Bava Metzia 57a (נז.) — the Talmud in English

In this manner, one must inquire:

what is the ruling regarding taking and eating

from them?

Can he take and eat from these wheat kernels that he planted in the ground?

It is obvious that there is no uncertainty concerning the wheat growth, since even if the previous Omer permitted the seeds before they were sown, and he sowed them before the Omer, because they did not take root until after the Omer, their growth is forbidden until the following Omer. The entire uncertainty concerns the seeds themselves—the wheat kernels that are in the ground: were they permitted through the bringing of the Omer, so that they may be removed and eaten after the Omer, or not?

The sides of the uncertainty are as follows: Are these wheat kernels

considered as though they were lying in a container

—that is, are they considered as though he had placed them in a container—

and the

Omer

permitted them,

as it permitted other wheat at the time the Omer was offered?

Or perhaps they were nullified by virtue of the ground

—or perhaps he nullified them by virtue of the ground, and they are therefore considered land, in which case the rule that the Omer permits them is inapplicable to them?

Regarding all these uncertainties that were raised concerning wheat that was planted in the ground—whether it is considered movable property or land—the Gemara leaves the matter at

teiku.

Rava said that Rav Ḥisda said:

Rabbi Ami raised a question:

We learned in the Mishna several things to which

the laws of ona'ah do not apply.

And now one must inquire:

does cancellation of the sale apply to them [if the ona'ah was more than one-sixth of the price]?

Or

does even cancellation of the sale

not apply to them?

Rav Naḥman said: He returned,

afterward, and

Rav Ḥisda said: Rabbi Ami resolved

this uncertainty: Although

the laws of ona'ah do not apply to them,

the things mentioned in the Mishna, nevertheless

cancellation of the sale does apply to them.

The Gemara now cites a dispute between amoraim who disagreed, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, concerning this matter: ona'ah does not apply to them, but cancellation of the sale does apply to them:

Rabbi Yona said

that this rule was stated

with regard to consecrated property,

whereas

Rabbi Yirmeya said

that this rule was stated

with regard to land.

And both of them,

Rabbi Yona and Rabbi Yirmeya,

said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan

that

the laws of ona'ah do not apply to them, but cancellation of the sale does apply to them.

The Gemara explains:

The one who says [Rabbi Yona, who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan that cancellation of the sale applies]

with regard to consecrated property—certainly

Rabbi Yoḥanan said this

with regard to land.

Since he taught us that cancellation of the sale is not included in the laws of ona'ah, there is no exclusion of land from the rule of cancellation of the sale. And if, with regard to consecrated property, where there can be no mistake before Heaven, the rule of cancellation of the sale nevertheless applies, then certainly this is the law with regard to the sale of land, which takes place between human beings and where a mistaken transaction is possible: the rule of cancellation of the sale should apply.

However,

the one who says, with regard to land,

that the rule of cancellation of the sale applies to it, said so specifically with regard to land, because cancellation of the sale is not part of the laws of ona'ah; rather, the sale was made in error. Therefore, this applies only to land.

But with regard to consecrated property, no.

Even cancellation of the sale does not apply to it, since a mistake before Heaven is not applicable to consecrated property. As for the laws of ona'ah, consecrated property was excluded from those laws,

as stated by Shmuel.

As Shmuel said:

If an object of

consecrated property worth one hundred dinars was redeemed for an object worth one peruta,

it is

redeemed. Others explained that cancellation of the sale applies here just as it does to movable property, but that Rav Naḥman himself disagrees with Rav Ḥisda, and maintains that there is no ona'ah with regard to land at all, and likewise no cancellation of the sale. The halakha is in accordance with his opinion, and this is also the ruling of the Rif and of Maimonides in chapter 13 of the Laws of Sale. Ramban, in Milḥamot, wrote, on the contrary, that the Jerusalem Talmud indicates that Rav Naḥman disagrees, since with regard to one who redeemed an object worth one hundred dinars for two hundred, it states that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan it is not redeemed because this is an extreme discrepancy. It follows that even when the discrepancy is one-half, cancellation of the sale applies. Consequently, Rav Naḥman, who says that one who sold an object worth one hundred for two hundred has no remedy, must disagree with Rav Ḥisda and maintain that there is no ona'ah whatsoever with regard to land. Ramban further disagrees with Rabbeinu Ḥananel concerning the meaning of “an extreme discrepancy”: it does not mean twice the value of the sale, but refers to the measure of ona'ah, which is not one-sixth as with other movable property, but one-third. It also follows from Ramban there that the measure of one-half with regard to ona'ah applies both to land and to consecrated property. Shiltei HaGibborim likewise wrote this with regard to documents.

