Bava Metzia 92b (צב:) — the Talmud in English

Ta shema: One who hires a worker to harvest figs,

to dry them in the field and make them into dried figs,

he may eat, and he is exempt from tithing.

For their work has not yet been completed, as they still need to dry.

And if the worker stipulated with the owner: “I am a worker

on the condition that I, and my son, may eat, or that my son may eat in my place,

with the value of this deducted from my wages,” then

he,

the worker himself, who eats by Torah law,

may eat, and is exempt

from tithing.

But his son,

who eats by virtue of the stipulation he made with the owner,

may eat, but is obligated

to tithe.

For one who eats by virtue of a stipulation has the status of one who purchases the produce, and one who purchases produce is obligated to tithe it.

And if you say, “He eats from his own [produce],”

and the eating of every worker is his wage for his labor, and nevertheless the Torah exempted him from tithing, then

why is his son obligated

to tithe? After all, his eating, too, is in payment for his father’s labor. Just as the worker himself, although his eating is payment for his labor, is not considered a purchaser and is exempt from tithing, so too his son, who eats in payment for the labor, should be exempt from tithing!

The Gemara answers:

Ravina said:

Indeed, as a matter of strict law, the son who eats in payment for the labor should be exempt from tithing. However, the Sages imposed stringency upon him and required him to tithe

because it appears

that his eating

is a purchase,

as he acquires the produce by virtue of the stipulation he made, unlike his father, who eats without any stipulation at all.

Ta shema: One who hires a worker

and informs him that he is being hired

to work with his fourth-year produce, they may not eat

from the produce, because it is forbidden to eat fourth-year produce outside Jerusalem.

But if he did not inform them,

and when they were hired they assumed that they also had the right to eat, he

redeems

the fourth-year produce with money

and feeds them.

For in addition to their wages for labor, he had become obligated to provide them with food from the produce, and this is a mistaken transaction.

And if you say that he eats from Heaven’s [provision], why does he redeem it and feed them!?

After all, the eating is a gift that the Torah granted them, allowing them to take from the produce, but

when it is forbidden,

as when the produce is fourth-year produce, which they are forbidden to eat outside Jerusalem,

the Merciful One did not grant them [the right],

and their right to eat is not an obligation incumbent upon the owner. He need not redeem the produce so that they will have something from which to eat.

It must be, then, that a worker eats from his own [produce] as payment for his labor, and this is an obligation upon the owner just like the wages. Therefore, when he misled them and they thought that they had the right to eat, he must take care of the matter, redeem the produce, and let them eat it.

The Gemara rejects this:

There,

the reason he was required to redeem the produce and feed them was not because of the workers’ right to eat. Rather,

it is because it appears to be a mistaken transaction.

For had he informed them that they were being hired to work with fourth-year produce and could not eat it, they would not have accepted the employment.

But still,

say the latter clause: If his round cakes of figs became scattered,

after the figs dried and came apart, and he hired them to join them together again, or if

his barrels became open

after he had put wine into them and hired them to seal them again,

then

they may not eat.

A worker has no right to eat after the completion of the work, and the wine and figs have already reached the completion of their preparation.

But if he did not inform them

that their work involved produce with regard to which a worker has no right to eat,

he tithes and feeds them.

And if you say that he eats from Heaven’s [provision], why does he tithe and feed them!?

After all, it is not the owner’s obligation to feed them; they merely have a charitable right, and

the Merciful One did not grant them [the right] when it is forbidden.

And if you would say that here too,

his obligation to tithe is not because of an obligation to feed them, but

because it appears to be a mistaken transaction,

as had he informed them, they would not have accepted employment with him—

It is impossible to answer in this manner.

For

granted that his round cakes of figs became scattered,

that his cakes came apart after drying and he wishes to press them together again,

it appears to be a mistaken transaction,

since when he tells them, “Come press figs for me,” they assume that the figs have not yet dried, that this is their first pressing before the completion of the work, and that they will therefore have the right to eat.

But

if his barrels became open,

and he hired them to seal his barrels,

what mistaken transaction is there?

After all,

they certainly know

that

it has become subject to tithing,

since the preparation of the wine was already completed when it was gathered into the barrels.

Rav Sheshet said:

Here we are dealing with a case

where his barrels became open

and the wine was poured back

into the pit.

When he hired them, they assumed that this was the first drawing of the wine from the pit, that its preparation for tithing had not been completed, and that they had the right to eat.

The Gemara raises an objection: Even according to their assumption that the wine had never been drawn from the pit:

But it was taught in a beraita: Once wine descends into the pit,

it is obligated in tithing, even before it is drawn out.

And when he hired them to draw the wine from the pit, they knew that they had no right to drink from it, since its preparation for tithing had already been completed.

The Gemara answers: This Mishna follows

Rabbi Akiva, who says

that the completion of the wine’s preparation for tithing occurs only

when it is skimmed,

when the kernels and refuse float to the surface of the wine in the pit and are removed.

They said to him,

the workers said to the owner: “When you hired us,

we did not know

that the kernels and refuse had already been removed from it, and you misled us into thinking that we had the right to eat.”

The Gemara raises an objection:

Let him say to them,

the owner should say to the workers:

You should have

[been required]

to consider

[the possibility]

that it had already been skimmed

[that perhaps the refuse had already been removed from the wine]. Why did you assume that the refuse had not yet been removed? You misled yourselves.

The Gemara answers:

In a place

where it was customary that

the man who drew

the wine from the pit

was the one who skimmed it,

removing the refuse, the workers hired to draw the wine were certain that the refuse still had to be removed.

And now,

after

Rav Zevid bar Rabbi Oshaya taught: Wine’s

completion of preparation for tithing, according to the first tanna, is

when it descends into the pit and is skimmed,

and the kernels floating on it are removed,

but Rabbi Akiva says: When it is filtered in the barrels,

when the sediment floating on it is removed after the wine has been placed in the barrels,

you may even say that his barrels did not become open

and the wine was not poured

into the pit,

but he hired them to seal barrels full of wine; it is still possible that they thought they had the right to eat,

as they said to him,

the workers said to the owner:

We did not know that it had been filtered,

that the sediment had already been removed and the barrels had been opened once more.

Let him say to them,

the owner should say to the workers: Although you thought that this was the first sealing of the barrels,

you should have considered

[the possibility]

that it had perhaps been filtered

and you misled yourselves.

In a place where the one who sealed,

the person who sealed the openings of the barrels with clay,

was the one who filtered it,

he also removed the sediment. They assumed that they were responsible for removing the sediment and that the preparation of the wine had not yet been completed. The owner should have informed them that his barrels had been opened after sealing and that the sediment had already been removed from them.

Ta shema,

a proof from what we learned below in the Mishna [93a]:

A person may stipulate

[make an agreement]

for

[his] worker to refrain from eating, even though he is entitled to eat by Torah law, in exchange for money that the owner gives him, whether

through himself,

when he is the worker, or

through his adult son or daughter,

when they are workers, or

through his adult male or female slave, or through his wife,

when they are workers,

because they possess understanding

to waive their eating.

But he may not stipulate

[make an agreement] for money in exchange for the eating

through his minor son or daughter, or through his minor male or female slave,

when they are workers,

or through his animal,

which he rents to others for threshing with it. He cannot waive its right to eat in exchange for money, since even when it has no right to eat, it is forbidden to muzzle it. In the case of minors, his stipulation to pay in exchange for their refraining from eating is ineffective,

because they do not possess understanding

to waive their eating.

The condition that the father makes on their behalf does not prevent them from eating, since they would have to waive their right, and they do not possess the understanding to waive it.

The Gemara proves this:

It might have entered your mind

that our Mishna, which says that a person may stipulate regarding the eating of his sons, daughters, and slaves, is speaking

when he provides them with sustenance,

and supports them.

