Bava Metzia 48a — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Shimon says

two things:

1.

Even though they said, “A gold dinar acquires a cloak, but a gold dinar does not acquire a cloak,”

that is, if a person pulled a cloak from his fellow and undertook to pay him its price with a gold dinar [and not with silver coins, as is customary], he is obligated to give him a gold dinar. But a gold dinar does not acquire a cloak, because with regard to merchandise [“produce”], the gold dinar is considered currency, and money does not acquire.

And this law is

nevertheless,

that is, even though retribution is destined to come upon one who retracts from the sale, nevertheless,

such

is the

halakha,

that they may retract from the sale after the giving of the money, and a court cannot prevent them from retracting.

But the Sages said

:

The One Who exacted punishment from the generation of the Flood, from the generation of the Dispersion, from the people of Sodom and Gomorrah, and from the Egyptians at the Sea—He is destined to exact punishment from one who does not stand by his word.

2.

And one who negotiates through words,

who speaks with his mouth without performing any act of acquisition,

does not acquire.

And

however,

one who retracts

from what he negotiated through words,

the spirit of the Sages is not pleased with him.

And he said

concerning this

Rava: We have nothing,

we do not hold [that is, this is how we must interpret the words of the beraita] that the curse of “The One Who exacted punishment” applies to one who retracts from what he negotiated through words

, but

we hold that this person is merely included among those with whom

the spirit of the Sages is not pleased.

And it is proven from here that, with regard to retracting from a sale in which there was only negotiation through words and no acquisition was performed, the one who retracts does not receive “The One Who exacted punishment,” but only the spirit of the Sages is not pleased with him. If so, this is difficult for Resh Lakish, who holds that money does not acquire by Torah law: why did Rabbi Shimon say that everyone who retracts from a sale performed with money is included among those subject to “The One Who exacted punishment”? This sale did not take effect according to Resh Lakish, and if so, why is there here “The One Who exacted punishment” for one who retracts!?

And the Gemara answers that one must distinguish and say:

A sale in which there were words of

words, and there are together with them

money,

for the giving of money accompanied them—since there was here an act of giving money, although the acquisition did not take effect [because money does not acquire according to Resh Lakish], nevertheless,

he stands under “But,”

the one who retracts stands under the curse of “The One Who exacted punishment” for violating his verbal promise, because the words also came to the level of an act, through the giving of the money.

But a sale in which there were only words of

words, and there are no money together with them, does not stand under “But.”

Rava said: The verse,

the words of Scripture,

and the beraita,

the words of the beraita,

support Resh Lakish,

who holds that money did not acquire at all, not even by the words of Torah.

The verse

that supports him is from this,

as it is written [

Leviticus 5] concerning one who lied and denied his fellow’s monetary claim, and even swore falsely about it, that he is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for his denial under oath:

“And he denies his fellow”

[he swore falsely concerning a monetary claim that his fellow brought against him], for example:

1. He denied under oath

a deposit

that had been deposited with him; 2.

or a loan,

that he denied under oath a loan that his fellow had lent him,

3.

or robbery,

that he robbed his fellow, and when he sued him for it, he denied it under oath,

4.

or he oppressed his fellow,”

that a hired worker worked for the employer, and the employer was obligated to pay him the wages of a hired worker, but he did not pay him his wages; and when the worker sued him, he denied his claim under oath.

And Rava brings the explanation of Rav Hisda concerning these words of Scripture:

“A loan,”

stated in this verse, does not mean that he denied under oath an ordinary loan, but rather,

Rav Hisda said:

Scripture speaks specifically of

a case where he designated for him

the borrower to the lender

an article for his loan.

That is, one who denies a loan under oath is obligated to bring a guilt-offering only if the borrower designated an article for the lender from which to collect the debt.

And the reason for this matter is that the lender’s money itself was given for expenditure, and the borrower need not invest the money in something enduring. Therefore, if the borrower denied it, he is not obligated to bring a guilt-offering for his oath; only if he designated an article for the lender from which to collect the debt is the matter considered as though the borrower denied a deposit, and he becomes liable for this offering.

And Rava continues to bring the words of Rav Hisda in explanation of the words of Scripture:

“Oppressed”

stated in the verse does not mean that the employer merely denied to the worker his obligation to pay him the wages of a hired worker, but rather,

Rav Hisda said:

It is speaking specifically of

a case where he designated for him,

the employer for the worker,

an article with which to oppress him,

that is, the employer designated an article for the worker that would be encumbered for him, so that he could collect his wages from it. Therefore, when the employer denied his obligation for his wages, it turns out that he denied the article encumbered for payment of the wages, and in this he resembles denial of a deposit.

Now, having brought Rav Hisda’s words in explanation of the verse, Rava proves from the words of Scripture in accordance with Resh Lakish:

At first, Scripture stated [Leviticus 5:21] what the sin is for which one becomes liable for the offering for an oath concerning a deposit: “

A person, when he sins and denies his fellow concerning a deposit, or concerning a loan, or concerning robbery, or he oppresses his fellow.

Or he finds a lost object and denies it, and swears falsely.”

And when Scripture repeats it,

when afterward Scripture returns to the list of things concerning which he denied, with regard to correcting the sin when he confessed his sin [that he must return the thing concerning which he denied, and must bring an offering for the false oath

, it is written,

Scripture says as follows:

[there, verse 23]

“And it shall be, when he sins and becomes guilty, that he shall return the robbery which he robbed, or the oppression with which he oppressed, or the deposit which was deposited with him,”

whereas

the

“loan”

[a loan, which according to Rav Hisda speaks of a case where he designated an article for it],

it did not repeat,

Scripture did not return to mention it among the commandments of return.

And therefore Rava infers from the words of Scripture:

What is the reason,

why did Scripture not return and include in the commandment of correcting the sin also the obligation to return the article that the borrower designated for the lender as repayment for his loan?

Is it not

because

because the article

that he designated for his loan is lacking

pulling!

Since the lender did not pull this article from the hands of the borrower, it was not acquired by him, and the borrower is not obligated to return it to him; rather, his entire obligation is only to repay money. And it is proven from here that only pulling acquires an article, and not money!?

Rav Pappa said to Rava:

One cannot bring proof from the fact that Scripture did not return to say “loan” with regard to the commandment of return; rather, on the contrary,

say,

one should say the opposite:

it is from “oppression,”

the wages of a hired worker,

that Scripture returned!

That is, since Scripture returned and stated the commandment of return with regard to oppression, which we likewise established as a case where the employer designated an article for the worker from which to collect his wages, Scripture revealed that the wages of his work alone acquire the article, and pulling is not required. If so, the same is true when an article was designated for a loan: the lender acquires it through the loan money alone, and need not pull the article. Therefore Scripture did not need to return and say this also with regard to a loan, because the law of a loan can be learned from the law of oppression of the wages of a hired worker.

And according to this, not only is there no support for Resh Lakish from this verse, but there is proof from here against him, from the fact that the wages of a hired worker acquire the designated article even without pulling!?

And Rava answers that there is no difficulty from here for Resh Lakish, because:

Here, with what are we dealing,

in what manner is Scripture speaking when it returned and mentioned the commandment of return with regard to oppression of the wages of a hired worker? With

a case where he took it from him,

where the worker took [pulled] from his employer the article designated for payment of his wages,

and they returned and deposited it with him,

so that there is here pulling, which acquires the designated article; the designated article is not acquired by the worker’s wages alone.

But the Gemara is astonished at establishing Scripture in such a manner:

If so,

if Scripture is speaking in a manner where the worker pulled the article and then returned and deposited it with his employer,

it is a deposit!

What is the difference between this deposit and the deposit that Scripture already mentioned, and why did Scripture need to state the matter of oppression of the wages of a hired worker in the manner of a deposit!?

And the Gemara answers: the verse speaks of

two types of deposits!

This verse speaks of two forms of deposit: one, a deposit in which a person deposits his money with his fellow, and the bailee denies it and swears falsely about it; and the second, a deposit that the worker received as collateral for payment of his wages, which is not actually the worker’s property, but is only collateral guaranteeing payment of his wages, and the worker then returned and deposited the collateral with his employer as a deposit, and now the bailee denied this deposit.

Scripture innovates that even in the case of an oath concerning denial of a deposit that is collateral, he is liable for an oath-offering and is obligated to return it in order to correct his sin.

But the Gemara is still astonished:

If so,

if you established what the verse returned and wrote concerning the law of return of the wages of a hired worker as a case where he pulled the collateral to himself and then returned and deposited it, this is difficult:

“A loan”

[a loan]

also, let it repeat it,

let Scripture return and write it with regard to the commandment of return, and

let it establish it

and establish it as

a case where he took it from him,

where the borrower pulled the article that the lender designated for him,

and he returned

the borrower

and deposited it with him,

the collateral, with the lender, just as you established the law of oppression of the wages of a hired worker; and why did Scripture not return, when detailing all the laws of return, to write also the law of returning a loan!?

And the Gemara answers: indeed, it should have returned and stated also the law of a loan in the same manner as the oppression of the wages of a hired worker.

But

if Scripture had repeated

the loan in the same manner as the oppression of the wages of a hired worker,

there would be neither refutation nor support,

the words of Scripture would have provided neither a refutation nor proof concerning the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish.

For Rabbi Yohanan would establish both cases, of the loan and of the wages of a hired worker, as cases where he did not pull the article designated for him, because according to his view money acquires. Whereas Resh Lakish would establish both cases as ones where he pulled the article to himself and then returned and deposited it with him.

But

now that Scripture did not repeat

the loan, but only the oppression,

it supports him

this verse supports Resh Lakish!

That is, since Scripture omitted the law of a loan with regard to return, whereas it returned and wrote the law of oppression, we must learn from the intention of the verse that two distinct manners are involved here: with the wages of a hired worker, it speaks of a case where he pulled the article and then returned and deposited it; whereas with a loan, it speaks of a case where the lender did not pull the article to himself. Therefore Scripture did not return to include this in the commandment of return, because since the lender did not pull to himself the article that the borrower designated for him, he did not acquire it, and therefore the borrower is not commanded to return it. And here Scripture teaches that only pulling acquires, whereas money does not acquire, in accordance with the words of Resh Lakish.

And now the Gemara discusses:

And

if

Scripture did not repeat “a loan”!?

But it was taught: Rabbi Shimon said: From where is it derived to apply all that is stated above,

all

that is stated above,

at the beginning of the passage, when Scripture lists all the forms of denial of money [including a loan], also

below,

when Scripture lists the commandment of return?

As it is written

below, in the commandment of return,

“or anything about which he swears falsely,”

Scripture included in this every monetary claim that he denied and concerning which he swore.

And Rav Naḥman said, Ravba bar Avuha said, Rav:

this teaching of Rabbi Shimon comes

to include a loan for return!

To say that even for denial of a loan one is liable for an offering and is obligated to return it.

And if so, a loan too is included in the commandment of return, and Scripture did not omit it; how, then, did we infer from its omission from the list that pulling does not acquire!?

And the Gemara answers:

Explicitly,

explicitly [and not from the teaching of “anything about which he swears falsely”],

at least, Scripture did not repeat

the article designated for a loan, for return!

That is, from the fact that Scripture refrained from saying explicitly that one is obligated to return the article designated for a loan and to bring an offering for his denial under oath, we infer that pulling does not acquire, and therefore he need not return the article or bring an offering for his denial under oath.

And what Scripture included by saying “anything about which he swears falsely” we will establish as a case where the lender pulled the article to himself, and then returned and deposited it with the borrower, and when he sued him for the article, the borrower denied it and swore falsely concerning it; since the lender had already pulled it to himself, it is considered acquired by him, and once he deposited it with the borrower, its law is like that of a deposit.

And now Rava continues and explains what he said: “The verse and the beraita support Resh Lakish”:

The beraita

that supports Resh Lakish—

from where do we know it?

For it was taught:

one who took a peruta of consecrated property and

gave it

as payment of wages

to a bath attendant

[the man who works in the bathhouse], so that he would bathe him,

from

the one who gave the peruta, through consecrated property. And he is obligated to pay the consecrated property the peruta plus a fifth, and to bring an offering for his misuse of consecrated property.

And all this is so even though the bath attendant had not yet bathed him, and the one who hired the bath attendant had not yet benefited from the peruta of consecrated property; since through the actual taking effect of the rental acquisition, he removed the peruta of consecrated property into the non-sacred realm.

And Rav said

concerning the words of this beraita that one must infer from the wording of the beraita, which specifically chose the example of a bath attendant and did not choose the example of another hired worker, because

specifically a bath attendant, he is

the one who misuses immediately upon giving the peruta, because

he is not lacking pulling,

the bath attendant has no work implement, but performs the bathing work with his hands; therefore his rental acquisition takes effect through the giving of money alone, without the one hiring him having to pull the worker’s work implement to himself for the rental to take effect. And because of this, from the moment the rental acquisition takes effect through the giving of the peruta, the giver immediately misuses the consecrated property.

But with another item,

the rental acquisition of another worker, who has a work implement, the rental does not take effect until the one hiring him pulls the hired worker’s work implement to himself, since his acquisition concerns both the hired worker’s labor and the use of his implements; and since

it is lacking pulling,

since pulling the work implement is still lacking,

he does not misuse

the one hiring him through giving the peruta to the worker,

until he pulls

the hired worker’s work implement to himself, because only through pulling the work implement to himself does the rental acquisition take effect, and only then does the misuse of consecrated property occur with the peruta that he gave him.

And it is proven from Rav’s explanation of the words of the beraita that money does not acquire until he pulls.

But a difficulty is raised against Rav’s words from what we learned in another beraita:

And it was taught: He gave

the one who misused consecrated property gave the peruta of consecrated property

to a barber—he misused!

And

behold,

a barber,

since he has a shaving implement,

here he needs to pull the shaving implement,

according to Rav, the one hiring him must pull the shaving implement to himself for the rental to take effect; why, then, did the giver misuse immediately when he gave it to the barber!?

And the Gemara answers:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a gentile barber, who is not subject to pulling!

That is, with a gentile there is no acquisition through pulling, because Scripture, when discussing pulling, said, “or acquire from the hand of your fellow,” and a gentile is not “your fellow”; therefore his rental acquisition is through money.

And the Gemara is precise:

It was taught likewise,

that necessarily, the acquisition through rental discussed here is specifically with a gentile barber, who is not subject to the laws of pulling:

For it was taught:

If he gave

a peruta of consecrated property

to a barber, or to a sailor, or to any craftsmen, he has not committed sacrilege until he pulls

their tool of the craft to himself!

And seemingly,

the statements

of the two beraitot

contradict one another.

For the first beraita says: If he gave it to a barber, he committed sacrilege immediately. Whereas the second beraita says that he did not commit sacrilege until he pulled it.

Rather, must we not infer from it,

that necessarily we must distinguish and say:

Here,

the first beraita is speaking

of a gentile barber,

who is not subject to pulling, and therefore money acquires in his case.

Here,

the second beraita is speaking

of a Jewish barber,

who is subject to acquisition through pulling, and therefore he did not commit sacrilege until he pulled the barbering tool.

And the Gemara concludes: Indeed,

infer from it!

And now, after the Gemara has explained the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish as to whether money acquires or pulling acquires, the Gemara brings that Rav Nahman also agrees with Rabbi Yohanan:

And Rav Nahman likewise said,

in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan:

By Torah law, money acquires.

And

likewise,

Levi

examined and emended

this

halakha that money acquires,

in his Mishna,

and added in the Tosefta that he arranged and would teach in it,

and found,

a beraita from which it is implied that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan:

For it was taught: A shopkeeper who

gave

a peruta of consecrated property

to a wholesaler, he committed sacrilege,

the shopkeeper. “

A siton is a large merchant, from whom the small shopkeepers purchase their produce in order to sell it in their shops to buyers.”

And the small shopkeepers make an agreement with the wholesaler to purchase a large quantity of produce, but they do not take all the produce that they agreed upon with him at one time; and likewise, they do not immediately pay for all the quantity that they agreed upon with him. Rather, from time to time they take part of the produce and pay him according to the pace of their sales.

Rather, at the beginning they give the wholesaler a small amount of money as an advance payment, to validate the entire transaction.

And therefore, if the shopkeeper gave the wholesaler a peruta of consecrated property as an advance payment toward the payment for the entire quantity of produce that he agreed upon with him, the buyer acquired with this peruta all the produce that he had agreed upon with him, and thereby committed sacrilege against consecrated property.

And all this even though the buyer had not yet pulled all the produce that he had agreed upon with him, for he does not take the entire quantity at one time.

And it is proven from here that an acquisition through money is effective. For if only pulling acquires, why did the shopkeeper commit sacrilege by giving the peruta to the wholesaler? After all, the peruta had still acquired nothing!