Bava Metzia 47b (מז:) — the Talmud in English

acquire

with a maruka,

a utensil made from cattle dung, but the halakha does not follow Shmuel. Rather, one may not acquire with a maruka. Therefore, they instituted that the deed should state: “with a utensil that is fit for acquisition,” to teach us that one may not acquire with a maruka.

And as for what is written in the deed, “with a utensil that is fit

to acquire

with it,” this is

to exclude the opinion of

Levi.

For he said:

Exchange is effected

with

the utensil of the one transferring ownership.

They did not

say:

“to cause to acquire,”

because the expression “to cause to acquire” can be understood as “to transfer ownership with it,” in accordance with Levi’s opinion.

And as for what is written in the deed, “with a utensil that is fit to acquire

with it,”

this implies an exclusion: with it, but not with another object.

Rav Pappa said: “

with it”

excludes a coin,

for one cannot acquire with a coin.

And Rav Zevid

said,

and some say [that

some say]

Rav Ashi said: “

with it”

excludes objects from which it is prohibited to derive benefit,

for one cannot acquire with a utensil from which it is prohibited to derive benefit.

Some say: “With it”

which they write in the deed,

he said,

explained

Rav Pappa: “to exclude a coin,”

as above. And Rav Ashi as well holds that “with it” comes to exclude a coin.

And the word

“fit”

written in the deed does not come to exclude a maruka, but rather

Rav Zevid said, and some say Rav Ashi said: “to exclude objects from which it is prohibited to derive benefit.”

But a maruka does not require exclusion

to say that one may not acquire with a maruka, since it is obvious that one cannot acquire with a maruka.

We learned in the Mishna:

“A token acquires the coin,”

but the coin does not acquire the token.

And we explain:

What is a “token”?

He said,

he explained,

Rav: “Money

that is worn and inferior,

given in

turn

as a

sign to the bathhouse attendant,

at the bathhouse,

so that he would know, from the number of coins, how many people had come to bathe in the bathhouse, and, according to the number of people who came, he would heat water and prepare towels for them after bathing.”

The beraita raises an objection

from a beraita against Rav’s statement:

It is stated in the passage concerning the second tithe [Deuteronomy 14:25]: “And you shall give the money, and bind up the money in your hand, and you shall go to the place that the Lord your God will choose.” Rabbi Akiva [below, at the end of the passage] derived from the expression “and bind up the money” that one may redeem produce of the second tithe only with money that bears a design.

One may not redeem second tithe with a token, and

one may not redeem second tithe

with

coins given as tokens at the bathhouse.

From the fact that the beraita taught two things—tokens and coins given as tokens—

by inference,

it follows

that a token is not

the same as

coins given as tokens at the bathhouse!?

And if you would say:

The law of coins given as tokens in the latter clause is not a second law stated in the beraita, but rather

it merely

explains

the latter clause

as referring to the first clause, and this is what it means: One may not redeem second tithe with a token; and what is a token? Coins given as tokens at the bathhouse.

But it was not taught that way,

in another beraita!?

As it was taught:

One may redeem second tithe with a token;

these are

the words of Rabbi Dosa.

And the Sages

disagree and

say: One may not redeem

second tithe with a token.

And Rabbi Dosa and the Sages agree

that

one may not redeem with coins given as tokens at the bathhouse.

From the fact that Rabbi Dosa and the Sages disagree concerning a token but do not disagree concerning coins given as tokens, it is proven that a token and coins given as tokens are two different things. This therefore poses a difficulty for Rav, who said that a token is coins given as tokens at the bathhouse!?

Rather, he said,

he explained,

Rabbi Yoḥanan: What is a token

that we learned in our Mishna?

A pulsa,

a smooth coin on which the design of a coin has not yet been stamped.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan followed his own reasoning,

for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that a token is a pulsa—an object without a design—corresponds to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement below:

For Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Dosa,

in his statement above,

and Rabbi Yishmael,

in the beraita below,

said the same thing.

Rabbi Dosa—

this is what we said,

the matter already mentioned above, that Rabbi Dosa says that one may redeem second tithe with a token.

And

what is Rabbi Yishmael’s statement?

Where do we find that Rabbi Yishmael expresses the opinion of Rabbi Dosa?

As it was taught

in a beraita: It is stated [Deuteronomy 14:25]: “And you shall give the money,

and bind up the money in your hand,”

and we learn from here

to include everything that can be bound in one’s hand—even a token; a coin specifically bearing a “design” is not required, for “and bind up the money” is an expression of “their bundles of money” [Genesis 42:35].

These are

the words of Rabbi Yishmael,

and they accord with Rabbi Dosa, who likewise holds that one may redeem second tithe with a “token” that has no design, as Rabbi Yoḥanan stated above.

Rabbi Akiva says: The expression “and bind up the money” stated by the verse is an expression of “design,”

and we learn from it:

to include every object that bears a design—

excluding a token, which bears no design.

We learned above in the Mishna:

“How so? If he pulled produce from him but did not give him money, he cannot retract, etc.”

The Gemara now returns to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement, which was cited on the preceding page:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: By Torah law, money acquires

movable property.

And why did they say

that the Sages ordained that only

pulling

alone

acquires

movable property, and not money?

As a decree, lest he say to him

the seller to the buyer:

“Your wheat has been burned in the upper room.”

The Gemara discusses the meaning of his statement:

Why should we be concerned about the buyer’s loss if a fire breaks out and the wheat burns while it is still in the seller’s possession? After all,

in the end, whoever kindles the fire is obligated to pay!?

Ultimately, whoever sets the fire will be liable to pay the buyer for the full extent of his loss. If so, the buyer will suffer no loss; why, then, did the Sages institute that the wheat is not acquired until the buyer pulls it to himself!?

The Gemara explains:

Rather,

the Sages instituted that money does not effect the acquisition,

as a decree lest a fire break out through no fault of anyone,

by itself, without any person being responsible for causing it. Therefore,

if you establish it for them

if we regard the wheat as being

in his domain,

in the seller’s possession until the buyer comes and pulls it to himself,

he will devote himself to it, take the trouble, and save it.

The seller will devote himself to saving it, since it is still his; and if he does not save it, he will have to return to the buyer the money he received from him for it.

But if not,

if we do not regard it as being in the seller’s possession, but the buyer’s money acquires the wheat even if he has not pulled it to himself,

he will not devote

the seller

himself to it, take the trouble, and save it.

He will not devote himself to taking the trouble to save it for the buyer.

Whereas

Reish Lakish said: Pulling is explicitly a Torah

act of acquisition.

The Gemara explains:

What is the reason of Reish Lakish?

That is, what is the Torah source for his statement?

The verse states

Leviticus 25”: “

When you sell anything to your fellow, or acquire from the hand of your fellow,

do not wrong one another.” The verse’s phrase “or acquire from the hand of your fellow” teaches the acquisition effected by pulling, which is

something acquired from hand to hand,

as the buyer pulls the purchased item with his hands from the seller’s hands.

The Gemara explains why Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees with this derivation:

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

The word used by the verse,

“hand,”

does not intend to teach about acquisition by pulling. Rather, it comes to teach with regard to the laws of exploitation, which is the subject of the verse, and

to exclude land,

which cannot be transferred from hand to hand, and to say

that it does not have,

in a sale of land, the law of

exploitation,

since it is not acquired from hand to hand.

And Reish Lakish

responded to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s argument:

If so,

if we say, as you claim, that the verse’s intent is only to exclude land from the laws of exploitation,

let the verse write: “When you sell anything from the hand

of your fellow, do not wrong,”

and that would suffice to exclude land from the law of exploitation, since land is not transferred from hand to hand.

What need is there for the verse to add and say

“or acquire

from the hand of your fellow,”

why do I need this!?

Infer from it,

the superfluous phrase comes to teach

the

acquisition of

pulling.”

That is, the superfluous phrase is intended to associate the acquisition with “from the hand of your fellow,” teaching that movable property is acquired by the buyer only once it has passed from the seller’s hand into the buyer’s hand; this is acquisition by pulling.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan,

what does he do with the superfluous phrase

“or acquire

from the hand of your fellow,”

what does he derive from it?

For what matter does he expound it?

He needs it for that which was taught in a beraita:

As it was taught:

“When you sell anything, do not wrong.”

I have

only learned from this verse

that

the case is one

in which the buyer was exploited

by the seller.

If

the seller was exploited

by the buyer,

, from where

do I know that the law of exploitation applies here as well?

The verse states,

the verse therefore adds and says,

“or acquire

from the hand of your fellow, do not wrong,” teaching an additional point: the buyer, too, may not exploit the seller.

And Reish Lakish,

who derives from this verse that pulling effects acquisition by Torah law,

derives two matters from it.

He learns both matters from this superfluous verse. He learns the law concerning exploitation of the seller by the buyer from the verse itself: “or acquire from the hand of your fellow, do not wrong.” As for acquisition by pulling, he learns it from the fact that the verse associates the word “hand” with “acquire,” rather than with “anything sold.” For the verse could have said: “When you sell anything to the hand of your fellow.” Since the verse specifically associates “hand” with “acquire,” it follows that the verse comes to teach about an acquisition effected from hand to hand, namely, acquisition by pulling.

The Gemara now raises an objection to Reish Lakish from the statement of Rabbi Shimon [mentioned in our Mishna, at the beginning of the chapter, on 44a], who disagrees with the Sages, who maintain that if the buyer gave money to the seller, both of them may still retract. In Rabbi Shimon’s view, only the seller, who has the money in his possession, may retract, but the buyer may not:

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Shimon says: Whoever has the money in his possession

namely, only the seller, who received the money into his possession,

has the upper hand,

for if he wishes to retract, the sale is annulled; but if he does not retract, the sale remains in force even if the buyer retracts.

The Gemara proves from here against Reish Lakish’s statement: According to Rabbi Shimon, only

the seller is able to retract,

he alone can retract from the sale as long as the buyer has not pulled the item to himself, but

the buyer is not able to retract.

Granted, if you say that “money acquires

by Torah law,” and only the Sages instituted that one may retract before pulling,

for that reason, the seller is able to retract, but the buyer is not able to retract.

That is, there is indeed a basis for distinguishing between the seller’s retraction and the buyer’s retraction. Rabbi Shimon holds that it is sufficient for the Sages to institute that only the seller may retract, in order to cause him to take the trouble to save the wheat from the fire. The seller will think to himself that it is worthwhile for him to take the trouble to save it, because the wheat may become more expensive in the future, at which point he will be able to retract from the sale and profit from the increase in the wheat’s price. There is no need to annul the sale if the buyer wishes to retract.

Rather,

but

if you say that money does not acquire

by Torah law, as Reish Lakish maintains,

the buyer too

should be able to retract,

for according to Reish Lakish, by Torah law he has not acquired the wheat until he pulls it to himself!?

Reish Lakish could have said to you:

Indeed,

according to Rabbi Shimon, I did not say this.

I did not say that money does not acquire by Torah law and that only pulling acquires, with regard to Rabbi Shimon, because he holds that pulling is merely an ordinance of the Sages, whereas money acquires by Torah law. Therefore, according to Rabbi Shimon, it is sufficient to abrogate the acquisition effected by money only with regard to the seller’s retraction, but not with regard to the buyer’s retraction.

When I said

that pulling acquires by Torah law and not money,

it was according to the Sages.

That is the context of my statement; therefore, as long as the buyer has not pulled the wheat, both parties may retract by Torah law.

The Gemara now challenges Rabbi Yoḥanan’s position:

Granted, according to Reish Lakish,

who holds that according to the Sages pulling is what acquires by Torah law,

this is the difference between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages:

This is precisely the matter over which they disagree: whether pulling acquires by Torah law or money acquires.

Rabbi Shimon holds that only the seller may retract, because in his view the acquisition effected by money is by Torah law. It is sufficient to abrogate the acquisition effected by money by Torah law and institute that the seller may retract until the buyer performs the acquisition by pulling; but there is no need to abrogate the acquisition effected by money with regard to the buyer’s retraction.

For the entire ordinance concerning pulling was enacted only so that the seller would take the trouble to save the buyer’s wheat while it was in his possession. Therefore, the Sages instituted only with regard to the seller’s retraction that he may retract until the buyer pulls the wheat, so that he will save it, lest it become more expensive and he be able to retract from the sale and profit. There is no reason to institute that the buyer should be able to retract.

The Sages, by contrast, hold that only pulling acquires by Torah law. Therefore, in their view, as long as the buyer has not pulled the wheat, both parties may retract.

But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan,

who holds that according to both Rabbi Shimon and the Sages acquisition by pulling is only an ordinance of the Sages, and by Torah law money acquires according to both opinions, the question arises:

what is there,

what is the reason for the disagreement

between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages!?

The Gemara answers:

There is a difference between them:

the reason for their disagreement is the principle

of Rav Ḥisda.

For Rav Ḥisda said: Just as the Sages instituted

the institution of

pulling with regard to sellers,

so that the seller may retract from the sale as long as the buyer has not pulled the item,

so they instituted

the institution of

pulling with regard to buyers,

so that the buyer may retract before he pulls the item.

The reason for this is that because of the very same consideration for which the Sages instituted the seller’s ability to retract before pulling—to cause him to take the trouble to save the wheat—they likewise instituted that the buyer may retract. This will cause the seller to take the trouble to save the wheat, because the seller will fear that if he does not save it, the buyer will retract from the sale immediately upon seeing the fire, and then the entire loss will be borne by the seller.

Rabbi Shimon does not accept Rav Ḥisda’s principle,

but he holds that it is sufficient to institute the seller’s ability to retract alone, in order to cause him to take the trouble to save the wheat.

The Sages accept Rav Ḥisda’s principle.

The Sages added another factor that would cause the seller to take the trouble to save the wheat: They instituted that the buyer, too, may retract. Therefore, the seller will save the wheat out of fear that the buyer will retract upon seeing the fire, leaving the loss caused by the fire upon him.

The Gemara now challenges Reish Lakish’s position:

We learned

at the end of the Mishna: If one gave money to another but did not pull produce from him, he may retract,

but they said: “May He who exacted payment from the generation of the Flood exact payment from anyone who does not keep his word!”

The Gemara argues:

Granted, if you say that money acquires

by Torah law,

for that reason he stands

therefore, the one who retracts from the sale stands

under the

curse

“but

they said: ‘May He who exacted payment from the generation of the Flood exact payment from anyone who does not keep his word.’”

But if you say that money does not acquire

by Torah law, as Reish Lakish maintains,

why does he stand

the one who retracts from the sale

under the

curse,

“but

they said: “May He who exacted payment from the generation of the Flood exact payment from anyone who does not keep his word”!? The sale has not yet taken effect, since money does not acquire!?

The Gemara answers: Indeed, the sale does not take effect through acquisition by money, but nevertheless he becomes liable to Mi Shepara,

because of words,

for failing to keep his word after agreeing to the sale.

But the Gemara is perplexed:

And for words,

for merely violating his verbal promise,

does he stand under “but”!?

But it was taught in a beraita: