Bava Metzia 93a — the Talmud in English

That is fine according to the one who says that the master cannot say to the slave, “Work with me, and I will not sustain you.”

Since he does not provide his slave with sustenance, he is not obligated to work for him, and even his rights do not belong to him.

Rather,

according to the one who says that the master can say to the slave, “Work with me, and I will not sustain you,” what is there to say?

For even if he does not provide him with sustenance, the master acquires the slave’s labor, and the slave’s rights belong to him, and he can relinquish his right to eat.

Rather, both this and that,

both the beraita and the Mishna, speak

of a case where he does not provide them with sustenance.

And in this they disagree:

One master,

the master in the beraita, which allows the master to stipulate concerning the right of his minor slave to eat,

holds: He can

the master acquire the labor of his slave even when he does not sustain him, and the right to eat belongs to his master, and he can stipulate concerning it.

And the other,

the master in the Mishna, which did not allow the master to relinquish the right of his minor slave to eat when he does not sustain him,

holds: He cannot

the master acquire the labor of his slave when he does not sustain him. And even his right to eat does not belong to him, so that he can stipulate concerning it.

And the Gemara raises an objection: How can we establish that the Mishna holds that the master cannot say to the slave, “Work with me, and I will not sustain you”?

And

since

Rabbi Yohanan, who says that the master can

acquire the labor of his slave even when he does not sustain him,

abandon the Mishna and act according to the beraita!?

But where the Mishna and the beraita disagree, he must rule according to the Mishna!

Rather, everyone,

both the Mishna and the beraita, holds:

He eats from Heaven’s portion, and he cannot stipulate a deduction

by the master concerning the worker’s right to eat,

because

this is not a monetary right acquired by the worker, such that the master should acquire it and relinquish it.

And what is the meaning of “deducts,” which Rabbi Oshaya said

that he can deduct concerning the right of his minor slave to eat?

It does not mean that he relinquishes his slave’s right to eat. Rather, he deducts an amount of money for

sustenance,

which he will feed his slave before the work, so that he will not eat many of the produce’s fruits.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Correspondingly,

in the same manner,

regarding his animal,

why did the beraita say that one cannot deduct?

But

let him deduct for straw!

He should deduct in exchange for the straw with which he will feed it before threshing. And it is certainly permitted to feed it before threshing, so that it will be satiated at the time of threshing and will not eat during threshing,

Rather, in this they disagree:

One master,

the tannai in the beraita, who allows the master to deduct in exchange for the eating of his minor slave,

holds: He eats from his own,

and the master acquires the right to eat and can relinquish it and stipulate concerning it.

And the other,

the tannai in the Mishna, who holds that the master cannot stipulate concerning the right of his minor slave to eat,

holds: He eats from Heaven’s portion,

and this is not a right that the master can acquire and relinquish.

Mishna:

A person can deduct, a worker,

so that he will not eat from the produce in exchange for money,

through himself,

when he himself is the worker,

through his adult son and daughter,

when they are the workers,

through his adult male and female slave, and through his wife, because they have understanding

and can relinquish their eating.

But he cannot deduct through his minor son and daughter, nor through his minor male and female slave, nor through his animal, because they have no understanding,

and their relinquishment that they will not eat is not effective.

One who hires workers to work with his fourth-year produce: these may not eat,

because it is forbidden to eat fourth-year produce outside Jerusalem.

And

if he did not inform them

that it was fourth-year produce, but when he hired them for the work they thought that they had a right to eat from the produce,

he redeems it and feeds them,

since he became obligated to feed them.

If his

dried figs’

round cakes became scattered,

having already been dried, and he hired workers to press them together again,

or

his barrels became opened

after he had already sealed them,

these may not eat,

because the work of the produce has already been completed, and a worker eats only produce whose work has not been completed.

And

if he did not inform them,

and when they were hired they thought that the work of the produce had not yet been completed and that they had a right to eat, he

tithes and feeds them.

He is obligated to see to it that they are fed, because they were hired by him on that understanding.

Watchmen of produce eat

only

by the laws of the state.

For this is the custom, and the watchman is hired for the work of guarding with the understanding that he will receive whatever people customarily give a worker.

But not by Torah law.

And the Gemara explains why.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

Watchmen of produce

do not eat by Torah law, but by custom.

Rav said: They taught this only with regard to watchmen of gardens and orchards,

where the produce is still attached, and its time for completing its work has not yet arrived, and a worker eats only at the time of completion of the work.

But watchmen of winepresses and heaps,

where the produce is detached and now is the time when its work is completed,

eat by Torah law.

And the Gemara explains Rav’s words:

He holds

Rav,

that guarding

is considered like performing an act

with the produce

.

And therefore he eats by Torah law; whereas our Mishna, which says that a watchman does not eat by Torah law, must be speaking of one who guards attached produce whose work has not yet been completed. And this is the reason that he does not eat by Torah law, while the Mishna teaches that he eats by custom.

And Shmuel said: They taught

in our Mishna that watchmen of produce eat because of the custom

only with regard to watchmen of winepresses and heaps,

where the produce is at the stage of completion of its work.

But watchmen of gardens and orchards,

where the produce has not yet reached the stage at which its work is completed,

do not eat either by Torah law or by the laws of the state!

And the Gemara explains Shmuel’s words:

He holds

Shmuel,

that guarding

is not considered like performing an act

with the produce

.

And he has no right to eat as a worker.

And concerning one who guards but does not perform an act, the Mishna taught that there is a custom to allow him to eat. But a worker working with produce whose work has not yet reached the time of completion, which has no right of eating, even if he actually works with it, has no custom established to allow him to eat.

Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna raises an objection: One who guards the cow

a red cow so that it should not become impure, his body becomes impure and

renders his garments impure

that he is wearing, as is the law concerning all those occupied with the burning of the cow.

And if you say that guarding is not considered like performing an act

with the thing that he guards,

why does he render his garments impure?

After all, he is not occupied with the cow!?

Rather, learn from this that one who guards is considered occupied with the thing that he guards. And this is difficult for Shmuel, who holds that a guard does not eat by Torah law even when the produce is detached, because he is not considered like one who performs an act.

Rabba bar Ulla said:

In truth, by the basic law, the guard is not considered occupied with the burning of the cow, and he should have remained pure. Rather,

a decree

was made that he become impure,

lest he move a limb of it,

without noticing, and become impure through contact with the cow; therefore they decreed that every guard of a red cow be rendered impure.

Rav Kahana raises an objection: One who guards four or five cucumber beds

[beds planted with cucumbers] belonging to five people,

may not fill his belly from one of them, but from each and every one he eats according to the calculation.

And if you say that guarding is not considered like performing an act,

and the Mishna established as a novelty that he is to be treated as one who performs an act and allowed to eat by virtue of the custom,

why does he eat

the guard in the cucumber beds? For even if you treat him as one who performs an act, the produce has still not reached the stage at which its work is completed, and a worker does not eat from it even by custom. This is difficult for Shmuel!

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: They taught this with regard to uprooted plants,

where they had already reached the stage at which their work is completed. And since a guard does not perform an act, he should not have eaten. Nevertheless, because of the custom, he eats.

And the Gemara raises an objection: Can we establish the Mishna with regard to

uprooted plants!? But their work has been completed with regard to tithing!

And after the completion of the work, a worker does not eat.

And the Gemara answers: It is speaking of a case

where the pikes have not been removed,

the flower at their top,

from them.

And as long as the flower has not been removed, their work has not been completed.

Rav Ashi said: In accordance with Shmuel,

who holds that one who guards attached produce does not eat even by custom,

it is reasonable,

since this is the meaning of the Mishna:

for we learned: And these

workers

eat by Torah law: one who works with attached produce at the time of completion of the work, and with detached produce, etc.

By inference

from this, that the Mishna needed to emphasize “eat by Torah law,” you learn

that there is one who does not eat by Torah law, but only by the laws of the state

[because of the custom].

Come and hear the final clause: And these do not eat.

What is the meaning of “do not eat”?

What novelty is taught by this? Surely it is obvious that anyone who is not included among those said in the first clause to eat does not eat!

If you say

that if you wish to answer and say that there are some

who do not eat by Torah law but only by the laws of the state,

and it taught us that there are some who eat by custom, then

that is the first clause,

for from the Mishna’s emphasis “eat by Torah law,” we already learned that there are some who eat by custom.

Rather, is it not

the intention of the Mishna to introduce and say that there are workers

who do not eat either by Torah law or by the laws of the state. And who are they?

They are:

one who works with attached produce,

such as one who weeds in a field,

at a time when the work has not been completed,

even though they perform an act.

And all the more so watchmen of gardens and orchards,

who do not perform an act, do not eat.

And this accords with Shmuel, who holds that with attached produce a worker has no right to eat, even by custom.

Mishna:

There are four watchmen: an unpaid watchman, a borrower, a paid watchman, and a renter.

An unpaid watchman swears concerning everything

that he was not negligent, and is exempt from payment.

And the borrower pays for everything,

even for unavoidable accidents.

And a paid watchman and a renter swear concerning one that was broken, one that was captured, and one that died,

for all these are unavoidable accidents, and they are exempt from unavoidable accidents.

And they pay for loss and theft.

Gemara:

Who is the tannai

who taught the Mishna of

four watchmen?

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha: It is Rabbi Meir.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Is there

a tannai

who does not have four watchmen,

that you establish our Mishna specifically as Rabbi Meir!?

He said to him: This is what I am saying to you: Who is the tannai,

who is the tannai who taught our Mishna, holding that

a renter is like a paid watchman,

and is liable even for theft and loss?

It is Rabbi Meir.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

But concerning Rabbi Meir, we have heard the opposite from him?

For it was taught in a beraita: How does a renter pay? Rabbi Meir says: Like an unpaid watchman

and he is liable only if he was negligent in guarding.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Like a paid watchman

and he is liable even for theft and loss.

And the Gemara answers:

Rabba bar Avuha taught it oppositely,

his version of the beraita was reversed: Rabbi Meir holds that a renter is like a paid watchman and is liable even for theft and loss, while Rabbi Yehuda holds that he is like an unpaid watchman and is liable only if he was negligent. And Rav Naḥman likewise had this version.

But the Gemara raises another objection:

If so,

that the renter’s law is either like that of an unpaid watchman or like that of a paid watchman, it is difficult: are there

four

watchmen?

But

there are three!

For the renter is not an additional watchman; rather, he is like an unpaid watchman or like a paid watchman!

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: There are four watchmen

who are obligated to guard,

but their laws,

when they did not guard and the animal died or was stolen, are

three.

There was a certain shepherd,

an incident involving a shepherd who guarded other people’s animals for pay,

who was grazing animals on the bank

[of it]

of the Pappa River

[the name of a river].

It slipped,

one

of them, and fell into the water,

and died.

He came before Rabba, and he exempted him

as the law of an unavoidable accident.

He said

Rabba: My reason for exempting him is that

what could I have done!?

What could he have done to prevent this slipping? Therefore, he is the victim of an unavoidable accident,