Bava Metzia 11b — the Talmud in English

and its place is rented to him,

the place where these fruits of the first tithe are now lying in my house shall be rented to Rabbi Yehoshua for one peruta that he will give me. And through this Rabbi Yehoshua will acquire the first tithe by an acquisition through a domain.

and another tenth that I am destined to measure,

an additional tenth of the fruits that I am destined to separate as the poor tithe observed in that year,

is given to Akiva son of Yosef,

and he is Rabbi Akiva, who was also on the ship, and he was a charity collector,

so that he may acquire

it for the poor.

And its place is rented to him

to Rabbi Akiva, so that he may acquire the poor tithe through an acquisition by domain.

But let it be difficult:

Were Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva standing beside the field of Rabban Gamliel?

And nevertheless they acquired the tithes through an acquisition by domain. It follows that it is not necessary that the owners be standing beside their domain?

He said to him

Ulla said to Rabbi Abba:

This scholar seems like people who have not learned a halakhic teaching!

Apparently, you do not know the correct interpretation of the Mishna from which you wish to raise a difficulty against me.

When he came

when Rabbi Abba arrived

in Sura,

he said to them

to the scholars there:

This is what Ulla said:

that it is necessary for him to be standing beside his field,

and this is how I raised an objection to him:

and I challenged him from the Mishna concerning the second tithe. And he did not answer me with a clear answer.

A certain scholar said to him

one of the scholars replied to Rabbi Abba:

Rabban Gamliel

did not transfer ownership of the tithes to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva through an acquisition by domain. Rather,

he transferred the movable property to them together with the real property

he transferred it to them through an acquisition of “together with” (agav). For the law is that one who sells or gives his fellow real property and movable property together need not perform a separate act of acquisition for the movable property; rather, he performs an acquisition only of the real property, and through that he also acquires the movable property.

And here too, they acquired the tithes, which are movable property, together with their acquisition [by renting] the place, which is real property. [ And even if this had been real property located elsewhere from the tithes, they would have acquired the tithes.]

But in truth, with an acquisition by domain, it is indeed necessary that the owner be standing beside his field.

Rabbi Zeira accepted it!

Rabbi Zeira accepted this answer, that the Mishna is speaking of an acquisition of agav and not of an acquisition by domain.

Rabbi Abba did not accept it!

He did not accept this answer.

Rava said: He acted correctly by not accepting it.

Rabbi Abba was correct in not accepting the answer.

For

did Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva not have

Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva

a cloth

a scarf

from which to acquire

from Rabban Gamliel

through exchange,

so that they would give Rabban Gamliel the cloth and through this acquire the tithes from him through an acquisition by exchange? And why did Rabban Gamliel need to receive money from them for renting the place of the tithes?

Rather,

certainly, it is for this reason that an acquisition by exchange is ineffective here:

the benefit of ownership is not property with which to acquire from him

through exchange.

Since the tithes do not belong to Rabban Gamliel, and he has only a benefit of ownership in them, in that he is entitled to give them to whomever he wishes, this benefit of ownership is not considered the owner’s property, so that an acquisition by exchange can take effect upon it.

Here too,

likewise,

the benefit of ownership is not property with which to acquire together with real property

an acquisition of agav also cannot take effect upon a benefit of ownership.

Therefore, it is impossible to say that they acquired the tithes from Rabban Gamliel through an acquisition of agav. Rather, Rabban Gamliel declared the tithes ownerless, and they acquired them through an acquisition by domain from ownerless property.

And again the question returns: it is proven from here that the owner need not stand beside his field?

And the Gemara rejects Rava’s words:

That is not so!

This is not the reason that Rabban Gamliel did not transfer ownership of them through exchange. For in truth, the benefit of ownership is property, and it can be acquired through an ordinary acquisition. Rather, he did not transfer ownership of them through exchange for the reason that

with regard to priestly gifts,

“giving”

is written concerning them.

The Torah writes, with regard to gifts that are given to the priest, the Levite, and the poor person, the language of giving, as it is stated: “And you shall give it to the Levite [the first tithe], to the stranger, the orphan, and the widow” [the poor tithe]. Therefore, it is forbidden to transfer ownership of them through exchange, because

exchange is a manner of purchase and sale,

in which one gives him a cloth and, in return, transfers ownership of the object to him. And if he transfers ownership of the tithes to him through exchange, it appears as though he is selling the tithes to him. But the Torah was particular that the tithes be given for free.

In contrast,

movable property together with real property,

an acquisition of “together with” (agav)

is a substantial giving

it is a complete giving, and therefore it is permitted to transfer ownership of the tithes through an acquisition of agav.

And the answer of that scholar is indeed accepted: Rabban Gamliel transferred ownership of the tithes to them as an acquisition of agav, and not through an acquisition by domain. And there is no difficulty from here against Ulla, who holds that the owner must stand beside his field.

Rav Pappa said:

In truth, Rabban Gamliel transferred ownership of the tithes to them through an acquisition by domain. And nevertheless, there is no difficulty against Ulla, because

when another person has the intention of transferring ownership of them, it is different.

Ulla said that it is necessary to stand beside his field only when the domain acquires ownerless property. But when the domain acquires a gift or a purchase, where there is another person’s intention transferring the gift or the purchase to the owner of the domain, such as the tithes of Rabban Gamliel, who transferred ownership of them to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, there Ulla will concede that the owner need not stand beside his field, since it is easier to acquire when another person has the intention of transferring ownership of the object.

And the Gemara explains:

And from where do you say this,

from where do we know that another person’s intention to transfer ownership of them is an improvement with regard to acquisitions?

For we learned

in our Mishna:

If he saw them running after the found object

after a lame deer or after fledglings that had not flown away, and he said, “My field has acquired for me,” it acquires for him.

And Rabbi Yirmeya said that Rabbi Yohanan said: And this

the Mishna is speaking only

when he runs after them and reaches them.

So that the owner of the field can manage to seize them before they leave his field, at which point they are considered guarded within his field, and therefore he acquires them.

And Rabbi Yirmeya raised a question: With regard to a gift, what is the law?

What is the law when a person gives his fellow a deer and fledglings as a gift, and they are already within his field? Is it also necessary that the owner of the field be able to manage to seize them within his field, and only then does he acquire them through his domain? Or is the law with regard to a gift different?

Rabbi Abba bar Kahana accepted it from him,

Rabbi Abba bar Kahana agreed with Rabbi Yirmeya that there is a difference between ownerless property and a gift, and ruled as a practical matter that with regard to a gift the law is

that even though he runs after them but does not reach them

he nevertheless acquires them.

What is the reason?

Why is a gift different from ownerless property?

Is it not

the case

because when another person has the intention of transferring ownership of them, it is different?

It is easier to acquire when another person has the intention of transferring ownership, and therefore it is not necessary that he run after them and reach them.

And the same law applies: with regard to a gift too, it is not necessary that he stand beside his field, since another person has the intention of transferring ownership of them.

And we raise a difficulty:

Rav Shimi said to Rav Pappa: But a bill of divorce is a case in which another person has the intention of transferring ownership of it,

for the husband transfers the bill of divorce to his wife, and nevertheless

Ulla said:

with regard to what is stated in the Mishna in Gittin [77a], that if one throws a bill of divorce into his wife’s house or into her domain, she is divorced,

and this

is specifically when

she is standing

the woman

beside her house or beside her domain.

This is difficult for Rav Pappa, who says that Ulla concedes, in a case where another person has the intention of transferring ownership, that it is not necessary for the owner to stand beside his field.

And we answer:

A bill of divorce is different, since it can be given against her will,

as the husband can divorce his wife even against her will. Therefore, it is specifically necessary that she be standing beside her domain.

Rav Sheshet son of Rav Idi raised an objection to him: But is it not a kal va-chomer?

And just as with a bill of divorce, which can be given against her will,

the domain acquires the bill of divorce for the woman even when she does not wish at all to acquire it. And nevertheless Ulla says

if she is standing beside her house or beside her domain, it does;

only then is she divorced.

If not,

and if she is not standing beside her house or beside her domain,

it does not.

She cannot be divorced.

A gift, since it is with her consent,

for the domain can acquire the gift for a person only if the person wishes it,

all the more so

that it should be necessary for him to stand beside his field!?

And we answer:

Rather, Rav Ashi said: