Bava Metzia 60b (ס:) — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

because

by lowering the price, he

causes the market price to rise,

the price goes down among the other sellers . [ Taraa, a gate]:

We learned in the Mishna:

“And he may not sort the groats; these are the words of Abba Shaul, but the Sages permit it, etc.”

And we explain:

Who are the Sages? Rabbi Aḥa.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Aḥa permits it when the matter is visible

to the eye, and the buyer can see how much more the groats are worth because of the removal of the waste, and agrees to pay more for them so that he will not have to sort them himself:

We learned in the Mishna:

“One may not adorn neither a person, etc., nor utensils.”

The Sages taught: One may not mesharevet,

one may not raise

the

hair of

an animal

like a staff, so that it will appear fat,

and one may not blow air into the innards

sold in a butcher shop, so that they will appear larger,

and one may not soak the meat in water

so that it will appear white and fat.

And we explain:

What does “one may not mesharevet”

the animal mean? How does one raise the animal’s hair?

Here,

in Babylonia,

they interpreted it

as referring to raising the hair by giving the animal

water of ḥizra,

bran water; its hair stands up, and concerning this the Sages said in the Mishna that one may not do so.

Ze’iri said in the name of Rav Kahana:

The animal’s hair is raised by means of a

raising tool,

with which its hair is scraped with a currycomb.

Shmuel permitted

adding silk threads to a garment,

sewing silk threads around the garment to beautify it.

Rav Yehuda permitted rubbing colored garments,

scrubbing colored garments with bran water.

Rabba permitted tightening the tzardei,

tightening the garment’s threads so that they will appear fine.

Rava permitted drawing arrows,

drawing arrows on the garment.

Rav Pappa bar Shmuel permitted drawing baskets,

drawing baskets on the garment.

And we challenge this: How did all those amoraim permit sellers to beautify their garments,

when we learned in the Mishna: “One may not adorn either a person, an animal, or utensils”?

And we resolve:

It is not difficult. This

case, in which we find that the amoraim permitted sellers to beautify their merchandise, refers to

new

garments,

new ones,

for there is no deception in this, and anyone who wishes to add to their price on account of their beauty may do so,

whereas

this

case, in which our Mishna prohibited beautifying utensils, refers to

old

utensils,

old

ones, since if one beautifies them, customers may mistake them for new ones and pay for them as though they were new.

We learned in the Mishna: One may not adorn a person.

And we explain:

What is the adornment of a person?

It is like that incident involving an elderly slave,

an old slave,

whose head and beard he had dyed,

having dyed his hair and beard black.

He came

—that elderly slave—

before Rava,

and

said to him: “Buy me!”

Buy me as a slave ,

He said to him,

Rava said: I prefer to take poor people to serve me and support them, as we learned:

“Let the poor be members of your household.”

After some time

he came,

the slave happened

before Rav Pappa bar Shmuel,

and

he bought him,

and Rav Pappa purchased him.

One day he said to him,

Rav Pappa said to his slave:

“Give me water!”

Give me water.

He went,

to bring water, and the water splashed onto the slave, and

his head and beard turned white,

the water removed the black dye from his head and beard, revealing that he was elderly.

He said to him,

the slave said to Rav Pappa:

“See, I am older than your father.”

See that I am older than your father, Shmuel.

Rav Pappa bar Shmuel recited

the verse

to himself

from Proverbs 11:

“The righteous is rescued from distress”

—Rava, who did not purchase the slave—

“and another comes in his place”

—Rav Pappa, who purchased him.

We shall return to you, chapter “The Golden One.”

Introduction to the Chapter “What Is Neshekh”

The prohibitions against interest are written in the Torah in three places:

In Exodus, chapter 22, verse 24, it is written: “When you lend money to My people, to the poor with you,”

“you shall not place upon him neshekh.”

In Leviticus, chapter 25, verses 35–36, it is written: “And if your brother becomes impoverished and his hand falters with you, you shall strengthen him. Do not take from him neshekh or marbit.”

“You shall not give him your money with neshekh,”

“and with marbit you shall not give him your food.”

In Deuteronomy, chapter 23, verses 20–21, it is written:

“You shall not make your brother pay interest, interest on money, interest on food,”

“interest on anything that bears interest. To a gentile you may make pay interest, but to your brother you shall not make pay interest, so that the Lord your God may bless you.”

The prohibition against interest applies both to the lender and to the borrower, as it is written: “You shall not give him your money,” which is the prohibition applying to the lender. Whereas in Mishneh Torah it is written, “You shall not make your brother pay interest,” and the Sages interpreted this verse as referring to the borrower, who may not allow the lender to make him pay interest.

