutting meat upon it.

But with regard to a “bone-breaker,”

which is a surface designated for cutting meat upon and breaking bones upon,

everyone agrees that it is permitted,

because this labor is permitted on the Festival.

And we challenge this:

Is it not obvious,

for with regard to

“the pestle,”

which is a utensil whose primary use is for a prohibited purpose,

we learned

that they dispute its status, but not with regard to a bone-breaker, which is a utensil specially designated for cutting meat upon it, an act that is permitted on the Festival? It is obviously permitted to move it!

And we explain:

Lest you say

that

the same law applies even to a bone-breaker,

that Beit Shammai likewise adopted the stringency of prohibiting it, because perhaps he will trouble himself to move it and then decide not to cut meat, with the result that he troubled himself to move it on the Festival for no purpose,

and the reason that it teaches

in our Mishna

the pestle

is in order

to inform you of the strength of Beit Hillel, that even

a utensil whose use is

for a prohibited purpose

they too permit

moving it for the sake of the joy of the Festival .

This teaches us

that a bone-breaker is permitted.

There are those who say:

Abaye said: It was necessary only

to permit

even a new bone-breaker,

one that is new.

For

lest you say:

Since it is new,

he may change his mind,

as he may come to regret using it

and not break bones upon it

—and he will not break bones upon it —and there is concern that he will move it without purpose.

This teaches us

that it is permitted to move it, and they were not concerned that he would regret using it.

We inquire:

And

do

Beit Shammai not take concern that he may change his mind?

But

surely

it was taught in a beraita: Beit Shammai say: One may not bring

on the Festival

the slaughterer

[the one who slaughters]

or

the

knife to the animal

that is located at a distance.

And

likewise,

one may not

bring the

animal

from a distant place

to the slaughterer and the knife.

This is because perhaps he will change his mind, with the result that he troubled himself on the Festival for no purpose .

And Beit Hillel say: They may bring

them

to one another,

and they were not concerned that he would change his mind.

Beit Shammai say: One may not bring spices and a pestle

—the handle with which one pounds in the mortar—

to the mortar, nor the mortar to the spices and the pestle,

lest he change his mind, with the result that he troubled himself without need for the Festival.

And Beit Hillel say: They may bring them to one another.

This demonstrates that Beit Shammai are concerned lest he change his mind, whereas Abaye said that they are not concerned.

And we answer:

Can this really be compared!?

What is the comparison?!

Granted,

with regard to bringing the

animal,

there is concern that he may

come to change his mind,

because

he may say

to himself:

I will leave

and spare

this lean animal, and I will bring

another animal

that is fatter than this one.

And with regard to bringing spices in order to grind them for the

pot,

also

there is concern that he may

come to change his mind

about pounding them, because

he may say: I will leave

the preparation of

this pot that requires spices, and I will bring

another pot

that does not require spices.

But

here,

with regard to a bone-breaker,

what is there to say?

Why should there be concern that he will

change his mind and not break bones

upon it?!

For

once he has slaughtered

the animal,

it stands ready to have its bones broken

upon the bone-breaker

and this is certain,

so he will certainly do so!

We learned in the Mishna:

Beit Shammai say: One may not place the hide

before those who trample it.

The tanna taught: And Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree

that

one salts upon it

meat, on top of the hide that he flayed on the Festival .

Meat for roasting.

One salts the meat upon it before roasting it, and a small amount of salt scatters onto the hide, thereby preserving the hide. They permitted this form of tanning because it is performed indirectly, and because of the joy of the Festival: If he knew that the animal’s hide would spoil, he would refrain from slaughtering it .

Abaye said: They taught

that it is permitted to salt meat on top of the hide

only

when the salting is

for roasting,

which involves a small amount of salt.

But

salting

for

cooking in a

pot,

which involves extensive salting,

is not

permitted to be performed on top of the hide.

And we challenge this:

Is it not obvious,

for the beraita explicitly states that the salting is

“for roasting,” we learned!

And we explain:

Abaye teaches us

by saying, “But for cooking in a pot, it is not”—that

even

if one salts meat

for roasting,

but does so with an extensive amount of salt

as one would for cooking in a pot, it is prohibited

to salt it on top of the hide.

The Sages taught: One may not salt

on the Festival

the suet

of an animal so that it will not spoil, because by doing so he tans it .

And they do not turn them over,

so that they may air out, since this too is somewhat like the melakha of processing .

In the name of Rabbi Yehoshua they said: One spreads them

the suet

in the wind, upon pegs,

so that they will not stink, so that he will not refrain from slaughtering.

Rav Mattana said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua.

Some say:

Rav Mattana said: The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua.

We raise an objection:

Granted, according to the one who says that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua,

it is well that it

was necessary

to teach us this.

For

it might have entered your mind to say: When there is an individual and a majority, the halakha follows the majority,

therefore

it teaches us

that here

the halakha follows the individual.

But according to the one who says that the halakha does not follow

Rabbi Yehoshua—

it is obvious;

what need was there to teach us this, since the rule is always that when there is an

individual and a majority,

the halakha follows the majority!?

And we answer:

It might have entered your mind to say

that

Rabbi Yehoshua’s reasoning is compelling, for if you do not permit him, he will refrain and will not slaughter,

and therefore the halakha should follow him.

It teaches us

that nevertheless the halakha does not follow him.

We raise an objection:

What is different

that they prohibited spreading the suet in the wind

from

spreading

a hide before those who tread on it,

which Beit Hillel permitted!?