Bava Metzia 47a (מז.) — the Talmud in English

One who sells an article to another, and the buyer gives him money whose value is less than that of the article, this is onaah (overcharging). If he reduced the payment by one-sixth of the price, the buyer acquires the article and must return the overcharge; but if he reduced it by more than one-sixth, the sale is void.

And he has against him

a

claim of overcharging,

so that if the money he gave was one-sixth less than the value of the article, the buyer must complete the payment to the seller. Rav Huna explains his statement:

The buyer acquires

the article with the money, and neither of them can retract.

Although he did not perform meshikha

with the article,

since he was not particular

to ask how much money he had given him,

he acquires it, for it is comparable to barter,

and he acquires it through the giving of the money.

The initial assumption is: He acquires it through an act of barter, and currency can serve as the object of barter. For if this were merely an acquisition through money, we have established that money does not effect acquisition, and they can retract.

Later we challenge this: We have established that currency cannot serve as the object of barter?!

And he has against him a claim of overcharging, for

he

said to him, “Sell it to me for these,”

which is the language of a sale, to which the laws of overcharging apply, and not the language of barter.

Rav

Abba said

in the name of

Rav Huna:

A person holding money in his hand said to another:

Sell me

this article

for

this money,

he acquires it, and he has no claim of overcharging against him,

since he was not particular enough to ask how much money he was giving him. The Gemara says:

It is obvious

to us, and there is no doubt about it, that one who gives

money, and the seller does not

the seller does not

care about it,

to see whether it is sufficient to equal the value of the sale,

we have said that he acquires it, for it is comparable to barter.

But the question is: In

barter, when he is particular about it,

where a person gives another an article in exchange for an article in order to acquire it through barter, and the recipient is particular to see what the value is of the article he receives.

What

is its law? Is this considered barter, even though he is particular about the items, so that both parties acquire their respective items through the meshikha of one of the articles?

Or perhaps, since he is particular about them, they are like money, and he acquires it through payment; therefore, the sale is not completed until the second party also performs meshikha.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Come and hear

from a beraita that in barter where one is particular about the items, he does not acquire it through barter; rather, they have the status of money;

Behold,

a man

was holding his cow and standing

in the marketplace,

and another came and said to him: “Why is your cow

here in the marketplace?!”

The owner of the cow said to him:

“I need a donkey,”

and I wish to sell the cow and purchase a donkey with its proceeds.

His fellow said to him:

“I have a donkey, which I am giving,

and am prepared to sell;

take it.”

“How much is your cow

worth? How much do you wish to sell it for?”

The owner of the cow said to him: I wish to sell it

for such and such,

for a particular sum.

The owner of the cow asked the owner of the donkey:

“How much is your donkey

worth? For how much do you wish to sell it?”

The owner of the donkey answered him: I wish to sell it

for such and such,

for a particular sum. If

the owner of the donkey pulled the cow,

after they agreed to exchange the cow for the donkey.

But the owner of the cow did not manage to pull

the donkey

to himself before the donkey died.

The owner of the donkey did not acquire the cow,

even though he had already pulled it.

The initial assumption is: The cow is considered payment for the donkey, since the owner of the donkey was particular to know its value. Therefore, pulling the cow does not effect acquisition, for we have established that money does not effect acquisition of the purchased item.

Infer from this

from this beraita:

“Barter” in which one is particular

is

about it,

to know its value, does not have the status of barter; rather, it has the status of payment, and

he does not acquire it.

He said,

Rava challenged

,

your statement, that in barter where one is particular about the items he does not acquire them, means that the barter mentioned in the scroll of Ruth was barter in which one is not particular.

But the verses cannot possibly be explained in this manner, for

is it so that the barter

of the verse

concerns fools

[fools]

who are not particular

to know the value of the object they receive in exchange, in order to decide whether they are pleased to give their own in exchange for that article?!

Rather,

certainly,

all barter,

presumably,

people are particular about it

to know how much it is worth;

and

even so,

he acquires it.

But here,

in the aforementioned beraita,

with what case are we dealing? With one in which he said to him: “I am selling you a donkey

in exchange for a cow and a calf, and

he pulled the cow, but had still not pulled the calf.”

Indeed, if he had pulled both the cow and the calf, that would have been a complete act of meshikha, and the donkey would have been acquired by the owner of the cow and the calf through kinyan halippin.

But since he had still not pulled the calf, the owner of the cow and the calf did not acquire the donkey, since

he did not have

the pulling of the cow alone as

a proper act of meshikha.

The Gemara now returns to discuss Rav Huna's statement:

The master said

above:

“Sell it to me for these”—he acquires it, and he has a claim of overcharging against him.

The initial assumption is: He acquires it through barter.

And we challenge this:

Let us say,

would it be that

Rav Huna holds: Currency can serve as the object of barter?!

