Bava Metzia 11b (יא:) — the Talmud in English

and its place is rented to him,

the place where these fruits of maaser rishon are now lying in my house shall be rented to Rabbi Yehoshua for one peruta that he will give me. Through this, Rabbi Yehoshua will acquire the maaser rishon by means of kinyan chatzer, acquisition through one's domain.

and another tithe that I am destined to measure,

an additional tenth of the produce that I am destined to separate as maaser ani, which applies in that year,

is given to Akiva ben Yosef,

who was Rabbi Akiva, who was also on the ship, and he was the charity collector,

so that he may acquire

it for the poor.

And its place is rented to him,

to Rabbi Akiva, so that he may acquire the maaser ani through kinyan chatzer.

But challenge this:

Were Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva standing beside Rabban Gamliel's field?

And yet they acquired the tithes through kinyan chatzer. Evidently, it is not necessary for the owner to be standing beside his domain.

He said to him

Ulla to Rabbi Abba:

This scholar seems like someone who has not learned the matter properly!

Apparently, you do not know the correct interpretation of the Mishna from which you wish to challenge me.

When he arrived

when Rabbi Abba arrived

in Sura,

he said to them

to the scholars there:

This is what Ulla said:

that the owner must be standing beside his field,

and this is how I challenged him,

and I challenged him from the Mishna concerning maaser sheni. And he did not give me a clear answer.

One of the scholars said to him,

one of the scholars replied to Rabbi Abba:

Rabban Gamliel

did not transfer ownership of the tithes to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva through kinyan chatzer. Rather,

he transferred the movable property to them along with the land,

he transferred it to them through the acquisition of “along with” (agav). The law is that when one sells or gives another person land and movable property together, the purchaser need not perform a separate act of acquisition for the movable property. Rather, he performs an act of acquisition only with regard to the land, and through that he also acquires the movable property.

Here too, they acquired the tithes, which were movable property, along with their acquisition [through the rental] of the place, which was land. [ And even if this had been land located elsewhere from the tithes, they would have acquired the tithes.]

But in truth, with kinyan chatzer, it is indeed necessary for the owner to be standing beside his field.

Rabbi Zeira accepted it!

Rabbi Zeira accepted this answer, that the Mishna is speaking of kinyan agav and not of kinyan chatzer.

Rabbi Abba did not accept it!

He did not accept this answer.

Rava said: He did well not to accept it.

Rabbi Abba was correct not to accept the answer.

For,

did Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva not have

Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva

a cloth

a scarf

with which to acquire from him

from Rabban Gamliel

through exchange,

by giving Rabban Gamliel the cloth and thereby acquiring the tithes from him through kinyan chalipin? And why did Rabban Gamliel need to receive money from them for renting the place where the tithes were located?

Rather,

certainly, kinyan chalipin is ineffective here because

the benefit of discretion is not money with which to acquire from him

through exchange.

Since the tithes did not belong to Rabban Gamliel, and he had only the benefit of discretion—the right to give them to whomever he wished—this benefit of discretion is not considered the owner's money, such that kinyan chalipin can take effect upon it.

Here too,

likewise,

the benefit of discretion is not money with which to acquire along with land,

and kinyan agav likewise cannot take effect upon the benefit of discretion.

Therefore, it is impossible to say that they acquired the tithes from Rabban Gamliel through kinyan agav. Rather, Rabban Gamliel declared the tithes hefker, and they acquired them through kinyan chatzer from hefker.

The question therefore returns: this proves that the owner need not be standing beside his field, does it not?

The Gemara rejects Rava's words:

That is not so!

That is not the reason Rabban Gamliel did not transfer ownership of them through chalipin. In truth, the benefit of discretion is money and can be acquired through an ordinary acquisition. Rather, he did not transfer ownership through chalipin because

with regard to priestly gifts, “

giving”

is written concerning them.

