Bava Metzia 48a (מח.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Shimon says

two things:

a.

Even though they said: A cloak “acquires” a gold dinar, but a gold dinar does not acquire a cloak,

that is, if a person pulled a cloak from another and undertook to pay its price with a gold dinar [and not with silver coins, as is customary], he is obligated to give him a gold dinar. But a gold dinar does not acquire a cloak, because with regard to merchandise [“produce”], the gold dinar is considered currency, and money does not effect acquisition.

And this law is

nevertheless,

that is, even though punishment is destined to come upon one who retracts from the transaction, nevertheless,

such

is the

halakha,

that they may retract from the transaction after the money has been given, and a court cannot prevent them from retracting.

But the Sages said

that

He who exacted punishment from the generation of the Flood, from the generation of the Dispersion, from the people of Sodom and Gomorrah, and from the Egyptians at the Sea—He will in the future exact punishment from anyone who does not stand by his word.

b.

And one who negotiates by words,

who speaks verbally without performing any act of acquisition,

has not acquired.

And

however,

one who retracts

from what he negotiated by words,

the spirit of the Sages is not pleased with him.

And

concerning this,

Rava said: We do not have,

we do not understand [that is, this is how we must interpret the words of the beraita] that the curse of “He who exacted punishment” applies to one who retracts from what he negotiated by words

, rather

we maintain that this person is merely included among those whose

conduct does not find favor in the eyes of the Sages.

It is evident from here that when one retracts from a transaction that consisted only of verbal negotiation, with no act of acquisition having been performed, he is not subject to “He who exacted punishment”; rather, his conduct merely does not find favor in the eyes of the Sages. If so, this is difficult for Reish Lakish, who holds that money does not effect acquisition by Torah law: Why did Rabbi Shimon say that anyone who retracts from a transaction carried out through the payment of money is included among those subject to “He who exacted punishment”? This transaction was not effective according to Reish Lakish; if so, why is there “He who exacted punishment” for one who retracts from it!?

The Gemara answers that a distinction must be made, and says:

A transaction in which there were verbal

words, and there was money along with them,

meaning that giving the money accompanied the words, since an act of giving money took place, even though the acquisition did not take effect [because, according to Reish Lakish, money does not acquire], nevertheless,

to which the giving of money was added—once there was an act here of giving money, although the acquisition was not effective [because money does not effect acquisition according to Reish Lakish], nevertheless,

he stands under the “But”

the one who retracts stands subject to the curse of “He who exacted punishment” for violating his verbal promise, since the words also led to an actual deed, through the giving of the money.

But a transaction in which there were only verbal

words, and there was no money along with them, does not stand under the “But.”

Rava said: The verse,

the words of Scripture,

and the matanita,

the words of the beraita,

support Reish Lakish,

who holds that money effected no acquisition at all, not even by Torah law.

The verse

that supports him is from this,

as it is written [Leviticus 5], concerning one who lied and denied his fellow’s monetary claim, and even swore falsely about it, and is therefore obligated to bring a guilt-offering for his denial under oath:

Leviticus 5] concerning one who lied and denied his fellow’s monetary claim, and even swore falsely about it, that he is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for his denial under oath:

“And he denied his fellow”

[he swore falsely concerning a monetary claim made by his fellow against him], for example:

a person denied under oath

a deposit

that had been entrusted to him; b.

or a loan,

denying under oath a loan that his fellow had lent him;

c.

or robbery,

having robbed his fellow and, when he sued him for it, denying it under oath;

d.

or he oppressed his fellow,”

a laborer who worked for an employer, to whom the employer was obligated to pay wages, but did not pay him his wages; and when the laborer sued him, the employer denied his claim under oath.

Rava cites Rav Hisda’s explanation of these words of Scripture:

“A loan,”

mentioned in this verse, does not mean that he denied under oath an ordinary loan; rather,

Rav Hisda said:

the verse is speaking specifically of

a case where he designated for him

the borrower to the lender

an object as security for the loan.

That is, one who denies a loan under oath becomes obligated to bring a guilt-offering only if the borrower designated an object for the lender from which the debt could be collected.

The reason is that the lender’s money itself was given for expenditure, and the borrower is not required to invest the money in something enduring. Therefore, if the borrower denies owing the money, he is not obligated to bring a guilt-offering for his oath. Only if he designated an object for the lender from which the debt could be collected is the matter considered as though the borrower denied a deposit, thereby becoming liable for an offering.

