Bava Metzia 11a (יא.) — the Talmud in English

We derive the law of a found object from the law of a bill of divorce.

We learn the law of a found object from the law of a bill of divorce: Just as, with regard to a bill of divorce, a minor girl has a courtyard, so too, with regard to a found object, she has a courtyard.

But

Reish Lakish

held: We do not derive the law of a found object from the law of a bill of divorce.

For it is impossible to derive monetary law from a prohibition. Indeed, with regard to a bill of divorce, the courtyard functions as a hand. But with regard to a found object, which is a monetary matter, we derive the law of a courtyard from another exposition of the verse “If he shall surely find,” stated with regard to theft. There it is possible that the courtyard functions by virtue of agency [and nevertheless the verse had to teach us that a thief also becomes liable through his courtyard, so that we would not say that there is no agency for a transgression]. Therefore, a minor girl, who does not have the legal status of an agent, likewise does not have a courtyard with regard to monetary matters.

And if you wish, say: With regard to a minor girl, everyone agrees that we derive the law of a found object from the law of a bill of divorce.

For in the case of a minor girl we find that the Torah explicitly expanded the law to establish that she has a courtyard with regard to a bill of divorce; therefore, we derive from this that she also has a courtyard with regard to a found object.

And here they disagree with regard to a minor boy.

Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree only with regard to whether a minor boy has a courtyard for purposes of acquiring a found object.

One master,

Rabbi Yoḥanan,

held: We derive the law of a minor boy from that of a minor girl,

so that a minor boy also has a courtyard with regard to a found object.

And the other master,

Reish Lakish,

held: We do not derive the law of a minor boy from that of a minor girl,

and a minor boy does not have a courtyard with regard to a found object.

And if you wish, say: One master stated one matter and the other master stated another matter,

Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yoḥanan each spoke about a different matter,

and they do not disagree.

There is no disagreement between them.

Reish Lakish is speaking with regard to a found object, where a minor girl does not have a courtyard, while Rabbi Yoḥanan is speaking with regard to a bill of divorce, where a minor girl does have a courtyard. Alternatively, Reish Lakish is speaking with regard to a minor boy, while Rabbi Yoḥanan is speaking with regard to a minor girl.

Mishna:

One who has a field and

saw them,

the people, while they were

running after a found object,

to acquire an ownerless object that had just been found in his field, or he saw them running

after a lame deer

with injured legs, which was in his field and could not flee because its legs were broken, or he saw them running

after fledgling birds that had not yet flown away,

which were in his field and, if the people did not take them, would remain in his field and be protected there,

and said,

the owner of the field:

“My field has acquired it for me!”

It has acquired them for him

his field has acquired all these found objects for him, since a person’s courtyard acquires for him whatever is inside it when the object is protected there.

But if

the deer was running in its usual manner, or the

fledgling birds were flying away, and he said: “My field has acquired it for me!”

He has said nothing,

because they are not protected in his field.

Gemara:

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

When does he acquire through the acquisition effected by a courtyard?

When he is standing beside his field.

And the Gemara discusses this:

Let his field acquire it for him

even when he is not standing beside it,

as Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: A person’s courtyard acquires for him without his knowledge!?

And it rejects this:

These words

that his courtyard acquires for him without his knowledge apply

to a guarded courtyard

on its own,

but in the case of a courtyard that is not guarded

on its own, then only

if he is standing beside his field, yes;

then it acquires for him, since he is standing beside it and guarding it. But

if not,

if he is not standing beside it, it

does not

acquire for him.

And from where do you say

that it is correct to say

that a courtyard that is not guarded

on its own acquires specifically

if he is standing beside his field, yes; if not, no!?

This follows from what we learned with regard to the mitzva of shikheḥa, forgotten sheaves: If a person forgot sheaves in his field, they belong to the poor. If he had workers in the field, forgot the sheaves, and returned to the city while the workers remained to complete the work, this is not shikheḥa until the workers also forget them. Conversely, if the owner of the field left sheaves while remembering them, returned to the city, and the workers forgot them in the field, this is not shikheḥa; it becomes shikheḥa only once the owner of the field also forgets them.

As it was taught:

If

he was standing

the owner of the field

in the city, and said: “I know that there is a sheaf of mine in the field,”

and I left it in the field intentionally, and did not forget it,

but

the

workers

who were supposed to bring it

forgot it,

and therefore I proclaim and say:

“This shall not have

the status of

‘shikheḥa’!”

One might have thought that it shall not be shikheḥa

even if afterward the owner of the field also forgets it.

The verse states: “And you forget a sheaf in the field.”

The verse teaches that specifically when one forgets a sheaf

in the field,

I apply to it the term

“and you forget,”

because only in this manner does the sheaf have the status of shikheḥa,

and not

do I apply the term “and you forget”

in the city!

That is, if while he was in the field he remembered the sheaf, and only upon arriving in the city did he forget it, this sheaf does not have the status of shikheḥa. Rather, it is his, and the workers’ forgetting is not considered shikheḥa.

And the Gemara analyzes the words of the beraita:

This itself is difficult!

At first

you said, “One might have thought that it shall not be shikheḥa”; evidently, it is shikheḥa,

once the owner of the field forgets it.

And the Gemara derives from it,

while, conversely, the beraita continues and expounds the verse to mean the opposite:

“In the field, ‘and you forget,’ but not in the city!”

Evidently,

if the owner of the field remembers the sheaf when he comes from the field to the city, and only the workers who remained in the field forget it, then

it is not shikheḥa

even after the owner of the field forgets it!

Rather, is it not

necessarily

what the tanna is saying

in the beraita:

Only when the owners are

in the field,

and their forgetting is of the category of

“forgotten from the outset,”

meaning that they initially forgot it, and after they returned to the city the workers who remained in the field forgot it, only then

is it shikheḥa.

But if the forgetting was of the category of

“remembered and ultimately forgotten,”

meaning that the owners did not forget it when they returned to the city, but the workers who remained in the field forgot it, and only afterward the owners returned and forgot it, then

it is not

a case of

shikheḥa

ever, since the law of shikheḥa applies only when the owners forgot it as they left the field, and not when they forgot it after returning to the city.

And now the Gemara infers:

What is the reason

for distinguishing between something forgotten in the field and something forgotten in the city?

Since he is standing beside it,

since the owners are standing beside the field,

it is his courtyard

which acquires for him,

and it acquires it for him

with regard to the shikheḥa.

But in the city, even if it was remembered and ultimately forgotten, it is shikheḥa.

What is the reason? Because he is not there for it to acquire it for him.

This proves that in the case of a field that is not guarded, one acquires only when standing beside his field.

And the Gemara asks:

From where is this established? Perhaps it is a decree of the verse that in the field it shall be shikheḥa, but in the city it shall not be shikheḥa!

And it answers: It is impossible to say this, because

the verse says: “You shall not return to take it,” to include forgetting in the city.

And the Gemara asks:

This verse is needed

for the following purpose:

for the prohibition!

It is needed to teach us the prohibition against taking the forgotten sheaf for oneself, and therefore it is not superfluous to expound it in this manner.

And it answers:

If so, let the verse say: “You shall not take it.”

What is the meaning of “You shall not return”?

To include forgetting in the city.

But it is still needed

this verse

for that which we learned:

The shikheḥa

that is before him,

that is, stalks that he forgot to cut because he had not yet reached them to cut them,

is not shikheḥa,

but only stalks that he forgot to cut and passed by them in his forgetting, and they are now forgotten stalks

that are behind him are shikheḥa, as they are subject to “You shall not return.”

This is the principle: Anything subject to “You shall not return” is shikheḥa. Anything not subject to “You shall not return” is not shikheḥa.

Rav Ashi said: The verse says “It shall be,” to include forgetting in the city!

And Ulla likewise said: And this is when he is standing beside his field.

And Rabba bar bar Ḥana likewise said: And this is when he is standing beside his field.

Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Ulla:

We learned in tractate Maaser Sheni [5:9]:

There was an incident involving Rabban Gamliel and the Elders who were traveling on a ship,

and Rabban Gamliel remembered that he had untithed produce at home, and he was concerned that the members of his household might eat this produce, assuming that it had been tithed, since “it is presumed concerning a ḥaver that he does not remove from his possession something that is unprepared.” Therefore, Rabban Gamliel hastened to tithe it while he was still on the ship.

And this is what he did:

Rabban Gamliel said: “The tithe that I will eventually measure,

the tenth of the produce that I will eventually measure and separate as first tithe, shall be

given to Yehoshua

ben Ḥanania, who was with him on the ship and was a Levite, to whom first tithe is given.