A.

Biblically stipulated interest

and the dust of interest:

The prohibition against interest is divided into two categories: the first is prohibited by Torah law, and the second was prohibited by the Sages because it is close and similar to interest. The Torah prohibition against interest applies only to interest arising through a loan—that is, when the lender and borrower stipulated in advance an addition to the amount of the loan. This addition is given to the lender as an ager natar, meaning an additional payment for allowing the money to remain with the borrower. In the language of the Mishna, this interest is called “biblically stipulated interest.” However, the Sages prohibited all interest, even when it arises through a sale and purchase and was not stipulated in advance, but instead results from fluctuations of high and low prices in the market—nevertheless, it is prohibited. In the language of the Mishna, this interest is called “the dust of interest.”

B.

The severity of interest prohibited by Torah law.

The law of one who lends with interest prohibited by Torah law is more severe than that of one who lends with interest prohibited by rabbinic law in this respect: “Biblically stipulated interest is extracted by the judges.” That is, if the lender collected it in violation of the prohibition, the court compels him to return the interest—similar to the law of a robber, who is obligated to return what he robbed [as the Gemara will derive below from a verse]. Whereas “the dust of interest” is not extracted by the judges. That is, if the lender collected it in violation of the prohibition, the court does not compel him to return it. Nevertheless, the Rishonim disagree as to whether he is in any event obligated to return the interest in order to fulfill his obligation before Heaven [see below, 61a].

In addition, certain leniencies were stated with regard to “the dust of interest” that do not apply to “biblically stipulated interest”; see below, section D.

C.

Interest through a loan

and interest through a sale.

Interest through a loan applies both when the loan and repayment of the interest are in money—for example, he lends one hundred zuz in return for two hundred—and when the loan and repayment of the interest are in an object—for example, he lends a se’a of wheat and stipulates that two se’a will be repaid for it. In both forms the interest is biblically stipulated, and it is given as payment for the loan; therefore, it is prohibited by Torah law.

There is also another form of interest through a loan that is prohibited only by rabbinic law, namely, interest of “a se’a for a se’a.” That is, the borrower takes a se’a of produce as a loan and undertakes to return another se’a of produce to the lender later, and we are concerned that the produce might become more expensive between the time of the loan and the time of repayment, in which case there would be the dust of interest. However, by Torah law this is not prohibited, because the profit is not certain: the price of the produce might also decline or remain unchanged. Furthermore, there is no stipulation of interest at all. [There is an additional reason for permitting it: with regard to the time of the loan, the obligation to return a se’a in exchange for a se’a did not contain any interest, and “we follow the initial circumstance,” so it is permitted by Torah law—Rishonim.] Nevertheless, as stated, the Sages prohibited lending a se’a for a se’a because of “the dust of interest.” This interest is discussed in the Mishna at the end of the chapter [75a].

Interest through a sale,

The interest through a sale discussed in the first Mishna is in the form of “fixing a price.”

This is how the price is fixed: the buyer pays money to the seller of the wheat immediately at the beginning of the harvest, when the price of wheat is low, so that the seller will supply him with wheat at this price throughout the year. Usually, by the time of delivery, the wheat will be more expensive than the amount the buyer paid for it.

By Torah law this is permitted for two reasons: (a) the interest does not arise through a loan but through a sale, and the Torah prohibited only interest through a loan [as Rashi wrote]; (b) there is no certain interest here, since the produce might become cheaper, or at least remain as it is [as the Ritva wrote]. Nevertheless, this transaction appears like a loan with interest, since the buyer advances his money to the seller at the time when prices are low, before receiving his purchase, and in return for the money he advanced receives produce more valuable than it; therefore, the Sages prohibited it.

Another form of interest in the form of a sale is discussed below [63b and in the Mishna on 65], namely, when the seller raises or lowers the price for the buyer.

He raises the price for him because he gives him the produce on credit. Or he lowers the price for him because the buyer advances his money before the seller supplies him with the produce. The Sages included this type of interest under the category of ager natar, and prohibited it.

D. There are two principal leniencies concerning “fixing a price” for produce in the market: (a) the leniency of “the market price has been established”; (b) the leniency of “he has it.” We shall explain them briefly:

The leniency of “the market price has been established”:

If, at the time the buyer and seller fixed the price, the market price was already firm and stable, such that it was not likely to increase further. In such a case the Sages permitted fixing a price for the produce, and there was no concern that it might become more expensive. Since the seller could already now use the money he received to obtain the produce in many places, this is considered as though he already possessed that produce, and the sale takes effect upon it. Any subsequent increase in price is treated as though the produce increased in value while in the buyer’s possession.

The leniency of

“he has it”:

Even if the market price has not been established [or, in another case, where the market price does not permit him to do so], if, at the time the price is fixed, the seller possesses the quantity of produce for which they fixed the price, this is considered as though the sale took effect upon that produce, and it is permitted.

This leniency of “he has it” also applies to the interest of “a se’a for a se’a” mentioned above, in the Mishna at the end of the chapter.

Some of the matters above are explained by the Mishna before us, whose main purpose is to clarify what constitutes interest through a loan, which the Torah prohibited, and what constitutes the dust of interest, which the Sages prohibited.

We find in the Torah, and likewise in the words of the Sages, two expressions defining “interest.”

One defines interest as “neshekh,” biting the borrower, while the other defines it as “increase,” whereby the lender’s money increases through taking the interest from the borrower.

In the wording of the verse in Leviticus [25:36–37] it is stated: “Do not take from him

neshekh and increase.”

Likewise, the verse states there: “You shall not give him your money

with neshekh,

and with increase

you shall not give him your food.”

Both are prohibited by Torah law, since neshekh and increase constitute a single prohibition; the verse merely employs a doubled expression.

However, in the words of the Sages we find a distinction between “neshekh,” the Sages’ expression for interest prohibited by Torah law, and “increase,” the Sages’ expression for interest prohibited by rabbinic law.

Therefore, the Mishna asks:

Mishna:

What is neshekh,

the expression used by the Sages for interest prohibited by Torah law,

and what is increase,

the expression used by the Sages for interest prohibited only by rabbinic law?

The Mishna explains:

What is neshekh?

This is

one who lends a sela,

which is four dinars,

on

the condition that the borrower will return to him in exchange

five dinars.

This is one form of interest prohibited by Torah law, because it arises through a loan and was stipulated in advance.

The second form is, for example, one who lends

two se’a

of wheat

on

the condition that he will return to him in exchange

three

se’a of wheat.

All this is

prohibited by Torah law, and with regard to this prohibition the Sages used the expression “neshekh,”

because he,

the lender,

bites

the borrower through this stipulation, by forcing him to pay more than he received from him.

What is “increase,”

the expression used by the Sages for interest that is prohibited only by rabbinic law?—

This is

one who

increases his produce.

That is, the form of “increase” is when the buyer increases his money at the seller’s expense by fixing a price for produce in a sale.

The tanna continues and specifies:

How?

How and when is there a prohibition against “fixing a price” for produce when it constitutes interest?

The tanna gives an example of fixing a price whose beginning is permitted and whose end is prohibited:

He purchased wheat from him,

the buyer Reuven fixed an agreement with the seller Shimon that Shimon would supply him with wheat throughout the year,

at one gold dinar per kor.

That is, Reuven paid Shimon one gold dinar for a kor of wheat, whose value was twenty-five silver dinars.

And likewise the market price—

this was the price at which wheat was being sold in the market at that time. Therefore, even if Shimon the seller did not currently have wheat, he could obtain wheat at that price, with the money he received from Reuven, wherever he wished. This is like a case in which Shimon had wheat in his house, where it is obvious that he could agree with Reuven to give him that wheat little by little throughout the year, while taking all the money for it immediately.

The benefit of this is that once the market price has been established, the seller is not considered to have borrowed money from the buyer in order to provide him with wheat throughout the year [even if the wheat becomes more expensive by then, allowing the buyer to profit at the seller’s expense]. Rather, we regard the sale as having been completed immediately with regard to the wheat in the market. From this point onward there is no concern that the wheat might become more expensive and thereby constitute interest. This concludes the permitted part.

The tanna continues to explain how the matter becomes prohibited:

But if, after some time,

the price of [

the wheat increased,]

wheat,

and its current market price is

thirty dinars,

and not twenty-five, as it had been sold until then,

and then

he said to him,

Reuven the buyer said to Shimon the seller:

Give me my wheat

that I fixed the price for with you, because

I want

to sell it

now,

and to purchase with it [

with the money from the wheat, whose price has increased and which is now worth thirty]—

wine.

The law is divided in this manner: if the seller indeed gives the buyer wheat worth thirty, as he requested, there is no prohibition, since the market price had been established at the time the price was fixed, and the sale is considered to have been completed then. Consequently, the wheat is considered to have increased in value while in the buyer’s possession, as explained.

But if

he said to him,

the seller said to the buyer: Why should you take the wheat and trouble yourself to sell it in order to receive thirty dinars, and then purchase wine with those thirty dinars?

Instead,

here is your wheat,

which you fixed an agreement with me to supply to you, and which is now worth thirty dinars;

it is made over to me,

I undertake to pay you money for it

at

the value of

thirty

dinars, as the wheat is worth today.

And here you have from me in exchange for it:

instead of the thirty dinars that you have with me for the wheat, you shall have with me in exchange a price fixed for

wine

worth thirty dinars.

If he indeed had wine, he would be permitted to make a new agreement fixing the price of wine at thirty dinars.

But

however, since

he does not have wine,

the seller of the wheat cannot currently provide the wine stipulated in place of the debt of thirty dinars [for the wheat], it is impossible to treat this matter as a sale, but it appears to be taking interest, and not a transaction by way of sale, as will be explained in the Gemara.

This is the form of “increasing his produce” that is prohibited.

Gemara:

The prohibition against interest in Leviticus states: “You shall not give him your money with neshekh, and with increase you shall not give your food.” The meaning of the verse is that there are two types of interest: (a) “neshekh”; (b) “increase.” Both are interest prohibited by Torah law.

The Gemara analyzes the wording of the Mishna:

Since it omits [

since the tanna left aside]

interest prohibited by Torah law,

and did not choose to explain what “increase” is in a case where there is no biblically prohibited “neshekh,”

and explains what “increase” is only in the form of interest

prohibited by the Sages,

From this

you may infer that with regard to interest

prohibited by Torah law,

the tanna found no situation in which interest is defined as neshekh without increase, or as increase without neshekh. In his view,

neshekh and increase—

are one and the same matter!

We raise an objection:

But,

after all,

verses are written: “

Neshekh—

money”; “

increase—

food.” The fact that the Torah divided neshekh and increase into two prohibitions, prohibiting neshekh with regard to money and increase with regard to food, demonstrates that there are two types of interest prohibited by Torah law! “Neshekh” means interest that bites and diminishes the borrower, even though the lender does not profit from it. And “increase” means that the lender’s money increases through the repayment without the borrower’s money diminishing. If so, why does the tanna maintain that neshekh and increase prohibited by Torah law are one and the same matter?!

We challenge the one who raised the objection:

But can you really maintain [

do you really think]

that there is [

that there exists] a possibility that the interest will be

neshekh

toward the borrower

without

its being

increase,

without profit for the lender?

And likewise, do you maintain that there is a possibility of

increase,

profit for the lender,

without neshekh

for the borrower?!

Consider the matter:

Neshekh without increase—what are the circumstances?

How is it possible?

Perhaps you will say that such a possibility exists because of the relative change in the values of the currencies. The “strong,” stable currency is one made of silver, while the “weak,” fluctuating currency is copper coinage.

Since the exchange rate of copper perutot fluctuates, changing from time to time relative to silver currency, if the loan was made in copper perutot, and the exchange rate of the currencies changed between the time of the loan and the time of repayment, whether there is interest depends on the wording of the loan, as the Gemara now discusses.

If he lent him,

if we establish the case as one in which the lender lent the borrower

one hundred

copper perutot

on

the condition that he would return

one hundred and twenty

perutot,

and

initially,

at the time he lent it to him,

one hundred were worth one dankah,

one hundred copper perutot were worth the value of one silver ma’a, which is one-sixth of a dinar and is called a “dankah.”

And ultimately,

at the time of repayment,

they stand at,

the copper perutot had depreciated, so that now

one hundred and twenty

perutot

are worth one

dankah [

a silver ma’a]. Seemingly, in such a case there is only

neshekh,

a loss to the borrower,

there is,

because

he bites him,

the lender bites and diminishes the borrower by

taking from him [

what he takes from the borrower]

something,

namely, [an additional twenty perutot],

which he did not give him,

which the lender did not give him.

But

if there were

increase,

an increase in the lender’s money,

there is none.

Because

he has no profit,

he gains no monetary profit from this, since, as the perutot depreciated, it turns out that in total

he lent him one dankah,

the loan was one silver ma’a, and in total he takes from him only

one dankah,

the value of one silver ma’a—no more.

The Gemara rejects this:

Ultimately,

even in this case there is no distinction between neshekh and increase.

The Gemara first introduces here a fundamental inquiry concerning the definition of the interest prohibited by the Torah [and the halakha regarding perutot that depreciated between the loan and repayment also depends on this inquiry]:

There are two possible ways to define interest:

The first possibility is to define interest according to the time of the stipulation. If, at the time they stipulated the loan, the principal was a certain amount, then everything added to it is forever deemed interest, even if, at the time of repayment, the addition somehow becomes part of the principal.

Conversely, if, according to the time of the stipulation, there was no interest here, but interest arose only at the time of repayment, this is not interest prohibited by Torah law, and it is permitted.

The second possibility is to define interest according to the “time of repayment.” If, at the time of repayment, part of the amount they stipulated somehow becomes an “addition” to the principal, then even if it did not constitute interest at the time of the loan, it is nevertheless prohibited.

The same applies in the opposite case: if, at the time of repayment, the addition is not defined as interest, it is permitted, even if, according to the time of the loan, there was an undertaking to pay an additional amount over the principal.

Now, in either event, regardless of how you resolve the above uncertainty, you will not find a possibility of “neshekh without increase.”

You are going according to the initial stage!

If you are referring to the time of the fixing as defining the interest, then in this case this is actual interest, despite the subsequent change in the value of the currency. Since at the time of the fixing, when the copper perutot were worth one hundred per danka, he undertook to repay an additional twenty perutot, this undertaking is defined as interest!

And if so, with reference to the time of the fixing,

there is neshekh, and there is marbit!

The borrower is diminished by the additional twenty perutot, and the lender profits by those twenty perutot?

But

you are going according to the final stage!

And if you are referring to the time of repayment as the time that defines the interest, then

there is no neshekh, and there is no marbit!

There is no interest here at all, neither from the perspective of the borrower nor from that of the lender, since today the value of one hundred and twenty perutot [danka] is equivalent to the value of the one hundred perutot [danka] that he received as a loan.

And if so, how can you maintain that there is such a concept as neshekh without marbit?

Furthermore!

It is also difficult to understand your intention in saying that there is

marbit without neshekh

—

what are the circumstances?

What is the case in which neshekh is distinct from marbit?!

If he lent him

If the lender lent the borrower

one hundred

copper perutot,

on

condition that he repay him likewise

one hundred,

and

initially,

at the time of the loan,

they stood

the copper perutot were worth

one hundred per danka,

a silver ma'ah, which is one-sixth of a dinar

, and ultimately

at the time of repayment, the perutot appreciated, and one hundred copper perutot were now worth

five humashim [

one-fifth of a dinar], so that the danka was now worth approximately eighty-three copper perutot, and the lender had a profit of approximately seventeen perutot [approximately].

This too is difficult, whichever way you look at it: how does your position regarding interest apply in such a case?

If you go according to the initial stage!

If you are referring to the time of the fixing, then

there is no neshekh, and there is no marbit!

There was no fixing here that diminished the borrower or increased the lender's wealth, since at the time of the loan it was one hundred copper perutot, on condition that he repay one hundred copper perutot, and there is no aspect of interest here.

But

if you go according to the final stage,

if you are referring to the time of repayment, then, since at the time of repayment the perutot had appreciated, so that approximately eighty-three of them amounted to one danka, it follows that if the borrower returns all one hundred perutot that he borrowed, he is thereby adding more than he received. In such a case,

there is neshekh, and there is marbit;

this involves both the biting of the borrower and an increase for the lender!

Rather, Rava said:

The conclusion is that

there is

no

way to find

neshekh without marbit,

nor

a way to find

marbit without neshekh

as we have just demonstrated.

It is therefore necessary for us to explain that

the verse did not distinguish

between neshekh and marbit [when it said: “You shall not give him your money with neshekh, and with marbit you shall not give him your food”]

except

in order

to cause one to transgress two negative commandments.

For in every collection of interest, one transgresses two negative commandments: both because of the neshekh involved and because of the marbit involved. Therefore, the Torah repeated the prohibition in two formulations.

The Sages taught:

In Leviticus, chapter 25, it is stated, “

You shall not give him your money with neshekh, and with marbit you shall not give him your food.”

This implies that the Torah attached the prohibition of neshekh to a loan of money, whereas the prohibition of interest was attached to a loan of food.

The beraita discusses this:

I have

a source from the verse

only

for prohibiting

“neshekh” with money [

a loan of money], and likewise for the prohibition of

“interest” with food [

a loan of food], such as one se'a of wheat for two se'ah.

The prohibition of

“neshekh” with

a loan of

food—from where?

The verse states,

as it is written in Deuteronomy, chapter 23: “You shall not charge your brother

food neshekh.”

The Torah thereby expanded the prohibition of neshekh to a loan of produce as well.

There is still no source for the prohibition of

“interest”

in a loan of

money—from where?

The verse states,

as it is written in Deuteronomy, there: “You shall not charge

money neshekh.”