Bava Metzia 49a — the Talmud in English

Rather,

according to your words,

the pledge that the lender holds

from the debtor

why does he need it,

what benefit does he have from it, according to Rabbi Judah the Prince, and for what purpose does he seize it, if he has no acquisition in it even against its value?

For if the lender acquires through the pledge against its value, then with regard to this amount I do not apply to the debt “he shall not press,” and why did Rabbi Judah the Prince say that the Sabbatical year releases even against the pledge?

Rather, is it not

necessarily

learn from this: What is the meaning of “does not release” that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says? It does not release it in its entirety,

that is, the debt is not released at all.

And what is the meaning of “releases” that Rabbi Judah the Prince says? It releases this half,

that portion of the debt

against which he does not hold a pledge,

but the half of the debt against which he holds a pledge, even according to Rabbi Judah the Prince, is not released.

And in this they disagree,

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Judah the Prince:

For Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: It is against the whole of it,

the pledge,

that acquires;

therefore, even with a pledge that is worth only half, the debt is not released at all.

And Rabbi Judah the Prince holds:

only

against it does it acquire,

but it does not acquire against the whole of it; therefore, the remainder of the debt against which he does not hold a pledge is released in the Sabbatical year.

According to this explanation, Rav, who says: A deposit acquires against it, holds in accordance with the view of Rabbi Judah the Prince; and Rabbi Yohanan, who says: A deposit acquires against the whole of it, holds in accordance with the view of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

And we reject this:

No,

there is no proof from here, for it is possible to say that even according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, a pledge acquires only against it. And

what is the meaning of “does not release” that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says—

for this half, against which he holds a pledge,

but the remainder of the debt, against which he does not hold a pledge, is indeed released.

And we raise an objection:

From this

you learn

that Rabbi Judah the Prince holds: This half also, against which he holds a pledge, is released,

and it is difficult:

Rather,

if so,

why does he need the pledge that he holds,

if he is not preparing to collect the debt from it?

And we answer: His holding the pledge is only

merely as a reminder of matters,

so that the borrower will not evade him and will not wish to repay him; but he has no acquisition in the pledge, according to Rabbi Judah the Prince.

The Gemara relates:

Rav Kahana

sold flax, and

they gave him money for the flax [the purchasers paid part of the price of the flax],

but they had still not drawn it.

In the end, the price of the flax rose,

and

Rav Kahana came

before

Rav

to ask him whether he could withdraw from the sale and demand that the purchasers pay for the flax according to what it was now worth?

He said to him

Rav to Rav Kahana:

With regard to the money that you took,

that portion which the purchasers had already paid you,

give it to them [give it to them], and if you do not give them this portion, you will have to accept upon yourself the curse of “mi shepara,” etc.

If you do not give them this amount, you will have to accept upon yourself the curse of “He Who exacted payment” and so forth.

And the other,

the remainder of the flax, for which you have not yet received payment, you may withdraw from the sale and demand a higher payment for it.

And even though it was agreed between you that you would give them the flax and they would pay you such-and-such, you are permitted to withdraw, because

they are “words” [these are nothing but mere “words”].

—that is, nothing more than verbal statements.

And “words” do not involve “lacking trust,”

one who withdraws and does not fulfill his word is not called “a person lacking trust.”

For it was stated:

“Words,”

a person who promised his fellow to sell him an object or give him a gift, and the like.

Rav said: They do not involve “lacking trust,”

and he is permitted to withdraw.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: They involve “lacking trust,”

he is forbidden to withdraw, and if he withdraws, he is called “a person lacking trust.”

He raises an objection,

against Rav’s words from the words of the baraita, for it was taught:

Rabbi Yosei b

en

Rabbi Judah says: It is stated [Leviticus 19:35–36]: “You shall not commit injustice in judgment,”

in measure, in weight, or in measure. “You shall have righteous scales, righteous weights, a righteous ephah, and a righteous hin.”

A “hin” of the Torah contains twelve log; an “ephah” of the Torah contains three seah, which are seventy-two log.

What does “a righteous hin” come to teach? But is not

the prohibition against distorting the measure of the

“hin”

included in the prohibition against distorting the

“ephah,” was it not?

as it was included within the prohibition against falsifying the ephah?

And for what purpose did Scripture repeat itself and say also, “You shall have a righteous hin”?

Rather,

Scripture came

to tell you that when

you say “yes,”

your “yes” shall be righteous

and true,

and

when you say “no,” your

“no” shall be righteous

and true.

And it entered our minds that the intention of Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi Judah is to say that a person is obligated to fulfill his word and make it true, in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan’s words. And this is difficult for Rav, who says: “Words” do not involve “lacking trust”!

And we answer:

Abaye said: That

verse does not speak of a person’s obligation to fulfill his words, but of a person’s obligation at the time that he speaks:

that one must not speak with one in his mouth and another in his heart.

At the time that he says the words, his mouth and his heart must be equal, and he must not intend to change what he says.

But if, at the time that he said “yes” or “no,” he intended to fulfill his words, then at the time of saying the “yes,” his “yes” was righteous and true; and at the time of saying the “no,” his “no” was righteous and true.

When afterward the market price changed, and the prices rose, and he withdraws because of the change in the market price, there is no “lack of trust” here.

He raises an objection

to Rav’s words:

Rabbi Shimon says: Even though they said:

the drawing of the

garment acquires,

obligating

the

golden

dinar

that the purchaser undertook to give in exchange for the garment,

and the golden dinar

does not

acquire

the

garment,

for money does not acquire.

And even though everyone who withdraws and does not stand by his word will ultimately be punished by Heaven,

nevertheless, this is the halakha—

that he may withdraw, and the court does not compel him to stand by his word, nor can it prevent him from withdrawing.

But the Sages said

:

“The One who exacted punishment from the people of the generation of the Flood and from the people of the generation of the Dispersion, He will in the future exact punishment from one who does not stand by his word”

and punish him, if he withdraws after the purchaser has paid him the money.

And the beraita concludes: and one who negotiates with words alone has not acquired anything—not even with regard to mi shepara; and one who retracts his word has not found favor in the eyes of the Sages. And from what they said, “He has not found favor in the eyes of the Sages,” it follows that it is forbidden for a person to retract his word, but this is difficult for Rav, who says: words do not involve the status of one who lacks reliability!?

And we answer:

It is a dispute between tannaim.

Indeed, Rabbi Shimon holds that “words” involve the status of those who lack reliability, but the tanna below holds that “words” do not involve the status of those who lack reliability, and Rav holds in accordance with the tanna below.

For we learned:

in [the chapter] “One who hires laborers” [83a]:

There was an incident

that

with Rabbi Yohanan ben Matya, who said to his son: Go out and hire laborers

for our work.

The son went

and

set a price for them,

promising them

“food,”

but he did not specify how much food he would give them.

And when he came

the son

to his father,

and told him what he had stipulated with the laborers,

he said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan:

Even

if

you prepare for them

a great feast

like the feast of Solomon in his time,

when he was king, you still

have not fulfilled your obligation toward them, for

they are

the children of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,

and Abraham’s feast was greater than Solomon’s feast, and you must give them the equivalent of Abraham’s feast!

Rather,

what will you do so that you will not be obligated to provide them such an expensive feast?

Before they begin [

before they begin]

the work, go out and say to them:

I am hiring you only

on the condition that you have no claim against me

for anything

other than bread and legumes alone.

The Gemara now proves that Rabbi Yohanan ben Matya holds that “words” do not involve the status of those who lack reliability:

And if it enters your mind that “words” do involve the status of those who lack reliability, how did he say to him

Rabbi Yohanan ben Matya to his son:

Go, retract,

retract your commitment!?

Rather, you are compelled to say that Rabbi Yohanan ben Matya holds that they do not involve the status of those who lack reliability, and Rav holds in accordance with him.

And we reject this: there is no proof from here that Rabbi Yohanan ben Matya holds that “words” do not involve the status of those who lack reliability.

For one can say that they do involve the status of those who lack reliability, but

that case is different,

in the incident involving Rabbi Yohanan ben Matya,

for the laborers themselves did not rely

on the son’s words.

And

for what reason

did the laborers not rely on the son’s words?

Because

they knew,

the laborers,

that the son relied upon his father,

that if the father agreed to what his son had committed himself on his behalf, the agreement between them would be fulfilled, and if the father did not agree, the agreement would be annulled.

If so, the son’s words, in which he set food for the laborers, were not “words” of commitment, such that one who retracts would be included among those who lack reliability; rather, these were merely words, until the father agreed to his son’s words.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

according to your words, that you say: Rabbi Yohanan ben Matya too concedes that “words” involve the status of those who lack reliability, and here it is different because the laborers themselves did not rely,

Why, then, did Rabbi Yohanan ben Matya say to his son that he should retract specifically before the laborers began their work!?

You said that there is no reliance here at all; if so,

even if they began the work

he could also retract, since they did not rely on his words.

And we answer: if they

began the work,

he is forbidden to retract, because

they certainly rely

the laborers on the son’s words, after they have already begun their work.

For

they said

the laborers in their hearts:

He surely said,

the son has certainly already managed to say

before his father

what he committed himself to give them,

and it is agreeable to him

his father.

For if the father had not consented to this, the son would already have retracted his commitment, and if the son has not retracted until now, infer from this that the father consented to it; and the laborers relied that he would no longer retract.

Therefore Rabbi Yohanan ben Matya said to his son: before the laborers began the work, you may retract; but if the laborers had already begun their work, you may no longer retract.

And we wonder:

Did Rabbi Yohanan really say this,

that it is forbidden for a person to retract his word!?

But

he

said: Rabbah bar bar Hannah said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: One who says to his fellow, “I am giving you a gift,” may

he

retract.

And this is difficult for us concerning Rabbi Yohanan’s wording:

“May”—is it not obvious!?

For he did not take possession, and the court has no power to compel him to do so!?

Rather,

you are compelled to say that Rabbi Yohanan said as follows: One who says to his fellow, “I am giving you a gift,”

is permitted to retract.

And it is difficult: did we not say that according to Rabbi Yohanan, “words” involve the status of those who lack reliability? How, then, did Rabbi Yohanan say that he is permitted to retract!?

He said,

he answered,

Rav Pappa: Rabbi Yohanan concedes

that Rabbi Yohanan,

who said that he is permitted to retract,

with regard to a small gift,

that he is forbidden to retract, since

the recipients rely

on the giver’s word.

And what Rabbi Yohanan said, that he is permitted to retract, was said with regard to a large gift, for the recipient’s mind does not rely on the giver’s words concerning a large gift, and he is not certain that he will fulfill his words.

The Gemara says:

It is also reasonable

that with regard to a “small gift,” Rabbi Yohanan concedes that he is forbidden to retract.

a. Produce that grew in the possession of a Jew [in the Land of Israel] is “untithed produce,” and is forbidden to be eaten until one separates from it the “great offering,” which is given to a priest, and the “first tithe,” which is given to a Levite.

For grain of years one, two, four, and five of the Sabbatical cycle, he must also separate the “second tithe,” which is eaten in Jerusalem; and for grain of years three and six of the Sabbatical cycle, he must also separate the “poor tithe,” which is given to the poor.

b. The “first tithe,” which is given to a Levite, may not be eaten until the Levite separates from it the tithe of the tithe [“the tithe-offering”], which is given to a priest.

c. The owner of the produce may give the offering to any priest he wishes; and likewise, the tithes may be given to any Levite or poor person he wishes. [Likewise, the Levite may give the “tithe-offering” to any priest he wishes].

d. It is not necessary to separate offerings and tithes “from within themselves”—from that same produce itself; rather, he may bring “untithed produce” from another place, separate on its account, and permit it to be eaten. [And the same law applies to separating the “tithe-offering” from the “first tithe” that the Levite receives].

e. A person cannot separate offerings and tithes from his fellow’s produce.

For

he

said: Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: A Jew who said to a son of Levi

“You have a kor of tithe

in my possession,”

I separated from my produce a “kor” [thirty seahs] of “first tithe,” and I will give it to you.

That son of Levi

is permitted to make

that same kor of “first tithe” into

“a tithe-offering”

for another place.

For if he has nine kors of “first tithe” in another place, he can say: Behold, the first-tithe kor that is in the possession of so-and-so the Jew is made “tithe-offering” for these nine kors. And he is permitted to eat what is in his possession on the presumption that it is tithed produce.

From these words of Rabbi Yohanan, the Gemara proves that Rabbi Yohanan holds that it is forbidden for a person to retract his word when he said that he would give a “small gift”:

Granted, if you say that he cannot,

a person is not permitted

to retract,

to retract, at least from a “small gift,”

for that reason he is permitted

to make that kor into a “tithe-offering” for another place.

For the promise to give the tithe to this Levite and not to another is only in the category of a “small gift,” for Israel has nothing in this tithe except merely the benefit of discretion—to decide to whom to give it.

And if you should say: A person is not permitted to retract from a “small gift,” the Levite may rely on the Israelite that he will not change his word and will not give the tithe to another Levite.

For it is stated [Zephaniah 3:13]: “The remnant of Israel shall do no injustice and shall not speak falsehood,” and a proper Israelite is not likely to change from what he promised to do.

Rather, if you say:

even with regard to a “small gift”

he can retract

from his word,

why is

the Levite permitted to make this kor of grain a tithe offering for another place!?

There is, after all, concern lest the Israelite gave it to another Levite and

it was found

that

the

Levite’s separation was not a valid separation, and

he is eating

the Levite

tevel [“first tithe” upon which the “tithe offering” was not separated]!?

130).

And from here it is possible to learn: It is forbidden for a person to retract from “words” that he said, when his commitment is only a “small gift.”

And we reject this: There is no proof from here, for it can be said: In reality, a person is always permitted to retract from his word, even with regard to a “small gift”; and as for what Rabba bar bar Hanna said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan, that the Levite is permitted to make the kor a “tithe offering” for another place,

in what case are we dealing

with the Levite

having taken it from him,

from the Israelite, and thereby acquired it through a complete acquisition,

and

afterward

the Levite returned

and

deposited it with him [with the Israelite].

And we raise an objection:

If so,

according to your words, that we are dealing with a case where he took it and then returned and deposited it with him,

say the latter clause,

the latter clause of that statement of Rabbi Yohanan should be difficult for you:

If, after he said to the Levite, “You have a kor of tithe in my possession,” the Israelite then

gave it to another Levite, he has none

to the first Levite,

against him,

against the Israelite,

except a “grievance”

he is permitted to bear a grievance against him, for having promised him and caused him an expectation and hope that ended in disappointment.

And if it should enter your mind

that here

we are dealing with a case where he took it from him and then returned and deposited it with him,

we are dealing,

why does he have against him only a grievance!?

After all,

since he drew it to himself,

the Levite from the Israelite,

he has money

belonging to the Levite

with him

in the Israelite’s possession; and if the Israelite then gave it to another, it is outright robbery, and he can sue him in court. Why, then, did Rabbi Yohanan say: He has against him only a grievance!?

Rather, is it not so

necessarily,

learn from it

that it is

where he did not take it

the Levite from the Israelite that he is speaking.

If so, learn from it that Rabbi Yohanan holds: It is forbidden for a person to retract from his word when he promised to give a “small gift.”

And we conclude: Indeed,

learn from it.

The Gemara relates:

A certain man gave money

for sesame; in the end the sesame increased in price, and they retracted

the sellers

and said to him

to that certain man:

We do not have sesame

to sell to you;

take your money.

A case involving a man who purchased sesame and gave its price, but had not yet drawn it into his possession; afterward the sesame increased in price and its value rose, and the sellers—regretted the sale and said to the buyer: We do not have sesame to sell to you, come and take your money.

He did not take

the buyer

his money,

his money from the sellers;

it was stolen,

the money was stolen from the sellers’ house.

They came

the sellers and the buyer

before Rava.

Rava said to him

to the buyer:

Since they said to you

the sellers:

Take your money, and you did not take it,

the money is under your full responsibility.

a. A “paid bailee” is obligated to pay the depositor if the deposit was damaged through the bailee’s negligence, but he is not obligated to pay for thefts or losses.

b. A “paid bailee” is obligated to pay the depositor even if the deposit was lost or stolen, and only in a case of an unavoidable accident is the bailee exempt from paying.

It is not necessary to say that a “paid bailee” he was not

the seller, and he is exempt for the theft of the money.

Rather, even a “free bailee” he was not,

and it is impossible to sue him to pay, even for “negligence” in guarding.

The Sages said to Rava: But

since the seller received money,

he must accept upon himself “who exacted punishment”

for his retraction; perhaps the seller was unwilling to accept upon himself the curse of “who exacted punishment,” and would have upheld the sale, in which case the money that was lost would be the seller’s, not the buyer’s!?

He said to them

Rava to the Sages:

So too,

their words are indeed correct.

The sellers have two options: Either they give the sesame to the buyer, and the money that was lost is lost to the sellers.

Or they accept upon themselves the curse of “who exacted punishment,” the sale is annulled, and the money that was lost is lost to the buyer.

Rav Pappi said: Ravina said to me: He himself told me

he told me

a certain one of the Sages, and his name was Rav Tevot; and some say: His name was Rav Shmuel bar Zutra.

And that Torah scholar was so outstanding in the attribute of truth, to the extent

that if they gave him all the empty space of the world, he would not change his word

[he would not change his word, even if they gave him all the empty space of the world].

And that Torah scholar related as follows:

It was with me

that

incident

of a buyer who wished to purchase sesame, etc., but the incident did not occur as it was brought above for had I received the money in order to give sesame, I would not have retracted throughout all the empty space of the world, and this was not the matter over which we came to judgment; rather, this is how the incident occurred:

That day,

on which the incident occurred,

it was the eve of Shabbat

[close to the entry of Shabbat ]

it was, and I was sitting, and that certain man came and stood at the doorway

[I was sitting, and that man came and stood at the doorway].

He said to me

that man:

Do you have sesame to sell

do you have sesame to sell?