Bava Metzia 92b — the Talmud in English

Come and hear: One who hires a worker to gather figs,

to dry them in the field and make them dried figs,

he may eat, and is exempt from tithing.

For their work has not yet been completed, since they still need to dry.

And if the worker stipulated with the owner: “I am a worker

on condition that I, and my son, may eat, or that my son may eat in my wage,”

and the value of this is deducted from the account of the wage for my labor, then

he,

the worker himself, who may eat by Torah law,

may eat, and is exempt

from tithing.

And his son,

who eats because of the condition that he stipulated with the owner,

may eat, and is obligated

to tithe.

For one who eats because of a condition has the status of one who purchases the produce. And one who purchases produce is obligated to tithe it.

And if you say, “He eats from his own,”

and the eating of every worker is payment for his labor, and nevertheless the Torah exempted him from tithing, if so,

why is his son obligated

to tithe? But his eating, too, is in the wage for his father’s labor. And just as the worker himself, although his eating is payment for his labor, is not considered a purchaser and is exempt from tithing, so too his son, who eats in payment for his labor, should be exempt from tithing!

And the Gemara answers:

Ravina said:

Indeed, by the fundamental law, the son who eats because of the wage for the labor should have been exempt from tithing. Rather, the Sages were stringent with regard to him, that he should tithe,

because it appears

that his eating

is like a purchase,

for he purchases through the condition that he stipulated, and he is unlike his father, who eats without any condition at all.

Come and hear: One who hires a worker,

and informs him that he is hired

to work with his fourth-year produce, these may not eat

from the produce, because it is forbidden to eat fourth-year produce outside Jerusalem.

And if he did not inform them,

and when they were hired they thought that they also had the right to eat,

he redeems

the fourth-year produce for money

and feeds them.

For in addition to the wage for the labor, he became obligated to them to provide eating from the produce, and it is a mistaken transaction.

And if you say that he eats from Heaven, why does he redeem and feed them!?

But the eating is charity that the Torah granted them, to take from the produce, and

that which is forbidden,

when the produce is fourth-year produce, which they are forbidden to eat outside Jerusalem,

the Merciful One did not grant them,

and their right to eat is not an obligation upon the owner, and he need not redeem it so that they will have something from which to eat.

And necessarily, the worker eats from his own as payment for his labor, and it is an obligation upon the owners like the wage. Therefore, when he misled them and they thought that they had the right to eat, he must take care of this, and redeem it and let them eat it.

And the Gemara rejects:

There,

what they obligated him to redeem and feed them was not because of the workers’ right to eat. Rather,

because it appears like a mistaken transaction.

For had he informed them that they were being hired for fourth-year produce, from which they could not eat, they would not have been hired.

But still,

say the latter clause: When his round cakes became scattered,

after the figs dried, they separated, and he hired them to join them again, or when

his barrels became opened

after he had put wine into them, and he hired them to close them again,

these

may not eat.

For a worker has no right to eat after the completion of the labor, and the wine and the figs had already completed their preparation.

And if he did not inform them

that their labor was with produce regarding which there is no right of eating for a worker,

he tithes and feeds them,

And if you say that he eats from Heaven, why does he tithe and feed them!?

But it is not the owner’s obligation to feed them; rather, they have a charitable right, and

the Merciful One did not grant them what is forbidden.

And should you say, here too

his obligation to tithe is not because of the obligation to feed them, but rather

because it appears like a mistaken transaction,

for had he informed them, they would not have been hired by him—

It is impossible to answer this way.

For

granted that when his round cakes became scattered,

his round cakes separated after they dried, and he wishes to press them together again,

it appears like a mistaken transaction,

since when he says to them, “Come press figs for me,” they think that they have not yet dried, and that this is their first pressing, before the completion of the labor, and they will have the right to eat.

Rather,

when his barrels became opened,

and he hired them to close his barrels,

what mistaken transaction is there?

But

they certainly know

—and after all, they know—

that it has become obligated for them to tithe,

for the preparation of the wine had already been completed from the time it was gathered into the barrels.

Rav Sheshet said:

Here we are dealing with a case in which

his barrels became opened,

and the wine was poured back

into the pit.

And when he hired them, they thought that this was the first drawing up from the pit, and that its preparation for tithing had not been completed, and that they had the right to eat.

And the Gemara raises an objection: Even according to their assumption, that they had never drawn the wine up from the pit:

But it was taught in a beraita: Once wine descends into the pit,

it is obligated in tithing, even before it is drawn up.

And when he hired them to draw the wine up from the pit, they knew that they did not have the right to drink from it, since its preparation for tithing had already been completed.

And the Gemara answers: This Mishna held

in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who says

that the completion of the preparation of wine for tithing is only

when it is skimmed,

when the seeds and refuse float upon the wine in the pit and they remove them.

They said to him,

the workers to the owner: When he hired us,

we did not know

that the seeds and refuse had already been removed from it, and you misled us into thinking that we had the possibility of eating.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Let him say to them,

the owner to the workers:

You should have

—it was incumbent upon you—

taken into consideration

—brought to mind—

that perhaps it had been skimmed,

and why did you think that the refuse had not yet been removed from it? You misled yourselves.

And the Gemara answers:

In a place

where it is customary that

that man who draws

the wine up from the pit

skims it himself,

removes the refuse, and they who were hired to draw up the wine were certain that the refuse still needed to be removed from it.

And now,

after

Rav Zevid bar Rabbi Rabbi Hoshaya taught: Wine,

the completion of its preparation for tithing, according to the first tanna, is

once it descends into the pit and is skimmed,

and the floating seeds are removed from it,

And Rabbi Akiva says: Once it is drawn off into barrels,

when the dregs floating upon it are removed after they have put it into barrels,

you may even say that his barrels did not become opened

and were poured

into the pit,

but rather he hired them to close barrels full of wine; it is still possible that they thought that they had the right to eat,

for they said to him,

the workers to the owner:

We did not know that it had been drawn off,

that the dregs had already been removed and that the barrels had been opened once again.

Let him say to them,

the owner to the workers: Although you thought that this was the first closing of the barrels,

you should have taken into consideration

—it was incumbent upon you to bring to mind—

that perhaps it had been drawn off

from the dregs, and you misled yourselves.

In a place where that one who seals,

the person who seals the openings of the barrels with clay,

is that same one who draws it off,

he also removes the dregs, and they thought that they were responsible for removing the dregs and that the preparation of the wine had not yet been completed. He should have informed them that his barrels had been opened after being sealed, and that the dregs had already been removed from them.

Come and hear,

a proof from what we learned below in the Mishna [93a]:

A person may stipulate

—make an arrangement—

for

a worker to refrain from eating, even though he is entitled to this by Torah law, in exchange for money that the owner gives him, whether

by himself,

when he is the worker, or

through his adult son and daughter,

when they are workers, or

through his adult male and female slave and through his wife,

when they are workers,

because they possess understanding

to waive their eating.

But he may not stipulate

—make an arrangement—money in exchange for the eating

through his minor son and daughter, and not through his minor male and female slave,

when they are workers,

and not through his animal,

which he rents to others for threshing with it, for he cannot waive its right to be fed in exchange for money, since even without the right of eating it is forbidden to muzzle it. And regarding minors, his stipulation to pay in exchange for their refraining from eating is ineffective,

because they do not possess understanding

to waive their eating.

And the condition that the father stipulates on their behalf does not prevent them from eating, since they need to waive it, and they do not possess the understanding to waive.

And the Gemara proves:

It entered your mind

that our Mishna, which says that a person stipulates regarding the eating of his sons, daughters, and slaves, is discussing a case

in which he provides them with sustenance,

and he supports them.

If you say, granted, that he eats from Heaven,

and the worker has no right and acquisition in the produce to eat it,

for this reason he may not stipulate,

regarding minors, since there is no right that the father can waive.

Rather,

if you say that he eats from his own,

the worker eats by virtue of a right that he has in the produce to eat it,

then with minors too, let us stipulate for them,

let their father waive to the owner their right of eating in exchange for the money he gives him, since he supports them, and all their rights of eating belong to him, and he can waive it.

And the Gemara rejects:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case in which he does not

provide them with sustenance,

and their rights are not his, and the right of eating that they have in the produce is not his either, and he cannot waive it.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

If so,

that we established our Mishna as referring to a case in which he does not support them,

then adults too,

how can their father stipulate money with the owner in exchange for their not eating? What connection do they have to his condition? After all, they are not dependent upon his table, and why should they agree to his words?

And the Gemara answers:

Adults know,

they hear that their father stipulated,

and they waive.

For from the moment they remained silent and did not protest, they agreed with his words and waived their eating.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

But Rabbi Hoshaya taught: A person may stipulate

to refrain from eating in exchange for money

through himself and through his wife. But not through his animal,

when he rents it to others, he cannot waive the right that it be fed, since it is forbidden to muzzle it even when he has no right to feed it.

And

a person may likewise stipulate

through his adult son and daughter,

making a condition that the owner prevent them from eating in exchange for money.

But not through his minor son and daughter,

for they do not possess the understanding to waive their right of eating, and they eat even when he stipulates.

And he may stipulate concerning his Canaanite slave and maidservant, both adults and minors.

And in the Mishna above we learned: specifically concerning adult slaves, who are capable of waiving, he may stipulate, but not concerning minors,

Is it not,

apparently, necessarily to interpret that

both this and that,

both the Mishna and the baraita, speak

when he provides them sustenance,

and the rights of the slaves belong to their masters,

and in this they disagree:

One master,

the tanna of the baraita, which said that even concerning the eating right of a minor slave the owner may stipulate,

holds that he eats from his own,

and since the eating is the worker’s right, his owner may stipulate and waive this right, since the rights of his minor slave belong to him.

And the other master,

the tanna of the Mishna, which said that the owner may not stipulate concerning the eating right of a minor slave,

holds that he eats from what belongs to Heaven,

and the worker’s eating is not a right and an acquisition in the produce, such that the master would have something to waive and stipulate concerning.

And the Gemara rejects:

No; everyone holds that he eats from his own,

and since the worker’s eating is his right, the owner of the slave may waive and stipulate concerning this right.

And it is not difficult:

Here,

the Mishna, which said that it is impossible to stipulate concerning the eating of a minor slave, speaks

when he does not provide them sustenance,

and the slave’s rights do not belong to his master when he does not support him, and he cannot waive them.

And the baraita,

which permits the owner of the minor slave to stipulate concerning the slave’s eating right,

when he provides them sustenance,

and his rights belong to his master. And he is stipulating concerning them.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

In what have you established it

[in what have you established] the baraita,

when he provides them sustenance.

If so,

concerning his minor son and daughter

as well, let him stipulate for them!

Since their rights, when he supports them, are his, he can waive their eating right. And why did the baraita say that he does not stipulate concerning his minor son and daughter?

And the Gemara answers: a right that is

their distress—the minor son’s and daughter’s—the Merciful One did not grant him.

And therefore they did not grant the father the ability to waive their eating right, since it is distress for them.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

In what have you established the Mishna

[in what have you established the Mishna] which says that a person does not stipulate concerning his minor slave,

when he does not provide them sustenance,

for then the master does not acquire the eating right of his slave, so as to waive it.