Bava Metzia 48b — the Talmud in English

Rather, there is a difficulty

with this beraita,

for Reish Lakish!

And the Gemara answers:

Reish Lakish could say to you: This

beraita,

whose view is it,

according to whose method is it stated? According to the method of

Rabbi Shimon it is!

For Rabbi Shimon says in our Mishna that the purchaser cannot retract, and the reason for the matter is that he holds that money effects acquisition by Torah law. But the Rabbis dispute him, and hold that pulling effects acquisition, and Reish Lakish rules like them.

We learned in the Mishna: If he gave him money but did not pull produce from him, he may retract,

but they said: “He upon whom He who exacted payment”

from the people of the generation of the Flood and from the generation of the Dispersion will in the future exact payment from one who does not stand by his word.

It was stated:

Abaye said:

when they say to him that “He upon whom He who exacted payment,” and so forth, their intention is not to curse him with their mouths, as the reason is explained shortly, but rather

we inform him,

and say to him: Know that it is a transgression, and if you retract from the transaction, in the end they will exact payment from you for this matter.

Rava said: We curse him with a curse,

this statement is an expression of a curse, and they curse him that the Creator exact payment from him and punish him for retracting and not standing by his word.

Abaye said: We inform him

and do not curse him,

as it is written [Exodus 22:27]: “You shall not curse God [a judge],

nor curse a ruler among your people,”

and

it is not only a judge and a ruler whom it is forbidden to curse; rather, anyone who is “among your people” is included in this prohibition.

If so, it is impossible to curse him that he be punished for not standing by his word, and it necessarily follows that this statement is merely information: Know that one who acts like you is punished.

Rava said: We curse him with a curse,

and even though it is forbidden to curse any Israelite, it is permitted to curse one who does not stand by his word,

for

this

is what is written: “among your people,”

which indicates that the prohibition against cursing applies only

to

a person who

acts

and conducts himself according to

the deed of his people.

But this person does not conduct himself according to the conduct of proper Israelites, as it is written [Zephaniah 3:13]: “The remnant of Israel shall do no injustice and speak no falsehood.”

If so, there is no prohibition against cursing him and saying to him: “He upon whom He who exacted payment from the generation of the Flood and from the generation of the Dispersion—He will exact payment from him for not standing by his word.”

Rava said: From where do I say this,

from where do I say that this statement is a complete curse, and not merely information?

From an incident that occurred with Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef:

for Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef

sold salt, and

they gave him money for the salt [

they paid him for the salt],

in the end, the price of salt rose,

and Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef wished to retract from the transaction and not sell the salt at the price originally agreed upon with the customers.

He came,

Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef came

before Rabbi Yohanan,

and said to him that he wished to retract from the transaction.

He said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan said to Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef:

Go, give [

give]

them

the salt, since the customers had already paid for it.

And if not,

if you do not wish to stand by your word,

accept upon yourself “He upon whom He who exacted payment.”

And

from here, Rava holds, one can prove his position, that the statement “He upon whom He who exacted payment” is an actual curse:

For

if you say that “He upon whom He who exacted payment” is not a curse, but rather

that

we inform him,

the following difficulty arises: Is it so that

Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef needed to be informed!?

He was a Torah scholar, and certainly he knew that the Holy One, blessed be He, exacts payment from liars, and he did not need to be informed of this.

Rather, it necessarily follows that from here one must learn that we curse him with a curse.

And we reject this:

But rather, what

according to your opinion,

we curse him with a curse,

this too is not settled, for is it so that

Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef came to accept upon himself the curse

of the Sages [

could Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef be expected to agree to accept upon himself the curse of the Sages]!?

If so, even according to your method, it is impossible that Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef wanted to retract from the transaction, and we must explain how the incident took place.

Rather,

this is how the incident took place:

Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef—the deposit,

“an advance payment,” on account of the payment for the salt,

it was that they gave him

the customers.

He,

Rabbi Hiyya,

thought

and was uncertain whether to say that when a person gives an “advance payment,” we do not say that the entire object is acquired for him immediately and the remainder of the payment is recorded as a debt upon him; rather, the deposit

corresponding to it

alone

acquires,

according to the value of the “advance payment” given by the customers, so they acquire that amount of the object being acquired. If it is a sale of land, in order to acquire a complete acquisition, and if it is a sale of movable property, in order to obligate the one who retracts from the transaction with “He upon whom He who exacted payment.”

And concerning that portion for which the customers had still not paid, Rabbi Hiyya asked Rabbi Yohanan whether he could retract from the sale, for if we say that the deposit acquires against itself, the customers acquired the salt only corresponding to their money.

And Rabbi Yohanan said to him:

You cannot retract at all, for the deposit—the advance payment that you received—

acquires against the whole,

and through the giving of part of the money the entire sale is acquired by the buyer, while the remainder of the money became a loan and a debt.

The Gemara now discusses the law of a deposit, and brings a dispute whether a deposit acquires only against itself or against the whole:

It was stated: A deposit,

one who paid part of the money of the sale as a deposit toward payment for the purchase of the entire sale.

Rav says: Against itself

only

it acquires,

because the money is payment only for part of the object being acquired.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Against the whole it acquires,

the money that he gave acquires the entire object, and the remainder of the money is recorded as a debt upon him.

It raises an objection

from a beraita against the words of Rav: “

Asmachta,” is an undertaking by which a person undertakes toward his fellow: if I do not do such-and-such [and likewise conversely—if I do it], I undertake to give you such-and-such an object. And the tannaim disputed this: Rabbi Yosei says that asmachta acquires and obligates, while Rabbi Yehuda says that asmachta does not acquire, since he did not resolve in his heart to undertake the obligation, for he thought that his condition would be fulfilled.

One who gives a deposit

and a pledge

to his fellow,

for a sale upon which the two of them agreed,

and says to him: If I retract

from the sale, a penalty will be imposed upon me—that his

deposit

will be acquired and

forgiven to you.

And the other,

the seller who received the deposit and the pledge,

said to him: If I retract

from the sale, a penalty will be imposed upon me, and I undertake that

I will double for you

your

deposit,

that is, for the deposit you gave, I will give you from the sale twice the value of the deposit you gave.

The conditions were fulfilled,

if the buyer retracted, he lost his deposit, and if the seller retracted, he doubled the deposit; these are

the words of Rabbi Yosei.

And the Gemara explains:

Rabbi Yosei follows his own reasoning,

he follows his method,

for he said

in Bava Batra 168a:

“Asmachta acquires.”

Rabbi Yehuda

disagrees with Rabbi Yosei and

says: “Asmachta” does not acquire; the buyer will not forgive his deposit if he retracts,

and the seller will not double it.

It is enough that he acquire

the buyer

against his deposit,

and neither the seller nor the buyer can retract from fulfilling the sale corresponding to the value of the deposit, but with regard to the remainder, they can retract.

Rabban said

Shimon ben Gamaliel: In what circumstances is this statement made,

that he acquires only against his deposit?

When he said to him

the buyer:

“My deposit shall acquire”

[shall acquire], the entire [sale], since initially he stipulated to give him more, and therefore he did not acquire the entire thing with his deposit.

But if he sold him a house or a field for one thousand zuz, and he paid him from it,

from the one thousand,

five hundred zuz

as the beginning of payment, or if he left his words unstated and did not say, “My deposit shall acquire,”

he acquires

immediately the entire house or field.

And the remainder of the money is recorded as a loan upon him,

and the buyer returns

to

him,

to the seller,

the remainder, even after several years.

Is it not,

with regard to land, that the deposit acquired against the whole, a complete acquisition, when he gave him part of its money without specification, and

the same is true of movable property: when it is without specification, he acquires all of it,

with regard to mi shepara, in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan’s view? And this would be a difficulty against Rav, who says that a deposit acquires only against itself!?

We reject this:

No,

movable property is not like land, and with

movable property, when it is without specification, he does not acquire

the whole; rather, he acquires only corresponding to his money.

And we wonder:

And in what way is

land different from movable property!? And we answer:

Land, which is through money,

if the buyer paid the money of the sale, then

he acquires it ממש,

since land is acquired through money.

Therefore the force of the deposit is effective, and even if he did not explicitly say

“acquire it,”

his money, given without specification,

for all of it,

the entire land.

But

movable property, which he does not acquire

through what he paid as its price,

except

with regard

to accepting

upon himself

“mi shepara,”

since movable property is acquired only through taking possession, and not through acquisition by money.

Therefore the force of the deposit is not effective, and if he did not explicitly state that he wished to acquire the whole,

he does not acquire it

for

all of it

without specification; rather, only corresponding to his money.

The Gemara asks:

Shall we say, in accordance with the tannaim?

Does this mean that the tannaim already disputed the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yohanan, and that Rav’s words are only the view of one of the tannaim, while Rabbi Yohanan’s view is only that of the other tanna in the beraita?

A. A debt over which the Sabbatical year passed is released, and it is forbidden for the creditor to demand that the debtor pay it, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 15:2–3]: “And this is the matter of the release: every owner of a loan shall release his hand from what he lent his fellow; he shall not press his fellow or his brother, for the release has been proclaimed for the Lord. You may press the foreigner, but whatever is yours with your brother, your hand shall release.”

B. One who lends against a pledge [the borrower gave the creditor a pledge for his debt]: the Sabbatical year does not release the debt, for I do not apply to it “he shall not press his fellow,” since he is not demanding anything from him.

We learned in a beraita:

“One who lends to his fellow against a pledge, and the Sabbatical year arrived,

even though

the pledge

is worth only half

[half] of the debt,

it is not released

[the debt is not released]; these are

the words of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel.

Rabbi Judah the Patriarch

disagrees and

says: If the collateral was equal to his loan [

the value of the collateral is equal to the loan]

it does not release the debt, but if not,

if the value of the collateral is less than the amount of the loan, then he

releases

the debt. And he proceeds to explain their dispute:

What is the meaning of “it does not release” that Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says?

If you say,

if it is said, “it does not release”

the corresponding amount

he means, corresponding to half the debt for which he holds collateral, but he does release the remainder.

By implication,

it follows,

that Rabbi Judah the Patriarch

who says: If the collateral was not equal to his loan, then he releases it,

holds: This half

for which he holds collateral

he also releases.