Bava Metzia 57b (נז:) — the Talmud in English

And this is what it means:

even less than the measure of overreaching, the transaction is rescinded.

Therefore, Reish Lakish holds that one must establish its monetary value by Torah law, while Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with Rav Hisda and explains the Mishna according to its plain meaning: there is no law of overreaching at all with regard to them. Therefore, one need add compensation only by rabbinic decree.

Meytivi

from what we learned in a beraita: There is

interest and overreaching with regard to an ordinary person, but there is neither interest nor overreaching with regard to consecrated property.

The simple meaning is that the law of overreaching does not apply at all to consecrated property. This is difficult for Rav Hisda, who holds that even a transaction involving less than the measure of overreaching is rescinded, is it not?

We answer:

Is

the beraita

stronger than the Mishna, which we established

as meaning that when it says, “There is no overreaching with regard to them,” they are not

subject to the law of overreaching?!

On the contrary, even a transaction involving less than the measure of overreaching is rescinded.

Here too

we will interpret the beraita as follows:

There is interest and the law of overreaching with regard to an ordinary person, but there is neither interest nor the law of overreaching with regard to consecrated property.

And this is in accordance with Rav Hisda, who holds that even a transaction involving less than the measure of overreaching is rescinded.

We challenge this:

If so, this is what is taught in the latter clause

of the beraita:

This is a stringency with regard to an ordinary person over consecrated property,

but it cannot be properly understood, since with regard to overreaching, consecrated property is more stringent, as a transaction involving even less than the measure of overreaching is rescinded, is it not?

We answer: Indeed, what we said—“This is a stringency with regard to an ordinary person over consecrated property”—refers only

to interest,

with regard to which the ordinary person is subject to a greater stringency, as there is no prohibition of interest with regard to consecrated property.

We challenge this:

Let it also teach: “This is a stringency with regard to consecrated property over an ordinary person,” referring to overreaching,

since consecrated property is more stringent, as a transaction involving even less than the measure of overreaching is rescinded? The Gemara rejects the challenge:

How can these matters be compared?!

The cases are not equivalent.

For

granted, “This is a stringency with regard to an ordinary person over consecrated property”:

this contains a novelty, that an ordinary person is subject to a greater stringency than consecrated property,

and no more,

as in other matters consecrated property is more stringent than an ordinary person.

But with regard to consecrated property,

which is more stringent than an ordinary person, is it possible to state a novelty:

“This is a stringency,” and no more?!

On the contrary, that is indeed generally the case, and there is no novelty in it.

We inquire:

The interest of consecrated property,

which is not prohibited—

what are the circumstances?

In what manner was this law stated?

If we say that he lent it

[that he lent] the

treasurer one hundred

on the condition that he return

one

with

one hundred twenty,

and this is the case concerning which it was said that it is not prohibited,

this is difficult:

But surely the treasurer committed misuse of consecrated property

when he lent the money inadvertently, as he mistakenly thought that there was no prohibition, since the consecrated property would profit.

And once the treasurer committed misuse of consecrated property, his money became non-sacred, and it is considered ordinary property,

and it is in the treasurer’s possession. The treasurer is obligated only to pay the principal and an additional fifth to consecrated property. If so, there is certainly a prohibition of interest with regard to this money, is there not?

We answer:

Rav Oshaya said: Here, with what are we dealing?

This law applies in a case

such as when he accepted upon himself

the person who received money from consecrated property accepted upon himself, on the condition

to supply fine flour

to consecrated property for the communal meal-offering throughout the year, and they stipulated that the price would be

four

seahs of wheat per sela. The wheat then increased in price

and stood at three

seahs per sela. It follows that if he now supplies it at the price they stipulated, he gives an additional seah for each sela, and this is interest; but with regard to consecrated property it is permitted, because there is no interest with regard to consecrated property.

As it is taught in a beraita: One who accepts upon himself to supply fine flour

to consecrated property

for four

seahs per sela, and the wheat becomes more expensive

and stands at three

seahs per sela,

supplies

fine flour at the price they stipulated, namely

four

seahs per sela.

And if the price they stipulated was

three

seahs per sela, and the price subsequently decreases

and stands at four

seahs per sela, he

supplies

to consecrated property

four

seahs per sela, in accordance with the current price and not the price they stipulated initially, because

the authority of consecrated property prevails,

so that consecrated property should not suffer a loss; and there is no prohibition of interest in this, as there is no interest with regard to consecrated property.

Rav Pappa said: Here we are dealing with building stones entrusted to the treasurer

for construction on behalf of consecrated property,

we are dealing

with. These stones are consecrated only after they have been incorporated into the building. At present they are not yet in the possession of consecrated property and have no sanctity. This treasurer lent them on condition that an additional payment of interest be made, and in this case there is no misuse of consecrated property, since the stones are still non-sacred. This is the case concerning which they said that there is no prohibition of interest, because there is no interest with regard to consecrated property.

In accordance with the statement of Shmuel, for Shmuel said: Construction is performed with non-sacred materials,

meaning that consecrated property purchases the building stones on credit and does not consecrate them until construction is complete, so that they will not lead to misuse of consecrated property during construction,

and afterward they consecrate them.

At the completion of the work, they redeem the building by transferring consecrated funds onto it, and the money is given to the merchants and craftsmen. Similarly, one who wishes to donate stones for consecration gives them to the collector, but does not consecrate them until construction is complete.

We learned in our Mishna: Slaves, documents, land, and consecrated property

do not have payments of

double payment.

We inquire:

From where are these matters

derived?