Rava continues to cite Rav Hisda’s explanation of the verse:

“He oppressed,”

mentioned in the verse, does not mean merely that the employer denied his obligation to pay the worker his wages; rather,

Rav Hisda said:

it is speaking specifically of

a case where he designated for him,

the employer to the worker,

an object with which to oppress him,

that is, the employer designated an object for the worker, making it subject to the worker’s claim so that he could collect his wages from it. Therefore, when the employer denied his obligation to pay the wages, he was found to have denied the object subject to payment of the wages, and this resembles denial of a deposit.

Now that Rava has brought Rav Hisda’s explanation of the verse, he proves from the words of Scripture in accordance with Reish Lakish:

At first, the verse states [Leviticus 5:21] what sin makes one liable for the offering brought for an oath concerning a deposit: "

When a person sins and denies his fellow, concerning a deposit, or concerning a loan, or concerning robbery, or he oppresses his fellow.

Or he found a lost item and denied it, and swore falsely."

And when the verse repeats it,

when Scripture subsequently repeats the list of matters that he denied, concerning rectifying the sin after he confessed his wrongdoing [for he must return the item that he denied, and must bring an offering for the false oath],

it is written,

the verse says as follows:

[there, verse 23]

“And it shall be, when he sins and incurs guilt, that he shall return the robbery that he robbed, or the oppression with which he oppressed, or the deposit that was deposited with him,”

whereas

the

“loan”

[a loan which, according to Rav Hisda, refers to a case where an object was designated as security],

it did not repeat,

the verse did not mention it again among the commandments of restitution.

Therefore Rava deduces from the words of Scripture:

What is the reason,

why did the verse not repeat and include among the commandments for rectifying the sin the obligation to return the object that the borrower had designated for the lender as repayment for his loan?

Is it not

because

because it lacks

the object that he designated for the loan

being pulled!

Since the lender did not pull this object from the borrower’s possession, the object was not acquired by him, and the borrower is not obligated to return it to him; rather, his only obligation is to repay money. It is evident from here that only pulling effects acquisition of an object, and not money!

Rav Pappa said to Rava:

One cannot bring proof from the fact that Scripture did not repeat the mention of a loan with regard to the commandment of restitution. On the contrary,

say

that one should say the opposite:

it is the oppression

of a hired worker’s wages

that the verse repeated!

That is, since the verse repeated the commandment of restitution with regard to the withholding of a hired worker’s wages—and we likewise established that case as one in which the employer designated an object for the worker from which he could collect his wages—the verse has revealed that the wages themselves effect acquisition of the object, and pulling is unnecessary. If so, the same should apply when an object was designated as security for a loan: the lender acquires it through the loan money alone and need not pull the object. Therefore, the verse did not need to repeat this also with regard to a loan, since the law of a loan can be derived from the law of withholding a hired worker’s wages.

Accordingly, this verse not only does not support Reish Lakish; it provides proof against him, since a hired worker’s wages acquire the designated object even without pulling it!

Rava answers that this is not a difficulty for Reish Lakish, because:

What are we dealing with here,

in what situation is the verse speaking when it repeated the commandment of restitution with regard to withholding a hired worker’s wages?

For example, where he took it from him,

where the worker took [pulled] from his employer the object designated for payment of his wages,

and then deposited it with him again,

so that there was a pulling that effected acquisition of the designated object; the object was not acquired merely through the worker’s wages.

But the Gemara challenges this interpretation of the verse:

If so,

if the verse is speaking of a case in which the worker pulled the object and then deposited it back with his employer,

it is a deposit!

What is the difference between this deposit and the deposit already mentioned by the verse, and why did the verse need to state the matter of withholding a hired worker’s wages in the form of a deposit!?

The Gemara answers: The verse is speaking of

two types of deposits!

This verse speaks of two types of deposits: one is a deposit in which a person entrusts his money to his fellow, and the bailee denies it and swears falsely about it. The second is a deposit that the worker received as security for payment of his wages. It is not actually the worker’s property, but merely collateral guaranteeing payment of his wages; the worker then deposited the collateral with his employer as a deposit, and now the bailee denied this deposit.

The verse teaches that even in the case of an oath concerning denial of a deposit that is collateral, one is liable to bring an offering for the oath and is obligated to return it in order to rectify his sin.

But the Gemara still challenges this:

If so,

if you interpret what the verse repeated concerning the law of restitution for withholding a hired worker’s wages as referring to a case in which he pulled the collateral to himself and then deposited it again, this is difficult:

a loan

[a loan]

also should have been repeated,

the verse should have repeated it with regard to the commandment of restitution, and

established it

as

a case where he took it from him,

where the borrower pulled the object that the lender had designated for him,

and

the borrower

deposited it with him again,

the collateral with the lender, just as you established the law of withholding a hired worker’s wages. Why, when detailing all the laws of restitution, did the verse not also write the law of restitution for a loan!?

The Gemara answers: Indeed, it should have repeated the law of a loan as well, in the same manner as the law of withholding a hired worker’s wages.

But

if the verse had repeated

the law of a loan in the same manner as the law of withholding a hired worker’s wages,

it would have provided neither a refutation nor support,

the words of Scripture would have provided neither a challenge nor proof concerning the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish.

Rabbi Yohanan would establish both cases—the loan and the hired worker’s wages—as referring to a situation in which the designated object was not pulled, because according to him money effects acquisition. Reish Lakish, however, would establish both cases as referring to a situation in which the object was pulled to him and then deposited with him again.

But

now that the verse did not repeat

the law of a loan, but repeated only the law of withholding wages,

it supports him

this verse supports Reish Lakish!

That is, since the verse omitted the law of a loan with regard to restitution, while it repeated the law of withholding wages, we must understand the verse as referring here to two different situations: with regard to the wages of a hired worker, it speaks of a case in which the object was pulled and then deposited again; whereas with regard to a loan, it speaks of a case in which the lender did not pull the object to himself. Therefore, the verse did not repeat the matter in the commandment of restitution: since the lender did not pull to himself the object designated for him by the borrower, he did not acquire it, and therefore the borrower is not commanded to return it. Here the verse teaches that only pulling effects acquisition, whereas money does not effect acquisition, in accordance with Reish Lakish.

The Gemara now discusses this:

And

if

the verse did not repeat the law of a loan!?

But it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon said: From where is it derived that all

that is

stated above,

at the beginning of the passage, when Scripture enumerates all the forms of denial of a monetary obligation [including a loan], should also apply

below,

when Scripture enumerates the commandment of restitution?

As it is written

below, in the commandment of restitution,

“or anything about which he swore falsely,”

whereby the verse includes every monetary claim that he denied and concerning which he swore.

And Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said that Rav said:

This teaching of Rabbi Shimon comes

to include a loan among the matters to be returned!

That is, even for denial of a loan one is obligated to bring an offering and obligated to return it.

If so, a loan is also included in the commandment of restitution, and the verse did not omit it. How, then, did we deduce from its omission from the list that pulling does not effect acquisition!?

The Gemara answers:

Explicitly,

in explicit terms [and not through the derivation of “anything about which he swore falsely”],

at least, the verse did not repeat

the object designated as security for a loan as subject to restitution!

That is, from the fact that the verse refrained from stating explicitly that one is obligated to return the object designated for a loan and to bring an offering for denying it under oath, we infer that pulling does not effect acquisition. Therefore, he need not return the object, nor bring an offering for denying it under oath.

As for the fact that the verse included a loan by saying “anything about which he swore falsely,” we will establish that statement as referring to a case in which the lender pulled the object to himself and then deposited it with the borrower; when the lender demanded the object from him, the borrower denied it and swore falsely concerning it. Since the lender had already pulled it to himself, it is considered acquired by him, and once he deposited it with the borrower, its status is that of a deposit.

Rava now continues to explain what he said: “The verse and the matanita support Reish Lakish”:

The matanita,

which supports Reish Lakish,

from where do we know it?

As it was taught:

One who took a peruta belonging to the Sanctuary and

gave it

as payment for the wages

to a bath attendant

[the man who works in a bathhouse], so that he would bathe him,

has committed misuse

of consecrated property by giving the peruta. He is obligated to pay the Sanctuary the peruta plus an additional fifth, and to bring an offering for his misuse of consecrated property.

All this is so even though the bath attendant had not yet bathed him, and the person who hired the bath attendant had not yet derived benefit from the peruta belonging to the Sanctuary. Since the rental acquisition itself takes effect, he has removed the peruta belonging to the Sanctuary into the realm of the nonconsecrated.

