Bava Metzia 61a — the Talmud in English

If it does not concern

[since it is not needed]

for

the prohibition of

biting

for a loan of

money, since

it was already

stated

there was a prohibition concerning it at the beginning of the verse, “

You shall not make your brother suffer,” assign it to this matter

[derive it yourself]

for interest on money.

Now we have a source for the prohibition of biting and interest, both in a loan of money and in a loan of food.

And still

I have no

source for the prohibition of biting on food and interest on money

except

with regard to the prohibition of the

borrower,

for the verse “interest on money, interest on food” was stated concerning him, as we have just expounded.

But regarding the prohibition stated concerning the

lender,

in which we find only the prohibition of biting with money and interest with food,

from where

is it that it also contains the prohibition of biting with food and the prohibition of interest with money?

“Biting” was stated concerning the borrower,

“You shall not make your brother suffer interest,”

and “biting” was stated concerning the lender,

“You shall not give your money to him with biting.”

And we learn through a gezerah shavah:

Just as

just as

the “biting” stated concerning the borrower was not divided

in it

between money and food, between biting and interest.

He always transgresses both negative commandments, as we expounded above.

So too, the “biting” stated concerning the lender—you shall not divide

among its prohibitions. Rather, it is always forbidden,

both with money and with food, both with biting and with interest.

And the tanai continues: Until now we have learned a source for prohibiting interest only in a loan of money and produce.

From where is everything included

[all types in the world], whose lending with interest is forbidden?

The verse teaches:

[there], “

interest on every matter that

causes interest.”

From here, every single thing is included in the prohibition of interest.

We asked above: From where do we know that the lender, too, is subject to the additional prohibition of biting with food and the additional prohibition of increase with money, as we find concerning the borrower? And we were compelled to derive this through a gezerah shavah.

And

Ravina said:

With regard to the prohibitions of the lender,

neither biting with food nor interest with money requires a verse!

There is no need for a special inclusion, since everything is heard from the verse.

For

indeed,

if

the Torah had written the two parts of the verse in one form, as follows:

“You shall not give your money to him with biting. And you shall not give your food with increase.”

the verse would have been precise

as you said

[as you had thought], namely, that “biting” is stated specifically concerning money, whereas “increase” is stated specifically concerning food. And if so, indeed we would have no source for the prohibition of biting with food and increase with money.

“deduction” refers specifically to money, whereas “increase” refers specifically to food. If so, we would indeed have no source for a deduction in food and an increase in money.

But

now, since it is written, “You shall not give your money to him with biting and with increase you shall not give your food,”

since the Torah changed and wrote the words “biting and increase” between “you shall not give your money” and “you shall not give your food,”

read it this way,

you must expound the verse in both directions, and in this manner:

You shall not give your money to him with biting and with increase.

With biting and with increase you shall not give your food.

And it is as though it were written explicitly: biting and increase both with regard to “you shall not give your money to him” [a loan of money] and with regard to “you shall not give your food” [a loan of produce].

And we raise an objection:

But

the wording of the

tanai

in the beraita above is as follows: “

It was stated

biting concerning the borrower and

it was stated

biting concerning the lender,”

it says,

which shows that the derivation is from a gezerah shavah!

And we answer:

This is what it says:

The intention of the tanai is to say:

If the verse had not been stated,

and as Ravina expounded above, then

I would have said: a gezerah shavah

from lender to lender.

But

now that the verse has been stated,

the verse “with biting and with increase you shall not give your food,” as Ravina expounded,

a gezerah shavah is not needed.

And we raise an objection:

But then, why do I need a gezerah shavah?

And we answer: The gezerah shavah is needed

for

the matter of the addition of

“interest on every matter that causes interest,”

which is written together with the prohibitions of the borrower, and from which we included above every species within the prohibition of interest. And

since not

this inclusion

was written

was written

with the lender

but only with the borrower, therefore the gezerah shavah is needed to teach that the lender, too, transgresses a prohibition with every species.

Rava said: Why did the Merciful One need to write,

why did the Torah need to designate three separate negative commandments concerning one matter? They are:

A negative commandment concerning interest

“Do not take from him biting” [Leviticus 25:36],

a negative commandment concerning robbery

“You shall not rob” [Leviticus 19:13],

a negative commandment concerning exploitation

“You shall not wrong one another” [Leviticus 25].

After all, the general principle emerging from all these prohibitions is that a person is forbidden to diminish his fellow’s property in any manner whatsoever! And if so, the Torah could have written only one of them, and the others would be learned from it through “the aspect of both”; why is a special negative commandment needed for each one?

And he answers:

They are necessary,

for in truth each one differs from the other in such a manner that it is not possible to learn one from the other.

For if the Merciful One had written a prohibition concerning interest,

I would not have learned from this to prohibit in every place where there is a loss of money [such as robbery],

because

I would have said

that a novelty

is particular

to it

in the passage concerning interest. And the proof of this is:

for even concerning the borrower,

who does not cause his fellow a loss of money by paying the interest, but, on the contrary, he is the one who suffers the loss,

the Merciful One prohibited it.

And necessarily, the prohibition of interest is not because of the “loss of his fellow’s money,” but it is a novelty concerning interest specifically, and one cannot learn robbery from this. Therefore the Torah singled out a prohibition concerning robbery.

Likewise,

if

it

had written

the

Merciful One a prohibition

only

concerning robbery,

and not concerning overreaching and interest, I would not have learned from this to prohibit interest and overreaching, for perhaps the Torah prohibited specifically robbery

because against his will,

for he seizes the money against the will of the owner.

