Bava Metzia 49a (מט.) — the Talmud in English

Rather,

according to your statement,

what need is there for the collateral that the

lender

takes?

What benefit does he derive from it, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and why does he take it, if he acquires no right to it even to the extent of its value?

For if the lender acquires rights to the collateral to the extent of its value, then with regard to that amount I would not apply to the debt the phrase “he may not press him,” and why did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi say that the Sabbatical Year cancels the debt even with regard to the collateral?

Rather,

inevitably,

learn from it: What is the meaning of “it does not cancel,” which Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel stated? It does not cancel the entire debt,

meaning that the debt is not canceled at all.

And what is the meaning of “it cancels,” which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi stated? It cancels this half,

that portion of the debt

for which he did not take collateral,

but the half of the debt for which he took collateral is not canceled even according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

And they disagree

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi:

As Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: The collateral acquires rights

to the entire debt,

to the extent of all of it;

therefore, even when the collateral is worth only half the debt, the debt is not canceled at all.

And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds:

only

to the extent of its value does it acquire rights,

but it does not acquire rights with regard to the entire debt. Therefore, the remainder of the debt, for which he did not take collateral, is canceled in the Sabbatical Year.

According to this explanation, Rav, who says that a deposit acquires rights to the extent of its value, follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi; and Rabbi Yohanan, who says that a deposit acquires rights with regard to the entire debt, follows the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

And we reject this:

No,

there is no proof from here, as it is possible to say that even according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, collateral acquires rights only to the extent of its value. And

what is the meaning of “it does not cancel,” which Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel stated—

with regard to this half, for which he took collateral,

but the rest of the debt, for which he did not take collateral, is indeed canceled.

And we question this:

By inference,

you learn

that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds: This half, for which he took collateral, is also canceled,

and one can raise the difficulty:

Rather,

if so,

what need is there for the collateral that he took,

if he does not intend to collect the debt from it?

And we answer: His taking the collateral is only

merely as a reminder,

so that the borrower will not forget the debt and will not wish to repay it; but according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, he acquires no rights in the collateral.

The Gemara relates:

Rav Kahana

sold flax, and

they gave him money for the flax

[the buyers paid part of the price of the flax], but they had not yet taken possession of it.

Ultimately, the price of flax increased,

and

he came

Rav Kahana

before Rav

to ask him whether he could retract from the sale and demand that the buyers pay for the flax according to its current value.

He said to him

Rav said to Rav Kahana:

With regard to the money that you received,

that portion which the buyers have already paid you,

give it to them

[give it to them]; and if you do not give them this portion, you will have to accept upon yourself the curse of “He Who exacted payment from the generation of the Flood,” etc.

And the other portion,

the rest of the flax, for which you have not yet received payment, you may retract from the sale and demand a higher payment for it.

Even though it was agreed between you that you would give them the flax and they would pay you such-and-such an amount, you are permitted to retract, because

“these are mere words”

[they are nothing more than “words” alone].

And with regard to “words,” there is no violation of “lacking trustworthiness,”

one who retracts and does not fulfill his word is not called “a person lacking trustworthiness.”

As it was stated:

“Words,”

a person who promised another to sell him an item, give him a gift, or the like.

Rav said: “Words” do not involve lacking trustworthiness,

and he is permitted to retract.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: “Words” do involve lacking trustworthiness;

he is forbidden to retract, and if he retracts, he is called “a person lacking trustworthiness.”

A challenge is raised,

against Rav’s statement from a beraita, as it was taught:

Rabbi Yosei b

en

Rabbi Yehuda says:

It is stated [Leviticus 19:35–36]: “You shall do no injustice in judgment,” in measure, in weight, or in measure of capacity. You shall have just scales, just weights, a just ephah, and a just hin. “Hin” according to the Torah contains twelve log; an “ephah” according to the Torah contains three se’a, which are seventy-two log.

What does the verse mean by stating: “A just hin”? Is

the phrase “a just hin”

not

included

within the prohibition against falsifying the

“ephah,”

as it was included within the prohibition against falsifying the ephah?

And why did the verse repeat itself and also say, “You shall have a just hin”?

Rather,

the verse comes

to tell you: When

you say “yes,”

let your “yes” be just

and truthful,

and

when you say “no,” let your

“no” be just

and truthful.

And it initially enters our minds that Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi Yehuda intends to say that a person is obligated to fulfill his word and make it true, in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan. This would present a difficulty to Rav, who says that “words” do not involve lacking trustworthiness.

And we answer:

Abaye said: That

verse does not speak of a person’s obligation to fulfill his words, but of a person’s obligation at the time he speaks:

He must not speak with one thing in his mouth and another in his heart.

At the time he utters his statement, his mouth and his heart must be in agreement, and he must not intend to change his words.

But if, at the time he said “yes” or “no,” he intended to fulfill his words, then at the time he said the “yes,” his “yes” was just and truthful, and at the time he said the “no,” his “no” was just and truthful.

When afterward the market price changed and prices rose, and he retracts because of the change in the market price, this is not a case of “lacking trustworthiness.”

A challenge is raised

to Rav’s statement:

Rabbi Shimon says: Even though they said

that taking possession of a

garment effects acquisition,

and obligates

the gold dinar

that

the buyer

undertook to give in exchange for the garment,

the gold dinar does not

does not

acquire

the

garment,

as money does not effect acquisition.

And although anyone who retracts and does not stand by his word will ultimately be punished by Heaven,

nevertheless, this is the law

—he may retract, and the court does not compel him to stand by his word, nor can it prevent him from retracting.

But the Sages said

:

“He Who exacted payment from the generation of the Flood and from the generation of the Dispersion will ultimately exact payment from one who does not stand by his word,”

and punish him if he retracts after the buyer has paid him the money.

And the baraita concludes: One who negotiates only verbally has not acquired anything—not even with regard to mi shepara; and one who retracts his word is not favorably regarded by the Sages. From what they said, “he is not favorably regarded by the Sages,” it follows that it is forbidden for a person to retract his word , and this is difficult for Rav, who says: Mere words do not involve a violation of the prohibition against failing to keep one’s word!?

And we answer

It is a dispute between tannaim:

Indeed, Rabbi Shimon holds that “mere words” involve a violation of the prohibition against failing to keep one’s word, but the tanna below holds that “mere words” do not involve such a violation, and Rav follows the tanna below.

As we learned,

in tractate HaSokher et ha-Po'alim [83a]:

There was an incident

that

Rabbi Yohanan ben Matya said to his son: Go and hire workers for us

for our work.

The son went

and

agreed with them,

promising them

“sustenance,”

but he did not specify how much sustenance he would give them.

And when

the son came

to his father

and told him what he had stipulated with the workers,

Rabbi Yohanan said to him:

Rabbi Yohanan

Even

if

you provide them

with a lavish feast

like Solomon’s feast in his time,

when he was king, you still

will not have fulfilled your obligation toward them, for

since

they are the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,

and Abraham’s feast was greater than Solomon’s feast, you must provide them with a feast like Abraham’s!

Rather,

what should you do so that you will not be obligated to provide them with such an expensive feast?

Before they begin [before they begin]

before they start

the work, go and tell them:

I am hiring you only

on the condition that you have no claim against me

for anything

other than bread and legumes.

This now proves that Rabbi Yohanan ben Matya holds that “mere words” do not involve a violation of the prohibition against failing to keep one’s word:

And if it enters your mind that “mere words” involve a violation of the prohibition against failing to keep one’s word, how could he say to him

—Rabbi Yohanan ben Matya to his son—

“Go back on your word,”

retract your commitment!?

Rather, it is necessarily the case that Rabbi Yohanan ben Matya holds that “mere words” do not involve such a violation, and Rav follows his view.

And we reject this: There is no proof from here that Rabbi Yohanan ben Matya holds that “mere words” do not involve a violation of the prohibition against failing to keep one’s word.

For one can say that “mere words” do involve such a violation, but

there it is different,

in the incident involving Rabbi Yohanan ben Matya,

because the workers themselves did not rely on the son’s words

because of the nature of his relationship with his father.

And

for what reason

did the workers not rely on the son’s words?

Because

they knew,

the workers,

that the son relied on his father,

meaning that if the father agreed to what his son had committed himself to provide on his behalf, their agreement would stand, and if the father did not agree, their agreement would be annulled.

If so, the son’s words, in which he stipulated sustenance for the workers, were not “mere words” constituting a commitment such that retracting them would place him among those who fail to keep their word. They were merely words spoken here until the father agreed to his son’s terms.

And we raise an objection

If so,

according to your words —that you say that Rabbi Yohanan ben Matya too concedes that “mere words” involve a violation of the prohibition against failing to keep one’s word, and that here it is different because the workers themselves did not rely on the son’s words—

why did Rabbi Yohanan ben Matya tell his son to retract specifically before the workers began their work!?

You said that there is no reliance here at all. If so,

even if they began the work

he should still be able to retract, since they did not rely on his words.

And we answer: If they

began the work,

he is forbidden to retract, because

the workers would certainly rely

on the son’s words once they had already begun their work.

Because

they said

to themselves, the workers:

“He must have said,”

surely the son has already managed to say

before his father

what he committed himself to provide them,

and his father is pleased with it

—with what the son had said.

For if the father had not agreed to it, the son would already have retracted his commitment. And if the son had not retracted it by now, conclude from this that the father had agreed to it, and the workers relied on the fact that he would no longer retract.

Therefore Rabbi Yohanan ben Matya said to his son: Before the workers began the work, you may retract; but once the workers had already begun their work, you may no longer retract.

And we ask

Did Rabbi Yohanan really say this,

that it is forbidden for a person to retract his word!?

But

he

said, in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: One who says to another: I am giving you a gift, may

he

retract.

And we find Rabbi Yohanan’s wording difficult:

“May he”—is that obvious!?

After all, the recipient did not perform an act of acquisition by pulling the item, and the court has no power to compel him to do so!?

Rather,

Rabbi Yohanan necessarily said as follows: One who says to another, “I am giving you a gift,”

is permitted to retract.

But this is difficult: We said that according to Rabbi Yohanan, “mere words” involve a violation of the prohibition against failing to keep one’s word; how then did Rabbi Yohanan say that he is permitted to retract!?

He said,

in explanation,

Rav Pappa: Rabbi Yohanan concedes

that

Rabbi Yohanan, who said that he is permitted to retract, was referring

to a large gift,

with regard to which it is prohibited to retract, since

the recipients rely

on the giver’s word.

And what Rabbi Yohanan said—that he is permitted to retract—was said with regard to a large gift, where the recipient’s mind does not rely on the giver’s words concerning a large gift, and he is not certain that the giver will fulfill his words.

The Gemara says

This too is logically evident

that with regard to a “small gift,” Rabbi Yohanan concedes that he is forbidden to retract.

a. Produce that grew in the possession of a Jew [in the Land of Israel] is tevel, and is forbidden to be eaten until teruma gedola, which is given to a kohen, and ma'aser rishon, which is given to a Levite, have been separated from it.

From produce of the first, second, fourth, and fifth years of the shemitta cycle, he must also separate ma'aser sheni, which is eaten in Jerusalem. From produce of the third and sixth years of the shemitta cycle, he must also separate ma'aser ani, which is given to the poor.

b. Ma'aser rishon, which is given to a Levite, may not be eaten until the Levite separates from it ma'aser min ha-ma'aser [terumat ma'aser], which is given to a kohen.

c. The owner of the produce may give the teruma to any kohen he wishes, and likewise he may give the tithes to any Levite or poor person he wishes. [Similarly, the Levite may give the terumat ma'aser to any kohen he wishes.]

d. It is not necessary to separate terumot and tithes “from within themselves”—from the produce itself. Rather, he may bring tevel from elsewhere, separate the gifts on its behalf, and thereby permit it to be eaten. [The same law applies to separating terumat ma'aser from ma'aser rishon that the Levite receives.]

e. A person cannot separate terumot and tithes from the produce of another.

For

this

is what Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: If a Jew says to a Levite

“You have a kor of tithe

in my possession,”

I separated from my produce a “kor” [thirty se'a] of ma'aser rishon, and I will give it to you.

That Levite

is permitted to make

that kor of ma'aser rishon into

“terumat ma'aser”

for another place.

If he has nine kors of ma'aser rishon elsewhere, he may say: Let the kor of ma'aser rishon belonging to that certain Jew be made terumat ma'aser for these nine kors. He is then permitted to eat what is in his possession, presuming it to be produce from which the required separations have been made.

From these words of Rabbi Yohanan, the Gemara proves that Rabbi Yohanan holds that it is forbidden for a person to retract his word when he said that he would give a “small gift”:

Granted, if you say that he cannot,

that a person is not permitted

to retract,

to retract at least from a “small gift,”

for that reason he is permitted

to make that kor into terumat ma'aser for another place.

For the promise to give the tithe to this Levite and not to another is merely in the category of a “small gift,” since the Israelite has no more than the tovat hana’a of this tithe—the right to decide to whom to give it.

And if you would say: A person is not permitted to retract from a “small gift,” the Levite may rely on the Israelite that he will not change his word and give the tithe to another Levite.

For it is stated: “The remnant of Israel shall not commit injustice, nor speak lies,” and a proper Israelite would not change what he had promised to do.

Rather, if you say:

even with regard to a “small gift”

he can retract

from his word,

why is the Levite permitted

to designate this kor as terumat maaser against produce elsewhere!?

For there is concern that perhaps the Israelite gave it to another Levite and

it was discovered—

it turns out

that

the Levite’s separation is not a valid separation, and

he is eating

the Levite

untithed produce [“

first tithe” from which “terumat maaser” was not separated]!?

From here one can learn: It is forbidden for a person to retract from “words” that he has stated when his commitment is only a “small gift.”

And we reject this: There is no proof from here, for one can say: In fact, a person is always permitted to retract from his word, even with regard to a “small gift.” And as for what Rabba bar bar Hanna said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan—that the Levite is permitted to designate the kor as terumat maaser against produce elsewhere—

here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he took it

the Levite

from him,

from the Israelite, thereby acquiring it through a fully effective act of acquisition,

and

afterward

the Levite retracted

the Levite

and deposited it with him [

with the Israelite]. And we challenge this:

If so,

according to your statement that we are dealing with a case where he took it and then deposited it with him,

say the latter clause,

the latter clause of that same statement of Rabbi Yohanan presents a difficulty for you:

If, after he said to the Levite, “You have a kor of tithe in my possession,” the Israelite then

gave it to another Levite, he has none,

the first Levite

against him,

against the Israelite,

other than a “grievance”;

he is permitted to voice a grievance against him, because he made him a promise and caused him a disappointed expectation and hope.

And if it could enter your mind

that here

we are dealing with a case where he took it from him and then deposited it with him

—

why does he have nothing against him other than a grievance!?

For

once he pulled it,

the Levite from the Israelite,

he has property

the Levite’s

with him

in the Israelite’s possession. And if the Israelite then gave it to another, it is outright robbery, and he can bring a claim against him in court. Why, then, did Rabbi Yohanan say: He has nothing against him other than a grievance!?

Rather, is it not so

that inevitably,

infer from here

that the case

is one where he did not take it

the Levite from the Israelite.

If so, infer from here that Rabbi Yohanan holds: It is forbidden for a person to retract from his word when he promised to give a “small gift.”

And we conclude: Indeed,

infer from here.

The Gemara relates:

There was a certain man who gave money

for sesame; in the end the price of sesame rose, and the sellers retracted

the sellers

and said to him

to that man:

We have no sesame

to sell you;

take your money. [

There was an incident involving a man who purchased sesame and paid for it, but had not yet pulled it into his possession. The sesame then became more expensive and its price rose. The sellers regretted the sale and said to the purchaser: “We have no sesame to sell you,” come and take your money.]

He did not take

the purchaser

his money,

his money, from the sellers;

it was stolen, [

the money was stolen from the sellers’ house].

They came

the sellers and the purchaser

before Rava.

He said to him

Rava to the purchaser:

Once they said to you

the sellers:

“Take your money,” and you did not take it,

the money was entirely your responsibility.

a. An unpaid bailee is liable to pay the depositor if the deposit was damaged through the bailee’s negligence, but he is not liable to pay for theft or loss.

b. A paid bailee is liable to pay the depositor even if the deposit was lost or stolen; only in a case of unavoidable accident is the bailee exempt from payment.

It is unnecessary to say that a paid bailee was not

the seller, and therefore he was exempt with regard to theft of the money.

Rather, even an unpaid bailee was not,

and it is impossible to bring a claim against him for payment, even for negligence in safeguarding it.

The Sages said to Rava: But

since the seller received money,

he is required to accept upon himself the “Mi shepara” curse

for retracting; perhaps the seller was unwilling to accept upon himself the curse of “Mi shepara” and would have upheld the sale. It would then turn out that the money that was lost was the seller’s money, not the purchaser’s money—!?

He said to them

Rava to the Sages:

It is indeed so,

their words are correct.

The sellers had two options: either they would give the sesame to the purchaser, and the money that was lost would be lost to the sellers.

Or they would accept upon themselves the curse of “Mi shepara,” the sale would be canceled, and the money that was lost would be lost to the purchaser.

Rav Pappi said: Ravina said to me: He himself told me [

he related to me]

that one of the Sages—his name was Rav Tavot; and some say: His name was Rav Shmuel bar Zutra.

And that Torah scholar was so outstanding in the trait of truth that

if they were to give him all the open space of the world, he would not change his word [

he would not change his word even if they gave him all the open space of the world].

And that Torah scholar related as follows:

This incident happened to me:

that

incident

involving a purchaser who wished to buy sesame, and so on, but the incident did not occur as related above if I had received the money in order to give sesame, I would not have retracted even for all the open space of the world, and that was not the matter over which we came to judgment. Rather, this is what happened:

That day,

on which the incident occurred,

it was the eve of Shabbat [

shortly before the onset of Shabbat ]

I was sitting, and that man came and stood at the door [

I was sitting, and that man came and stood at the entrance].

He said to me

that man:

Do you have sesame to sell

do you have sesame to sell?