Bava Metzia 9a — the Talmud in English

If the acquisition was indeed effected,

“In this manner, they acquire it!”

An animal is acquired by moving it from its place. There is a distinction between the animals: a camel is led by pulling it, whereas a donkey need not be pulled by a rope; it is sufficient to lead it by calling to it and having it come, by striking it, or by walking beside it. This is what the beraita—a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna—states: According to the first tanna, two people who pulled a camel or led a donkey acquire it. Likewise, in his view, if one pulled and the other led, they acquire it.

Rabbi Yehuda says: “One never acquires it unless there is pulling with a camel and leading with a donkey.”

Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the first tanna regarding the case in which one pulled and the other led. In his view, they acquire the animal only when there is pulling with a camel or leading with a donkey.

In any event, it teaches: “Or one was pulling and the other was leading.”

The Gemara, the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna, infers from the words of the first tanna that he specifically added the case in which one was pulling and the other was leading, but did not mention the case in which one was riding. Thus, only

“pulling and leading—yes; but riding—no,”

and the rider does not acquire it.

The Gemara rejects this inference:

The same law applies even to riding.

In fact, even if one was riding and the other was leading, both acquire the animal; there is no proof that riding in place of leading does not effect acquisition.

And the fact that it teaches

only

“pulling and leading,”

and does not say “riding and leading,” means:

“To exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that there must be pulling with a camel and leading with a donkey.”

That is, it comes to exclude Rabbi Yehuda’s view, according to which even when one pulls and the other leads, they do not acquire the animal; they acquire it only when both pull a camel or both lead a donkey,

it teaches us that even the reverse also effects acquisition!

Even if they pull a donkey and lead a camel, they acquire them. Although this is not the usual way to lead these animals, they nevertheless acquire them; therefore, when one pulls and the other leads, they acquire the animal.

But the Gemara asks:

If so,

since the tanna holds that both pulling and leading are effective with both a donkey and a camel,

let him combine them and teach them together;

why did the tanna distinguish between two people pulling a camel and leading a donkey, rather than include them under one general statement:

“Two people who pulled or led, whether with a camel or with a donkey”?

The Gemara answers: The tanna did not combine leading and pulling with both animals because

“There is one possibility in which they do not acquire it.”

With one of them, either the donkey or the camel, the two forms of acquisition are not both effective; only one of them is effective, either leading or pulling.

Some say: Pulling with a donkey is ineffective.

And some say: Leading a camel is ineffective.

There are those who say that pulling a donkey is ineffective. According to them, only leading is effective with a donkey, while both methods are effective with a camel. The tanna’s statement, “If one was pulling and the other was leading, both acquire it,” refers to a camel.

And there are those who say that leading a camel is ineffective. Consequently, with a donkey either leading or pulling is effective, and it is regarding a donkey that it is stated: “If one was pulling and the other was leading, both acquire it.” Therefore, the tanna did not combine pulling and leading with both animals.

And some raise an objection from the latter clause,

as some challenged Rabbi Yehuda’s explicit view that riding in place of leading does not effect acquisition, based on the latter clause, where we learned:

“In this manner, he acquires it.”

“In this manner”—what does this exclude? Is it not meant to exclude riding?

The wording of the beraita indicates that when there is leading and pulling with a camel or a donkey, specifically “in this manner” they acquire it. The emphasis on “in this manner” comes to exclude riding. It therefore proves that riding in place of leading does not effect acquisition.

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

the tanna did not come to exclude riding, but rather

“To exclude the reverse.”

The tanna comes to say that specifically pulling a camel and leading a donkey effect acquisition—this is “in this manner.” But conversely, pulling a donkey or leading a camel does not effect acquisition.

The Gemara asks:

“If so, this is precisely the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda!”

If we explain the first tanna’s words, “in this manner,” as meaning that specifically pulling a camel and leading a donkey are effective, but not the reverse, then there is a difficulty: How does the first tanna disagree with Rabbi Yehuda? That is precisely Rabbi Yehuda’s view!?

The Gemara answers:

“There is one possibility between them in which he does not acquire it.”

Some say: pulling with a donkey. And some say: leading a camel.

The first tanna’s view differs from Rabbi Yehuda’s in that, according to the first tanna, only one of the two methods is effective with one of the animals, either the donkey or the camel. Some say that leading a donkey is specifically effective, but pulling is not; others say that pulling a camel is specifically effective, but leading is not. Rabbi Yehuda, by contrast, said the opposite.

Come and hear a proof

from a beraita against Rav Yehuda’s report in the name of Shmuel:

As it is taught:

One was riding

on

a donkey, and one

was

holding the halter

of the donkey;

this one acquires the donkey, and that one acquires the halter.

Conclude from this that riding effects acquisition!

This beraita proves that the person riding the donkey acquires the donkey.

It likewise follows that if riding effects acquisition of the entire animal, then riding in place of leading effects acquisition of half the animal. The Gemara rejects this:

“Here too, it is referring to one who leads it with his feet.”

There is no proof from here, because the rider acquires the animal due to the fact that he is not only riding it but also leading it with his feet. Therefore, he acquires it through the acquisition of pulling.

But the Gemara asks:

If so,

if the case is one in which the rider also leads the animal with his feet, meaning that he performs the acquisition of pulling, then

the rider should also acquire the halter!

He should acquire the halter as well, since pulling is effective for acquiring movable property, and when he pulls the animal, he also pulls the halter.

Granted, if the case were one of riding alone, without leading the animal with his feet, then even though he was holding the halter, he would nevertheless not acquire it, because the acquisition of handing over is not effective for movable property, but only for an animal [whereas movable property is acquired through pulling or lifting].

But if the case here is one in which, in addition to riding, he also leads the animal with his feet, then he performs the acquisition of pulling, which is also effective for movable property that is upon the animal. Why, then, should he not acquire the halter through his pulling!?

The Gemara answers:

Say

the following instead:

“This one acquires the donkey and half the halter, and that one acquires half the halter.”

Indeed, the case is one in which the rider also leads the animal with his feet, and he does acquire half the halter, because both of them acquire the halter: the rider, who led it with his feet, acquired it through pulling, while the other person, who was holding the halter, acquired it through lifting it from the ground. Therefore, they divide it between them.

The Gemara nevertheless asks: How is the lifting performed by the person holding the halter effective? Two people who lift a found object acquire it only when each lifts it on his own behalf and on behalf of the other. Here, however, the rider did not lift the part of the halter hanging from the donkey’s neck; only the person holding the halter lifted the strap [which extends and trails] from its other end [above the ground]. If so, how can the lifting performed by the person holding the halter enable him to acquire half of it for himself?

For the halter also contains a long strap, which hangs from the donkey’s head at one end and trails along the ground at the other. As long as the entire strap has not been lifted from the ground, neither of them can acquire it through lifting. Therefore, the Gemara asks:

Granted, the rider acquires

his portion of the halter, since he pulled it when he pulled the donkey by leading it with his feet.

And even if he did not pull it, he properly acquires it through lifting, as though he had lifted it, because from his perspective there is no deficiency in the fact that its other half remains on the ground, since

the

other person, who is now holding the strap,

is lifting

the other half of the halter. He is

a person with understanding,

and he lifted the halter’s strap with the intention of acquiring it for himself and also for the rider.

But the person holding the halter—through what does he acquire it!?

That is, the Gemara is now discussing acquisition through lifting, even according to the possibility that acquisition through pulling is ineffective [as will be explained below, where there is a possibility that pulling an animal is not effective for acquiring objects upon it]. It argues: The rider does acquire the halter by holding it, since with regard to him the object is considered as though it was uprooted from its place and lifted by him. But how does the person holding the halter acquire it through lifting it? The other part is considered, with regard to him, as though it were lying on the ground, since the other person, the rider, does not lift the halter and it remains in its place. Thus, with regard to the person holding the halter, the deficiency remains that lifting only one part of a found object is ineffective until he lifts the entire object from the ground.

The Gemara answers:

“Say instead: This one acquires the donkey and the entire halter, and that one acquires whatever he is holding in his hand!”

That is, the person holding the halter does not acquire half of it through lifting; rather, he acquires only what is inside his hand. He acquires it through “acquisition through possession,” because when part of an object is held in his hand, that part is considered as though he had lifted it from the ground.

But the Gemara still asks:

“What is this!?”

How can the lifting performed by the person holding the halter be effective for the rider, enabling him to acquire half of it, but not be effective for the person holding it himself!?

For even

if you should say

that

“when one lifts a found object for another, the other acquires it—this applies only when he lifts it with the intention of acquiring it for the other.”

But

this person,

the one holding the halter,

is lifting it with the intention of acquiring it for himself,

and if

he himself does not acquire it,

for himself, then

can he acquire it for someone else!?

That is, the Gemara asks: The rider’s acquisition of the halter through lifting must necessarily be because the other person, who is holding the halter, lifted it also on his behalf, based on the rule that one who lifts a found object for another enables the other to acquire it. But that works only when he lifts it also for his fellow. Here, however, the person holding the halter is lifting it for himself. If the lifting is ineffective for himself, because with regard to him the entire object was not lifted from the place where it was lying on the animal, then it is clear that he is not lifting it solely for his fellow, the rider. If so, why does the rider acquire the halter?

Rav Ashi said: “This one acquires the donkey and the part of the halter on its head, and that one acquires what he is holding in his hand. The remainder is acquired by neither this one nor that one.”

Indeed, the rider acquires only the donkey and its “headpiece,” which is the part of the halter located on the donkey itself. He acquires it by virtue of acquiring the donkey, since it is considered subordinate to it. Therefore, even if he was riding and leading it with his feet, he acquires no more than this.

The other person, who is holding the halter, acquires only the part that is beneath his hand. Neither of them acquires the rest of the halter. If another person comes and snatches it, he acquires the part of the halter that is not beneath the hand of the person holding it.

Rabbi Abbahu said: “Actually, it is as it is taught: Since he can pull it loose and bring it to himself.”

Rabbi Abbahu rejects this and holds that the rider acquired only the donkey, whereas the person holding the halter acquired the entire halter, including the headpiece on the donkey. The reason is that since the person holding the halter can, through his grasp, pull the entire halter loose and bring it to himself, it is considered as though he is holding the entire halter, including the headpiece, since he can detach it from the donkey. Therefore, the halter is considered to be held only by the person holding it and is not subordinate to the donkey.

But this statement of Rabbi Abbahu

—

is untenable!

Rabbi Abbahu’s view—that even when the person holding an object does not lift the entire object, if he lifts it in a manner that enables him to pull the entire object loose and bring it into his hands, he is considered to have lifted the whole object—is incorrect!

For if you do not say so, consider a garment half of which is lying on the ground and half of which is on a pillar. One person came and lifted the half from the ground, and another came and lifted the half from the pillar—

would

here too

we say

that the first acquires it and the second does not, since

the first

could pull it loose and bring it to himself!?

That is, it was obvious to the Gemara, without dissent, that if a garment was lying half on the ground and half on a pillar, and one person lifted the half that was on the ground while the other half remained on the pillar and the entire garment was not uprooted from its place, the person who lifted it had still not acquired his half. If the second person then came and lifted the half that had remained on the pillar, they would then both acquire it, because the garment was lifted by both of them.

If we accept Rabbi Abbahu’s view that lifting one part of a garment in a manner that enables one to pull the entire garment toward oneself is considered lifting the entire garment, then in this case, where half the garment was on the pillar, the person who lifted the half on the ground could easily pull the other half from the pillar toward himself. Since, at the moment when the first person lifted half of it, he could also pull loose the half on the pillar and bring it to himself, the law should be that the first person acquires the entire garment.

But this is difficult, since we find no tanna who distinguishes, in the law of two people holding a garment, between a garment that is entirely on the ground and one that is half on the ground and half on a pillar, requiring them to divide it.

Rather,

necessarily,

“Rabbi Abbahu’s statement is untenable!”

Rabbi Abbahu’s statement is incorrect. It must necessarily be said that the beraita reads: “This one acquires the donkey and its headpiece; the one holding the halter acquires only what he is holding; and the remainder is acquired by neither this one nor that one.”

Come and hear a proof

from what we learned in a beraita:

As it is taught:

Rabbi Eliezer says: “One who rides in the field and one who leads in the city acquire the animal.”

If a person was riding an ownerless animal in a field, he acquires the animal by riding it. But if he leads the animal, he acquires it even in the city, and not only in the field.

This proves that riding is effective for acquiring an animal, at least in a field. And if riding alone is effective for acquiring an animal, then when one person is riding and another is leading, they should divide it.

The Gemara considers this:

“Here too, it is referring to one who leads it with his feet.”

When Rabbi Eliezer says that riding is effective for acquiring the animal, he is referring to one who rides and leads it with his feet—that is, he also effects the acquisition of pulling by leading the animal with his feet and causing it to walk.

The Gemara asks:

“If so, this is simply leading!”

If “riding” refers to a person who also leads the animal with his feet, then this is simply leading. Yet the beraita says: “One who rides and one who leads.”

The Gemara answers:

“There are two types of leading.”

Rabbi Eliezer mentions two types of leading, and there is a difference in their laws, as will be explained.

But the Gemara argues:

“If so, why does riding in the city not effect acquisition!?”

If “riding” means that he leads the animal with his feet, why does riding effect acquisition specifically in the field and not in the city!?

Granted, if we said that “riding” means riding alone, without leading it with his feet, we could explain the distinction between a field and a city: In a field there are no people, so the animal walks only because of the rider, and this is considered as though he pulls it by leading it through his riding. But in a city, where there are other people on the roads, the animal does not walk because of the rider but because of itself; therefore, the rider does not acquire it. But if the case is one in which he rides and also leads it with his feet, then he is certainly the one leading it, and it is not walking on its own. If so, why does he not acquire it in the city? After all, he is performing an act of pulling.

Rav Kahana said: “Because it is not the practice of people to ride in a city.”

Indeed, the case is one in which he rides and also leads the animal with his feet, and this involves pulling. Nevertheless, he acquires it only in a field and not in a city, because it is not customary to ride in a city, for reasons of modesty. Therefore, pulling performed in an unusual manner does not effect acquisition. In the city, he acquires it only through leading alone.

“But from now on, if one lifted my purse on Shabbat, when it is not the practice of people to lift a purse on Shabbat, would you say here too that he does not acquire it?”

If we propose that he does not acquire the animal in the city because it is not customary for people to pull through riding, and that this prevents acquisition, then if a person lifts a purse on Shabbat, when it is not customary to lift purses on Shabbat—even though this is because of Shabbat, just as people do not ride in a city because of modesty—he should not acquire the purse through this lifting. Yet we do not find this stated regarding theft on Shabbat.

“Rather, whatever he did, he did. Here too, whatever he did, he did, and he acquires it.”

Rather, necessarily, although it is not customary to lift an object on Shabbat, if he lifted it, he acquires it. Likewise, although it is not customary to ride in a city, if he rode, he acquires the animal. Why, then, according to Rabbi Eliezer, does riding in a city not effect acquisition?

“Rather, we are dealing with a sale,

for example,

where the seller said to him: ‘Acquire it in the manner in which people acquire it!’”

The Gemara answers: what Rabbi Eliezer said—that riding is an acquisition in a field and not in a city—this means specifically in a sale and purchase, and it is speaking of a case where the seller stipulated with the buyer that he perform an act of acquisition in the manner in which people acquire. Therefore, even if he was riding and leading with his feet, nevertheless, since it is not the manner of people to acquire in this way, because this is not a modest manner, he did not acquire in the city. Rather, if he leads the animal.