Bava Metzia 47b — the Talmud in English

Acquire ![](pamud.bmp "

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with a maruka,

an implement made from cattle dung, and the halakha is not in accordance with Shmuel; rather, one does not acquire with a maruka. Therefore they instituted that one should write in the document, “with an implement that is fit,” to teach us that one does not acquire with a maruka.

And what they write in the document, “with an implement that is fit”

to acquire

is:

to exclude the

opinion of

Levi.

For he says:

exchange is effected

with the implement of the one transferring [the property].

And

it teaches us:

exchange is effected only with the implement of the acquirer. And this is the meaning of the wording that they write in the document:

“to acquire,”

to acquire with it, in the manner of a purchaser who gives something in order to acquire an object.

And they did not

say:

“to cause to acquire,”

because the expression “to cause to acquire” can be understood like “to transfer with it,” in accordance with Levi’s view.

And what they write in the document, “with an implement that is fit to acquire”

with it,

indicates an exclusion: with it, but not with another object.

Rav Pappa said: “

with it” —

to exclude a coin,

for one does not acquire with a coin.

And Rav Zevid

said,

and some say

[there are those who say] that

Rav Ashi said: “

with it” —

to exclude objects forbidden for benefit,

for one does not acquire with an implement that is forbidden for benefit.

Some say: “With it”

which they write in the document,

he said,

explained

Rav Pappa: to exclude a coin,

as above. And Rav Ashi also holds that “with it” comes to exclude a coin.

And

“that is fit”

which they write in the document does not come to exclude a maruka; rather,

Rav Zevid said, and some say Rav Ashi: to exclude objects forbidden for benefit.

But a maruka does not require exclusion

in order to say that one does not acquire with a maruka, since it is obvious that one does not acquire with a maruka.

We learned in the Mishna:

A token acquires the coin,

but the coin does not acquire the token.

And we explain:

What is a “token”?

He said,

he explained,

Rav: deficient

and poor-quality coins,

given in

a turn

as a sign to

the bathhouse attendant

of the bathhouse,

so that he would know, according to the number of coins, how many had come to bathe in the bathhouse, and according to the number of those coming, he would heat water and prepare towels for them after bathing.

He challenges

from a beraita, against Rav’s words:

It is stated in the passage concerning the second tithe [Deuteronomy 14:25]: “And you shall give the money, and bind up the money in your hand, and you shall go to the place that the Lord your God will choose.” And Rabbi Akiva learned [below, at the end of the sugya] from the expression “and bind up the money” that one may redeem produce of the second tithe only with money that has a form.

One may not redeem the second tithe with a token, and

one may not redeem the second tithe

with

coins given as a sign to the bathhouse.

And from the fact that we learned two things in the beraita— a token and coins given as a sign—

by inference,

it follows

that a token is not

the same as

coins given as a sign to the bathhouse!?

And if you would say:

the law of coins given as a sign in the latter clause is not a second law in the beraita, but rather

it explains

the

latter clause

as referring to the first clause, and this is what it says: One may not redeem the second tithe with a token—and what is a token? Coins given as a sign to the bathhouse.

But it was not taught so,

in another beraita!?

For it was taught:

One may redeem the second tithe with a token;

these are

the words of Rabbi Dosa.

And the Sages

disagree and

say: One may not redeem

the second tithe with a token.

And they agree,

Rabbi Dosa and the Sages,

that one may not redeem with coins given as a sign to the bathhouse.

And from the fact that Rabbi Dosa and the Sages disagreed concerning a token, but did not disagree concerning coins given as a sign, it is proven that a token and coins given as a sign are two different things. And this is a difficulty against Rav, who said: A token is coins given as a sign to the bathhouse!?

Rather, he said,

he explained,

Rabbi Yohanan: What is a token

that we learned in our Mishna?

A pulsa,

a smooth coin on which the form of a coin has not yet been stamped.

And Rabbi Yohanan followed his own view,

the words of Rabbi Yohanan that a token is a “pulsa”—an object that has no form—accord with the words of Rabbi Yohanan below:

For Rabbi Yohanan said: Rabbi Dosa,

in his words above,

and Rabbi Yishmael,

in the beraita below,

said one thing.

Rabbi Dosa —

this is what we said,

what was already mentioned above: Rabbi Dosa says that one may redeem the second tithe with a token.

And

what is Rabbi Yishmael’s [view]?

Where did we learn in Rabbi Yishmael’s words a view like Rabbi Dosa’s?

For it was taught

in a beraita: It is stated [Deuteronomy 14:25]: “And you shall give the money,

and bind up the money in your hand,”

and we learned from here

to include every object that can be bound in the hand —

even a token; it is not necessary specifically to use a coin that has a “form,” for “and bind up the money” is an expression of “their bundles of money” [Genesis 42:35].

These are

the words of Rabbi Yishmael,

and like Rabbi Dosa, who likewise holds that one redeems the second tithe with a “token” that has no form, as Rabbi Yohanan said above.

Rabbi Akiva says: The “and bind up the money” that Scripture stated is an expression of “form,”

and one learns from it:

to include every object that has a form upon it —

to exclude a token, which has no form upon it.

We learned earlier in the Mishna:

How so? If he pulled produce from him but did not give him money, he cannot retract, and so forth.

And now the Gemara returns and brings the words of Rabbi Yohanan, which were brought on the preceding page:

Rabbi Yohanan said: By Torah law, money acquires

movable property.

And for what reason did they say

that the Sages [instituted] that only

pulling

alone

acquires

movable property, and not money?

It is a decree, lest he say to him

the seller to the buyer:

“Your wheat has been burned in the loft.”

And the Gemara discusses his words in explanation:

Why do we have to be concerned for the buyer’s loss if a fire should fall and the wheat should burn while it is still in the seller’s possession? For

ultimately, whoever set the fire must pay!?

For in the end, whoever causes the fire will be liable to pay the buyer for all his damage; and if so, no loss will be caused to the buyer of the wheat. And why did the Sages have to institute that he should not acquire the wheat so long as he has not pulled it to himself!?

And the Gemara explains:

Rather,

for this reason the Sages instituted that money should not acquire,

as a decree lest a fire fall through unavoidable circumstances,

of itself, without a person being responsible for causing it. And therefore,

if you establish them,

if we establish them as wheat

in his possession,

in the seller’s possession, until the buyer comes and pulls them to himself,

he will devote himself, trouble himself, and rescue them.

The seller will devote himself to saving them, since they are still his; and if he does not save them, he will have to return to the buyer the money that he received from him for them.

And if not,

if we do not establish them in the seller’s possession, but the buyer’s money will acquire the wheat even if he has not pulled it to himself,

he will not devote

the seller

himself, trouble himself, and rescue them.

He will not devote himself to troubling himself and saving them for the buyer.

But

Reish Lakish said: pulling is explicitly from the Torah

as an act of acquisition.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason of Reish Lakish?

That is to say, what is the source from the Torah for his words?

The verse says [Leviticus 25]: “

Leviticus 25”: “

When you sell a sale to your fellow, or acquire from the hand of your fellow,

do not wrong one another.” The verse’s saying “or acquire from the hand of your fellow” teaches about acquisition by pulling, which is

a thing acquired from hand to hand,

for the buyer pulls with his hands the thing being acquired from the hands of the seller.

And the Gemara explains why Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with this derivation:

And Rabbi Yohanan said:

What the verse said

“from the hand,”

its intention is not to teach about acquisition by pulling. Rather, it comes to teach concerning the laws of overreaching, with which the verse is occupied, and

to exclude land,

which cannot be transferred from hand to hand, and to say

that it does not have,

in a sale of land, the law of

overreaching,

since it is not acquired from hand to hand.

And Reish Lakish

answered Rabbi Yohanan’s claim:

If so,

if it is said as you say, that the verse’s intention is only to exclude land from the laws of overreaching,

let the verse write: “When you sell a sale from the hand

of your fellow, do not wrong,”

and this would be sufficient to exclude land from overreaching, since land is not transferred from hand to hand.

This that the verse added and said

“or acquire

from the hand of your fellow,”

why do I need it!?

Conclude from it,

the superfluous verse came to teach

about

acquisition by

pulling.”

That is, the superfluous verse came to juxtapose the acquisition with “from the hand of your fellow,” to say that movable property is acquired by the buyer only once it has passed from the seller’s hand to the buyer’s hand, which is acquisition by pulling.

And Rabbi Yohanan,

the superfluous verse

“or acquire

from the hand of your fellow,”

what does he do with it?

For what matter does he expound it?

He needs it for that which was taught:

For it was taught:

“When you sell a sale, do not wrong.”

I have only

to learn from these words of the verse

but

the case

where the buyer was overreached

by the seller.

If

the seller was overreached

by the buyer,

from where

do I know that here too the law of overreaching applies?

The verse says,

for this reason the verse added and said,

“or acquire

from the hand of your fellow, do not wrong,” to teach an additional matter: that the buyer too should not overreach the seller.

And Reish Lakish,

who derives from this verse that pulling acquires by Torah law,

learns two things from it.

He learns both matters from this superfluous verse. The law of the seller’s being overreached by the buyer he learns from the very words of the verse, “or acquire from the hand of your fellow, do not wrong.” But acquisition by pulling he learns from the fact that the verse juxtaposed the word “from the hand” with “or acquire,” and did not juxtapose it with “sale.” For the verse could have said, “When you sell a sale to your fellow.” Since the verse juxtaposed the word “from the hand” specifically with “acquire,” it follows that the verse came to teach about the law of an acquisition made from hand to hand, which is acquisition by pulling.

And now the Gemara raises an objection against Reish Lakish from the words of Rabbi Shimon [mentioned in our Mishna, at the beginning of the chapter, on folio 44a], who disagrees with the Sages, who hold that if the buyer gave money to the seller, both of them can still retract; whereas in his view only the seller, who has the money in his possession, can retract, but not the buyer:

We learned: Rabbi Shimon says: Whoever has the money in his possession

that is, only the seller, who received the money into his hands,

his hand is uppermost,

for if he wishes to retract, the sale is nullified; but if he does not retract, the sale remains in force even if the buyer retracts.

And the Gemara proves from here against the words of Reish Lakish: according to Rabbi Shimon, only

the seller is able to retract,

he alone can retract from the sale so long as the buyer has not pulled the object to himself, but the

buyer is not able to retract.

If you say that “money acquires

by Torah law,” and only the Sages instituted that one may retract before the pulling,

for this reason, the seller is able to retract, but the buyer is not able to retract.

That is to say, there is properly a distinction between the seller’s retraction and the buyer’s retraction, because Rabbi Shimon holds that it is sufficient that they institute that only the seller can retract, in order to cause him to trouble himself to save the wheat from the fire. For the seller will think in his heart that it is worthwhile for him to trouble himself and save it because of the possibility that the wheat will become more expensive in the future, at which time he will be able to retract from the sale and profit from the rise in the price of the wheat. And there is no need to nullify the sale if the buyer wishes to retract.

Rather,

but,

if you say that money does not acquire

by Torah law, as Reish Lakish holds,

the buyer too

should retract,

for according to Reish Lakish, by Torah law he has not acquired until he pulls it!?

Reish Lakish could say to you:

Indeed,

according to Rabbi Shimon, I did not say so,

I did not say that money does not acquire by Torah law, but pulling does, because he holds that pulling is only an enactment of the Sages, whereas money acquires by Torah law; and therefore, according to Rabbi Shimon, it is sufficient that we nullify the acquisition by money only with regard to the seller’s retraction, but not with regard to the buyer’s retraction.

When I said

that pulling acquires by Torah law and not money,

it was according to the Sages

that I said my words, and therefore, so long as he has not pulled, both of them can retract by Torah law.

And now the Gemara raises an objection concerning Rabbi Yohanan’s words:

It is understandable according to Reish Lakish,

who holds that according to the Sages, pulling is what acquires by Torah law,

this is what there is between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages,

for this itself is what they disagree about: whether pulling acquires by Torah law or money acquires.

Rabbi Shimon holds that only the seller retracts, because in his view the acquisition by money is by Torah law, and it is sufficient for us to nullify the acquisition by money by Torah law and institute that the seller can retract until the buyer performs acquisition by pulling, but not to nullify the acquisition by money with regard to the buyer’s retraction.

For the entire enactment of pulling is only so that the seller will trouble himself to save the buyer’s wheat while it is in his possession. Therefore, only concerning the seller’s retraction did the Sages institute that he can retract until the buyer pulls it, so that he will save the wheat, lest it become more expensive and he be able to retract from the sale and profit; but there is no reason to institute that the buyer can retract.

Whereas the Sages hold that only pulling acquires by Torah law, and therefore, in their view, so long as the buyer has not pulled the wheat, both of them can retract.

But according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who holds that according to both Rabbi Shimon and the Sages acquisition by pulling is only an enactment of the Sages, and by Torah law money acquires according to both of them, there is a difficulty:

what is there,

what is the reason for the disagreement,

between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages!?

And the Gemara answers:

There is between them

the reason for their disagreement in

the position of Rav Hisda.

For Rav Hisda said: Just as they instituted

the Sages

pulling for sellers,

so that the seller can retract from the sale so long as the buyer has not pulled,

so they instituted

the Sages

pulling for buyers,

so that the buyer can retract before he has pulled.

And the reason for the matter is that, because of that very same reason for which the Sages instituted the seller’s retraction before pulling, so that he would trouble himself to save the wheat, they likewise instituted that the buyer can retract; for this will cause the seller to trouble himself to save the wheat, because the seller will fear that if he does not save it, the buyer will retract from the sale immediately upon seeing the fire, and then all the damage will be at the seller’s expense.

Rabbi Shimon does not hold the position of Rav Hisda,

but he holds that it is sufficient that we institute the possibility of retraction for the seller alone, in order to cause him to trouble himself and save the wheat.

The Sages hold the position of Rav Hisda.

The Sages added another reason that would cause the seller to trouble himself and save the wheat, by instituting that the buyer too can retract. Therefore the seller will save the wheat because of the fear that the buyer might retract when he sees the fire, and the loss from the burning will fall upon him.

And now the Gemara raises an objection concerning the words of Reish Lakish:

We learned

at the end of the Mishna: If one gave him money but did not pull produce from him, he can retract,

but they said: “May He who exacted punishment from the generation of the Flood exact punishment from whoever does not stand by his word!”

And the Gemara argues:

If you say, it is understandable that money acquires

by Torah law,

for this reason he stands

therefore the one who retracts from the sale stands

under the

curse

“But

they said, ‘May He who exacted punishment from the generation of the Flood exact punishment from whoever does not stand by his word.’”

But if you say that money does not acquire

by Torah law, as Reish Lakish says,

why does he stand

the one who retracts from the sale

under the

curse

“But

they said, ‘May He who exacted punishment from the generation of the Flood exact punishment from whoever does not stand by his word’”? Yet the sale has still not taken effect, since money does not acquire!?

And the Gemara answers: Indeed, the sale did not take effect through acquisition by money, and nevertheless he becomes subject to “May He who exacted punishment,”

because of words,

because he did not stand by his word, by which he had agreed to the sale.

But the Gemara is astonished:

And because of words,

for violating his promise by mere speech,

does he stand under “But”!?

But it was taught: