Bava Metzia 60b — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

because

by his lowering the price

he causes the market price to gain room,

the price falls among the other sellers . [ market price, a gate]:

We learned in the Mishna:

“And he may not sort the split beans; these are the words of Abba Shaul, but the Sages permit, and so forth”:

And we explain:

Who are the Sages? Rabbi Aḥa.

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Aḥa permits a matter that is visible

to the eye, and the buyer can see how much more the split beans are worth because of the removal of the waste, and agrees to raise their price so that he will not have to sort them himself:

We learned in the Mishna:

“One may not adorn neither a person, and so forth, nor utensils”:

The Sages taught: One may not brush up,

one may not set upright

the

hair

of an animal

like a rod, so that it will appear fat,

and one may not blow air into the innards

that are sold in the butcher’s shop, so that they will appear large,

and one may not soak meat in water

so that it will appear white and fatty.

And we explain:

What does “one may not brush up

the animal” mean? How do they set the animal’s hairs upright?

Here,

in Babylonia,

they explained:

by watering the animal

bran water,

the hairs stand upright; and concerning this they said in the Mishna that one may not do so.

Zeiri said in the name of Rav Kahana:

The animal’s hairs stand upright by means of

a hair-raiser,

with which they scrape its hairs with a currycomb.

Shmuel permitted,

he permitted

to throw silk threads onto a garment,

to sew silk threads around the garment in order to beautify it.

Rav Yehuda permitted rubbing colored garments,

to rub colored garments with bran water.

Rabba permitted tightening the threads,

to tighten the garment’s threads until they appear thin.

Rava permitted drawing arrows,

to draw arrows on the garment.

Rav Pappa bar Shmuel permitted drawing baskets,

to draw baskets on the garment.

And we raise an objection: How did all those amoraim permit sellers to beautify their garments,

but did we not learn in the Mishna: “One may not adorn neither a person, nor an animal, nor utensils”?

And we answer:

This is not difficult. This

that we find that the amoraim permitted sellers to beautify their merchandise refers

to

garments

that are new,

new ones, for there is no wronging in this, and anyone who wishes to add to their price on account of their beauty may add,

and

that

which they prohibited in our Mishna, to beautify the utensils, refers

to

utensils

that are old,

for if he beautifies them, the customers may be mistaken about them and pay for them as though they were new.

We learned in the Mishna: One may not adorn a person.

And we explain:

What is the adornment of a person?

Like that incident involving an old slave,

an old slave,

whose hair color went from his head and his beard,

for he had dyed his hair and beard black,

he came

that old slave

before Rava,

and

said to him, “Buy me!”

Buy me as a slave ,

He said to him,

Rava: I prefer to take poor people to serve me and to support them, as we learned:

“Let the poor be members of your household.”

After some time

he came,

the slave happened

before Rav Pappa bar Shmuel,

and

he bought him,

and Rav Pappa bought him.

One day he said to him,

Rav Pappa to his slave:

“Give me water to drink!”

Give me water to drink.

He went,

he went to bring water, and the water splashed onto the slave, and

it whitened his head and his beard,

the water removed the black dye from his head and beard, and it was revealed that he was old.

The slave said to him,

to Rav Pappa:

“See, for I am older than your father.”

See that I am older than your father, Shmuel.

Rav Pappa bar Shmuel recited

the verse

upon himself

the verse [Proverbs 11]: “

The righteous is rescued from distress

Rava, who did not buy the slave

and another comes in his place

Rav Pappa, who bought him.”

We have returned to you, chapter “The Golden One”

Introduction to the Chapter “What Is Usury”

The prohibitions of usury were written in the Torah in three places:

In Exodus, chapter 22, verse 24, it is written: “When you lend money to My people, to the poor person with you,”

“you shall not place upon him usury”:

In Leviticus, chapter 25, verses 35–36, it is written: “And when your brother becomes poor and his hand falters with you, you shall support him. You shall not take from him usury and increase.”

“You shall not give him your money with usury,”

“and with increase you shall not give your food”:

In Deuteronomy, chapter 23, verses 20–21, it is written:

“You shall not make your brother pay usury, usury of money, usury of food,”

usury of anything that can incur usury. “To the foreigner you may make pay usury, but to your brother you shall not make pay usury, so that the Lord your God may bless you.”

The prohibition of usury applies both to the lender and to the borrower, as it is written, “You shall not give him your money,” and this is the prohibition upon the lender. Whereas in the repetition of the Torah it is written, “You shall not make your brother pay,” and the Sages interpreted this verse as referring to the borrower, that the borrower must not allow the lender to “bite” him with usury.

A.

Fixed usury,

and the dust of usury:

The prohibition of usury is divided into two: the first is forbidden by the Torah, and the second the Sages prohibited because it is close and similar to usury. The prohibition of usury from the Torah exists only with usury that comes by way of a loan, meaning that the lender and the borrower stipulated in advance an addition to the amount of the loan. And it is given to the lender as “a wage for waiting,” that is, as an additional wage for the money remaining with the borrower. In the language of the Mishna, this usury is called “fixed usury.” However, the Rabbis prohibited all usury, even if it comes by way of buying and selling and was not stipulated in advance, but came through the circumstances of the rise and fall of prices in the market—in any event it is forbidden. This usury is called in the language of the Mishna “the dust of usury.”

B.

The severity of usury from the Torah.

The law of a lender with usury from the Torah is more severe than that of a lender with usury by rabbinic law in this respect: “fixed usury is extracted by judges.” That is, if the lender collected it in prohibition, the court compels him to return the usury—similar to the law of a robber, who is obligated to return his robbery [and this is expounded in the Gemara below from a verse]. Whereas “the dust of usury” is not extracted by judges. That is, if the lender collected it in prohibition, the court does not compel him to return it. Indeed, the early authorities disputed whether he is nevertheless obligated to return the usury in order to fulfill the obligation before Heaven [see below, folio 61a].

Besides this, there are certain leniencies stated regarding “the dust of usury” that do not exist regarding “fixed usury”; see below, section D.

C.

Usury by way of a loan, and

usury by way of a sale.

Usury by way of a loan applies both when the loan and repayment of the usury are in money, such as when he lends one hundred zuz for two hundred, and when the loan and repayment of the usury are in an object, such as when he lends a se'a of wheat and stipulates two se'ah for it. In both ways the usury is fixed, and it is given as payment for the loan; therefore it is forbidden by the Torah.

There is also another form of usury by way of a loan, which is forbidden only by rabbinic law, and it is usury of “a se'a for a se'a.” That is, the borrower takes a se'a of produce as a loan and undertakes to return another se'a of produce to the lender after some time, and we are concerned lest the produce become more expensive between the time of the loan and the time of repayment, and there thereby be the dust of usury. However, by Torah law this is not forbidden, because the profit is not certain, since it is also possible that the price of the produce will fall or remain at its value. And there is no stipulation of usury here at all. [And there is another reason for the permissibility, because with regard to the time of the loan, there was no usury at all in the undertaking to return a se'a for a se'a, and “we follow the beginning,” and it is permitted by Torah law—the early authorities.] Rather, as stated, the Sages prohibited lending a se'a for a se'a because of “the dust of usury.” This usury is taught in the Mishna at the end of the chapter [folio 75a].

Usury by way of a sale,

The usury by way of a sale discussed in the first Mishna is in the form of “fixing a price.”

And this is the fixing of the price: the buyer advances money to the seller of the wheat immediately at the beginning of the harvest, when the price of wheat is low, in order that the seller supply him with wheat at this price throughout the entire year. And usually, when the time of supply arrives, the wheat is then more expensive than the amount the buyer paid for it.

By Torah law this is permitted for two reasons: A—since the usury does not come by way of a loan but rather by way of a sale, and the Torah prohibited only usury by way of a loan [so wrote Rashi]. B—since there is no certain usury here, because perhaps the produce will become cheaper, or at any rate will remain as it is [so wrote the Ritva]. Nevertheless, this transaction appears like a loan with usury, since the buyer advances his money to the seller at the time of cheapness, before receiving his purchase, and receives in return for advancing him the money produce more expensive than it; therefore the Sages prohibited it.

Another form of usury in the form of a sale is discussed below [folio 63b and in the Mishna on folio 65], namely, by the seller making the price more expensive or cheaper for the buyer.

He makes the price more expensive for him because he gives him the produce on credit. Or he makes the price cheaper for him in return for the buyer advancing him his money even before he supplies him with the produce. And the Sages included this type of usury under “a wage for waiting,” and prohibited it.

D. There are two principal leniencies for “fixing a price” on produce in the market: A—the leniency of “the market price has been established.” B—the leniency of “he has it.” And we shall explain them briefly:

The leniency of an established market price:

If, at the time of fixing the price between the buyer and seller, the market price was already strong and stable, in such a manner that it was not likely to become more expensive any further. In such a case the Sages permitted fixing a price for the produce, and did not fear lest it become more expensive. For since even now the seller can, with the money he received, obtain the produce in many places, this is considered as though he already possesses that produce, and the sale takes effect upon it; and whatever becomes more expensive, we regard as though the produce became more expensive in the buyer’s domain.

The leniency of

“he has it”:

Even if the market price has not been established [or in another case, where the market price does not permit him], if at the time of fixing the price the seller has in his possession the quantity of produce for which they fixed the price, this is considered as though the sale took effect upon that produce, and it is permitted. [

This leniency of “he has it” was also stated regarding the usury of “a se'a for a se'a” mentioned above, in the Mishna at the end of the chapter.]

Some of the matters above are explained from the Mishna before us, and the principal purpose of our Mishna is to explain what is the usury by way of a loan that the Torah prohibited, and what is the dust of usury that the Sages prohibited.

We find in the Torah, and likewise in the words of the Sages, two expressions defining “usury.”

The first defines usury as “biting,” which bites the borrower, and the second defines it in the language of “increase,” by which the lender’s property increases through taking the usury from the borrower.

In the language of the verse in Leviticus [25:36–37] it says, “You shall not take from him”

“biting and increase.”

And likewise the verse says there, “You shall not give him your money”

“with biting,”

“and with increase”

you shall not give your food.

Both are forbidden by the Torah, since the biting and the increase are one prohibition, except that the verse uses doubled wording.

But in the words of the Sages, we find a distinction between “biting,” which is the expression of the Sages for the prohibition of usury from the Torah, and “increase,” which is the expression of the Sages for the prohibition of usury by rabbinic law.

Therefore, the Mishna discusses:

Mishna:

What is biting,

which is the expression of the Sages for usury forbidden by the Torah,

and what is increase,

which is the expression of the Sages for usury forbidden only by rabbinic law?

And the Mishna explains:

What is biting?—

This is

one who lends a sela,

which is four dinars,

on

condition that the borrower return to him in exchange for it

five dinars.

This is one form forbidden by the Torah, because it comes by way of a loan and was fixed in advance.

The second form is, for example, when he lends

two se'ah

of wheat

on

condition that he return to him in exchange for them

three

se'ah of wheat.

All this is

forbidden

by the Torah, and the Sages used regarding this prohibition the expression “biting,”

because he,

the lender,

bites

the borrower through this stipulation, by compelling him to pay more than he received from him.

What is “increase,”

which is the expression of the Sages for usury that is forbidden only by rabbinic law?—

This is

one who increases produce.

That is, the manner of increase is that the buyer increases his property at the seller’s expense, by way of fixing a price for produce in buying and selling.