The Torah uses the language of giving with regard to gifts given to a koen, a Levite, and a poor person, as it is stated: “And you shall give it to the Levite [the maaser rishon], to the stranger, to the orphan, and to the widow” [the maaser ani]. Therefore, it is forbidden to transfer ownership of them through chalipin, because

exchange is a mode of purchase and sale;

one gives him a cloth, and in return he transfers ownership of the object to him. If he were to transfer ownership of the tithes to him through chalipin, it would appear as though he were selling the tithes to him. But the Torah was particular that the tithes be given free of charge.

In contrast,

movable property along with land

the acquisition of “along with” (agav)

is an effective form of giving;

it is a complete transfer. Therefore, it is permitted to transfer the tithes through kinyan agav.

The answer of that scholar is indeed accepted: Rabban Gamliel transferred the tithes to them through kinyan agav and not through kinyan chatzer. There is therefore no difficulty from here against Ulla, who maintains that the owner must be standing beside his field.

Rav Pappa said:

In truth, Rabban Gamliel transferred the tithes to them through kinyan chatzer. Nevertheless, there is no difficulty against Ulla, because

when another party confers ownership of them, it is different.

Ulla said that it is necessary for the owner to stand beside his field only when the domain acquires an ownerless object. But when the domain acquires a gift or a purchase, where another party confers ownership of the gift or the purchase upon the owner of the domain—as with Rabban Gamliel's tithes, which he transferred to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva—Ulla will agree that the owner need not be standing beside his field, since it is easier to acquire an object when another party is conferring ownership of it.

The Gemara explains:

And from where do you say this,

that the fact that another party confers ownership of an object makes acquisition easier?

As we learned

in our Mishna:

If he saw them running after the found object

after a crippled deer or after fledglings that had not yet flown, and he said, “My field has acquired it for me,” his field acquires it for him.

And Rabbi Yirmeya said that Rabbi Yohanan said: And this

the Mishna is speaking only when

he was running after them and could reach them.

The owner of the field can manage to seize them before they leave his field, in which case they are considered guarded within his field, and therefore he acquires them.

And Rabbi Yirmeya raised the question: With regard to a gift, what is the law?

When a person gives another a deer or fledglings as a gift, and they are already located within the recipient's field, is it also necessary for the owner of the field to be able to seize them while they are still in his field, and only then does he acquire them through his domain? Or is the law different with regard to a gift?

Rabbi Abba bar Kahana received this tradition from him,

Rabbi Abba bar Kahana agreed with Rabbi Yirmeya that there is a difference between hefker and a gift, and ruled in practice that in the case of a gift,

even if he was running after them but could not reach them,

he nevertheless acquires them.

What is the reason?

Why is a gift different from hefker?

Is it not

because

when another party confers ownership of them, it is different?

It is easier to acquire an object when another party confers ownership of it, and therefore it is unnecessary for him to run after them and reach them.

The same law applies to a gift: it is also unnecessary for him to be standing beside his field, since another party is conferring ownership of it.

And we challenge this:

Rav Shimi said to Rav Pappa: But a bill of divorce is a case where another party confers ownership of it,

since the husband transfers ownership of the bill of divorce to his wife, and nevertheless

Ulla said:

Regarding what is stated in the Mishna in Gittin [77a], that if one throws a bill of divorce into his wife's house or domain, she is divorced,

and this

is specifically when

she is standing

the woman

beside her house or beside her domain.

This is difficult for Rav Pappa, who says that Ulla agrees that when another party confers ownership, it is unnecessary for the owner to be standing beside his field.

And we answer:

A bill of divorce is different, since it can be given against her will,

as the husband can divorce his wife even against her will. Therefore, it is specifically necessary for her to be standing beside her domain.

Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, raised an objection to this: But is this not a kal va-chomer?

Just as with a bill of divorce, which can be given against her will,

the domain acquires the bill of divorce for the woman even when she does not wish at all to acquire it, and nevertheless Ulla says

if she is standing beside her house or beside her domain, it is effective;

only then is she divorced.

If not,

if she is not standing beside her house or beside her domain,

it is not effective.

She cannot be divorced.

In the case of a gift, which is dependent on her will,

for the domain can acquire the gift for a person only if the person wishes it,

all the more so

is it necessary for him to be standing beside his field!?

And we answer:

Rather, Rav Ashi said: