Bava Metzia 10a — the Talmud in English

If so, it can be said:

Who is the author of the Mishna?

The Rabbis!

Our Mishna, which says that even in the case of a lost item a person cannot acquire it on behalf of his fellow, although he can acquire it for himself, follows the view of the Rabbis, who say that even a poor person cannot acquire pe'a on behalf of his fellow poor person.

But if you say

that only

with regard to a rich person and a poor person

there is

a dispute

between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis,

but from one poor person to another poor person, everyone agrees that he acquires it for him,

it is difficult:

this

Mishna,

who is its author?

Neither the Rabbis nor Rabbi Eliezer! For even the Rabbis concede that if the one who gathers the pe'a is himself poor, he can acquire the pe'a on behalf of his fellow poor person, whereas it is explained in our Mishna that one cannot acquire a lost item on behalf of his fellow!

For even the Rabbis agree that if the person gathering the pe'a is himself poor, he can acquire the pe'a on behalf of another poor person, whereas our Mishna explains that one cannot acquire a lost item on behalf of another person!

Ulla said to Rav Naḥman:

There is no proof from our Mishna that the Rabbis disagree even from one poor person to another poor person. Rather, the Mishna always holds that one who lifts a lost item for his fellow, his fellow acquires it, just as a poor person can acquire pe'a on behalf of his fellow poor person.

And as for what is stated in the

Mishna,

that if he said, “I acquired it,” he acquires it, this does not mean that initially he intended to acquire it on behalf of his fellow and only afterward changed his mind and wished to acquire it for himself. Rather,

he said: Initially,

from the outset, at the time he lifted it, he intended to acquire the lost item for himself and not for his fellow, and therefore he acquires it.

And the Gemara adds:

This too is reasonably inferred,

that the Mishna intends that the one who lifted the lost item said that from the outset he lifted it for himself.

For it teaches in the latter clause

of the Mishna:

If, after he gave it to him, he said, “I acquired it initially,” he has said nothing.

And raise a difficulty:

“Initially”—

why do I need it in the latter clause!?

Why does the Mishna need to say that he claims that he acquired it initially, before he gave it to his fellow, intending to acquire it? After all,

it is obvious, even though he did not

say

“initially,”

he is saying ‘initially’!

Certainly his intention is to say that he acquired it before he gave it to him, for afterward, when the lost item is already in his fellow’s possession, how could he acquire it?

Rather, is it not so that “initially” means that from the very beginning of lifting it, he intended to acquire it, and

this teaches us: the first clause is where he says

“initially.”

The latter clause comes to reveal the meaning of the first clause: he claims that from the outset he intended to acquire it for himself. And the latter clause comes to say that if he made this claim only after he had already given it to his fellow, he is not believed, since by giving it to his fellow he revealed his intention that he had lifted the lost item in order to give it to him.

But the other one,

Rav Naḥman, who proved from the first clause of the Mishna that one who lifts a lost item for his fellow does not acquire it for his fellow, and who holds that the first clause is not speaking when he claims that from the outset he intended to acquire it for himself, but rather that after he lifted it for his fellow he changed his mind and wished to acquire it for himself, would say:

The tanna taught the latter clause “initially” in order

«сначала», чтобы

to reveal the meaning of the first clause.

Since, as stated, the “initially” in the latter clause is superfluous, it necessarily comes only to reveal that only in the

latter clause

is it speaking

of one who says

“initially.” But in the

But in the

first clause,

where “initially” is not mentioned, it is speaking

of one who did not say

“initially.”

And the meaning of “initially” is that he intended to acquire it before he gave it to his fellow. In the first clause, where he makes this claim before he gave it to his fellow, he is believed and acquires it, even though from the outset he lifted it for his fellow. But in the latter clause he is not believed, since once he has already given it to his fellow, he has revealed his intention that he indeed lifted it for the sake of his fellow and not for his own sake.

Rav Naḥman and Rav Ḥisda both say: One who lifts a lost item for his fellow does not acquire it for his fellow.

What is the reason?

Because

it is like one who seizes for a creditor in a place where he causes a loss to others.

Like a person who comes and seizes Reuven’s property for Shimon, who is Reuven’s creditor [lender]. Through this seizure, he causes a loss to other creditors, who will have nothing from which to collect their debts.

And one who seizes for a creditor in a place where he causes a loss to others does not acquire it.

Because a person may not stand on his own initiative and seize the borrower’s property without the lender having appointed him an agent for this, thereby causing a loss to the other creditors.

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman:

It was taught:

A laborer’s found item,

whatever the laborer finds, he acquires

for himself

and not for the employer.

When are these matters said? When the employer said to him: Weed with me today

or

hoe with me today,

as he was hired only for this particular work and not for every task of the employer.

But if he said to him,

the employer said to him:

Do work with me today,

which implies every type of work, including lifting lost items. Therefore,

the found item belongs to the employer.

It follows that one who lifts a lost item for his fellow acquires it for his fellow. And this is difficult for Rav Naḥman?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman said:

A laborer is different, for his hand is like the hand of

the employer.

It is as though the employer himself lifted the lost item, and therefore acquired it. But another person who lifts a lost item for his fellow does not acquire it for his fellow.

And Rava raises a difficulty to Rav Naḥman:

But Rav said: A laborer can retract

from being a laborer

even in the middle of the day.

And if a laborer’s hand is like the employer’s hand, how can he retract?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman said: In reality,

as long as he has not retracted,

as long as the laborer has not retracted, his hand is

like the employer’s hand.

When he retracts,

and the fact that he has the authority to retract,

has another reason,

it is for another reason,

as it is written [

Leviticus 25:55 ] “

For the children of Israel are servants to Me,”

they are My servants,

which implies that they are servants only to Him,

and not servants to servants,

that they do not become servants to human beings who themselves are servants to Him.

And from here we learn that a laborer is not like a slave of the employer, who would be unable to retract. Rather, if he wishes to retract in the middle of his work and forgo his wages from that point onward, he may do so.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who lifts a lost item for his fellow, his fellow acquires it.

And if you say: Our Mishna,

after all, a difficulty can be raised from our Mishna, where it says that if the one who lifted it said, “I acquired it,” he acquires it. This implies that now he wishes to acquire it, although at the time of lifting it he intended to acquire it for his fellow. Nevertheless, he acquires it, because one who lifts a lost item for his fellow does not acquire it for his fellow?

It can be answered: because

he said,

the rider said:

“Give it to me,” and he did not

say, “Acquire it for me,”

for he did not intend to appoint him as an agent to acquire it for him through lifting it, but rather that he should give him the lost item and then he would acquire it. And since, before giving it, the agent retracted and wished to acquire it for himself, he acquired it.

Mishna:

He saw the lost item

on the ground

and fell upon it,

but did not take hold of it,

and another came and took hold of it,

grasping it in his hand,

the one who took hold of it acquires it.

Gemara:

Reish Lakish said in the name of Abba Kohen Bardela: A person’s four cubits acquire for him everywhere,

so that every ownerless object found within a person’s four cubits belongs to him.

What is the reason?

Because

the Rabbis instituted

this is what the Sages instituted,

so that people would not come to quarrel,

so that people would not come to dispute who took hold of the lost item first.

Abaye said: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef raises an objection from Pe'a,

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef raised a difficulty against the law of four cubits from a Mishna in tractate Pe'a.

Rava said: Rav Ya'akov bar Idi raises an objection from Nezikin,

Rav Ya'akov bar Idi raised a difficulty against the law of four cubits from a Mishna in the order Nezikin.

And we explain:

Abaye said: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef raises an objection from Pe'a,

as we learned in tractate Pe'a:

If he took

one of the poor,

part of the pe'a

which he gathered for himself,

and threw it onto the remainder,

onto the pe'a that had not yet been detached, thinking that through this he acquired the remainder,

he has nothing in it,

for they penalize him and take from him even the pe'a that he had already gathered [because he sought to conceal the remainder of the pe'a from the other poor].

If he fell upon it,

he threw himself upon the pe'a. Or

he spread his garment over it,

spreading his garment over it in order to acquire it,

they remove him from it.

They take from him the pe'a upon which he fell or over which he spread his garment, because he did not acquire it through these methods.

And likewise with regard to a forgotten sheaf,

these laws also apply to shikḥa, which is one of the gifts to the poor: when the employer forgets one sheaf in the field, he is forbidden to return and take it, but must leave it for the poor.

And if you say

that

a person’s four cubits acquire for him everywhere,

then why did the poor person not acquire the pe'a upon which he fell?

Let his four cubits acquire it for him,

for is it not located within his four cubits, and why should he not acquire it through the acquisition of four cubits?

And we answer:

With what are we dealing here?

For example,

he did not say, “Acquire it for me,”

that he did not explicitly say that he wished to acquire the pe'a through the acquisition of four cubits, and therefore this acquisition did not benefit him.

And we challenge:

And if the Rabbis instituted

if, as you say, the Sages instituted an acquisition through four cubits,

when he did not say, what is there

why must he explicitly say that he wishes to acquire through this acquisition?

And we resolve:

Since he fell, he revealed his intention that he is pleased that it should be acquired for him through falling; through four cubits he is not pleased that it should be acquired for him

for through his falling he revealed his intention that he does not wish to acquire the peah by virtue of the enactment of the Sages concerning four cubits, but through falling. And since falling does not acquire it, it follows that he did not acquire it at all, neither through falling nor through the four cubits.