The Sages taught:

It is stated concerning the thief’s obligation to pay double: [Exodus 22] “For every matter of trespass, concerning an ox, concerning a donkey, concerning a sheep, concerning a garment, concerning any lost item, of which he says: This is it; he shall pay double to his fellow.”

This verse is expounded by means of the hermeneutical principle of a generalization, a specification, and a generalization:

“For every matter of trespass,”

this is a

generalization.

“Concerning an ox, concerning a donkey, concerning a sheep, concerning a garment,”

this is a

specification.

“Concerning any lost item, of which he says

“This is it,”

he returned and generalized.

This derivation is one of the thirteen hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is expounded. According to this principle, whenever a matter is initially written in general terms, then written again in specific terms, and afterward written again in general terms, this teaches that when one derives a law from this verse,

you may derive only what is similar to the specification

stated in the verse.

And this is how we reason:

Just as the specification is explicit

in this verse as

an item that can be moved and whose substance has monetary value,

and if it is stolen, the thief is obligated to pay double,

so too, every item that can be moved and whose substance has monetary value

entails an obligation to pay double for its theft.

Land is excluded, as it cannot be moved,

and there is no obligation to pay double for it.

Likewise,

slaves are excluded,

as there is no obligation to pay double for their theft, because

they were equated with land

with regard to inheritance, as it is stated [Leviticus 25]: “And you shall take them as an inheritance for your children after you, to inherit them as a possession.” From here they learned [Kiddushin 22b] that Scripture equated them with an ancestral field with regard to acquisitions, and likewise with regard to other matters, including double payment.

Likewise,

documents are excluded,

as there is no obligation to pay double for their theft,

since even though

they are

movable property,

they are nevertheless excluded from double payment because

their substance does not have monetary value.

Likewise,

consecrated property

does not entail an obligation of double payment for its theft, since

the verse says [Exodus 22]

“

his fellow,”

and thereby Scripture excludes the case in which one steals from

his fellow

as the only case entailing double payment,

but not

when one steals

from consecrated property.

We further learned in our Mishna that these items entail no obligation of double payment

and no payment of four or five.

We inquire:

What is the reason?

And we answer: Only

“payment of four or five,” the Merciful One said,

referring to the obligation for slaughtering or selling

and not payment of “three or four.”

With regard to these items, since he does not pay double for them, it follows that for slaughtering or selling them he would pay only three or four, and this is not an obligation imposed by the Torah. In any event, payment of four or five applies only when there is an obligation of double payment.

We further learned in our Mishna that with regard to these items,

an unpaid bailee does not take an oath,

if the deposit was stolen or was lost through unavoidable circumstances.

We inquire:

From where are these matters derived?

The Sages taught:

It is stated in the section concerning bailees [Exodus 22]:

“When a man gives to his fellow

money or vessels to guard,” and this verse is expounded as a generalization, a specification, and a generalization.

That is: “When a man gives to his fellow” is a

generalization; “money or vessels”

is a

specification; “to guard”

the verse

returned and generalized.

And since this verse contains

a generalization, a specification, and a generalization,

when you come to derive a law from it by this principle,

you may derive only

an item that is

similar to the specification:

Just as the specification,

which is

explicit

in the verse, is only

an item that can be moved and whose substance has monetary value,

so too, every item

derived from here is subject to the law of the oath of bailees only if it is

an item that can be moved and whose substance has monetary value.

Land is excluded, as it cannot be moved,

and there is no oath with regard to it.

Slaves are excluded,

and one does not take an oath with regard to them because

they were equated with land.

Likewise,

documents are excluded, even though they can be moved,

but

their substance does not have monetary value,

and therefore there is no oath with regard to them. The reason that

consecrated property

does not entail an oath is that

the verse says [Exodus 22]:

“When a man gives to

his fellow,”

and the verse comes to exclude and say:

“His fellow,” but not property of consecrated property.

We further learned that with regard to these items,

a paid bailee does not pay,

if they were stolen or lost while in his possession.

We inquire:

From where are these matters derived?

The Sages taught:

It is stated in the section concerning a paid bailee [Exodus 22], which is the second section concerning bailees,

“When a man gives to his fellow,”

this is a

generalization; “a donkey, an ox, or a sheep,”

this is a

specification; “and every animal to guard”—he returned and generalized.

And this verse is expounded by

a generalization, a specification, and a generalization,

and therefore

you may derive only what is similar to the specification:

Just as the specification explicitly consists of an item that can be moved and whose substance has monetary value,

a paid bailee is liable for its theft or loss,

so too, every item that can be moved and whose substance has monetary value

renders a paid bailee liable for it.

Land is excluded, as it cannot be moved; slaves, which were equated with land, are excluded; documents are excluded, even though

they can be moved, their substance does not have monetary value;

and

consecrated property

is excluded because

the verse says, “his fellow”—his fellow, but not property of consecrated property.

We learned in the Mishna concerning land and consecrated property:

“An unpaid bailee does not take an oath, and so on”:

And we raise a contradiction

from what we learned at the beginning of tractate Shekalim:

“The residents of a city who sent their shekels,”

the half-shekel that they collected from each person in order to purchase communal offerings with it for all Israel—if the residents of the city sent their shekels to the Temple through messengers, who are considered bailees,

and the shekels were stolen or lost

from the messengers who were guarding them, then:

If

the messengers came to court as defendants because the shekels were lost or stolen from them,

after the “contribution” was made,

that is, after the time when they “contributed” from all the shekels that had already arrived and been collected in the Temple.