Bava Metzia 10a (י.) — the Talmud in English

If so, it may be said:

whose opinion is reflected in the Mishna?

The opinion of the Rabbis!

Our Mishna, which states that even in the case of a lost item, a person cannot acquire it on behalf of another although he can acquire it for himself, follows the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that even a poor person cannot acquire pe'a on behalf of another poor person.

But if you say

that only

with regard to a rich person and a poor person

is there

a dispute

between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis,

but from one poor person to another poor person, everyone agrees that he acquires it for him,

then raise a difficulty:

this

Mishna,

whose opinion is it?

It follows neither the Rabbis nor Rabbi Eliezer!

For even the Rabbis agree that if the person gathering the pe'a is himself poor, he can acquire the pe'a on behalf of another poor person, whereas our Mishna explains that one cannot acquire a lost item on behalf of another person!

He said to him

Ulla said to Rav Naḥman: There is no proof from our Mishna that the Rabbis dispute even in the case of one poor person acquiring for another poor person. Rather, the Mishna always maintains that when one lifts a lost item on behalf of his fellow, his fellow acquires it, just as one poor person can acquire pe'a on behalf of another poor person.

And as for what is stated in the

Mishna,

that if he said, “I acquired it,” he acquires it, this does not mean that initially he intended to acquire it on behalf of his fellow, and only afterward changed his mind and wished to acquire it for himself. Rather,

he said: Initially,

from the outset, at the time he lifted it, he intended to acquire the lost item for himself and not for his fellow; therefore, he acquires it.

And the Gemara adds:

This is also evidently so,

that the Mishna means that the person who lifted the lost item said that from the outset he had lifted it for himself.

As it teaches in the latter clause

of the Mishna:

If, after he gave it to him, he said, “I acquired it initially,” he has said nothing.

And raise a difficulty:

“Initially,”

why do I need it in the latter clause!?

Why does the Mishna need to state that he claims that he acquired it initially, meaning that before giving it to his fellow he intended to acquire it? After all,

it is obvious; even though he did not

say

“initially,”

he is saying “initially”!

Certainly, his intention is to say that he acquired it before giving it to him, for afterward, once the lost item is already in the possession of his fellow, how could he acquire it?

Rather, is it not the case that “initially” means that from the very beginning of lifting it he intended to acquire it? And

this teaches us: In the first clause, he said

“initially.”

The latter clause comes to clarify the first clause: He claims that from the outset he intended to acquire it for himself. The latter clause teaches that if he made this claim only after he had already given it to his fellow, he is not believed, since by giving it to his fellow he revealed that he had lifted the lost item in order to give it to him.

But the other one,

Rav Naḥman, who proved from the first clause of the Mishna that when one lifts a lost item on behalf of his fellow, his fellow does not acquire it, and who maintains that the first clause is not discussing a case in which he claims that from the outset he intended to acquire it for himself, but rather a case in which, after lifting it for his fellow, he changed his mind and wished to acquire it for himself, would say:

The tanna taught in the latter clause “initially” in order

to clarify the first clause.

Since, as stated, the word “initially” in the latter clause is superfluous, it must have been included only to reveal that it is only in the

latter clause

that it

states

“initially.”

But in the

first clause,

where “initially” is not mentioned, it is discussing a case

in which he did not say

“initially.”

And the meaning of “initially” is that he intended to acquire it before giving it to his fellow. In the first clause, where he makes this claim before giving it to his fellow, he is believed and acquires it, despite the fact that from the outset he lifted it for his fellow. In the latter clause, he is not believed, because once he has already given it to his fellow, he has revealed that he indeed lifted it for his fellow and not for himself.

Rav Naḥman and Rav Ḥisda both say: When one lifts a lost item on behalf of his fellow, his fellow does not acquire it.

What is the reason?

Because

it is like one who seizes property for a creditor in a situation where he causes a loss to others.

This is analogous to a person who comes and seizes Reuben's property on behalf of Simeon, who is Reuben's creditor [lender]. By this seizure, he causes a loss to other creditors, who will have nothing left from which to collect their debts.

And one who seizes property for a creditor in a situation where he causes a loss to others does not acquire it.

For a person may not independently come and seize the debtor's property without the creditor having appointed him as his agent, thereby causing a loss to the other creditors.

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman:

It is taught in a beraita:

A laborer's found object

whatever the laborer finds, he acquires

for himself

and not for the employer.

When are these matters said? When the employer said to him: “Weed with me today,”

or

“Plow with me today,”

as he was hired only for this particular labor and not for every task of the employer.

But if he said to him

the employer:

“Perform labor with me today,”

this implies every type of labor, including lifting lost items. Therefore,

the found object belongs to the employer.

Thus, we see that when one lifts a lost item on behalf of his fellow, his fellow acquires it. This is a difficulty against Rav Naḥman.

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman

said: A laborer's hand is like the hand of

the employer.

It is as though the employer himself lifted the lost item, and therefore acquired it. But in the case of another person who lifts a lost item on behalf of his fellow, his fellow does not acquire it.

And Rava raises an objection to Rav Naḥman:

But Rav said: A laborer can retract

from his status as a laborer

even in the middle of the day.

And if a laborer's hand is like the employer's hand, how can he retract?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman said to him: In reality,

as long as he has not retracted,

as long as the laborer has not retracted, his hand

is like the employer's hand.

When he retracts,

and the fact that he has the right to retract,

it is for another reason,

it is based on another rationale:

as it is written [Leviticus 25:55],

Leviticus 25:55 ] “

“For the Children of Israel are servants to Me,”

they are My servants,

which implies that they are servants only to Him

and not servants to servants,

for they do not become servants to human beings who are themselves servants to Him.

From here we learn that a laborer is not like a slave of the employer, who would be unable to retract. Rather, if he wishes to retract in the middle of his work and forgo his wages from that point onward, he may do so.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: When one lifts a lost item on behalf of his fellow, his fellow acquires it.

And if you would say: Our Mishna

then presents a difficulty, for it states that if the person who lifted it said, “I acquired it,” he acquires it. This implies that now he wishes to acquire it, despite having intended at the time of lifting it to acquire it for his fellow. Nevertheless, he acquires it because when one lifts a lost item on behalf of his fellow, his fellow does not acquire it.

It may be answered that this is because

he said

the rider:

“Give it to me,” and he did not

say: “Acquire it for me.”

For he did not intend to appoint him as an agent who would acquire it for him by lifting it, but rather that he should give him the lost item and he would then acquire it. Since, before giving it to him, the agent changed his mind and wished to acquire it for himself, he acquired it.

Mishna:

If he saw the lost item

on the ground

and fell upon it

but did not take possession of it,

and another came and took possession of it

by seizing it in his hand,

the one who took possession of it acquires it.

Gemara:

Reish Lakish said in the name of Abba Kohen Bardela: A person's four cubits acquire for him everywhere

so that any ownerless object found within a person's four cubits belongs to him.

What is the reason?

Because

the Sages instituted

this enactment

so that people would not come to quarrel,

so that people would not come to dispute who first took possession of the lost item.

Abaye said: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef raises an objection from Pe'a.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef challenged the law of four cubits from a Mishna in tractate Pe'a.

Rava said: Rav Ya'akov bar Idi raises an objection from Nezikin.

Rav Ya'akov bar Idi challenged the law of four cubits from a Mishna in the order of Nezikin.

And we explain:

Abaye said: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef raises an objection from Pe'a,

as we learned in tractate Pe'a:

If he took

one of the poor people

part of the pe'a

that he gathered for himself

and threw it onto the rest

onto the pe'a that had not yet been detached, thinking that by doing so he would acquire the rest,

he has nothing of it,

for he is penalized, and even the pe'a that he had already gathered is taken from him [because he sought to conceal the remaining pe'a from the other poor people].

If he fell upon it,

he threw himself upon the pe'a. Or

if he spread his garment over it,

spreading his garment over it in order to acquire it,

they remove him from it.

They take from him the pe'a upon which he fell or over which he spread his garment, because he did not acquire it through these means.

And likewise with a forgotten sheaf,

these laws also apply to shikḥa, one of the gifts to the poor: when the landowner forgets a single sheaf in the field, he may not return and take it, but must leave it for the poor.

And if you say

that

that a person's four cubits acquire for him everywhere,

then why did the poor person not acquire the pe'a upon which he fell?

Let his four cubits acquire it for him,

for it was located within his four cubits; why should he not acquire it through acquisition by four cubits?

And we answer:

What are we dealing with here?

For example,

he did not say, “Acquire it for me.”

He did not explicitly state that he wished to acquire the pe'a through acquisition by four cubits, and therefore this acquisition did not benefit him.

And we challenge this:

And if the Sages instituted

a mode of acquisition through four cubits, as you say,

why does he need to say anything?

Why must he explicitly state that he wishes to acquire it through this mode of acquisition?

And we answer:

Since he fell, he revealed his דעת that he is pleased for it to be acquired through falling; he is not pleased for it to be acquired through four cubits.

By falling, he revealed that he does not wish to acquire the pe'a through the enactment of the Sages concerning four cubits, but rather through falling. And since falling does not effect acquisition, it follows that he acquired it neither through falling nor through the four cubits.