Bava Metzia 9b — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara adds:

And if it is the public domain, he acquires it.

And this is according to what we have now established: that the matter concerns a sale, and the seller said to him, “Acquire it in the manner in which people acquire.” Thus, if he was riding in the public domain, he acquired it. For there, this is the customary manner: to ride and not to lead, so that passersby would not interrupt between him and the animal; therefore, he leads it by riding.

And if he is an important person, he acquires it.

An important person does not ordinarily lead an animal; rather, it is a manner of honor for him to ride the animal. Therefore, he acquires it by riding, because this is the customary manner for an important person.

And if she is a woman, she acquires it.

A woman does not ordinarily lead an animal, because she does not have the strength to pull it, lest the animal break away from her; therefore, she leads an animal by riding. And if so, in the case of a woman as well, this is the customary manner.

And if he is a contemptible person, he acquires it.

A lowly person, whose practice is to ride before everyone, and who is not modest, acquires it by riding, because this is his practice.

It follows that, according to the conclusion, riding in the city does not acquire only when this was in an alley in the city, and only when the rider was a man who was neither an important person nor a person of inferior standing, but an average person, who is not considered wealthy, who is not embarrassed to lead an animal on foot; therefore, it is not his practice to ride, and if he rode in an alley, he did not acquire it.

Rabbi Elazar raised a question: If one says to his fellow: “Pull this animal, in order to acquire the vessels upon it,” what is the law?

A person who wishes to sell his fellow the vessels upon the animal without the animal itself: can the buyer acquire the vessels through the act of pulling the animal, when he does not move the vessels themselves from their place?

And the Gemara is astonished:

“In order to acquire”!? Who said to him, “Acquire it”!?

That is to say, the Gemara understood that he says to him, “Pull the animal in order to acquire the vessels upon it,” and the meaning of this statement is: You will indeed pull it with the intention of acquiring, but I, the seller, do not transfer ownership to you! And if so, how will he acquire it when there is no intention on the part of the transferor?

Rather,

the wording of Rabbi Elazar’s question must be corrected as follows: If one says to his fellow:

“Pull this animal and acquire”

by this pulling

the vessels upon it—what is the law?

He says to him: Pull this animal so that you will acquire [the vessels], and I indeed intend to transfer ownership to you.

Does the pulling of an animal effect the acquisition of vessels, or not?

The doubt is whether the vessels are acquired through pulling the animal. And it is certain that if he says to him, “Pull this chest and acquire the vessels inside it,” he acquires the vessels through pulling the chest. But with vessels upon an animal, he is indeed pulling the animal, but the animal moves on its own. And if so, there is room to say that the pulling does not benefit the vessels, since in practice the vessels are dragged because of the animal’s walking and not because of the buyer’s act of pulling the animal.

Rava said: If he said to him, “Acquire the animal and acquire the vessels,” does he acquire the vessels?

For the animal

is a moving courtyard

and

a moving courtyard does not acquire!

That is to say, Rava infers from the fact that Rabbi Elazar’s doubt is specifically when he sells him only the vessels that, if he sells him the animal together with the vessels, he certainly acquires the vessels. And Rava wonders: How will he acquire the vessels together with the animal, according to the possibility that pulling an animal does not benefit the vessels?

And one cannot say that he acquired them through acquisition by means of a courtyard, because the vessels are upon the animal, and the animal is like his courtyard; and since he acquired the animal through pulling, the vessels placed upon it are acquired by him through acquisition by means of a courtyard. For this is impossible, since the animal is a “moving courtyard,” and a moving courtyard does not acquire.

And if you would say that it is when it was standing,

perhaps we should say that the acquisition of the vessels upon the animal through acquisition by means of a courtyard is speaking when it was standing. This too is impossible, since

but

there is a general principle concerning acquisition by means of a courtyard:

anything that, if it were

while

moving, would not acquire

through acquisition by means of a courtyard, also when it is

standing or sitting, it does not acquire.

That is to say, any courtyard that is fit to move, even though it is not moving now, is considered a moving courtyard. Therefore, even a standing animal, since it is fit to move, is not a courtyard for acquiring.

And the conclusion of the Gemara is:

And the halakha is: when it is tied!

The acquisition of the vessels upon an animal through acquisition by means of a courtyard—that is, that the animal is considered his courtyard—is specifically when the animal is tied, for then it cannot walk, and only then does he acquire the vessels upon it.

It follows that if he sells him the animal and the vessels upon it, he acquires both of them specifically if he pulled the animal and afterward [or while he was pulling it] it was tied, for then he acquires the vessels upon it through acquisition by means of a courtyard. But acquiring vessels upon an animal through pulling the animal without acquiring the animal itself is the doubt raised by Rabbi Elazar.

Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rabbi Yehoshua, said to Rava: If that is so,

according to your statement, that everything that does not remain in its place but moves and sways is considered a moving courtyard, and a moving courtyard does not acquire, then one who

was moving [

traveling ]

in a boat, and fish jumped and fell into the boat—so too,

shall we say here

that it is a moving courtyard, and he does not acquire

the fish through acquisition by means of a courtyard, because the boat is a “moving courtyard”!?

He said to him: The boat is resting in place, and it is the water that carries it.

A boat is not considered a moving courtyard, because the boat remains in its place, and only the water carries it; this is unlike an animal, which carries itself.

And the Gemara raises another difficulty against Rava’s words:

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: If that is so,

that a moving courtyard does not acquire, if she

was moving in the public domain,

which is not the woman’s domain, and her husband

threw

to her

a bill of divorce into her lap or into her basket,

a basket placed upon her head, then

here too,

if he gave the bill of divorce into the basket, shall you say

that she is not divorced

by it, since the basket is a moving courtyard!? But the Mishna in tractate Gittin [77a] says: If he threw her bill of divorce into her lap or into her basket, she is divorced!

He said to him: The basket is resting in place, and she is walking beneath it.

A basket that is upon her head is not a moving courtyard, just as in the case of a boat, because the basket is resting, and only the woman beneath it is moving; but the basket itself does not move from its place, and therefore it is not a moving courtyard.

Mishna:

One who

was riding upon an animal,

and saw the lost object

lying on the ground,

and said to his fellow

who was walking beside him:

“Give it to me,”

raise the lost object and give it to me

!” His fellow picked it up

and

said: “I acquired it for myself

for myself”—

!” His fellow acquired it.

His companion.

But,

if, after he gave it to him,

only after he had given him the lost object,

his fellow said

:

“I acquired it first,”

immediately, because at the time I lifted it I intended to acquire it for myself,

he has said nothing!

For either way, if we believe him that he indeed acquired the lost object for himself from the outset, then he subsequently gave it to his riding fellow as a gift. And all the more so if we do not believe him, but say that he truly intended at the outset to acquire the lost object for his fellow and afterward changed his mind, then his fellow acquired it immediately upon his lifting it. And even if we say that one who lifts a lost object for his fellow does not acquire it for his fellow [see the Gemara], this lost object is ownerless in the interim, until it reaches his fellow’s hand, and then he acquires it.

Gemara:

We learned there

in tractate Peah:

One who gathered the peah,

a person who entered his fellow’s field, and gathered the peah,

and said: “Behold, this is for so-and-so, a poor person.”

The Shita Mekubetzet cites early authorities who disagree with Rashi, because there is a migo: if he had declared all his property ownerless, this field would also have been included, and he would consequently no longer be the owner of the field and could gather the portions for himself. [Nevertheless, they write that Rashi’s interpretation is correct, that the case does not involve the owner of the field himself. This follows from the continuation of the Gemara’s discussion, which states that in a case of one poor person gathering for another poor person, everyone agrees that he acquires it for him. If he were the owner of the field himself, we would again have to invoke two migo inferences: first, the inference that he could have declared the field ownerless, and afterward the inference that since he could acquire it for himself, he could also acquire it for his companion. For as long as he had not declared his field ownerless, one could not say that since he could acquire it for himself, he could also acquire it for his companion, since he is warned regarding what is his. Why, then, would the Sages agree?] The early authorities also wrote that Rashi maintains that even if he declares his field ownerless, he remains prohibited from gathering the designated portions from that field. The determining factor is the time when the main crop of the field was harvested: if the field belonged to him at that time, he can never gather the designated portions from that field, even if, at the time when the designated portions are gathered, the field no longer belongs to him. The Kehillot Yaakov [14] explained the disagreement between the early authorities and Rashi as follows. Rashi maintains that the basis of the prohibition against a poor person gathering from his own field is to complete and reinforce the positive commandment to give the designated portions to the poor. Therefore, the Torah warned the owner of the field not to gather them for himself, even if he is poor. Accordingly, everything depends on the time when the obligation of the designated portions takes effect—that is, the time when the main crop of the field is harvested. If he was obligated in these designated portions at that time, he remains obligated forever, even if he later becomes poor. The early authorities, by contrast, maintain that the basis of the prohibition is that the owner of the field is always considered wealthy with regard to these designated portions, since the main part of the field belongs to him, even though he is actually poor. Therefore, the determining factor is the time when the designated portions are gathered. If, at that time, he has already declared the field ownerless, he is considered poor with regard to those portions and is permitted to gather them. It is certain that one who has declared all his property ownerless is immediately permitted to gather any designated portion, even those portions that had been designated as such while he was still wealthy. The Kehillot Yaakov offered another explanation of the view of the early authorities: the law governing a wealthy person, who is prohibited from gathering designated portions at all, differs from the law governing a poor person, who is prohibited only from gathering them in his own field. The basis of the wealthy person’s prohibition is the prohibition against theft, since the designated portions do not belong to him. Therefore, he cannot gather them for another poor person. Just as he cannot acquire another person’s money for himself without that person’s knowledge, so he cannot acquire it for others, even though they are entitled to that money; how can he acquire property that does not belong to him? This is not the case with a poor person who owns the field. He has a right to designated portions in general. The reason he cannot gather designated portions from his own field is not theft, but rather that a commandment is imposed upon him to leave the portions for other poor people. He can fulfill this commandment even if he first acquires the portions for himself and then gives them to a poor person as a gift from his own property, thereby fulfilling the commandment of the designated portion. Since he at least has the legal capacity to acquire these portions for himself on the condition that he subsequently give them to a poor person, we say: Since he can acquire them for himself, he can also acquire them for his companion. Therefore, he can acquire these portions for other poor people. [This explanation follows the Jerusalem Talmud, since the Babylonian Talmud explains that when a wealthy person gathers for a poor person, two migo inferences are required, whereas according to this explanation, one migo is sufficient.] The Penei Yehoshua wrote that Rashi maintains that, in the case of the owner of the field, it is not appropriate to say that there is a migo based on the possibility that he could have declared his field ownerless. For by doing so he would remove from himself the commandments of the designated portion and tithes. Why would he do that for the sake of the poor person for whom he wishes to acquire the portions? On the contrary, we accept the principle that a person prefers to perform a commandment with his own property, whereas after he declares his field ownerless, it is no longer his property. The writings of Rabbi Chaim explain Rashi’s view as follows: An ordinary wealthy person who gathers designated portions improperly violates only the prohibition against stealing from the poor. But the owner of the field who gathers them for himself violates an additional prohibition, “For the poor and the stranger you shall leave them.” A migo is effective only with regard to the law of theft, because a migo can establish a monetary right—meaning that through the migo he is considered to have a monetary right to the property. But a migo is not effective with regard to a prohibition. Therefore, in the case of the owner of the field, we do not say that since he could have declared his field ownerless, he may gather its designated portions, because in his case there is also a prohibition, and not merely a monetary law.

Rabbi Eliezer says: He acquired it for him

for that poor person, the peah.

And the Sages say:

That poor person did not acquire the peah; therefore,

he shall give it

the peah that he gathered

to the first poor person whom he encounters.

Ulla said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The dispute

between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages is only

from a wealthy person for a poor person,

where the person who gathered the peah was wealthy, so that he is not permitted to take peah for himself, and intended to acquire it for a poor person, who is permitted to take peah.

For Rabbi Eliezer holds:

we say “migo” twice:

The first

is: Since, had he wished, he could have declared his property ownerless and become poor, and it would have been fit for him,

since the wealthy person could have declared his property ownerless and become poor, in which case he would have been permitted to gather peah for himself,

now too it is fit for him,

we say that now as well, while he is still wealthy, he is as though he were poor and permitted to gather peah for himself. Therefore, he is also permitted to gather it for another poor person, because

since he can acquire it for himself, he can also acquire it for his fellow

since he can gather it for himself, he can also gather it for his poor fellow.

And the Rabbis hold: We say one migo; we do not say two migo arguments.

We say only one migo and not two. Therefore, only if the one who gathered it was himself poor can he acquire it for his poor fellow by virtue of “since he can acquire it for himself, he can also acquire it for his fellow.” But if he is wealthy, he cannot acquire it for his fellow by virtue of the additional migo of “since, had he wished, he could have declared his property ownerless.”

But from a poor person for a poor person,

if the one who gathered it is also poor,

everyone agrees: He acquired it for him

for his poor fellow. For the Sages too agree that we say one migo, namely,

that since he can acquire it for himself, he can also acquire it for his fellow.

Rav Nahman said to Ulla: And let the Master say,

why do you not say that even

from a poor person for a poor person is a dispute!?

For according to the Rabbis, even if the one who gathered it is himself poor, he cannot gather it for another poor person, since we do not say even one migo?

And proof that the Rabbis disagree even from a poor person for a poor person is:

for

a lost object,

everyone

in the category of

poor people

is

with regard to it,

since anyone can acquire a lost object, just as poor people can acquire peah.

And we learned

in our Mishna:

He was riding upon an animal, saw the lost object, and said to his fellow, “Give it to me.”

He picked it up and said, “I acquired it”; he acquired it.

And the Gemara now understands that when he says, “I acquired it,” his intention is that although, when he lifted the lost object, he intended to acquire it for his fellow, now he changes his mind and wishes to acquire it for himself. Nevertheless, his fellow did not acquire the lost object, because one who lifts a lost object for his fellow does not acquire it for his fellow.

Granted, if you say that from a poor person for a poor person is a dispute,

that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer even from a poor person for a poor person.