Thus, cancellation of the sale does not apply to consecrated property, even when the consecrated property suffered ona'ah greater than one-sixth. However, Ḥazon Ish, in Ḥoshen Mishpat, Likkutim, section 20, wrote that Ritva’s intention is that just as, with regard to asking about the consecration, there is a distinction between an object that has reached the treasurer’s possession and one that is still in the owner’s possession, so too, with regard to redemption, consecrated property is treated differently in this respect. If it is in the possession of the person who consecrated it, redemption takes effect even for one peruta; but if it has already reached the treasurer’s possession, it is like a purchase to which the laws of ona'ah apply. According to this, the distinction applies only to consecrated property for the maintenance of the Temple, but with regard to consecrated offerings there is no distinction between the owner and another person. Tosafot in Menaḥot (71b), however, wrote that this rule applies only to the owner. Later authorities were uncertain whether another person who redeemed it, with the owner’s authorization, for less than its value has redeemed it; Responsa Dvar Avraham (part I, responsum 15, section 5) discusses this at length. In Responsa Oneg Yom Tov, section 112, it is proven from Tosafot in Bekhorot (25a) and from Ritva here that a treasurer has the status of an owner, and if he redeemed an object worth one hundred dinars for one peruta, it is redeemed. As for this rule of Shmuel with regard to Second Tithe, Maimonides, in the Laws of Second Tithe (2:10), wrote in the name of the Geonim that it has the status of consecrated property, and nowadays it may be redeemed even initially. The Gra, in his commentary to Yoreh De'ah (294, subsection 20), wondered about this: Consecrated property is redeemed because the laws of ona'ah do not apply to consecrated property, but we do not find that Second Tithe was excluded from the laws of ona'ah. He answered that Second Tithe can indeed be compared to consecrated property only according to Rabbi Meir, who maintains that Second Tithe is the property of Heaven. According to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that the tithe is ordinary property, Second Tithe may be redeemed only at its full value; and Maimonides rules in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

We learned there:

In tractate Temura (26b), that if one says with regard to an unblemished offering that it should be redeemed upon an ordinary animal, or says, “This animal is in place of that animal,” or, “This is the exchange for that,” he has said nothing, since an unblemished offering cannot be redeemed.

But

if there was [an animal of]

consecrated property with a physical defect,

and he redeemed it with an ordinary animal,

it becomes ordinary property, but he must provide its monetary value [if the ordinary animal is not worth as much as the consecrated animal, he must add the difference to the consecrated property, despite the fact that the animal has acquired the sanctity of the offering].

And in explaining this law,

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

That which we learned in the Mishna,

“it becomes ordinary property,”

is

by Torah law;

although the two animals are not equal in value, the consecrated animal with a physical defect becomes ordinary property, because the laws of ona'ah do not apply to consecrated property.

Whereas that which we learned in the Mishna, that

he must provide its monetary value,

adding the difference between them to the consecrated property, is a law

by rabbinic decree.

The Sages obligated him to pay the consecrated property the amount of the ona'ah.

And Reish Lakish said: Even

that which they said,

“he must provide its monetary value,”

is

by Torah law.

And although the laws of ona'ah do not apply to consecrated property, the verse says with regard to redeeming consecrated property, “your valuation,” teaching that the redemption must correspond to its value.

Rabbi Yoḥanan, by contrast, maintains that the phrase means according to whatever valuation is assigned to it, even if that is not its true value.

The Gemara discusses:

With what are we dealing?

What was the difference between the value of the consecrated property and that of the ordinary property?