And the tan­nay continues and specifies:

How?

How and when is there a prohibition of “fixing a price” for produce that is a form of usury?

And the tan­nay brings an example of fixing a price whose beginning is permitted and whose end is forbidden:

He took wheat from him,

Reuven the buyer fixed an agreement with Shimon the seller that Shimon would supply him with wheat throughout the days of the year,

at one gold dinar per kor.

That is, Reuven paid Shimon one gold dinar for a kor of wheat, whose value is twenty-five silver dinars.

And this was the market price—

this was how the wheat was being sold in the market at that time. Therefore, even if Shimon the seller does not presently have wheat, he can now obtain wheat at this price, with the money he received from Reuven, wherever he wishes. And this is like someone who has wheat in his house; it is obvious that he can fix an agreement with Reuven to give him that wheat little by little throughout the year, and take all the money for it now.

The benefit of this is that, since the market price has been established, the seller is not considered as though he borrowed money from the buyer in order to provide him with wheat throughout the year [even if the wheat then becomes more expensive, and the buyer profits at the seller’s expense]; rather, we regard it as though the sale was immediately completed for the wheat in the market. And from now there is no reason to fear lest the wheat become more expensive and there thereby be usury. Thus far is the permitted part.

And the tan­nay continues to explain how there is a prohibition in the matter, as follows:

But if after some time

they stood [

became more expensive] the

wheat,

and its price now in the market was

thirty dinars,

and not twenty-five, as it had been sold until then.

And then

he said to him,

Reuven the buyer said to Shimon the seller:

Give me my wheat

that I fixed an agreement with you for, because

I want

to sell it

now,

and to take for it [

with the price of the wheat that became more expensive, and is now worth thirty]—

wine.

And here the law is divided in this manner: if the seller indeed gives the customer wheat worth thirty, as he requested, there is no prohibition in this, since the market price had been established at the time of fixing the price, and the sale is considered as though it had then been completed, and consequently the wheat is considered as though it became more expensive in the buyer’s domain, as explained.

But if

he said to him,

the seller said to the buyer: Why should you take the wheat and trouble yourself to sell it, in order to receive thirty dinars and buy wine with those thirty dinars?

Instead,

here is your wheat,

which you fixed an agreement with me to supply you, and which is currently worth thirty dinars;

they are made over to me,

I undertake to pay you money for them

at

the value of

thirty

dinars, according to the value of the wheat today. And

here you have with me in exchange for them,

instead of the thirty dinars that you have with me for the wheat, you shall have with me in exchange for them a fixing of the price of

wine

worth thirty dinars.

If he indeed had wine, he could make a new fixing of the price for wine worth thirty dinars.

But

however, since

he does not have wine,

the seller of the wheat, so that he could now establish the fixing of the price of the wine in place of the debt of thirty dinars [for the wheat], it is impossible to relate to this matter as a sale, rather, the matter appears as taking usury and not as a way of sale, as will be explained in the Gemara.

This is the manner of “one who increases produce,” which is forbidden.

Gemara:

It was stated regarding the prohibition of usury in the Book of Leviticus: “You shall not give him your money with biting, and with increase you shall not give your food.” The meaning of the verse is that there are two types of usury: A. “biting”; B. “increase.” And both of them are usury from the Torah.

And the Gemara precisely analyzes the language of the Mishna:

Since he left [

from the fact that the tan­nay left]

usury from the Torah,

and did not wish to explain what “increase” is in a manner in which there is no “biting” from the Torah,

and explains

what “increase” is only in the manner of usury

by rabbinic law.

From this

you learn that with usury

from the Torah,

the tan­nay did not find a circumstance of usury defined as biting without increase, or usury defined as increase without biting. And according to his view,

biting and increase—

are one matter!

And we raise an objection:

But,

behold,

verses are written: “

Biting—

money,” ‘increase—

food.’” Since the Torah divided biting and increase into two prohibitions, the prohibition of biting with money and the prohibition of increase with food, it is evident that they are two types of usury from the Torah! “Biting” means usury that bites and diminishes the borrower, even though the lender does not profit from it. And “increase” means that the lender’s property increases through the repayment without the borrower being diminished. If so, why does the tan­nay hold that biting and increase from the Torah are one matter?!

Since the Torah divided biting and increase into two prohibitions—prohibiting biting with money and increase with food—it is clear that there are two types of interest prohibited by Torah law! “Biting” means interest that bites and diminishes the borrower, even if the lender does not profit from it. “Increase” means that the lender’s money increases through the repayment without the borrower being diminished. If so, why does the tanna hold that biting and increase are one matter according to Torah law?!

We challenge the one who raised the objection:

And we express astonishment at the objector:

And can you understand it [

do you really hold this]

that there is [

that there exists] a possibility that the usury will be

biting

toward the borrower

without

its being

increase,

without profit for the lender?

And likewise, do you hold that there is a possibility of

increase,

profit for the lender,

without biting

for the borrower?!

Consider the matter:

biting without increase—what are its circumstances?

How is it possible?

Perhaps you will say that such a possibility exists because of the relative change in the currencies. For the “strong” and fixed currency is a currency made of silver, while the “weak” and fluctuating currency is a copper currency.

And since the exchange rate of the copper perutot is a fluctuating rate, changing from time to time relative to the silver currency, if the loan was in copper perutot, and a change took place in the exchange rate of the currencies between the time of the loan and the time of repayment, the matter of the usury depends upon the formulation of the loan, as the Gemara now discusses.

If he lent him,

if we establish the case as one in which the lender lent the borrower

one hundred

copper perutot

on

condition that he return to him

one hundred twenty

perutot,

and

at first,

at the time when he lent it to him,

one hundred stood at one denka,

one hundred copper perutot were equal to the value of one silver ma'a, which is one-sixth of a dinar and is called a “denka.”

And in the end,

at the time of repayment,

they stood,

the copper perutot became cheaper, so that now

one hundred twenty

perutot were worth

one denka [

a silver ma'a], and apparently, in such a case there is only

biting,

a loss to the borrower,

there is,

because

he bites him,

the lender bites and diminishes the borrower by

taking from him [

that he takes from the borrower]

something,

an item [twenty additional perutot],

which he did not give him,

which the lender did not give him.

But

if there were

increase,

an increase of property, for the lender,

there is none.

Because

he has no profit,

he has no monetary profit from this, since, because the perutot became cheaper, it turns out that altogether

he lent him one denka,

the loan he lent him was one silver ma'a, and altogether he takes from him only

one denka,

the value of one silver ma'a is what he collects from him today, and no more.

The Gemara rejects this:

In the end,

even in this case there is no distinction between biting and increase.

The Gemara first introduces here a fundamental inquiry into the definition of the usury forbidden by the Torah [and the law concerning perutot that became cheaper between the loan and repayment also depends upon this inquiry]:

For there are two possibilities for defining usury:

The first possibility is to define usury according to the time of the stipulation. If, at the time of the stipulation between them, the principal was a certain amount, then whatever is added to it is called usury forever, even if at the time of repayment the addition somehow becomes part of the principal. [

And likewise conversely, if according to the time of the stipulation there was no usury here, but only at the time of repayment did usury come into being, this is not usury from the Torah, and it is permitted.]

The second possibility is to define usury according to the “time of repayment.” If, at the time of repayment, part of the sum that they stipulated for some reason becomes an “addition” to the principal, then even if at the time of the loan there was no usury in it, nevertheless it is forbidden. [

And the same law applies conversely: if at the time of repayment the addition is not defined as usury, it is permitted, even if according to the time of the loan there was here an undertaking to pay an additional amount over the principal.]

