Beitzah 10a — the Talmud in English

But where there is no

complete permission, as with

“a thrust-in spade”—

they did not permit him to dig and cover the blood. Similarly, regarding designating the fledglings, Beit Shammai did not permit him to take them until he had moved them, thereby assuring that he would not change his mind about slaughtering the fledglings after taking them from the dovecote. For if he changed his mind, it would turn out that his designation had been invalidated retroactively, and he had moved them on a Festival without need.

they did not

permit him to dig and cover. And likewise here, concerning designating the fledglings, Beit Shammai did not permit him to take them until he moved them, thereby assuring himself that he would not change his mind about slaughtering the fledglings after taking them from the dovecote. For if he were to change his mind, it would turn out that his designation had been annulled retroactively, and he had moved them on the Festival without need.

Alternatively: Beit Hillel stated here only up to this point—

to be lenient with designation by speech, without requiring him to move them—

but since

there is only the prohibition of

“set-aside”

in taking them when they are not prepared for slaughter.

And therefore,

when one stands and says, “This one and that one I am taking”—

it suffices.

For mere designation is sufficient to remove the prohibition of set-aside from them, since through his speech they become “prepared.”

But there—

with a thrust-in spade—

they did not

permit Beit Hillel to cover, for the sake of Festival joy, because of the concern lest he come to crush clods of earth.

And if so, Rabbi Yohanan did not need to reverse their positions in the Mishna concerning the designation of fledglings, because of their positions in the Mishna concerning one who slaughters a wild animal or bird on the Festival.

Rather, if there is a difficulty—

a contradiction between the statements of the Mishnayot, so that Rabbi Yohanan had to exchange the position—

this is the difficulty:

We learned below [11a]:

Beit Shammai say: One may not take the pestle

which is a thick and heavy wooden surface, intended for crushing wheat, in order

to chop

—to cut—

meat upon it

on the Festival, since it is an implement whose “work is for a prohibition,” and therefore one may not take it even for its own use, to use it for permitted work for the sake of Festival joy.

And Beit Hillel permit

taking it for its own use, to chop meat upon it for the Festival.

Evidently: concerning Festival joy—

Beit Shammai

go

stringently

and prohibit,

and Beit Hillel leniently

and permit.

And we raise a contradiction

from the Mishna at the beginning of the chapter concerning digging with a thrust-in spade to cover the blood, where we find that Beit Hillel are stringent and Beit Shammai lenient:

One who slaughters a wild animal or bird: Beit Shammai, and so forth!

And concerning this

Rabbi Yohanan said: The position is reversed

in the matter of taking the pestle, and one must say that Beit Shammai were lenient in chopping meat upon it, and Beit Hillel prohibited it. [And as their dispute is in the Mishna at the beginning of the chapter.]

And we challenge this:

From where

—from where do you know that the position must be reversed?

Perhaps it is not so!

For

Beit Shammai stated there only up to this point, where there is a thrust-in spade

and there is no prohibition at all in the covering.

But where there is no

complete permission, as with

“a thrust-in spade”—

they did not

permit it. And therefore they were also stringent with an implement whose work is for a prohibition.

Alternatively: Beit Hillel stated here only up to this point

to permit taking the pestle,

but

because

it retains the status of an implement,

and it is not severe set-aside on account of its own nature, but only because its work is for a prohibition; and an implement whose work is for a prohibition may be taken for its own use without concern.

But there

in the matter of covering the blood—

they did not

act leniently in digging and covering, because of the concern lest he come to crush clods.

Rather, if there is a difficulty, this is the difficulty:

We learned below [11a]:

Beit Shammai say: One may not place

on the Festival

the hide

that he stripped from an animal, to spread it

before those who trample,

in a place where the public tramples, because placing it for trampling is prohibited on account of the appearance that he is “tanning” it.

And

likewise,

he may not lift it

after stripping it from the animal, since it is set-aside,

unless there is an olive-bulk of meat upon it,

for then he lifts it by virtue of the meat upon it [which is considered a hide attached to food, though there still applies to it the prohibition of tanning a hide].

And Beit Hillel permit

placing the hide before those who trample and lifting it even without an olive-bulk of meat, because of Festival joy, since if we do not permit him to spread the hide for trampling or to lift it, he will refrain from slaughtering so as not to lose the hide, which deteriorates without tanning.

Evidently: concerning Festival joy—

Beit Shammai are stringent, and Beit Hillel are lenient.

And we raise a contradiction: One who slaughters a wild animal or bird on the Festival, and so forth!

And it implies that Beit Hillel were stringent and Beit Shammai lenient.

Rabbi Yohanan said: The position is reversed

in the Mishna of placing the hide for trampling: Beit Hillel prohibited placing it before those who trample, and Beit Shammai permitted it [and this is like their dispute in the Mishna at the beginning of the chapter].

And we reject this:

From where

do you know that the position must be reversed?

Perhaps it is not so!

Rather,

Beit Shammai stated there only up to this point, where there is a thrust-in spade; but where there is no

reason for permission as with

“a thrust-in spade”—

no.

And here too one must be stringent because of tanning the hide: not to place it before those who trample, and not to lift it because of set-aside.

Alternatively: Beit Hillel stated here only up to this point

that one should be lenient with trampling it and moving it,

but because it is fit to recline upon,

since it is fit for sitting and leaning upon when it is spread out, and it does not appear that he is spreading it for the purpose of tanning; therefore Beit Hillel were lenient with lifting it and spreading it for the needs of the Festival.

But there

where there is concern about crushing clods—

they did not

permit it.

Rather, if there is a difficulty, this is the difficulty:

We learned below [11b]:

Beit Shammai say: One may not remove the shutters

—which are the doors of the shop windows, placed before them like stalls and not attached to the ground—

on the Festival,

in order to take spices for the Festival from the shopkeeper who knows him. Although these shutters do not involve a Torah prohibition of demolition, the Sages decreed concerning them because of shutters that do involve a prohibition of demolition [as explained below, 11b].

And Beit Hillel permit

taking the shutters in order to remove spices for the Festival from the shop, and

even returning

them to their place if they took them, although their return does not involve Festival joy, since if we do not allow him to return them, he will also not take them to open the shop. Beit Hillel permitted exertion on the Festival in taking them and returning them for the sake of Festival joy.

Evidently: concerning Festival joy—

Beit Shammai are stringent, and Beit Hillel are lenient.

And we raise a contradiction: One who slaughters a wild animal or bird on the Festival, and so forth!

And we answer only the contradiction between the statements of Beit Shammai. Granted, Beit Shammai versus Beit Shammai is not difficult.

There

is a difference: it should be permitted because

there is a spade

thrust in.

But

here—

there is no

permission like the permission of

“a thrust-in spade,”

since Beit Shammai hold that the category of the labor of demolishing and building applies also to implements.

But Beit Hillel versus Beit Hillel is difficult!

If they permitted returning the shutters because of Festival joy, why did they prohibit digging and covering the blood on the Festival?

And therefore

Rabbi Yohanan said: The position is reversed

in the Mishna of the shutters. Beit Hillel are the ones who prohibit removing them because of a rabbinic decree, which has no permission because of Festival joy.

And we reject this:

Perhaps it is not so.

Beit Hillel stated here only up to this point

to permit removing the shutters and returning them,

but because there is no

category of the labor of

“building” among implements, and there is no

category of the labor of

“demolishing” among implements. But there—

they did not

act leniently, since there is concern lest he crush clods.

Mishna:

Beit Shammai say: One may not take

a person on the Festival may not take from the dovecote wild fledglings, which come to the dovecote from the fields and are not “house doves”— since they are set-aside and are not “prepared” for slaughter on the Festival—

unless he moved them

—handled them and thereby prepared them for slaughter—

while it was still day.

And Beit Hillel say:

He need not handle them with his hands; rather, it is sufficient that he

stand and say: “This one and that one I am taking

tomorrow”!

Gemara:

Rav Hanan bar Ami said: The dispute

between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel applies only

to the “first brood.”

That is, doves customarily produce each month a pair of doves called a “brood.” But they stop producing from the “season of Tevet” until the “season of Nisan.” And in the season of Nisan the new breeding season begins.

And the owners of dovecotes customarily left the first pair [the first “brood”] of the new breeding season in the dovecote and did not take it from there, in order to make the dovecote attractive to the breeding doves, so that they would wish to remain and continue giving birth there, since the first pair born to them remains there.

For Beit Shammai hold:

He must move them with his hands, and designation by speech is not effective to remove the prohibition of set-aside from them, because

we decree

with regard to the first brood

lest he come to change his mind,

lest he come to regret it after taking them, and it turn out that he moved them on the Festival without need.

The reason they were concerned that he might change his mind is that it would be preferable for him to leave them in the dovecote so that they would serve as companions for the breeding pigeons. Therefore, they required him to move them, because then he firmly decides to take them and will no longer change his mind.

But the House of Hillel hold

that verbal preparation alone is sufficient, and

we do not institute a decree

since they were not concerned that he might change his mind even with regard to the first group.

But with regard to the second group,

there is certainly no concern that he might change his mind. Therefore,

according to everyone, if he stands and says,

“I am taking this one and that one” —

that is sufficient;

that is enough to prepare them and remove from them the prohibition against moving items set aside for use after the Festival began.

The Gemara asks:

With regard to the House of Hillel,

why does he need to say, “I am taking this one and that one”?

Let him say, “From here,

from this dovecote,

I am taking tomorrow”!

When he takes the fledglings tomorrow, it will become clear retroactively that these were the ones he had prepared.

And if you would say

that one could explain

that the House of Hillel do not accept the principle of retroactive designation,

meaning that they do not accept this legal principle even in a matter of rabbinic law, and according to them it will not become clear retroactively, when he takes fledglings tomorrow, that these are the ones he had prepared yesterday; therefore, they required him to say when preparing them, “I am taking this one and that one” .

It is impossible to say this. For we find that with regard to the rabbinic law of impurity transmitted through a shelter, the House of Hillel hold that retroactive designation applies, as will be stated below. [But the House of Shammai hold that retroactive designation does not apply, and therefore with regard to the second group one must say, “I am taking this one and that one”]. “

Biblical impurity transmitted through a shelter” is the impurity imparted by a corpse to everything that is with it beneath one roof.

And in tractate Oholot we find that impurity also applies to all the utensils located beneath the lintel of the doorway through which the corpse is eventually to be taken out. This law is called, “the impurity is destined to leave” . [ And in the notes we will clarify whether this impurity is biblical or rabbinic ].

If the doorway was open, the utensils become impure by Torah law through impurity transmitted by a shelter, since the lintel is considered an extension of the shelter. The law of “the impurity is destined to leave” is needed only when the doorway is closed and the utensils are outside the door, beneath the lintel.

And if the house in which the corpse is located has several doorways, all of them are impure, since it is possible that the corpse will be taken out through any one of them.

But if they designated a particular doorway through which to take out the corpse, impurity does not apply to the other doorways, provided that their doors are closed and locked, so that they will not become impure through the shelter.

And even if they did not designate a particular doorway for taking out the corpse, but one of the house's doorways was open while the other doorways were closed with locked doors, the other closed doorways do not impart impurity. Only those standing at the open doorway become impure through the shelter.

This is because the open doorway is considered the doorway designated for taking out the corpse through it; therefore, impurity does not apply to those beneath the lintels of the other doorways.

And we learned

in tractate Oholot [7:3]:

a.

A corpse

that was

in a house, and

the house

had

for it

doorways

many,

and all the doors of the doorways were open, or all of them were closed and locked—

all of them are impure .

Since it is not known through which doorway the corpse will be taken out, and it is possible that it will leave through each of the doorways, impurity certainly applies to everything located at the doorways .

b. And if after the corpse's death

one

doorway

of them is opened—

only

it,

the open doorway, is

impure [the doorway imparts impurity to the utensils now standing beneath its lintel].

(этот вход оскверняет сосуды, находящиеся теперь под его притолокой).

And

if

all

the other closed doorways are

pure,

so that they do not impart impurity, because the open doorway is the doorway designated for taking out the corpse.

And the utensils placed at the other doorways after the one doorway was opened are pure, since from that point onward there is a doorway designated for taking out the corpse.

However, with regard to the utensils that had been placed at the other doorways between the time of the corpse's death and the opening of the doorway, the Gemara now assumes that the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagree about their status: whether they are impure, since at that time all the doorways were included in the uncertainty that perhaps the corpse would leave through them, or whether they are not. This will be explained below. The conclusion is that everyone agrees that the uncertainty is not clarified by opening the doorway, and the utensils that had been there before it was opened remain impure.

c. And if all the doorways were closed, and he

intended

to take out the corpse

through one of them ,

Or

he intended to take out the corpse

through a window that has

an opening of

four

handbreadths

by four

handbreadths [this is the smallest measurement of an opening through which a corpse can be taken out]—

his intention to take the corpse out through one of the doorways protects

the other doorways

from all

the

other doorways,

to save all of them from impurity at doorways, as though he had actually opened that doorway in order to take out the corpse.

And on condition that the doors of the other openings be closed and locked, for if they are open, all those present there become impure .

d. And according to the Gemara’s premise, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel differed concerning the status of the vessels that were in the other openings between the time of death and the time when he intended to take out the dead through a particular opening:

Beit Shammai say:

the purification of the vessels that were in the other closed openings is conditional upon this:

And this is so

on condition

that he intended

with regard to the dead person

to take him out

through the particular opening while he was still alive,

before

dies the dead person.

And it follows that there was no time at which there was uncertainty concerning taking out the dead through the other openings.

And Beit Hillel say: even

if he intended concerning the particular opening only

after the dead person dies,

nevertheless, the vessels that were in the other openings are pure, even those that were there at the time when he had not yet intended concerning a particular opening.

And according to the Gemara’s present premise, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel differed concerning the law of retroactive designation:

whether, once he intended concerning a particular opening, it becomes clear retroactively that this opening had been designated for taking out the dead, and this is the view of Beit Hillel; and according to their view, impurity did not take effect upon the vessels that had previously been in the other openings, [and this is also their view in the first clause, in the case where one of the openings was opened, that the vessels that had been in the other openings are retroactively pure, as stated above].

Or one does not say that it becomes clear retroactively that this opening is the one designated for taking out the dead, and this is the view of Beit Shammai; and therefore all the vessels that were in the other openings between the time of the dead person’s death and the time when he decided upon the particular opening are impure.

And from here it is proven that Beit Hillel hold that “there is retroactive designation,” and say that the matter becomes clear retroactively.

And the question returns: Why must one say concerning the fledglings in the dovecote, on the eve of the Festival, “This one and this one I shall take tomorrow,” and is it not enough that he designate fledglings without specifying, and tomorrow, when he takes fledglings from the dovecote, it will become clear retroactively that these are the fledglings that he designated yesterday?

And we answer:

it was stated concerning it,

concerning this Mishna:

Rabba said:

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not differ concerning the law of retroactive designation. According to everyone, the vessels that were in all the openings until the time when they intended to take out the dead are impure, and we do not say that it became clear retroactively that the dead person was not destined to leave through them.

In what did Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel differ? —

To purify the openings from this point onward.

According to Beit Hillel, from the time that he decided upon a particular opening, all the openings become pure. But according to Beit Shammai, since the status of impurity descended upon the openings from the time that the dead person died, it remains even when he intended to take out the dead through a particular opening, and it does not depart from them except through the actual opening of one of the doors, for only an act removes one from the status created by intention. [And therefore vessels that are placed in the other openings become impure even after he intended concerning one of them].

And it follows that everyone agrees that the vessels that were in the openings before his intention remain in their impurity, and their dispute concerns only the vessels that were placed in the openings after his intention: before he actually opened one, according to Beit Hillel impurity does not take effect upon them, whereas according to Beit Shammai the vessels in all the openings become impure until he actually opens one opening. [But in the first clause they did not differ, since it is speaking of a case in which one opening had already actually been opened, and the vessels that had been in the other openings until then are impure, while from that point onward they are pure].

And Rabbi Oshaya likewise said

like Rabba: that their dispute concerns only

purifying the openings from this point onward.

And the Gemara explains:

“From this point onward”

yes,

only after he intended to take him out through one of them do the other openings become pure. But

retroactively

no,

they do not become pure even according to Beit Hillel, and therefore, also concerning the doves of the dovecote, they did not rely upon retroactive designation to permit them retroactively.

Rava said: actually,

also

retroactively

Beit Hillel purify, since according to their view “there is retroactive designation.”

But here,

with regard to the fledglings,

this is the reason

that Beit Hillel did not rely upon the law of retroactive designation, and it is not enough to say, “From here I shall take” —

perhaps he will handle

one fledgling, and examine it,

and abandon it.

For perhaps he will find it less fat than he thought, and abandon it, and again

handle

another fledgling,

and abandon it,

until he finds a fat fledgling according to his desire.

And

it follows that he

is handling something that is not fit for him,

an object that is muktze that is not fit for him, because he did not designate it .

And we object:

But you said, in the case of one standing

to the side

and saying, “This one and this one I shall take,” it is sufficient,

for it is enough that he says the designation verbally, and he need not check or examine them. If so, there is still concern that when he comes to take them on the Festival, he will examine them and reconsider and take others. How, then, does the detailed designation remove this concern?

And we answer:

These words

that he need not check them, but it is enough for him to say, “This one and this one I shall take,” apply only in a case where he specified his designation

on the eve of the Festival

and he knows that he is permitted to take only the doves that he designated, and not others, which are muktze. Therefore, there is no concern that he may examine them and exchange them on the Festival.