And Rav said

concerning the words of this beraita that one should derive a point from the fact that the beraita specifically chose the example of a bath attendant and did not give the example of another hired worker, because

specifically a bath attendant is one

who commits misuse immediately upon receiving the peruta, because

pulling is not lacking,

as the bath attendant has no work implement; rather, he performs the bathing with his hands. Therefore, his hiring is acquired through the mere giving of money, without the person hiring him having to pull the worker’s implement to himself in order for the hiring to take effect. Consequently, as soon as the hiring takes effect through the giving of the peruta, the giver immediately commits misuse.

But in the case of another

hired worker, who has a work implement, the hiring does not take effect until the person hiring him pulls the worker’s implement to himself, since the acquisition concerns both the worker’s labor and the use of his implement; and since

pulling is lacking,

the pulling of the work implement is still lacking,

he has not committed misuse

through giving the peruta to the hired worker

until he pulls

the hired worker’s work implement to himself, for only when the work implement is pulled to him does the hiring take effect, and only then does the misuse of consecrated property occur through the peruta that he gave him.

It is evident from Rav’s explanation of the words of the beraita that money does not effect acquisition until the object is pulled.

But the Gemara raises a difficulty against Rav’s statement from what we learned in another beraita:

And it was taught: If he gave

the person who committed misuse of consecrated property gave the consecrated peruta

to a barber, he has committed misuse!

And

behold, a

barber,

since he has a shaving implement,

must have his shaving implement pulled,

the person hiring him must pull his shaving implement to himself for the hiring to take effect, according to Rav; so why did the giver commit misuse immediately when he gave the peruta to the barber!?

The Gemara answers:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a gentile barber, who is not subject to acquisition through pulling!

That is, acquisition through pulling does not apply to a gentile, because Scripture, in discussing pulling, says: “Or acquire from the hand of your fellow,” and a gentile is not “your fellow.” Therefore, his hiring is acquired through money.

And the Gemara clarifies:

It was taught likewise,

that necessarily, the acquisition through the rental under discussion here concerns specifically a gentile barber, who is not subject to the laws of meshikha:

As it was taught:

If he gave

a consecrated peruta

to a barber, a sailor, or any craftsman, he has not committed misuse of consecrated property until he pulled

the tool of his trade to himself!

And ostensibly,

the statements

of the two beraitot

contradict one another.

For the first beraita says: If he gave it to a barber, he committed misuse immediately. Whereas the second beraita says that he did not commit misuse until he pulled it.

Rather, is it not the case that this proves

that we must necessarily distinguish between them and say:

Here,

the first beraita is speaking

of a gentile barber,

who is not subject to meshikha, and therefore money effects the acquisition from him.

Here,

the second beraita is speaking

of a Jewish barber,

for whom acquisition through meshikha applies, and therefore he did not commit misuse until he pulled the barbering tool.

And the Gemara concludes: Indeed,

this proves it!

And now, after the Gemara has explained the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish as to whether money effects acquisition or meshikha effects acquisition, the Gemara brings a statement indicating that Rav Naḥman also holds in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan:

And Rav Naḥman likewise said,

in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan:

By Torah law, money effects acquisition.

And

likewise,

he examined

and emended

Levi

this halakha that money effects acquisition

in his Mishna,

and he added it in the Tosefta that he arranged and would recite,

and found

a beraita from which it is apparent that it accords with Rabbi Yohanan:

As it was taught: A shopkeeper who

gave

a consecrated peruta

to a wholesaler, committed misuse

the shopkeeper. "

A siton is a large merchant, from whom small shopkeepers purchase their produce in order to sell it in their stores to customers."

The small shopkeepers make an agreement with the wholesaler to purchase a large quantity of produce, but they do not take all the produce agreed upon with him at one time. Likewise, they do not immediately pay him for the entire quantity agreed upon; rather, from time to time they take part of the produce and pay him according to the pace of their sales.

Rather, at the outset they give the wholesaler a small amount of money as an advance payment, to secure the entire transaction.

Therefore, if the shopkeeper gave the wholesaler a consecrated peruta as an advance payment toward the purchase of the entire quantity of produce agreed upon with him, the buyer acquired with this peruta all the produce agreed upon with him, and thereby committed misuse of consecrated property.

And all this is so even though the buyer had not yet pulled all the produce agreed upon with him, since he does not take the entire quantity at once.

This proves from here that acquisition through money is effective. For if only meshikha effects acquisition, why did the shopkeeper commit misuse by giving the peruta to the wholesaler? The peruta had not yet acquired anything!