Bava Metzia 61a (סא.) — the Talmud in English

If it does not apply [

since it is not needed]

to

the prohibition of

neshekh

in a loan of

money, since

it has already

been stated

as a prohibition at the beginning of the verse, “

You shall not charge your brother,” assign it to this matter [

expound it]

as referring to interest on money.

We now have a source for the prohibitions of neshekh and interest, both in a loan of money and in a loan of food.

Still,

I have no

source for the prohibition of neshekh with food and interest with money

except

with regard to the prohibition of the

borrower,

since the verse “money neshekh, food neshekh” was stated with regard to him, as we have just expounded.

But with regard to the prohibition imposed on the

lender,

we find only the prohibition of neshekh with money and interest with food.

From where

do we know that he is also subject to the prohibition of neshekh with food and the prohibition of interest with money?

Neshekh is stated with regard to the borrower, “

You shall not charge your brother neshekh,”

and neshekh is stated with regard to the lender, “

You shall not give him your money with neshekh.”

And we derive it through a gezerah shavah:

Just as

like

the “neshekh” stated with regard to the borrower, the verse did not distinguish

within

between money and food, and between neshekh and interest.

He always transgresses both negative commandments, as we expounded above.

So too, with regard to the “neshekh” stated concerning the lender, you shall not distinguish

among its prohibitions. Rather, it is always prohibited,

whether with money or with food, whether as neshekh or as interest.

The tanna continues: Until now, we have learned a source for prohibiting interest only in a loan of money and produce.

From where do we include every item [

all types of property in the world], whose loan with interest is prohibited?

The verse states:

[in that passage] “

neshekh on every item that

is charged.”

From here it follows that every single item is included in the prohibition of interest.

We asked above: From where do we know that the lender is also subject to the additional prohibition of neshekh with food and the additional prohibition of interest with money, as we find with the borrower? We had to derive this through a gezerah shavah.

But

Ravina said:

With regard to the prohibitions of the lender,

the verse is not needed for neshekh with food or interest with money!

No special expansion is necessary, since everything can be understood from the verse.

For

indeed,

if

the Torah had written the two parts of the verse in a single form, as follows:

“You shall not give him your money with neshekh, and you shall not give your food with interest,”

it would have been explicit from the wording

as you said [

as you had thought], namely: “neshekh” refers specifically to money, whereas “interest” refers specifically to food. If so, we would indeed have no source for the prohibition of neshekh with food and interest with money.

“deduction” refers specifically to money, whereas “increase” refers specifically to food. If so, we would indeed have no source for a deduction in food and an increase in money.

However,

now that it is written, “You shall not give him your money with neshekh, and with interest you shall not give your food,”

since the Torah changed its formulation and placed the words “neshekh and interest” between “you shall not give him your money” and “you shall not give your food,”

read it in this manner:

you must expound the verse in both directions, and thus:

“You shall not give him your money with neshekh and with interest.”

“You shall not give your food with neshekh and with interest.”

It is as though neshekh and interest were stated explicitly both with regard to “you shall not give him your money” [a loan of money] and with regard to “you shall not give your food” [a loan of produce].

We challenge this:

But

the wording of the

tanna

in the beraita above is as follows: “

Neshekh was stated

with regard to the borrower, and

neshekh was stated

with regard to the lender,”

he said;

it is clear that the derivation is through a gezerah shavah!

We answer:

This is what he means:

the tanna intends to say:

If the verse had not been stated,

as Ravina expounded above, then

I would have said that there is a gezerah shavah

from borrower to lender.

But

now that the verse has been stated,

the verse “with neshekh and with interest you shall not give your food,” as Ravina expounded it,

the gezerah shavah is not needed.

We challenge this:

Then why do I need the gezerah shavah?

We answer: The gezerah shavah is necessary

for

the matter of the addition in the verse

“neshekh on every item that is charged,”

which was written together with the prohibitions of the borrower, and from which we learned above that every type of item is included in the prohibition of interest. Since this addition was

not

written

with regard to

was written

the lender

but only with regard to the borrower, the gezerah shavah is necessary to teach that the lender too transgresses the prohibition with regard to every type of item.

Rava said: Why did the Merciful One need to write

Why did the Torah need to designate three separate negative commandments concerning one matter? They are:

A negative commandment concerning interest:

“Do not take neshekh from him” [Leviticus 25:36];

A negative commandment concerning robbery:

“You shall not rob” [Leviticus 19:13];

A negative commandment concerning exploitation:

“You shall not wrong one another” [Leviticus 25].

Is not the general principle emerging from all these prohibitions that a person is forbidden to diminish another's money in any manner whatsoever? If so, the Torah could have written only one of them, and the others could have been derived from it through a bamah hatzad. Why was a separate negative commandment necessary for each one?

And he answers:

They are necessary,

as each one is genuinely distinct from the other, in a manner that precludes deriving one from the other.

For had the Merciful One written only the prohibition against interest,

I would not have learned from it that it is prohibited in every case involving a monetary loss [such as robbery],

because

I would have said that

it is a special innovation

unique

to

the passage concerning interest. The proof of this is

that even with regard to a borrower,

who does not cause his fellow a monetary loss by paying the interest; on the contrary, he is the one who suffers the loss,

the Merciful One nevertheless prohibited it.

It necessarily follows that the prohibition against interest is not because of the “monetary loss” caused to the other person; rather, it is a special innovation applying specifically to interest, and it cannot be used to derive the prohibition against robbery. Therefore, the Torah specified a separate prohibition against robbery.

Likewise,

if

the Torah

had written

a

prohibition

only

against robbery,

and not against fraud and interest, I would not have learned from it that interest and fraud are prohibited, for perhaps the Torah prohibited robbery specifically

because it is done against the owner’s will;

the robber seizes the money against the owner’s will.

But fraud,

which is done by means of a sale and purchase [and likewise interest, which is given by means of a loan],

perhaps not.

Perhaps this is not subject to a prohibition. Therefore, the Torah specified a separate prohibition against fraud as well.

And

if the Merciful One had written a prohibition against fraud,

I would not have learned from it the prohibition against “robbery,” for I would have said: Since, in the case of robbery, the victim sees the stolen property and despairs of recovering it, he thereby waives his claim, and there is no prohibition in this; whereas that which the Torah prohibited in the case of fraud is

because the buyer does not know

at the time of the sale that the seller has defrauded him,

and waives his claim [

in order that he will waive his claim against him].

Therefore, all three were written.

And we raise another objection: Indeed,

one [

each one of them]

cannot be derived from one [

from any particular prohibition, had only that one been written]

from [

it would not have been learned] the reasons explained above.

There is still a difficulty:

let one be derived from two!

Once two of the prohibitions were written, the third is no longer necessary, since it can be derived from the two prohibitions that were already written.

And the Gemara considers:

Which one can be derived,

which prohibition can be learned from the other two?

If you mean that

the Merciful One should not have written a prohibition against interest, and it should be derived

that its prohibition

from these,

from robbery and fraud—

there is room to distinguish and say:

What is true of these,

robbery and fraud, which the Torah prohibited, is

that

the monetary loss caused by robbery and fraud is done

without the victim’s consent [

without his willingness]

! Can you say the same with regard to interest, which is given with his consent?

The borrower willingly gives the interest to the lender, and therefore the Torah had to specify a separate prohibition against interest.

And if you mean that

the Merciful One should not have written a prohibition against fraud, and it should be derived [

its prohibition should be learned]

from these,

from interest and robbery—

there is room to refute this and say:

What is true of these,

interest and robbery, which the Torah prohibited, is

that this is not the usual manner of sale and purchase.

That is not so with regard to fraud: Since there are people who are willing to pay for an object even more than its value, fraud is considered part of the ways of commerce. Perhaps such a matter was not prohibited by the Torah.

Rather,

the questioner’s intention in asking, “Let one be derived from two,” was certainly that

the Merciful One should not have written a prohibition against robbery, and it should be derived from these,

from the prohibitions against interest and fraud, by means of a kal va-homer: If a monetary loss caused with the victim’s consent is prohibited, then a loss caused through robbery— all the more so!

There is no answer to this derivation!

For

with what could you refute it?

If you would refute it by saying:

What

is true of the prohibition against

interest is that

it contains

a special innovation:

even the borrower, who does not cause a monetary loss, is prohibited from paying interest; therefore, there is no source here for the prohibition against robbery—

he can say to you:

Fraud,

with regard to which this innovation was not stated, and which is nevertheless prohibited,

proves

to you that the prohibition does not apply specifically to interest, and consequently it can also be derived with regard to robbery.

And if you reject the derivation from fraud because of the argument:

What is true of fraud is that the deceived party does not know

that he has been defrauded

and waives his claim,

whereas in the case of robbery, the victim knows of the robbery and despairs of recovering the property, and perhaps it is therefore permitted—

with regard to this,

interest proves

to you that it is prohibited, despite the fact that the borrower knows of his loss.

And the argument returns [

This is the rule in a derivation by the common denominator argument: When there are two sources, and each source has a particular stringency, we do not reject the derived case because it lacks the particular stringency found in each source. Since the sources themselves]

are not comparable one to the other [

they are not alike], this proves that it is not the particular stringency found in them that determines the law. Rather,

the common denominator between them

determines the law, and the common denominator of the prohibitions against interest and fraud is

that he robs him [

the lender causes the borrower a monetary loss, and the seller causes the buyer a monetary loss].

I too will include robbery,

for there is no greater case of causing a monetary loss than it, and it will certainly be prohibited!

And we answer:

They said: Indeed, so;

the prohibition against robbery can indeed be derived from the prohibitions against fraud and interest by means of the common denominator argument .

Rather,

if so, the difficulty returns:

Why do I need a prohibition against robbery!?

We answer: The prohibition “You shall not rob” comes to include a prohibition

against withholding the wages of a hired worker,

for one who denies his obligation and refrains from paying a hired worker’s wages. This prohibition could not be derived from interest and fraud, because one who withholds a hired worker’s wages does not cause his fellow a monetary loss; rather, he prevents him from receiving the wages owed to him.

And we ask: Is a derivation necessary for one who withholds a hired worker’s wages? After all,

“One who withholds a hired worker’s wages” is explicitly written as prohibited,

as it is stated [in Deuteronomy 24]:

“You shall not oppress a hired worker who is poor and needy”!

And we answer: The reason the Torah wrote an additional verse is

so that he will transgress it [

one who withholds a hired worker’s wages]

with two prohibitions.

And we raise another objection: If it is as you say, that the verse is not necessary for its own subject but rather to include another case as subject to two prohibitions, from where do you know that the verse should be applied specifically to one who withholds a hired worker’s wages?

Let us establish it with regard to interest and fraud, so that one who violates it transgresses two prohibitions!

And we answer:

“A matter is learned from its context.”

It is preferable to derive from the superfluous verse a matter resembling the subject about which the verse is speaking.