Bava Metzia 12a — the Talmud in English

A courtyard was established as a yad,

that is, even though we learn the law of a courtyard—that it acquires for a person—from the law of a yad, for a person’s courtyard is like his hand, nevertheless

and it is not inferior to agency.

It also possesses the advantage of agency. For even had we not learned from the verses above [10b] that a courtyard acquires for a person, we would have known this through reasoning, that the courtyard is a person’s agent. [And the verse comes only to include minors, who do not have the status of agency, that they have the status of a courtyard by virtue of a yad.] And the advantage of agency in a courtyard is that the owner does not need to stand beside his courtyard, just as he does not need to stand beside his agent who receives a gift on his behalf.

Therefore,

with regard to a bill of divorce, since it is a liability for her,

for the woman, who does not want the bill of divorce, the courtyard cannot become an agent for the woman for the purpose of receiving the bill of divorce, since

one may not impose a liability upon a person except in his presence.

A person cannot be an agent for his fellow with regard to something that is a liability for him, without his knowledge. And the entire law of a courtyard with regard to a bill of divorce is only by virtue of a yad: just as she is divorced through her hand against her will, so too she is divorced through her courtyard against her will. Therefore Ulla holds that the woman must be standing beside her courtyard, for only then does the courtyard have the status of a yad, which resembles a person’s hand, being near him.

But with regard to a gift, since it is a benefit for him,

for the person receiving the gift,

one may acquire for a person not in his presence,

and the courtyard becomes the agent of the recipient of the gift, as we are certain that it is pleasing to him that the courtyard be his agent. Therefore, even though he is not standing beside his courtyard, the courtyard acquires for him by virtue of agency: just as the principal does not need to stand beside the agent, so the owner does not need to stand beside his courtyard.

And therefore, in the incident involving Rabban Gamliel, which was a gift, Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva did not need to stand beside their courtyards. [And even though it was not safeguarded for them].

However, with regard to a lost item, Ulla said that he must be standing beside his field when the courtyard is not safeguarded.

And the reason for this is that with agency there must be at least either the awareness of the agent or the awareness of the principal, whereas with a lost item there is neither the awareness of a principal nor the awareness of an agent. Therefore he must be standing beside his field, in which case the courtyard functions by virtue of a yad, or the courtyard must be safeguarded.

The substance itself:

We learned in our Mishna:

“He saw them running after the lost item, et cetera.”

Rabbi Yirmeya said that Rabbi Yohanan said: And this is when he runs after them and reaches them.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a question: With a gift, what is the law?

Rabbi Abba bar Kahana received this answer from him: Even though he runs after them and does not reach them.

Rava raised a question: If he threw his wallet,

a person who threw his wallet and declared it ownerless, and the wallet entered

through this entrance

of the courtyard of so-and-so

and exited through another entrance,

what

is the law? Did that homeowner acquire it or not?

And the sides of the question are: whether

air whose end is not to come to rest

something located in the empty space of a house whose end is not to come to rest within the house

is considered as resting,

so that it is considered as though it is resting inside the house, and consequently the homeowner acquired the object,

or not.

For it is not considered as though it was placed inside the house, since it will ultimately exit from there, and that homeowner did not acquire it?

Rav Pappa said to Rava.

And some say

that

Rav Adda bar Mattana

said

to Rava.

And some say

that

Ravina

said

to Rava: Is this not our Mishna,

does this matter not resemble the case of our Mishna?

For we learned in it:

“He saw them running after the lost item.”

And Rabbi Yirmeya said that Rabbi Yohanan said: And this is when he runs after them and reaches them.

And Rabbi Yirmeya raised a question: With a gift, what is the law?

And Rabbi Abba bar Kahana received this answer from him: With a gift, even though he runs after them and does not reach them.

Is it not the case that even though the deer will not ultimately come to rest inside the field, nevertheless it is considered as though it was placed inside the field, and the owner of the field acquired it?

He said to him,

Rava:

Are you speaking of something rolling!?

There, with the deer, it is not running through the air; rather, it is rolling on the ground, and

a rolling object is different, for it is considered as resting.

Something rolling on the ground is certainly considered as resting, even though it will not ultimately come to rest there. But my question concerns something located only in the air: is it considered as resting there or not?

Mishna:

It was explained above that a person acquires a lost item through himself—when he takes hold of it with his hand—or through his domain—if it enters his safeguarded domain. Our Mishna explains that a person also acquires the lost item of members of his household.

The lost item of his son and daughter

the minors,

and likewise

the lost item of his Canaanite male and female slaves ,

and

the lost item of his wife -

These belong to him.

But

the lost item of his adult son and daughter

, the lost item of his Hebrew male and female slaves ,

and

the lost item of his wife whom he divorced, even though he has not yet given her the ketuba —

these belong to them.

Gemara:

We learned: “The lost item of his son and daughter, the minors: these belong to him.” And plainly, this refers to genuine minors, who do not have the capacity to acquire by Torah law. And even if they are not supported at his table.

And clarification is required: why does the father acquire their lost item?

Shmuel said: Why did they say that a minor’s lost item belongs to his father?

Because when he finds it, he brings it running to his father and does not delay it in his possession.

And therefore, when he lifted it, he lifted it for his father’s sake.

The Gemara infers from Shmuel’s words:

Does this mean that Shmuel holds—

a minor does not have the capacity to acquire for himself by Torah law?

For if he acquired by Torah law, Shmuel’s reason would not be sufficient in order to make his lost item belong to his father.

And

there is a difficulty:

f

or

it was taught

in a beraita:

“One who hires a worker

to work in his field as a day laborer

, his son may gather after him.”

That is, he has the status of a poor person, and his son is permitted to gather after him the leket that falls from him.

But if he received the field as a tenant farmer,

for half, a third, or a quarter,

then he is like the owner of this field, and

his son may not gather after him.

For what the son gathers belongs to his father, and the father is not entitled to take from the leket.

Rabbi Yose says: In either case, his son and his wife may gather after him.”

And his reason will be explained below.

And Shmuel said—

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yose.

And we considered this matter: what is Rabbi Yose’s reason?

Granted, if you say that a minor has the capacity to acquire for himself,

it is understandable why his son is permitted to gather after him.

Because

when he gathers, he gathers for himself,

and he himself is poor, and is permitted to take leket.

And his father acquires from him

afterward.

But if you say that a minor does not have the capacity to acquire for himself,

and his hand is like his father’s hand, then

when he gathers, he gathers for his father,

but

his father is wealthy ,

and

why may his wife

and his son gather after him?

Rather, certainly Rabbi Yose holds: “A minor has the capacity to acquire for himself.” And Shmuel ruled in accordance with him, and not as we inferred from his words above?

And we answer:

Shmuel

who said above, “Why did they say that a minor’s lost item belongs to his father?

, was stating the reason of the tanna of our Mishna. But he himself does not hold this way,”

that a minor’s lost item belongs to his father. Rather, he holds in accordance with Rabbi Yose mentioned above.

And

we ask further: Does

Rabbi Yose hold, “a minor has the capacity to acquire by Torah law ”?!

But we learned

in tractate Gittin:

“The lost item of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor is subject to the prohibition of robbery because of the ways of peace.

Rabbi Yosei says:

not only because of ways of peace is it forbidden to rob them, but there is in it

“complete robbery.”

And Rav Hisda said,

Rabbi Yosei does not intend to say

complete robbery

by Torah law, but robbery

by their words [-

by rabbinic enactment], because of ways of peace ; however,

the practical difference

between him and the first tanna is

to recover it through the courts.

According to the first tanna—they did not make their enactment as stringent as complete robbery, and if another seized it from them, they do not remove it from his possession in court.

But according to Rabbi Yosei—they made their enactment as stringent as complete robbery, and they remove it from the possession of the one who seized it.

In any event, it is explained in Rabbi Yosei’s words that a minor has no acquisition by Torah law, but only by an enactment of the Sages .

And if so, why should his son gather after him, since by Torah law he has no acquisition for himself? It follows that his father is robbing the poor.

Rather, Abaye said,

the reason of Rabbi Yosei, who permitted the son to gather after his father, is not because he has an acquisition for himself by Torah law, but because

they treated it as though gatherers had passed over it, [

as a field that had been gathered over and over, and nothing remained in it for the poor].

For the poor themselves take their minds off it,

and despair of the gleanings found in the field .

And here too, the poor despaired of the gleanings, for

they reasoned—

the son of this one will gather it. [

Surely the laborer’s sons will gather after him].

And after despair, it is permitted for every person to acquire the gleanings.

Rav Adda bar Matana said to Abaye:

How did they permit him to let his sons gather after him, and to rely on the poor’s despair,

and is it permitted for a person to set a lion loose in his field so that the poor will see and flee?!