And now, whichever way you decide concerning the doubt mentioned, you will not find a possibility of “biting without increase.”

You have gone according to the beginning!

If you are referring to the time of the fixing for defining the interest, then in this case this is actual interest, even though afterward there was a change in the value of the currency. Since at the time of the fixing, when the copper perutot were worth one hundred in a danka, and he undertook to give an additional twenty perutot, this undertaking is defined as interest!

And if so, with reference to the time of the fixing,

there is biting, and there is increase,

for the borrower loses an additional twenty perutot, and the lender gains those twenty perutot?

And

you have gone according to the end!

And if you are referring to the time of repayment as the time that defines the interest, then

there is no biting, and there is no increase!

There is no interest here at all, neither on the side of the borrower nor on the side of the lender, since today the value of one hundred and twenty perutot [danka] is equivalent to the value of the one hundred perutot [danka] that he received as a loan.

And if so, how do you think to say that there is a concept of biting without increase?

Furthermore!

Also, regarding your intention to say that there is

increase without biting,

it is difficult—

what are the circumstances?

What is the case in which biting is separated from increase!?

If he lent to him,

if the lender lent the borrower

one hundred

copper perutot,

on

condition that he repay him likewise

one hundred,

and

at the beginning,

at the time of the loan,

they stood

—the copper perutot were worth

one hundred in a danka,

a silver ma'ah, which is one-sixth of a dinar

, and at the end

at the time of repayment, the perutot became more expensive, and one hundred copper perutot were now worth

a chumsha [

one-fifth of a dinar], and it follows that the danka is now worth approximately eighty-three copper perutot, and there is a profit for the lender of approximately seventeen perutot [approximately].

This too is difficult, whichever way you look at it: how does your position regarding interest of this sort stand?

If you have gone according to the beginning!

If you are referring to the time of the fixing, then

there is no biting, and there is no increase!

There is no fixing here that diminishes the borrower or increases the lender, for at the time of the loan it was one hundred copper perutot, on condition that he repay one hundred copper perutot, and there is no aspect of interest here.

And

if you have gone according to the end,

if you are referring to the time of repayment, then, since at the time of repayment the perutot became more expensive, so that eighty-three of them [approximately] amount to the value of one danka, it follows that if the borrower returns all one hundred perutot that he borrowed, he is thereby adding more than he received. And in this manner,

there is biting, and there is increase,

there is both biting of the borrower and increase for the lender!

Rather, Rava said:

The conclusion of the matter is that

there is no

way you can find, not

a manner of

biting without increase,

nor

a manner of

increase without biting

as we have now proved.

Necessarily, we must explain that

Scripture did not divide them

between biting and increase [when it said: “Your money you shall not give him with biting, and with increase you shall not give your food

in order

to transgress two negative commandments against him.]

For in every collection of interest, one transgresses two negative commandments: both on account of the biting in the matter and on account of the increase in the matter. Therefore, the Torah repeated the prohibition in two expressions.

The Sages taught:

In the Book of Leviticus [chapter 25] it is stated, “

You shall not give your money to him with biting, and with increase you shall not give your food.”

It implies that the Torah attached the negative commandment of “biting” to a loan of money, whereas the negative commandment of “interest” to a loan of food.

And the beraita asks:

I have

a source from the verse

only

to prohibit the prohibition of

“biting” with money [

a loan of money], and likewise the prohibition of

“interest” with food [

a loan of food], such as a se'a of wheat for two se'ah.

The prohibition of

“biting” with

a loan of

food—from where?

The verse teaches,

for it is therefore stated in Deuteronomy [chapter 23], “You shall not make your brother suffer interest,

interest on food.”

Through this, the Torah included the prohibition of “biting” also in a loan of produce.

And still, the source for the prohibition of

“interest”

in a loan of

money—from where?

The verse teaches,

for it is stated in Deuteronomy [there], “You shall not make your brother suffer

interest on money.”