But overreaching,

which is done by way of buying and selling [and likewise interest, which is done by way of a loan],

say: not.

Perhaps there is no prohibition in this. Therefore the Torah singled out a prohibition concerning overreaching as well.

And

if the Merciful One had written a prohibition concerning overreaching,

I would not have learned from this to prohibit “robbery,” for I would have said: since, in robbery, the robbed person sees the robbery and despairs, he thereby waives his claim, and there is no prohibition in this; whereas what the Torah prohibited concerning overreaching is

because he does not know

at the time of the transaction that the buyer has been deceived by the seller,

so that he waives his claim [

in order that he waive his claim to him].

Therefore all three were written.

And we raise another objection: Indeed,

one [

each one of them]

from one [

from any particular prohibition, had only it been written]

cannot be derived [

it would not have been learned] for the reasons explained above.

It is still difficult:

Let one be derived from two

—once two of the prohibitions were written, the third is already unnecessary, since we can derive it from the two prohibitions that have already been written!

And the Gemara considers:

Which one should be derived,

which prohibition can be learned from the other two?

If your intention is that

the Merciful One should not write a prohibition concerning interest, and let it be derived

it should be learned

from these,

from robbery and overreaching?!

Is it not possible to distinguish and say:

What is there about these,

robbery and overreaching, that the Torah prohibited them?

For

the loss of money in robbery and overreaching is caused

without the knowledge [

without the consent] of the one who suffers the loss

! Can you say the same concerning interest, for it is with his knowledge?

It is by the borrower’s will that he gives the interest to the lender, and if so, the Torah had to single out a prohibition concerning interest.

And if your intention is to say that

the Merciful One should not write a prohibition concerning overreaching, and let it be derived [

its prohibition should be learned]

from these,

from interest and robbery?!

Is it not possible to refute and say:

What is there about these,

interest and robbery, that the Torah prohibited them?

For this is not the way of buying and selling.

That is not so concerning overreaching, since there are people who are willing to pay for an object even more than its value, and overreaching is therefore considered part of the ways of commerce. Perhaps such a matter was not prohibited by the Torah.

Rather,

certainly the intention of the objector in his question, “Let one be derived from two,” was that

the Merciful One should not write a prohibition concerning robbery, and let it be derived from these,

from the prohibition of interest and overreaching, by a kal va-chomer: if a loss of money caused with the knowledge of the one who suffers the loss is prohibited, a loss caused through robbery—is it not all the more so?!

And concerning this derivation there is no answer!

For

with what will you refute it?

If you refute it:

What

is there concerning the prohibition of

interest, for

there is in it

a novelty,

that even the borrower, who does not cause a loss of money, is prohibited, and therefore there is no source from here for the prohibition of robbery!

He can say to you:

Overreaching,

concerning which this novelty was not said, and which is prohibited—

proves

to you that the prohibition is not specific to interest, and consequently it can also be learned concerning robbery.

And if you reject the derivation from overreaching because of:

What is there concerning overreaching, for he did not know

the one who was deceived

and waived his claim,

whereas this is not so concerning robbery, for the robbed person knows of the robbery and despairs of it, and perhaps it is permitted?

Concerning this,

interest proves

to you that it is prohibited, despite the fact that the borrower knows of his loss.

And the matter returns [

so is the rule in the derivation of “by what is common to the two,” when there are two “teachers,” and in each teacher there is a certain stringency: we do not reject the matter derived [the third] because it does not possess the particular stringency found in each teacher. Since the teachers themselves]

this one is not like that one [

they are not similar to one another], this is proof that the particular stringency in them is not what causes the law. Rather,

the common aspect between them

causes the law, and the common aspect in the prohibition of interest and overreaching is

that he robs him [

the lender causes a loss of the borrower’s money, and the seller causes a loss of the buyer’s money].

I, too, shall bring robbery,

for there is no greater one who causes a loss of money than it, and certainly it should be prohibited!

And we answer:

They say: Indeed, so,

it is indeed possible to learn the prohibition of robbery from the prohibition of overreaching and interest through a derivation of “by what is common to the two” .

Rather,

if so, the difficulty returns:

Why do I need a prohibition concerning robbery!?

We shall answer: The prohibition of “You shall not rob” comes to include a prohibition

for one who withholds the wages of a hired worker,

for one who denies and refrains from paying the wages of a hired worker. And this prohibition could not be learned from interest and overreaching, because one who withholds the wages of a hired worker does not cause his fellow a monetary loss, but merely withholds from him the wages that are owed to him.

And we are astonished: Is an inclusion necessary for one who withholds the wages of a hired worker? For

“one who withholds the wages of a hired worker” is explicitly written as a prohibition concerning him,

as it is stated [in Deuteronomy 24],

“You shall not oppress a poor and needy hired worker”!

And we answer: The reason that the Torah wrote an additional verse is

to have him transgress it [

the one who withholds the wages of a hired worker]

through two prohibitions.

And we raise another objection: If it is as you say, that the verse is not necessary for its own subject, but rather to include elsewhere two prohibitions, from where do you know to establish the verse specifically concerning one who withholds the wages of a hired worker!

Let us establish it concerning interest and overreaching, so that he transgresses two prohibitions?

And we answer:

“A matter learned from its context.”

It is preferable to include from the superfluity of the verse a matter similar to the matter about which the verse speaks.