But we already proved above that currency cannot serve as the object of barter?!

And we answer:

No,

Rav Huna does not hold that currency can serve as the object of barter. Here he does not acquire it on account of barter; rather, he acquires it through payment.

And when Rav Huna said: “It is comparable to barter,” this is what he meant: This money effects acquisition without pulling the purchased article, just as in barter there is no need to pull it.

The reason is that

Rav Huna follows the view of Rabbi Yohanan, who said: By Torah law, money effects acquisition; and why did they say

the Sages that

meshikha effects acquisition

and not money?

It is a decree

that they instituted,

lest the seller say

to him

[to the buyer],

the buyer:

“Your wheat has been burned in the upper story.”

And since this is only a rabbinic decree, one can say:

In a common matter,

such as acquisition through money, with currency,

the Sages instituted a decree; but in an uncommon matter, the Sages did not institute a decree.

So too here, since it is uncommon for a person to sell an article without knowing how much money he is receiving, the money effects acquisition as it does by Torah law.

Mar Huna, son of Rav Nahman, said to Rav Ashi: “You, this is how you teach it,”

you transmit Rav Huna's statement in a manner that leaves it uncertain whether, in his view, currency can serve as the object of barter, or whether he agrees that currency cannot serve as the object of barter.

But

we teach it this way,

this is how we transmit Rav Huna's view:

And so

Rav Huna said: Currency cannot serve as the object of barter.

If so, it is obvious that Rav Huna’s statement, “He acquires even though he did not pull it,” is to be understood in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan, who holds that money effects acquisition by Torah law; and here, even by rabbinic law, the acquisition effected by the money did not lapse, as stated above.

The Gemara investigates:

By what means does one acquire?

That is, with whose utensil is the acquisition through exchange effected: with the utensil of the transferor or with the utensil of the acquirer?

Rav said: With the utensil of the acquirer,

the acquirer gives a utensil to the transferor, and through this giving the acquisition through exchange takes effect, and the acquirer acquires the object that the transferor agreed to transfer to him.

For

even though the acquirer is destined to pay the seller the value of the object, nevertheless

the acquirer is pleased that the transferor should become an acquirer

of the utensil that he is now giving him as well,

so that he will resolve to transfer it to him and acquire it for him,

so that the seller will agree to transfer the object to him already now, even though he will pay him the money only later.

And Levi said:

Exchange is effected

with the utensil of the transferor,

and the reason for this is

as we will say below.

He said,

he asked,

Rav Huna of Diskarta asked Rava: And

according to the view of

Levi, who said: With the utensil of the transferor,

if one wishes to acquire land through exchange,

he acquires the land through

the pulling of the

cloak,

as the purchaser pulls the cloth and acquires it through the acquisition of pulling, and through it he acquires the land as well.

If so, they would be “property that has responsibility,”

land ,

and are acquired together with

property that is acquired along with it,

“property that does not have responsibility,”

movable property.

But we learned the opposite

in the Mishna [Kiddushin 26a]:

“Property that does not have responsibility,”

movable property,

is acquired together with

property acquired along with it,

“property that has responsibility,”

for when one acquires the land with money, a document, or possession, this acquisition also effects the acquisition of movable property, even though this acquisition does not effect the acquisition of the movable property when he acquires it independently, without land.

It follows that specifically movable property is acquired together with land, but land is not acquired together with movable property.

If so, what is Levi’s rationale?

He said to him

Rava said to Rav Huna of Diskarta:

If Levi had been here,

and had heard your question,

he would have brought fiery blows out before your face,

he would have produced sparks of fire before you. This is an expression of excommunication, because he suspected Levi of intending to explain the law of exchange in this manner.

Do you suppose

that you believe that through the pulling of the

cloak he transfers to him

the land?!

Rather, this is nothing but exchange, as though he were giving him another object in exchange for the land. And what does he give him?

On account of the benefit that he receives from him,

that benefit—that he regards him favorably and is prepared to accept the utensil from him as a gift—is considered by him as though the acquirer were giving him a substantial gift, and

he resolves

to transfer it,

and transfers it to him

the land.

The Gemara says:

As a dispute between tanna’im,

for tanna’im already disputed the matter at issue between Rav and Levi, whether acquisition through exchange and through a cloth is effected by the acquirer giving the cloth or by the transferor giving it.

For the source of this acquisition is what is stated in the Scroll of Ruth [4:7]: “A man would remove his shoe and give it to his fellow.”

If we interpret this as meaning that the acquirer removed his shoe and gave it to the transferor, then it may be learned from here that acquisition through exchange is effected by the acquirer’s giving.

And if we interpret it as meaning that the transferor removed his shoe and gave it to the acquirer, it may be learned from this verse that acquisition through exchange is effected by the transferor’s giving.

In addition to the issue of whether exchange is effected with the acquirer’s utensil or with the transferor’s utensil, over which the tanna’im disagree, as will be explained below, the Gemara cites the entire beraita that explains the whole biblical passage dealing with acquisition through exchange.

It is stated in the Scroll of Ruth [4:7]:

“And this was formerly done in Israel, concerning redemption and concerning exchange, to establish every matter: A man would remove his shoe and give it to his fellow.”

“Redemption”

that the verse mentions

means a sale,

in which he made a complete sale to him for money, but the seller had not yet received the purchase price and the purchaser had not yet pulled the object; they came to establish the terms of their sale through an act of acquisition.

And

from where do we know that “redemption” is an expression of sale? For

so it says [Leviticus 27:32–33]: “And every tithe of cattle and flock, of all that passes under the staff, the tenth shall be holy to the Lord. He shall not inspect whether it is good or bad, and he shall not exchange it; and if he does exchange it, then both it and its replacement shall be holy,

it shall not be redeemed.”

“It shall not be redeemed.”

The meaning of what the verse says, “It shall not be redeemed,” is that it may not be sold, as we learned through a “gzera shava”: “It shall not be redeemed” concerning animal tithe from “it shall not be redeemed” concerning consecrated property, which may not be sold.

“Exchange,”

as the verse states,

means exchange,

whereby he exchanges this utensil for the corresponding object.

v

How do we know that temura is an expression denoting an exchange? For it says:

so it says

[Leviticus 27:9–10]: “If it is an animal of the kind that may be brought as an offering to the Lord, whatever one gives of it to the Lord shall be holy.

He shall not exchange it or substitute it

for it,

either a good animal for a bad one or a bad one for a good one; and if he does substitute one animal for another, both it and its substitute shall be holy.”

“To validate every matter, a man would remove his shoe

and give it to his fellow.” Who gave the shoe to whom

the shoe?

The Sages say:

Boaz,

who acquired Ruth and the field,

gave it to the redeemer.

And

Rabbi Yehuda says:

The

redeemer,

who transferred ownership,

gave it to Boaz

the shoe.

It follows that Rav, who says that the acquisition is made with the vessel of the purchaser, follows the view of the first tanna, who said: Boaz—the purchaser—gave his shoe to the redeemer—the transferor.

Levi’s statement, that the acquisition is made with the vessel of the transferor, follows the view of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: The redeemer—the transferor—gave his shoe to Boaz—the purchaser.

A tanna

in a beraita

taught

that an acquisition by exchange may be made with a vessel

even though it does not contain

anything

worth a peruta.

Rav Naḥman said: This statement was taught

with regard to making an acquisition

only with a vessel, but with produce,

anything that is not a vessel,

not

may one make an acquisition.

Rav Sheshet said:

One may make an acquisition

even with produce.

And we explain:

What is the reason of Rav Naḥman,

who says that an acquisition may be made only with a vessel?

For

the verse says: “his shoe,”

which indicates:

a shoe—

yes,

one may acquire with it;

something else

no,

one may not acquire with it.

And

what is the reason of Rav Sheshet,

who says that one may acquire even with produce? Was only a shoe, which is a vessel, not mentioned in the verse?

For

the verse says: “to validate every matter,”

meaning, to validate and effect this acquisition with any item.

We raise an objection: If so, this is difficult

for Rav Naḥman as well, for

it is

written: “to validate every matter,”

and what does the verse come to teach us if it does not include even produce?

We answer:

That phrase, “to validate every matter,”

refers to redemption and exchange,

which are acquired with a shoe.

We raise an objection:

And Rav Sheshet as well, for

it is

written: “his shoe,”

which indicates a vessel and not produce!?

We answer:

He said

he would explain

to you Rav Sheshet:

In fact, one may acquire even with produce. As for the fact that the verse mentions

a shoe, it comes to teach us: Just as “his shoe”

is “a distinct object”

[a complete object],

so too every

item with which one makes an acquisition must be

“a distinct object.”

To exclude

[to exclude]

half a pomegranate or half a nut, which one does not

acquire with them, since they are not a “distinct” and complete object. The transferor, by means of the cloth, intends that they write the purchaser a deed of evidence concerning the matter.

Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, said:

According to whom,

according to whose view,

do we write nowadays,

as is our practice, in a deed of “acquisition by means of a cloth”—the following formulation: “We acquired from him

with a vessel fit for making an acquisition with it”?

That is, what does this formulation in the deed come to exclude?

And we explain: What we write:

“With a vessel,”

is

to exclude the

words of

Rav Sheshet, who said: One may make an acquisition with produce.

It teaches us that “with a vessel”—with a vessel we acquired from him, and not with produce—in accordance with Rav Naḥman and not in accordance with Rav Sheshet.

And what we write: “With a vessel”

that is fit,

is

to exclude

the words of

Shmuel, who said: