Bava Metzia 11a — the Talmud in English

We derive the law of a lost item from a get.

We learn the law of a lost item from a get: just as, with regard to a get, a minor girl has a courtyard, so too, with regard to a lost item.

And the other one,

Reish Lakish

holds: We do not derive a lost item from a get.

for it is impossible to derive monetary law from a prohibition. Indeed, with regard to a get, the courtyard is on account of a hand. But with regard to a lost item, which is a monetary matter, we derive the law of the courtyard from another exposition of “it shall surely be found,” stated with regard to theft; and there it is possible that the courtyard is on account of agency [and nevertheless the verse had to teach us that the thief also becomes liable through his courtyard, so that we should not say that there is no agent for a transgression]]. And therefore a minor girl, who does not have the status of agency, also does not have a courtyard with regard to monetary matters.

And if you wish, say: With regard to a minor girl, everyone agrees that we derive a lost item from a get,

for with regard to a minor girl we find that the Torah explicitly increased [the law] that she has a courtyard with regard to a get, and therefore we derive with regard to her that she also has a courtyard with regard to a lost item.

And here they disagree with regard to a minor boy.

Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan disagree only with regard to a minor boy: whether he has a courtyard with regard to a lost item.

One master,

Rabbi Yohanan

holds: We derive a minor boy from a minor girl,

so that a minor boy also has a courtyard with regard to a lost item.

And the other master,

Reish Lakish

holds: We do not derive a minor boy from a minor girl,

and a minor boy does not have a courtyard with regard to a lost item.

And if you wish, say: One master said one thing and the other master said one thing,

Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan each spoke about a different matter,

and they do not disagree.

There is no disagreement between them.

Reish Lakish speaks with regard to a lost item, that a minor girl does not have a courtyard, and Rabbi Yohanan speaks with regard to a get, where a minor girl does have a courtyard. Or, Reish Lakish speaks with regard to a minor boy, and Rabbi Yohanan speaks with regard to a minor girl.

Mishna:

One who has a field and

saw them,

the people, when they were

running after a lost item,

to acquire a lost item of ownerless property that was now found in his field, or he saw them running

after a lame deer

on its legs, found in his field, which cannot flee from it because its legs were broken, or he saw them running

after fledglings that had not flown away,

and they were found in his field, and if those people did not take them, they would remain in his field and be guarded there,

and he said,

the owner of the field:

“Let my field acquire it for me!”

It acquired for him

his field, with regard to all these lost items, since a person’s courtyard acquires for him what is within it when the thing is guarded in it.

But if

the deer was running in its usual manner, or the

fledglings were flying, and he said: “Let my field acquire it for me!”

He has said nothing!

because they are not guarded in his field.

Gemara:

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

When does he acquire through acquisition by a courtyard?

And it is when he is standing beside his field.

And the Gemara discusses:

Let his field acquire it for him

even when he is not standing beside it?

For Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina said: A person’s courtyard acquires for him without his knowledge!?

And it rejects this:

These words

that his courtyard acquires for him without his knowledge

apply to a guarded courtyard

by itself,

but a courtyard that is not guarded

by itself, then only

if he is standing beside his field, yes.

Then it acquires for him, since he is standing beside it and guarding it. But

if not

standing beside it, it

does not

acquire for him.

And from where do you say

and from where do you have to say

that a courtyard that is not guarded

by itself, specifically

if he is standing beside his field, yes; if not, no!?

From the fact that we learned with regard to the mitzva of shikheha that if a person forgot sheaves in his field, they belong to the poor. And if he had workers in the field, and forgot the sheaves and returned to the city, but the workers still remained in order to complete the work, this is not shikheha until the workers also forget them. Conversely, if the owner of the field left sheaves while remembering them and returned to the city, and the workers forgot them in the field, this is not shikheha, but only once the owner of the field also forgets them.

For it was taught in a beraita:

If

the owner of the field was standing

in the city and saying:

“I know that I have a sheaf in the field,

and I left it in the field deliberately, and I did not forget it,

but

the

workers

who were supposed to bring it,

forgot it,

and therefore I declare and say:

“There shall not be

for this sheaf the law of

shikheha!”

Perhaps it shall not be shikheha,

even if afterward the owner of the field also forgets it?

The verse states: “And you forget a sheaf in the field.”

The verse teaches that specifically one who forgets a sheaf

in the field,

I apply to him

“and you forget,”

for only in this manner does the sheaf have the law of shikheha,

and not

do I apply “and you forget”

“in the city!”

That is, if while he was in the field he remembered the sheaf, and only upon coming to the city forgot it, this sheaf does not have the law of shikheha, but it is his, and the forgetting of the workers is not shikheha.

And the Gemara discusses the explanation of the words of the beraita:

This itself is difficult!

At first

you said, “Perhaps it shall not be shikheha?” Apparently, it is shikheha,

when the owner of the field forgets them.

And the Gemara continues with it,

and, conversely, the beraita continues and expounds from the verse the opposite:

“In the field, ‘and you forget,’ and not in the city!”

Apparently,

if the owner of the field remembers the sheaf when coming from the field to the city, and only the workers who remained in the field forgot it, then

it is not shikheha

even after the owner of the field forgets them!

Rather, is it not

necessarily

that this is what

the tannai in the beraita

only when the owners are

in the field,

and their forgetting was of the category

“forgotten from the outset,”

that they forgot it first, and afterward, when they returned to the city, the workers who remained in the field forgot it—only then

is it shikheha.

But if the forgetting was of the category of “

“remembered and ultimately forgotten,”

that the owners did not forget it when they returned to the city, but the workers who remained in the field forgot it, and only afterward the owners returned and forgot it, then

it is not

this

shikheha

ever, since the law of shikheha applies only if the owners forgot it when they left the field, and not if they forgot it after returning to the city.

And now the Gemara infers:

What is the reason

for distinguishing between something forgotten in the field and something forgotten in the city?

For since he is standing beside it,

since the owners are standing beside the field,

it is his courtyard

that acquires for him,

and it acquired for him,

with regard to the shikheha.

But in the city, even “remembered and ultimately forgotten” is shikheha.

What is the reason? For it is not with him, so that it should acquire for him.

And it is proven that in a field that is not guarded, he acquires only when he is standing beside his field.

And the Gemara asks:

From where [is this proven]? Perhaps it is a scriptural decree that in the field it should be shikheha, and in the city it should not be shikheha!

And it answers: It is impossible to say so, for

the verse says, “You shall not return to take it,” to include the forgetting of the city.

And the Gemara asks:

This is needed

the words of this verse are needed

for a prohibition!

to teach us the prohibition against taking the shikheha for oneself, and it is not superfluous so as to expound from it.

And it answers:

If so, let the verse say, “You shall not take it.”

What is the meaning of “You shall not return”? -

To include the forgetting of the city.

And still it is needed

for this verse

for that which we learned:

Shikheha

of what is before him,

that is, stalks that he forgot to cut because he had not yet reached them to cut them,

is not shikheha,

but only stalks that he forgot to cut and passed over them in his forgetting, and now they are forgotten stalks

of what is behind him—there is shikheha, for it is included in “You shall not return.”

This is the rule: Everything that is included in “You shall not return” is shikheha. Everything that is not included in “You shall not return” is not shikheha.

Rav Ashi said: The verse says “shall be,” to include the forgetting of the city!

And likewise Ulla said: And it is when he is standing beside his field.

And likewise Rabba bar bar Hana said: And it is when he is standing beside his field.

Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Ulla:

we learned in tractate Maaser Sheni [5:9]:

There was an incident involving Rabban Gamaliel and elders who were coming by ship,

and Rabban Gamaliel remembered that he had untithed produce at home that he had not tithed, and he was concerned lest the members of his household eat from this produce, assuming that it had been tithed, for “it is presumed of a chaver that he does not bring out from his possession something that is unprepared.” Therefore Rabban Gamaliel hastened to tithe it while he was still on the ship.

And this is what he did:

Rabban Gamaliel said: “The tithe that I am destined to measure,

a tenth of the produce that I am destined to measure and separate as first tithe, it is

given to Joshua

bar Hananiah, who was with him on the ship, and he is a Levite to whom first tithe is given.