Bava Metzia 9a (ט.) — the Talmud in English

If the acquisition was indeed performed

in this manner, they acquire it!

The acquisition of an animal is effected by moving the animal from its place. There is a distinction between the animals: a camel is led by pulling it, whereas a donkey need not be pulled by a rope; it is sufficient to lead it by calling to it and having it come, by striking it, or by walking beside it. This is what the beraita means: According to the first tanna, if two people pulled a camel or led a donkey, they acquired it. Likewise, if one was pulling and the other was leading, according to him, he acquired it.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He never acquires it unless there is pulling with a camel and leading with a donkey.

Rabbi Yehuda disputes the first tanna concerning the case in which one was pulling and the other was leading. In his view, one acquires it only if there was pulling with a camel or leading with a donkey.

In any event, it teaches: Or if one was pulling and the other was leading.

The Gemara infers from the words of the first tanna that he specifically added the case in which one was pulling and the other was leading, but did not mention a case in which one was riding. This indicates that

pulling and leading, yes, but riding, no;

the rider did not acquire it.

The Gemara rejects this:

The same law applies even to riding.

In fact, even if one was riding and the other was leading, both acquired it; there is no proof that riding, in place of leading, does not effect acquisition.

And the fact that it teaches

only

pulling and leading

and does not write “riding and leading” means

to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: Unless there is pulling with a camel and leading with a donkey.

That is, it comes to exclude Rabbi Yehuda’s position, according to which even if one was pulling and the other was leading, the rider did not acquire it; rather, they acquire it only if both are pulling the camel or both are leading the donkey,

it teaches us that even the reverse arrangement also effects acquisition!

Even if one pulls a donkey and leads a camel, they acquire it. For although this is not the usual way to lead them, they nevertheless acquire them; therefore, when one was pulling and the other was leading, he acquired it.

But the Gemara asks:

If so,

since the tanna holds that pulling and leading are effective both with a donkey and with a camel,

let him combine them and teach them together;

why did the tanna distinguish between two who were pulling a camel and leading a donkey, rather than include them under one general formulation:

Two who were pulling or leading, whether with a camel or with a donkey?

The Gemara answers: The tanna did not combine leading and pulling with both animals because

there is one aspect in which acquisition is not effected.

With one of them, either a donkey or a camel, the two forms of acquisition do not both work; only one of them is effective, either leading or pulling.

Some say: Pulling with a donkey.

And some say: Leading with a camel.

Some say that pulling a donkey is not effective. According to them, only leading is effective with a donkey, while both are effective with a camel. And when the tanna said, “If one was pulling and the other was leading, they both acquired it,” he was referring to a camel.

And some say that leading a camel is not effective. Consequently, with a donkey, either leading or pulling is effective, and it is with regard to this that it was said, “If one was pulling and the other was leading, they both acquired it.” Therefore, the tanna did not combine pulling and leading with both animals.

And there are those who raise an objection from the latter clause,

challenging Rabbi Yehuda, who plainly holds that riding in place of leading does not effect acquisition, from the latter clause, where we learned:

“In this manner, he acquires it.”

“In this manner”—to exclude what? Is it not to exclude riding?

The language of the beraita states that if there was leading and pulling with a camel or a donkey, specifically “in this manner” he acquires it. The emphasis on “in this manner” comes to exclude riding. This proves that riding in place of leading does not effect acquisition.

And the Gemara rejects this:

No,

the tanna did not come to exclude riding, but

to exclude the reverse arrangement.

The tanna is saying that pulling with a camel and leading a donkey specifically effect acquisition, and this is the meaning of “in this manner”; but conversely, pulling a donkey or leading a camel does not effect acquisition.

The Gemara asks:

If so, this is precisely the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda!

If we explain the words of the first tanna, who said “in this manner,” as meaning that specifically pulling a camel and leading a donkey are effective, but not the reverse, then there is a difficulty: In what does the first tanna disagree with Rabbi Yehuda? This is, after all, Rabbi Yehuda’s position!?