Granted, if you say that he eats from Heaven’s [provision],

and the worker has no right or ownership in the produce that would entitle him to eat it,

that is why he may not stipulate

in the case of minors: There is no right that the father can waive.

But

if you say that he eats from his own [produce],

the worker eats by virtue of a right that he has in the produce,

then in the case of minors as well, let us stipulate for them;

their father should waive their right to eat to the owner in exchange for the money he gives him. Since he supports them, all their rights to eat belong to him, and he can waive them.

The Gemara rejects this:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he does not

provide them with sustenance,

so their rights do not belong to him, and the right they have to eat the produce is not his either; therefore, he cannot waive it.

The Gemara raises an objection:

If so,

that we established our Mishna as referring to a case where he does not support them,

then adults as well:

How can their father stipulate with the owner for money in exchange for their refraining from eating? What connection do they have to his stipulation? After all, they do not depend on his table; why should they agree to his words?

The Gemara answers:

Adults know,

they hear that their father made the stipulation,

and they waive [their right].

Since they remain silent and do not protest, they thereby agree to his words and waive their right to eat.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But didn’t Rabbi Oshaya teach: A person may stipulate

to refrain from eating in exchange for money

through himself and through his wife, but not through his animal,

when he rents it to others, he cannot waive the right it has to be fed, since it is forbidden to muzzle it even when he has no right to feed it?

And

a person may likewise stipulate

through his adult son and daughter,

making an agreement that the owner will prevent them from eating in exchange for money.

But not through his minor son and daughter,

since they do not possess the understanding to waive their right to eat, and they eat even when he makes such a stipulation.

And he may waive this with regard to his Canaanite male and female slaves, whether adults or minors.

And in the Mishna above we learned that only with regard to adult slaves, who are capable of waiving their rights, can he stipulate, but not with regard to minors,

Is it not so,

apparently, you are compelled to explain that

both this and that,

both the Mishna and the beraita, speak

of one who provides them with sustenance,

and the slaves’ rights belong to their masters,

and it is with regard to this that they disagree:

One master,

the tanna of the beraita, which said that even with regard to the eating rights of a minor slave the owner can stipulate,

holds that he eats by virtue of his own entitlement,

and since the eating is the worker’s right, his owner can stipulate and waive this right, since the rights of his minor slave belong to him.

And the other master,

the tanna of the Mishna, which said that the owner cannot stipulate with regard to the eating rights of a minor slave,

holds that he eats by virtue of a gift from Heaven,

and the worker’s eating is not a right or an acquisition in the produce such that the master would have anything to waive or on which to stipulate.

The Gemara rejects this:

No; everyone agrees that he eats by virtue of his own entitlement,

and since the worker’s eating is his right, the slave’s owner can waive this right and stipulate with regard to it.

And it is not difficult.

Here,

the Mishna, which said that one cannot stipulate with regard to the eating of a minor slave, speaks

of a case where he does not provide them with sustenance,

and the slave’s rights do not belong to his master when he does not provide for him, so he cannot waive them.

And the beraita,

which allows the owner of the minor slave to stipulate with regard to the slave’s eating rights,

speaks of a case where he provides them with sustenance,

and his rights belong to his master; therefore, he stipulates with regard to them.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

On what basis did you establish

[as what did you establish] the beraita,

as referring to a case where he provides them with sustenance?

If so,

with regard to his

minor son and daughter as well, let him waive it for them!

Since their rights, when he provides for them, belong to him, he can waive their eating rights. Why, then, did the beraita say that he cannot waive it for his minor son and daughter?

The Gemara answers: A right that is

painful for his minor son and daughter, the Merciful One did not grant him.

Therefore, the father was not granted the authority to waive their eating rights, since doing so causes them pain.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

On what basis did you establish the Mishna

[as what did you establish the Mishna], which says that one cannot waive it for his minor slave,

as referring to a case where he does not provide them with sustenance,

for in that case the master does not acquire the eating right of his slave, enabling him to waive it.