Bava Metzia 10b — the Talmud in English

Rav Pappa said:

the poor man did not therefore acquire the pe'a within four cubits, because

when the Sages instituted for him the acquisition through four cubits

when did the Sages institute the acquisition through four cubits? Only

in general

in the public domain, or at the sides of the public domain, or in an alleyway, which are domains belonging to everyone. But

in the field belonging to the householder

in a field belonging to a particular person, such as this field in which the poor man gathered pe'a,

the Sages did not institute for him

there they did not institute the acquisition through four cubits.

And Rav Pappa explains:

and even though the Merciful One granted him [permission] in it

for the Torah granted the poor permission to enter the field of every person in order to gather pe'a, and, if so, it is logical that the acquisition through four cubits should apply there?

When the Merciful One granted him [permission],

it was specifically

to walk in it and to gather pe'a.

The Torah granted the poor man only the right to walk in the field and gather pe'a, but

for it to become his courtyard,

so that he would have a right truly as though it were his courtyard,

the Merciful One did not grant him [that],

and therefore the acquisition through four cubits does not apply there.

And the Gemara continues to explain:

Rava said: Rav Yaakov bar Idi raised an objection from Nezikin!

Rav Yaakov bar Idi raised an objection to the law of four cubits from our Mishna, which is in the order Nezikin:

He saw the lost item and fell upon it, and another came

and took hold of it; the one who took hold of it acquired it.

And if you say

that

a person’s four cubits acquire for him everywhere,

why did he not acquire the lost item upon which he fell?

Let his four cubits acquire it for him!

For even without the falling, it was located within his four cubits?

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he did not say, “I acquire it.”

He did not explicitly say that he wished to acquire the lost item through the acquisition of four cubits.

And we challenge:

And if the Sages instituted

the acquisition through four cubits,

when he did not say

explicitly that he wished to acquire it through this acquisition,

what of it?

And we answer:

Since he fell upon it, he revealed his mind that he wanted it to be acquired for him through the falling; through four cubits he did not want it to be acquired for him.

And therefore he does not acquire it through four cubits.

Rav Sheshet said:

He therefore does not acquire the lost item upon which he fell through four cubits because the lost item is in the public domain. And

when the Sages instituted

where did the Sages institute the acquisition through four cubits? Specifically

in an alleyway, where the public do not press against one another,

where there are not many people, but

in the public domain, where the public press against one another, the Sages did not institute

the acquisition through four cubits, since a person does not have four cubits there that are designated for him, for many people are standing around him.

And we challenge:

But

Reish Lakish said, “A person’s four cubits acquire for him

everywhere,”

he said,

and this implies even in the public domain?

And we answer:

“Everywhere”

comes to include the sides of the public domain.

Even at the sides of the public domain there is acquisition through four cubits, since there is not such crowding there. But in the actual public domain the Sages did not institute the acquisition through four cubits.

And Reish Lakish said in the name of Abba Kohen Bardela: A minor girl does not have a courtyard.

A woman who is a minor, and her husband threw a get into her courtyard, does not thereby become divorced, because a minor girl does not have the acquisition of a courtyard.

And she does not have four cubits,

if her husband threw the get into her four cubits, she likewise is not divorced, although an adult woman would become divorced through this, because the Sages did not institute for a minor girl the acquisition of four cubits [which is similar to the acquisition of a courtyard; and since she does not have the acquisition of a courtyard, they did not institute four cubits for her].

And Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Yannai: She has a courtyard and she has four cubits.

The minor girl becomes divorced both through her courtyard and through her four cubits.

And we explain:

With what do they disagree,

Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan?

One

Rabbi Yohanan

holds: A courtyard was included because of her hand,

The reason that a woman becomes divorced through the placing of the get in her courtyard is that a person’s courtyard is considered like his hand, meaning his domain. And what is stated concerning a get, “and he places it in her hand,” includes her courtyard as well.

And therefore a minor girl can also become divorced through her courtyard, because

just as she has a hand,

just as a minor girl has a “hand” with which to receive her get and become divorced through it,

a courtyard

also she has, so she has it

also a “courtyard” through which she can become divorced.

And the other

Reish Lakish

holds: A courtyard was included because of agency,

for the law of acquisition through a courtyard is learned from the law of agency: the courtyard is like a person’s agent, and since agency is effective for receiving a get, a courtyard is also effective.

And therefore a minor girl cannot become divorced through a courtyard, since

just as she does not have agency,

just as a minor girl cannot become divorced through an agent, since minors are not subject to the law of agency,

so too she does not have a courtyard.

So too, she cannot become divorced through her courtyard.

And we challenge:

Is there

indeed

one who says: A courtyard was included because of agency?

But it was taught:

It is stated in the section of Mishpatim: “If the theft is surely found

in his hand,

from an ox to a donkey to a live sheep, he shall pay double.”

I have only

that he is liable for double payment

but

when he stole with

his hand

literally. If the animal entered

his roof, courtyard, or enclosure [

a woodshed] and he locked the door before it in order to steal it,

from where

is it derived that he becomes liable for double payment for his theft?

The verse states: “Theft shall surely be found”

“surely found”

From the repetition of the wording we derive

from anywhere,

that even in his roof and courtyard he is considered a thief and becomes liable for double payment.

And if it enters your mind that a courtyard was included because of agency, then we find an agent for a transgression

for the courtyard has become the thief’s agent for a transgression?

And we have established: There is no agent for a transgression,

for the law of agency was not stated in this case, so that the principal would become liable for the agent’s act of transgression as though he had performed it. And how does the thief become liable for theft carried out through his courtyard? And we answer:

Ravina said:

Actually, a courtyard was included because of agency, and nevertheless it is possible for a courtyard to be an agent for a transgression. For

where do we say

when do we say

that there is no agent for a transgression?

Only

where the agent is subject to liability,

for the agent too is warned not to perform the transgression; therefore the principal cannot be held liable for the agent’s transgression, because the agent should not have listened to the principal and performed the transgression, as “the words of the master and the words of the student—the words of whom does he heed?”

But in the case of a courtyard, which is not subject to liability, its sender becomes liable.

The principal becomes liable even though it is a matter of transgression. Therefore the thief becomes liable for his courtyard, despite the fact that a courtyard is because of agency.

And we challenge:

If so,

that there is an agent for a transgression when the agent is not subject to liability, then

one who says to a woman or a slave, “Go and steal for me!”—for they are not subject to liability,

since the woman and the slave are exempt from paying for their theft,

so too

shall we say

that their sender becomes liable,

that the principal becomes liable for their theft?

And we answer:

You said: A woman and a slave are subject to liability.

In essence, they are liable to pay for what they stole.

But at present they do not have the means to pay

It is only impossible in practice to hold them liable, because they have nothing with which to pay, since the property of the woman and the slave belongs to the husband and to the master.

And at the moment when it becomes possible for them to pay, they truly

will become liable,

as we learned: If the woman was divorced

from her husband, or

the slave was emancipated, they are liable to pay.

And therefore they cannot be agents for theft, because there is no agent for a transgression.

Rav Sama said:

The reason that the thief becomes liable even through his courtyard, despite the fact that a courtyard is because of agency and there is no agent for a transgression, is that

where do we say

when do we say:

There is no agent for a transgression,

only

where, if he wishes, he acts, and if he wishes, he does not act,

where the agent has free choice and can refrain from carrying out the agency.

But a courtyard, which he places in it against its will,

for the courtyard cannot object to the owners’ using it,

its

sender becomes liable.

The owners who send the courtyard become liable for the courtyard’s act, even though it is a matter of transgression.

And we explain:

What practical difference is there between them?

What is the practical halakhic difference between the two answers of Ravina and Rav Sama?

There is a difference between them: a kohen who says to an Israelite, “Go out and betroth a divorced woman for me!”

who is forbidden to him by a prohibition, which includes not only intercourse with her but also the act of betrothal itself. Whereas the Israelite is not forbidden to marry a divorced woman.

Alternatively: a man who says to a woman, “Cause me to have the head of a

child”

shaved, as my agent, the side-lock of the child’s head, for one who shaves the side-lock of another’s head is also included in the prohibition of “You shall not round the corners of your heads.” Whereas a woman is not entirely included in this prohibition.

According to that formulation which says,

according to Rav Sama, who says:

Whenever, if he wishes, he performs it, and if he wishes, he does not perform it,

his sender is not liable, for the matter depends only on whether the agent is able to oppose the execution of the agency or not. If so,

here too,

in the case of the kohen and the divorced woman, and in the case of shaving the side-lock,

if he wishes, he performs it, and if he wishes, he does not perform it.

For the agent is able to refuse to perform the agency. Therefore, the rule that there is no agent for a transgression applies here,

and his sender is not liable.

The sender is not liable for the agent’s act.

And according to that formulation which you said,

according to Ravina, who says:

Whenever the agent is not one who is liable, his sender is liable,

for if the agent is not warned regarding this prohibition, the rule that there is no agent for a transgression does not apply; rather,

his sender is liable,

the sender is liable for the agent’s act. If so,

these too,

the Israelite and the woman are not forbidden to perform this act of agency; therefore, the law that there is no agent for a transgression is not stated here; rather,

their sender is liable

the kohen and the man are indeed liable for the act of their agents.

And we object:

But is there one who says

that someone holds

that a courtyard was included only on account of her hand?

And it was taught in a beraita:

It is stated in the section concerning the divorce of a woman, “And he shall write for her a scroll of severance and place it in

her hand.”

I have derived from here only that she is divorced

when

he places the bill of divorce in

her hand.

If he placed it inside her roof, her courtyard, or her enclosure, from where

is it derived that she is divorced?

The verse says: “

And he shall place.”

From the fact that Scripture did not say, “And in her hand he shall place it,” we expound the “and he shall place” independently, to say:

in any manner!

That is, any placing into her domain, such as inside her roof or her courtyard, suffices with regard to a bill of divorce.

It follows that a courtyard is [effective] on account of [being like] a hand. For if a courtyard were on account of agency, we would not need a special inclusion that a woman is divorced through her courtyard, since we had already learned that she is divorced through her agent!

And we answer:

With regard to a bill of divorce,

in truth,

everyone agrees that a courtyard was included on account of her hand,

as is demonstrated by the inclusion stated in the section concerning divorce, and a minor girl can indeed be divorced through her courtyard.

When they disagree,

Resh Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan did not disagree except

with regard to a lost object,

whether a minor girl has a courtyard through which she can acquire a lost object.

Master,

Rabbi Yohanan held: