Beitzah 10a (י.) — the Talmud in English

they did not permit him to dig and cover the blood. Similarly, regarding designating the fledglings, Beit Shammai did not permit him to take them until he had moved them, thereby assuring that he would not change his mind about slaughtering the fledglings after taking them from the dovecote. For if he changed his mind, it would turn out that his designation had been invalidated retroactively, and he had moved them on a Festival without need.

since Beit Shammai hold that the labor categories of demolishing and building also apply to utensils.

The reason they were concerned that he might regret his decision is that he would prefer to leave them in the dovecote so that they could serve as mates for the breeding pigeons. Therefore, they required him to shake them, for then he definitively resolves to take them and will no longer regret his decision.

And Beit Hillel hold

that verbal designation alone is sufficient preparation, and

we do not institute a decree

since they were not concerned that he would regret his decision even with regard to the first brood.

But with regard to the second brood,

there is certainly no concern that he will regret his decision. Therefore,

according to everyone, if he stands and says

“I will take this one and that one”—

it is sufficient;

this is enough to prepare them and remove the prohibition of muktzeh from them.

And we raised a difficulty with this:

And Beit Hillel—

why must he say, “I will take this one and that one”?

Let him say, “From here

from this dovecote

I will take tomorrow”!

And when he takes the fledglings tomorrow, it will become retroactively clear that these are the ones he designated.

And if you would say

that one could explain that

Beit Hillel do not accept the principle of retroactive designation,

as they do not accept the principle of berera even with regard to a rabbinic law, and in their view it will not become retroactively clear, when he takes the fledglings tomorrow, that these are the ones he designated yesterday; therefore, they required him to say when preparing them: “I will take this one and that one”.

It is impossible to say this. For we find with regard to the law of tent impurity, which is rabbinic, that Beit Hillel accept the principle of berera, as follows, whereas Beit Shammai do not accept berera; therefore, with regard to the second brood one must say, “I will take this one and that one.”

“Tent impurity” according to Torah law is the impurity imparted by a corpse to everything located with it beneath one roof.

And in tractate Oholot we find that impurity also applies to all vessels located beneath the lintel of the doorway through which the corpse is destined to be removed. This law is called “the end of impurity is to emerge”. [And in the notes we will clarify whether this is Torah impurity or rabbinic impurity.]

If the doorway was open, the vessels become impure by Torah law through tent impurity, since the lintel is regarded as an extension of the tent. The law of “the end of impurity is to emerge” is needed only when the doorway is closed and the vessels are outside the door, beneath the lintel.

And if the house in which the corpse is located had several doorways, all of them are impure, since with regard to each one it is possible that the corpse will be removed through it.

But if they designated a particular doorway through which to remove the corpse, impurity does not apply to the other doorways, provided that their doors are closed and locked, so that they will not become impure by virtue of tent impurity.

And even if they did not designate a particular doorway for removing the corpse, but one of the house's doorways was open while the other doorways were closed with locked doors, the other closed doorways do not impart impurity. Only those standing at the open doorway become impure through tent impurity.

This is because the open doorway is regarded as the doorway designated for removing the corpse through it; therefore, impurity does not apply to those located beneath the lintels of the other doorways.

And we learned

in tractate Oholot [7:3]:

a.

A corpse

that was

in a house, and

the house

had

for it

doorways

many,

and all the doorway doors were open, or all of them were closed and locked—

all of them are impure .

Since it is not known through which doorway the corpse will be removed, and with regard to each doorway it is possible that it will emerge through it, impurity certainly applies to everything located in the doorways .

b. And if after the corpse's death

one

doorway

of them is opened—

only

it—

the open doorway—

is impure [this doorway renders impure the vessels now standing beneath its lintel].

impure [the doorway imparts impurity to the utensils now standing beneath its lintel].

And

if

all

all the other closed doorways are

pure

and do not impart impurity, since the open doorway is the one designated for removing the corpse.

And vessels placed at the other doorways after the one doorway was opened are pure, since from that point onward there is a doorway designated for removing the corpse.

[But with regard to the vessels that were placed at the other doorways between the time of the corpse's death and the opening of the doorway, the Gemara initially assumed that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed their status: whether they are impure, since at that time all the doorways were included in the doubt as to whether the corpse would emerge through them, or whether they are not. As will be explained below. And we conclude that everyone agrees that the doubt is not clarified by the opening of the doorway, and the vessels that were there before it was opened remain in their state of impurity.]

c. And if all the doorways were closed, and he

intended

concerning the corpse

to remove it through one of them.

Wrote Rashash wrote that this intention depends on the person responsible for burying the corpse, and Mishna Aharona in Oholot likewise ruled this way based on the Tosefta [there, chapter 8, halakha 4]: if, after he intended to take the corpse out through a particular doorway, the brothers or relatives of the deceased came and decided to take it out through another doorway, the impurity is removed from the first doorway and transfers to the doorway chosen by the relatives. The reason is that from that point it is their responsibility to bury him. See the notes on Tosafot.

Or

he intended to remove the corpse

through a window that has

an

four

handbreadths

by four

handbreadths opening [which is the smallest measurement of an “opening” for removing a corpse]—

his intention to remove the corpse through one of the doorways protects

the other doorways

all

the

other doorways,

saving all of them from the impurity of doorways, as though he had actually opened that doorway in order to remove the corpse through it.

on condition that the doors of the other openings are closed and locked; for if they are open, everything located there becomes impure . d.

According to the Gemara's premise, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree concerning the status of the vessels that were in the other openings between the time of the death and the time when he decided to remove the corpse through a particular opening:

Beit Shammai say:

The purification of the vessels that were in the other sealed openings is conditional upon this:

And that is,

on condition

that he had intended

with regard to the corpse

to remove it

through the particular opening while he was still alive,

before

the corpse died.

Thus, there was never a time when there was uncertainty concerning the removal of the corpse through the other openings.

And Beit Hillel say: Even

if he thought of the particular opening only

after the corpse died,

nevertheless, the vessels that were in the other openings are pure, even those that were there at a time when he had not yet thought of a particular opening.

According to the Gemara's present premise, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree concerning the law of bereira:

Do we say that once he has decided upon a particular opening, it becomes clear retroactively that this was the opening designated for removing the corpse, as Beit Hillel maintain? According to their view, ritual impurity did not apply to the vessels that had earlier been in the other openings. [And this is also their view in the first clause, in the case where one of the openings was opened: The vessels that had been in the other openings become retroactively pure, as stated above].

Or do we not say that it becomes clear retroactively that this was the opening designated for removing the corpse, as Beit Shammai maintain? Therefore, all the vessels that were in the other openings between the time of the corpse's death and the time when he decided upon the particular opening are impure.

And from here it is proven that Beit Hillel maintain that “there is bereira,” and say that the matter becomes clear retroactively.

The question returns: Why must one say of the fledglings in the dovecote on the eve of a Festival, “I will take this one and that one tomorrow”? Why is it not sufficient to designate fledglings without specifying them, and then, on the following day, when he takes fledglings from the dovecote, it will become clear retroactively that these are the fledglings he designated yesterday?

And we answer:

This was stated concerning it,

concerning this Mishna:

Rabba said:

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel do not disagree concerning the law of bereira. According to everyone, the vessels that were in all the openings until the time when they decided to remove the corpse are impure; we do not say that it becomes clear retroactively that the corpse was not destined to be removed through them.

Concerning what do Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree?

Concerning purifying the openings from this point forward.

According to Beit Hillel, from the moment he decided upon a particular opening, all the openings became pure. According to Beit Shammai, once the status of impurity descended upon the openings from the moment the corpse died, it remains even when he decided to remove the corpse through a particular opening, and it is not removed from them until one of the doors is actually opened, because only an action can remove something from the status created by intention. [Therefore, vessels placed in the other openings will become impure even after he has thought of one of them].

It follows that everyone agrees that the vessels that were in the openings before his intention retain their impurity, and that their dispute concerns only vessels placed in the openings after his intention but before he actually opened one. According to Beit Hillel, impurity does not apply to them; according to Beit Shammai, the vessels in all the openings become impure until he actually opens one opening. [But in the first clause they do not disagree, since it concerns a case where one opening had already been opened in practice: Vessels that were in the other openings until then are impure, and from that point onward they are pure].

And Rabbi Oshaya likewise said

like Rabba: Their dispute concerns only

purifying the openings from this point forward.

The Gemara explains:

“From this point forward”

yes,

only after he has decided to remove it through one of them do the other openings become pure. But

“retroactively”

no: They do not become pure even according to Beit Hillel. Therefore, with regard to the fledglings in the dovecote as well, they did not rely on bereira to permit them retroactively.

Rava said: Actually

also

retroactively

Beit Hillel purify them, since they maintain that “there is bereira.”

But here,

with regard to the fledglings,

this is the reason

that Beit Hillel did not rely on the law of bereira, and it is not sufficient to say, “I will take from here”

perhaps he will handle

one fledgling and examine it,

and leave it.

For perhaps he will find it less plump than he had thought and leave it, and then

handle

another fledgling

and leave it,

until he finds a plump fledgling to his liking.

And

it turns out that he

is handling something that is not fit for him,

an muktze object that is not fit for him, since he did not designate it .

And we challenge this:

But you said that when he stands

to the side

and says, “I will take this one and that one,” it is sufficient,

that it is enough for him to state the designation verbally and he need not examine or handle them. If so, there is still reason for concern that when he comes to take them on the Festival, he will examine them, change his mind, and decide to take others. How, then, does the detailed designation remove this concern?

And we answer:

That statement applies

when he need not examine them, and it is sufficient for him to say, “I will take this one and that one”—that is, only when he specified his designation

on the eve of the Festival

and knows that he is permitted to take only the fledglings he designated, and not others, which are muktze. Therefore, there is no concern that he will examine them and exchange them on the Festival.