Bava Metzia 49b (מט:) — the Talmud in English

I said

to

him,

that man:

No,

I have no sesame to sell.

That man said to me

:

Let these coins be

which I brought here in order to purchase the sesame,

a deposit in your possession, for it has become dark for me,

and I cannot bring them to my house on Shabbat.

I said to him: Here is the house before you;

my house is before you!

He placed them

that man placed his money,

in the house,

in the house of that Torah scholar,

and it was stolen,

the money.

He came

that man

before Rava.

Rava said to him,

Rava

: Every

statement

“Here is the house before you” -

does not constitute acceptance of responsibility for the item, and therefore

it is not necessary to say that he is not a paid bailee;

rather, he is not even an unpaid bailee

at all,

and the owner of the house is exempt from safeguarding the money.

Ravina said:

I said

to that Torah scholar who related this incident:

And

if it was as you say, that you did not receive money for the sesame,

the Rabbis said to Rava: Does he not have to accept upon himself “Who exacted payment from the generation of the Flood”?

But according to your account, their question is incomprehensible, since the curse of “Who exacted payment from the generation of the Flood” applies only to one who retracts after receiving money!?

And he said to me,

that Torah scholar: Indeed, this report—that the Rabbis asked Rava about the curse of “Who exacted payment from the generation of the Flood” in connection with that incident involving sesame—is not accurate,

and the incident never happened.

We learned in the Mishna: If one gave money to another but did not pull produce from him, either party may retract [whether the seller or the buyer].

Rabbi Shimon says: Whenever the money is in the possession of

the seller,

his hand is uppermost

: If the seller wishes, he may retract; and if he wishes to uphold the sale, the buyer cannot cancel it.

It was taught

in a beraita to explain the words of Rabbi Shimon:

Rabbi Shimon said: When

does the seller have the option of retracting and canceling the sale?

When

the buyer paid the money, but the produce is not yet in his possession, since he did not pull it, and it turns out

that the money and the produce,

both of them, are

in the possession of the seller,

the Sages granted the seller permission to retract, so that if a fire were to break out, he would make an effort to save the produce.

But when the money

is already

in the possession of the seller, and the produce

is already

in the possession of the buyer,

he cannot retract,

because the equivalent of his money is in his possession.

The Gemara wonders: Is it so that the buyer’s money is

in his possession?

After all, it is

in the seller’s possession!?

Rather,

do not interpret the beraita literally, as saying that his money is in his possession. This is what it means:

Because the equivalent of his money,

the produce, is

in his possession,

in the possession

of the buyer.

The Gemara had assumed that the buyer pulled the produce, and it is now in his house.

It is obvious!?

The Gemara wonders: When the buyer pulled the produce, even the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Shimon that neither party can retract, so what innovation did Rabbi Shimon teach!?

Rabbi Shimon holds that money effects acquisition by Torah law.

He said,

he answered,

Rava:

This is not referring to a case in which the buyer performed pulling and thereby effected a complete acquisition of the produce. Rather,

with what are we dealing here?

For example, the upper story where the produce is located was

the buyer’s upper story,

but it was

rented to the seller

by the buyer.

Nevertheless, that upper story does not acquire the seller’s produce for the buyer through the acquisition effected by one’s courtyard, even after he paid his money, because it is the seller’s courtyard, since he rented it from the buyer.

In any event, in such a case Rabbi Shimon holds that money effects acquisition. Although the Sages nullified acquisition through money, here the Sages did not institute that his money should fail to acquire the produce.

For

what is the reason that the Sages instituted that pulling

effects acquisition rather than money?

It was a decree lest he say to him,

the seller to the buyer:

“Your wheat has burned in the upper story.”

Here,

there is no need to enact this decree, and there is no concern, since the produce is

in his domain,

in his upper story;

it belongs to the buyer,

and

if a fire should break out through unavoidable circumstances,

he,

the buyer,

will make an effort and bring it out.

The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving

a certain man who gave money for wine,

paying money for a donkey that he wished to purchase.

In the end he heard that the household of Parzak Ropila was seeking to take it,

he heard that the servants of “Parzak,” the viceroy, wanted to take the donkey.

He said to him,

the buyer to the seller:

“Give me my money,

return my money to me; I

do not want the donkey,

I do not want the donkey.”

He came before Rav Ḥisda,

who said to him: The buyer may retract and cancel the sale, since

just as they instituted

that pulling effects acquisition rather than money

for sellers,

so that the seller would be able to retract,

so they instituted pulling for buyers,

so that the buyer would be able to retract if he wished, as long as he had not given the money.

Mishna:

This Mishna concerns the laws of overreaching: what its measure is, and until when the person who was overreached may demand repayment of the overcharge.

“Overreaching” applies to the price of the object purchased, whether on the seller’s side or on the buyer’s side. That is, if the seller raised the price of an object without the buyer’s knowledge, the buyer was overreached by the seller. Conversely, if the buyer paid a price lower than the object’s value, the seller was thereby overreached by the buyer.

Three rules concerning three measures of overreaching were stated, and in the language of the Sages they are called by three expressions: “relinquishment,” “overreaching,” and “the sale is void”:

a.

“Relinquishment.”

If the price was higher or lower by an amount less than one-sixth of the object’s true price, the sale stands, and the person who was overreached is not entitled to demand repayment of the overcharge, since he relinquishes the minor overcharge. This is called “the sale is acquired.”

b.

“Overreaching.”

If the measure of the overcharge was one-sixth [called “one-sixth”] of the sale, the person overreached is entitled to demand the return of the amount of the overcharge. But he may not demand the cancellation of the sale. This measure of one-sixth is called “overreaching,” and is also called “the sale is acquired, and the overcharge is returned.”

c.

“The sale is void.”

If the overcharge was more than one-sixth, the sale is void even if the one who overreached wishes to pay the person overreached the amount of the overcharge. Such a case is called “the sale is void.”

In the first part, the Mishna explains the measure of one-sixth for overreaching and gives an example:

The overcharge,

for example, is when the overcharge was

four

silver coins

out of twenty-four silver coins to a sela.

That is, a sela made of silver contains twenty-four silver coins [a sela contains four dinars, and each dinar contains six silver coins]. Therefore, if the sale was for a sela, which is twenty-four coins, and there was an overcharge of four silver coins, this is overreaching, whose measure is

one-sixth of the sale.

Now, in the second part, the Mishna explains the period during which one may demand repayment of the overcharge:

Until when is it permitted

for the person overreached to demand from the one who overreached him

to return

the amount of the overcharge?

Until the time that he can show

the object to

a merchant,

who is familiar with prices,

or to a relative

of the person overreached.

The Mishna now presents, in its third part, an incident that occurred, and

Rabbi Tarfon ruled in Lod: The overcharge

is an amount of

eight silver coins out of twenty-four silver coins to a sela,

which is

one-third of the sale.

And the merchants of Lod rejoiced,

since they were experts in prices, and they were accustomed to charging high prices, selling at a price greater than one-sixth. From then on, they could raise their prices without the customers being able to demand the return of the overcharge, up to an amount less than one-third.

And he said to them,

Rabbi Tarfon later:

The entire day it is permitted

for the person overreached

to retract

and demand the amount of his overcharge, even after the period in which he could show the object to a merchant or relative had passed.

They said to him: Let Rabbi Tarfon leave us as we were!

We do not need his rulings.

And they returned to the words of the Sages,

that overreaching is up to one-sixth, but the person overreached may not retract throughout the entire day; rather, only for the time necessary to show the object to a merchant or relative.

Gemara:

The tanna of the Mishna stated that the measure of overreaching is “one-sixth of the sale.” Only in such a case is the law that the sale is not void, but the one who overreached must return the amount of the overcharge to the person overreached.

The meaning of the expression “one-sixth of the sale” is one-sixth of the object’s true value. It does not mean one-sixth of the sum of coins paid for the sale.

Sometimes there is a difference between the two.

For example, if the true value of the sale was six coins, and the seller overreached the buyer and sold it to him for seven coins: relative to the true price of the sale, there is an overcharge of one coin, which is one-sixth of the sale’s value. But relative to the seven coins paid for the sale, the additional coin constitutes an overcharge of only one-seventh.

The Gemara presents a dispute between amoraim concerning this matter:

It was stated: Rav said: “One-sixth of the sale”

specifically

is what we learned,

and only in such a case must the one who overreached pay the amount of the overcharge, while the sale cannot be voided if he pays the amount of the overcharge. But if the measure of the overcharge was one-sixth of the coins of the sale, and not of the sale’s value, the laws of one-sixth overreaching do not apply.

And Shmuel said: “One-sixth of the money,” as well, is what we learned.

Even when the overcharge was one-sixth of the money, and not one-sixth of the sale’s value, the laws of overreaching apply as they do to an overcharge of one-sixth. That is, the amount of the overcharge must be returned, and the sale is not void if the one who overreached agrees to return the amount of the overcharge, just as is the law with regard to an overcharge of “one-sixth of the sale.” The Gemara explains their dispute:

If the value of the sale was

worth

six

[coins],

and it was sold

for five,

for five coins, and the seller was overreached by one coin, which is one-sixth of the sale’s true value [but one-fifth of the sum of the coins paid],

or if the sale was

worth six,

and was sold

for seven

coins, and the buyer was overreached by one coin, which is one-sixth of the sale’s true value [but one-seventh of the sum of the coins paid]—

In this case,

everyone,

Rav and Shmuel,

does not disagree;

they do not dispute that the laws of one-sixth overreaching apply here, since

we follow the sale’s value, and it is overreaching.

For Shmuel too, who says that we also learned one-sixth of the money, concedes that one-sixth of the sale itself certainly entails the law of one-sixth overreaching, despite the fact that there is no one-sixth in the sale money [when the ratio is one to five or one to seven].

Where they disagree

Rav and Shmuel is in a case such as this:

Worth

the true value of the sale was

five,

and it was sold

for six.

In that case, the overcharge is against the buyer, by one zuz, which is one-fifth of the sale’s true value, but it is one-sixth of the money actually paid for it.

And [a case in which it was] worth seven and sold for six.

In that case, the overcharge is by one zuz against the seller, which is one-seventh of the sale’s true value, but it is one-sixth of the money paid for the sale.

According to Shmuel, who says, “We also follow the money,

as well

,”

in both cases,

since they contain one-sixth of the money paid for the sale,

it is overreaching.

According to Rav, who says

only

we follow the sale’s value,

and we do not consider overreaching in the money, in the case where it was sold

for five and sold for six,

where the measure of the overcharge is one-fifth of its value,

the sale is void.

But in the second case, where it was sold

for six when worth seven,

where the ratio is one-seventh of the sale’s value,

it is relinquishment!

And Shmuel said: When we say relinquishment

for less than one-sixth

and the sale is void

for more than one-sixth,

it is where there is no one-sixth from either perspective,

neither from the perspective of the sale’s value nor from that of the money paid.

But where there is one-sixth

even

from one perspective

alone,

it is overreaching.

The sale is acquired, and the overcharge is returned.

The Gemara brings a proof from our Mishna in support of Shmuel:

We learned: The overcharge is four silver coins out of twenty-four silver coins to a sela, one-sixth of the sale.

Is that not to say:

does this not simply refer to a case in which the seller deceived the buyer,

by selling

him an item that was

worth twenty

zuz

for twenty-four

zuz, so that the ona'a amounted to [four zuz,] one-sixth of the money paid, although it was one-fifth of the item's true value,

and infer from this that we also learned the measure of one-sixth of the money paid,

in accordance with Shmuel?!

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

you cannot prove Shmuel's opinion from here, for the Mishna is not dealing, as you had thought, with the buyer being deceived. Rather, it is dealing with a case

where he sold an item worth twenty

and four

zuz

for twenty

zuz; in such a case, the ona'a was one-sixth of the sale.

The Gemara nevertheless raises the following objection: According to your explanation, that you established the case as one in which an item worth twenty-four zuz was sold for twenty zuz, it necessarily follows that

who

was the one who

was deceived?

Certainly, the

seller

was the one deceived by the buyer.

If so,

consider the latter clause,

where we learned:

Until when is it permitted to return the item? Until he shows it to a merchant or to his relative.

And

concerning this,

Rav Naḥman said: This was taught

that he may retract only for the short period until he shows it to his relative [or to a merchant,

but

only with regard to a

buyer. But a seller may always retract!

That is, he may demand either reimbursement for the ona'a or rescission of the sale at any time.

This proves that the Mishna is speaking of a case in which the buyer was deceived, and not one in which the seller was deceived, contrary to your explanation of our Mishna!

Rather,

our Mishna must be established as referring to a case in which the seller deceived the buyer by one-sixth of the value of

the sale,

which everyone agrees constitutes ona'a; for example,

where he sold an item worth twenty-four z

uz

for twenty-eight,

for twenty-eight zuz. The additional four zuz are one-sixth of the value of the item [twenty-four], and everyone agrees that this constitutes ona'a.

The Gemara now presents a similar proof for Shmuel's opinion from the latter clause of the Mishna, and rejects it in a similar manner:

We learned: Rabbi Tarfon ruled in Lod:

the ona'a is eight ma'ot out of twenty-four ma'ot to a sela,

which is one-third of the sale.

The Gemara proves from this:

Is that not to say

that the Mishna is dealing with the buyer being deceived by the seller, for example,

where he sold

him an item

worth sixteen [

sixteen zuz]

for twenty-four

zuz? The ona'a was eight zuz more than the value of the item, which is ona'a of half the item's value [a ratio of eight to sixteen], and ona'a of one-third of the money paid for the item [eight ma'ot out of the twenty-four paid],

and infer from this

in accordance with Shmuel, that

we also learned one-third of the money paid.

The Gemara rejects the proof:

No,

it is not referring to such a case. Rather, it is referring to a case

where he sold an item worth twenty-four for sixteen,

so that the ona'a of eight zuz was one-third of the sale, and not one-third of the money paid.

The Gemara nevertheless objects: In such a case, it necessarily follows that

who was deceived

in this arrangement? The

seller

was the one deceived, by selling the item for less than its value.

If so,

consider the latter clause: He said to them, “It is permitted to retract throughout the entire day.”

And

concerning this,

Rav Naḥman said: This was taught

that he may retract only throughout the entire day, and no longer,

only with regard to a buyer. But a seller may always retract.

This proves that the Mishna is speaking of a case in which the buyer was deceived, and not the seller, contrary to your explanation.

Rather,

our Mishna must be established as referring to a case

where he sold an item worth twenty-four for thirty-two [

thirty-two zuz], so that the buyer was deceived by one-third of the sale, which everyone agrees constitutes ona'a.

The Gemara now cites a beraita that supports Shmuel's opinion:

A beraita was taught in accordance with Shmuel,

that we learned both one-sixth of the value of the sale and one-sixth of the money paid:

As it was taught: Anyone

upon whom

the loss of the ona'a falls—that is, the person who was deceived—

has the advantage!

The beraita explains:

How so?

One case is where he

sold him an item worth five for six.

In that case,

who was deceived?

Certainly, it was the

buyer.

Therefore,

the buyer has the advantage:

If he wishes,

the buyer may fully retract the sale, and

say

to the seller who deceived him:

“Give me my money”

back, thereby annulling the sale.

Alternatively,

if the buyer wishes to uphold the sale, he may uphold it, but he may say to the seller:

“Give me

the amount of

that by which you deceived me!”