If you say it was within the measure of ona'ah,

that is, less than one-sixth, is it conceivable that

in this case Reish Lakish would say, “He must provide its monetary value by Torah law,”

and it would follow that he maintains that the laws of ona'ah apply to consecrated property?

But we learned [above, 56a]:

“These are the things to which the laws of ona'ah do not apply: land, slaves, and documents”

“and consecrated property.”

If so, it is impossible to establish that the Mishna in tractate Temura is referring to a difference of less than one-sixth, since in that case it is certainly true that the laws of ona'ah do not apply to consecrated property, and he need not add any money at all.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that the difference was the measure of

cancellation of the sale,

that is, more than one-sixth, and it is concerning this that it was said that he must add its monetary value.

This too is impossible. Would

Rabbi Yoḥanan say in this case, “He must provide its monetary value by rabbinic decree,”

whereas by Torah law he need not add anything, because the laws of ona'ah do not apply to consecrated property even when the discrepancy is greater than one-sixth?

But Rabbi Yona said

the following statement:

“With regard to consecrated property,” and Rabbi Yirmeya said

this rule

“with regard to land,”

and both of them

said this

in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: “The laws of ona'ah do not apply to them,”

but

cancellation of the sale does apply to them.

It follows that according to Rabbi Yona, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that cancellation of the sale applies to consecrated property when the discrepancy is greater than one-sixth. This contradicts what Rabbi Yoḥanan said, that one must add the difference only by rabbinic decree.

And we answer:

Actually,

the Mishna’s statement that he must provide its monetary value refers to

cancellation of the sale,

that is, the difference was greater than one-sixth,

and reverse the positions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, and those of Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yoḥanan.

That is, according to Rabbi Yona, the dispute is reversed: Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that one must add the difference by Torah law, while Reish Lakish maintains that one need add it only by rabbinic decree. There is therefore no contradiction in the statements of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

The Gemara explains:

With regard to what do

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish

disagree?

They disagree concerning the statement of Shmuel.

As Shmuel said: “Consecrated property worth one hundred dinars that one redeemed for an object worth one peruta is redeemed,” even though there is ona'ah here greater than one-sixth; consecrated property was excluded from the laws of ona'ah even when the ona'ah is of the measure that causes cancellation of the sale.

One master,

Reish Lakish, who maintains that one must add the difference by rabbinic decree,

accepts the statement of Shmuel,

that the laws of ona'ah do not apply to consecrated property at all.

And the other master,

Rabbi Yoḥanan, who maintains that one must add the difference by Torah law,

does not accept the statement of Shmuel,

but maintains that even with regard to consecrated property, the exclusion applies only to the laws of ona'ah, whereas cancellation of the sale does apply to it.

Alternatively, everyone accepts the statement of Shmuel,

and indeed the laws of ona'ah do not apply to consecrated property at all,

and here they disagree about this:

One master,

who maintains that one must add the difference by Torah law,

holds that

“that he redeemed it”—yes;

only if he has already redeemed it for an object worth one peruta is it redeemed after the fact, since the laws of ona'ah do not apply to consecrated property.

But

initially,

when he comes to redeem it for less than its value,

no.

Since “your valuation,” stated in the Torah, implies its actual value, although the redemption takes effect, he is obligated by Torah law to add the difference.

And the other master maintains

that he need add the difference only by rabbinic decree, because he holds that Shmuel’s ruling applies

even initially,

and the phrase “your valuation” in the verse means any valuation; only by rabbinic decree must he add the difference.

Alternatively, actually

the Mishna’s statement that he must provide its monetary value refers to a case in which the difference is

the measure of ona'ah, and do not reverse

the positions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish as we explained above. Rather, it is Reish Lakish who maintains that he must provide its monetary value by Torah law.

As for our question from the Mishna, which says that the laws of ona'ah do not apply to consecrated property, and why he must add the difference by Torah law,

the answer is:

They disagree concerning the opinion of Rav Ḥisda.

As Rav Ḥisda said: What is the meaning of “the laws of ona'ah do not apply to them,”

as stated with regard to consecrated property?

It does not mean, as it does with regard to land, that he need not return the ona'ah. Rather, consecrated property

is not subject to the laws of ona'ah.