And we answer:

There is one aspect between them in which acquisition is not effected.

Some say: Pulling with a donkey. And some say: Leading with a camel.

The position of the first tanna differs from that of Rabbi Yehuda in that, according to the first tanna, only one of these is effective, either with a donkey or with a camel. Some say that leading a donkey is specifically effective, but pulling is not; and some say that pulling a camel is specifically effective, but leading is not. Rabbi Yehuda, by contrast, said the reverse.

Come and hear

a proof from a beraita against Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel:

As it is taught:

One was riding

on

a donkey, and one

was

holding the reins

of the donkey;

this one acquired the donkey, and that one acquired the reins.

Learn from this that a rider acquires!

It is proven from this beraita that the one riding the donkey acquires the donkey.

It is likewise proven from here that if a rider acquires everything, then riding in place of leading acquires half the animal. The Gemara rejects this:

Here too, it is referring to one who leads it with his feet.

There is no proof from here, because the rider acquires the animal only because this case involves someone who, in addition to riding the animal, also leads it with his feet. Therefore, he acquires it through the acquisition of pulling.

But the Gemara asks:

If so,

if the rider also leads it with his feet, meaning that he performs the acquisition of pulling, then

let the rider also acquire the reins!

He should also acquire the reins, because pulling is effective for acquiring movable property, and when he pulls the animal, he also pulls the reins.

Granted, if the case involved someone who was riding alone and did not lead it with his feet, then although he was holding the reins, he would nevertheless not acquire them, because the acquisition of mesira is effective with an animal but not with movable property [whereas movable property is acquired through pulling or lifting].

But if here the case involves someone who, in addition to riding, also leads it with his feet, then he performs the acquisition of pulling, which is effective even for movable property located on the animal. Why, then, should he not acquire the reins through his pulling!?

The Gemara answers:

Say

as follows:

This one acquired the donkey and half the reins, and that one acquired half the reins.

In fact, the case involves a rider who also leads the animal with his feet, and he indeed acquired half the reins, because both of them acquired the reins: the rider, who led the animal with his feet, acquired them through the acquisition of pulling, whereas the other one, who was holding the reins, acquired them through the acquisition of lifting them from the ground. Therefore, they divide them between them.

But the Gemara asks: How is the lifting performed by the one holding the reins effective? After all, when two people lift a lost object, they acquire it only if each one lifts it with the intention of doing so both for himself and for the other. Here, however, the rider did not lift the portion of the reins hanging from the donkey’s neck; only the one holding the reins lifted the strap [which extends and trails] from its other end [above the ground]. If so, how can the lifting performed by the one holding the reins acquire half of it for himself?

For the reins also include a long strap, one end of which hangs from the donkey’s head while the other end trails along the ground. As long as the entire strap has not been lifted from the ground, neither of them can acquire it through the acquisition of lifting. Therefore, the question arises:

Granted, the rider acquires

his share of the reins, since he pulled them when he pulled the donkey by leading it with his feet.

And even if he did not pull them, he properly acquired them through the acquisition of lifting, as though he had lifted them, because from his perspective there is no deficiency in the fact that the other half is lying on the ground, since

the

other one, who is now holding the strap,

is lifting it

for the second half of the reins, and he is

a person possessing intelligence,

so he lifted the reins with the intention of acquiring them both for himself and for the rider.

But the one holding the reins—through what does he acquire them!?

That is, the Gemara is now discussing the acquisition of lifting, even according to the possibility that the acquisition of pulling is not effective [as will be explained below, there is a possibility that pulling an animal does not acquire the objects upon it]. It argues that the rider indeed effects an acquisition of the reins by holding them, since with regard to him the object is considered as though it has been uprooted from its place and lifted by him. But how does the one holding the reins acquire them through lifting? The other portion is considered, with regard to him, as though it is lying on the ground, since the other one, the rider, is not lifting the reins and they remain in their place. If so, with regard to the one holding the reins, there is the deficiency that lifting one portion of a lost object is not effective until he lifts the entire object from the ground.

And we answer:

Say: This one acquired the donkey and all the reins, and that one acquired whatever he was holding in his hand!

That is, the one holding the reins did not acquire half of them through the acquisition of lifting; rather, he acquired only what was in his hand, and he acquired it through the “acquisition of the hand,” because an object held in a person’s hand is considered as though that portion had been lifted from the ground.

But the Gemara still asks:

What is this!?

How can it be that the lifting performed by the one holding the reins is effective with regard to the rider, so that he acquires half of them, but not with regard to the holder himself!?

After all, even

if you should say

that

one who lifts a lost object for another person, the other person acquires it, this applies only when he lifts it with the intention of doing so for the other person.

But

this one,

the one holding the reins,

is lifting it with his own intention,

and if

he himself does not acquire it

for himself, is it possible that he

acquires it for someone else!?

That is, the Gemara asks: The reason the rider acquired the reins through lifting must be that the other one, who was holding the reins, lifted them also for him, based on the principle that one who lifts a lost object for another person causes the other person to acquire it. This is understandable when he lifts it also for his fellow. Here, however, the one holding the reins lifts them for himself. And if the lifting is not effective for himself, because with regard to him the entire object was not lifted from the place where it lay on the animal, it is certainly not the case that he lifted it solely for the rider, his fellow. If so, why did the rider acquire the reins?

Rav Ashi said: This one acquired the donkey and the beit pagiyya, and that one acquired whatever he was holding in his hand. The remainder was acquired by neither this one nor that one.

Indeed, the rider acquired only the donkey and the beit pagiyya, the portion of the reins situated on the donkey itself. That portion is acquired by him by virtue of his acquisition of the donkey, since it is considered subordinate to it. Therefore, even if he was riding and leading it with his feet, he acquired no more than this.

The other one, who was holding the reins, acquired only the portion that was under his hand. Neither of them acquired the remainder of the reins. If another person were to come and snatch it, he would acquire the portion of the reins that was not under the hand of the one holding the reins.

Rabbi Abbahu said: Actually, it is as it was taught: Since he is able to detach it and bring it to himself.

Rabbi Abbahu rejects this and holds that the rider acquired only the donkey, whereas the owner of the reins acquired all the reins, including the beit pagiyya on the donkey. The reason is that the one holding the reins, since through his grasp he can detach the entire set of reins and bring it to himself, is considered as though he has a grasp of all the reins, including the beit pagiyya, since he can detach it from the donkey. If so, they are considered to be held only by the one holding the reins and are not subordinate to the donkey.

And this statement of Rabbi Abbahu —

—

is an erroneous teaching!

What Rabbi Abbahu holds—that even when the one lifting an object does not lift the entire object, nevertheless, if he lifts it in a manner that enables him to detach the entire object and bring it into his hands, he is considered as though he lifted all of it—is incorrect!

For if you do not say so, consider a cloak that is lying with half of it on the ground and half of it on a pillar, and one person came and lifted the half from the ground, while another came and lifted the half from the pillar;

would

even so

it be said

that the first acquired it and the latter did not acquire it, since

the first

was able to detach it and bring it to himself!?

That is, it was obvious to the Gemara, without dispute, that if a cloak was lying with half of it on the ground and half of it on a pillar, and one person lifted the half that was on the ground, while the other half remained on the pillar and the entire cloak was not uprooted from its place, the one who lifted it still did not acquire that half. If the second person then came and lifted the half that remained on the pillar, they both acquired it, since the cloak was then lifted by both of them.

If we were to say in accordance with Rabbi Abbahu that lifting one part of a cloak in a manner that enables one to pull the entire cloak and bring it to himself is considered lifting the entire cloak, then here, where half the cloak was lying on the pillar, the one who lifted the half from the ground could easily pull toward himself the other half lying on the pillar. Since, at the time the first person lifted half of it, he could also pull and detach the half lying on the pillar and bring it to himself, the law should be that the first person acquires the entire cloak.

And there would be a difficulty, for we find no tanna who distinguishes in the law of two holding a cloak and dividing it between them, whether the entire cloak was lying on the ground or whether half of it was on the ground and half on a pillar.

Rather,

it must be that

this statement of Rabbi Abbahu is an erroneous teaching!

Rabbi Abbahu’s words are incorrect. It must necessarily be said that the beraita reads: “This one acquired the donkey and the beit pagiyya, and the one holding the reins acquired only what he was holding; the remainder was acquired neither by this one nor by that one.”

Come and hear

a proof from what we learned in a beraita:

As it is taught:

Rabbi Eliezer says: One who rides in the field and leads in the city acquires it.

If he was riding an ownerless animal in the field, he acquires the animal through riding it. But if he leads the animal, he acquires it even in the city, and not only in the field.

It is proven that riding is effective for acquiring an animal, at least in the field. And if riding alone is effective for acquiring an animal, then when one is riding and the other is leading, they should divide it between them.

The Gemara analyzes this:

Here too, it is referring to one who leads it with his feet.

When Rabbi Eliezer says that riding is effective for acquisition, he is referring to one who rides and leads the animal with his feet. That is, he also performs the acquisition of pulling by leading the animal with his feet and causing it to walk.

And we ask:

If so, this is the same as leading!

If “riding” refers to one who also leads the animal with his feet, then this is simply leading. Yet the beraita says: “One who rides and one who leads.”

And we answer:

There are two types of leading.

Rabbi Eliezer mentioned two types of leading, and there is a difference in the law between them, as will be explained.

But the Gemara asks:

If so, why does riding in the city not effect acquisition!?

If “riding” means that he leads the animal with his feet, why does riding effect acquisition specifically in the field but not in the city!?

Granted, if we say that riding means riding alone, without leading it with his feet, we can explain the distinction between the field and the city: In the field there are no people, and the animal’s movement there is caused only by the rider, so it is considered as though he is pulling it by leading it through his riding. But in the city, where there are other people on the roads, the animal does not walk because of the rider but because of itself, and therefore the rider does not acquire it. But if the case involves one who rides and also leads it with his feet, then he is certainly the one leading it; it is not walking by itself. Why, then, does he not acquire it in the city? He is performing an act of pulling with it.

Rav Kahana said: Because it is not the practice of people to ride in the city.

Indeed, the case involves one who rides and also leads the animal with his feet, and this constitutes pulling. Nevertheless, he acquires it only in the field and not in the city, because it is not customary to ride in the city, due to modesty. Therefore, pulling in a manner that is not customary does not effect acquisition. In the city, he acquires it only through leading.

But from now on, if one lifted my wallet on Shabbat, when it is not the practice of people to lift wallets on Shabbat, would he likewise not acquire it?

If we introduce the principle that in the city he does not acquire because it is not customary for people to pull by riding, and that this prevents the acquisition, then if a person were to lift a wallet on Shabbat—when it is not customary to lift wallets on Shabbat—even though this is due to Shabbat, just as it is not customary to ride in the city because of modesty, he should not acquire the wallet through this lifting. Yet we do not find such a rule with regard to theft on Shabbat.

Rather, whatever he did, he did. Here too, whatever he did, he did, and he acquires it.

Rather, it must be that although it is not customary to lift an object on Shabbat, nevertheless, if he lifted it, he acquired it. Likewise, with riding in the city, although it is not customary to ride in the city, nevertheless, if he rode, he acquired it. Why, then, according to Rabbi Eliezer, does riding in the city not effect acquisition?

Rather, we are dealing with a sale,

as in a case

where he said to him: Acquire it in the manner in which people acquire!

The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Eliezer said that riding constitutes an acquisition in the field but not in the city, this applies specifically to a sale, where the seller stipulated to the buyer that he perform an act of acquisition in the manner in which people ordinarily acquire. Therefore, even if he was riding and guiding the animal with his feet, nevertheless, since people do not ordinarily acquire in this manner, as it is not modest conduct, he does not acquire it in the city—unless he is leading the animal.