Bava Metzia 46b — the Talmud in English

Anything that is appraised as money in exchange for another item [

anything which, when the buyer gives it to the seller as money, must be appraised in order to know its value ]], when the buyer gave it to the seller as an exchange item, its law is that

once this one acquired

the seller, the object,

this one became liable

the buyer,

for the

accidents of

exchange.

And the tanna came to teach us that movable property and produce become exchange items, and it is not specifically necessary to use a utensil in order to acquire through exchange. And although it is stated, “a man removes his shoe,” nevertheless, from “to uphold every matter” we learn that the acquisition is effected through any item.

And the Gemara adds:

it is also reasonable,

to explain the Mishna in this way, and not as referring to a coin. [

Since it teaches in the latter clause

of that Mishna:

How

is the law of exchange?

He exchanged an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox;

once this one acquired, this one became liable for its exchange.]

And when the latter clause says “How,” the intention of the Mishna is to explain the law stated in the first clause.

If so,

learn from it:

the Mishna does not deal with a coin, but with other movable property. And concerning this the tanna said: “How? He exchanged an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox; once this one acquired, this one became liable for its exchange.”

And we object:

And according to what entered one’s mind

at first

that the first clause speaks of

a coin,

and teaches us that a coin becomes an exchange item, if so,

what does “How” mean!?

How would we explain the latter clause, if you would say that the first clause deals with exchange through a coin!?

For the tanna should have said: “How? He exchanged money for a cow,” since the matter concerns exchange effected through a coin!?

And we answer: The tanna came to teach us two matters: a coin becomes an exchange item, and produce becomes an exchange item.

And

this is what it says:

Anything that becomes money in exchange for another item — that is, a coin — exchange is performed with it, and once this one acquired, this one became liable for the exchange.

And produce

also

performs exchange. How? He exchanged

an ox

for a cow, or a donkey for an ox;

once this one acquired, this one became liable for its exchange.

Rav Nahman and Rav Sheshet disagreed [below, 47a] whether the acquisition of exchange is effected only with utensils or with all movable property.

The Gemara says:

The

Mishna

is satisfactory for the

opinion of

Rav Sheshet, who said: ‘Produce

also

performs exchange.’

For according to Rav Sheshet, it is possible to explain the Mishna either according to the one who says that a coin becomes an exchange item, as entered our minds initially, or according to the one who says that a coin does not become an exchange item, as Rav Judah answered, since according to everyone the latter clause of the Mishna teaches us that produce becomes an exchange item.

But according to Rav Nahman, who says:

in

a utensil, yes,

indeed, exchange is performed with it,

but produce does not perform it,

acquisition

of exchange; what does ‘How’ mean!?

How is the latter clause of the Mishna to be explained, which teaches: “How? He exchanged an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox; once this one acquired, this one became liable for its exchange”?

For an ox and a donkey are considered “produce,” and not a utensil; how do they perform exchange according to Rav Nahman!?

In our Mishna it is explained that money does not acquire the purchase, and only pulling the movable property acquires it. The amoraim disagreed concerning the reason for this [below, 47b]:

Rabbi Yohanan holds: By Torah law, money acquires, as we find concerning consecrated property, where money acquires and pulling does not. Rather, the enactment of the Sages is that the buyer should not acquire by giving money, but by pulling the movable property. And Resh Lakish holds: Pulling is explicit in the Torah, and by Torah law money does not acquire.

And we answer: According to Rav Nahman,

this is what the

tanna of the Mishna says:

Even though we taught that money does not acquire, but pulling the purchase acquires, nevertheless

there are forms of payment

and money

that

acquire

as exchange.

And this is how the Mishna is to be explained: “Anything that is appraised as money in exchange for another item” — all movable property that a person appraises for his fellow and gives him the value of its appraisal, in return for another object that the buyer possesses.

Once this one acquired — the first buyer acquired the first movable property, which he pulled, even though he did not pull it as an exchange, but as payment, in order to acquire for him his object with the payment.

This one became liable — the second buyer, the one from whom it was pulled, who wishes to acquire an object in return for it as payment, became liable for all the accidents of exchange, because his money acquired the object for him, and he consequently becomes liable for its accidents.

How?

He sold him an ox for such-and-such coins, and he pulled the ox, and became obligated to him for the coins.

The buyer said to him: “I have a cow, which I am giving you for the price of the ox that I owe you.”

The owner of the ox agreed, and

exchanged

the

price

of the

ox for the cow.

Or the price of a donkey,

for which the buyer had become obligated to him in money, for a donkey that he had sold him, and he agreed to exchange it

for an ox.

Behold, the owner of the cow became obligated to give him the cow, and neither of them can retract; and likewise the owner of the ox—the one brought in exchange for the price of the donkey—became obligated to give the owner of the donkey the ox, and neither of them can retract.

And we explain:

What is the reason of Rav Naḥman

that, according to his position, we say: here money acquires?

He agrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: By Torah law,

by Torah law,

money acquires

the purchase.

And why did they say

the Sages:

pulling acquires

and not money!?

It is a decree

that

perhaps

the buyer will leave the money in the seller’s house for a long time, and if a fire breaks out in the seller’s neighborhood, he will not trouble himself to extinguish it, since the movable property is not his, and

he will say to him,

to the buyer

, “Your wheat has burned in the upper room.”

And

since this is a rabbinic enactment, one must say:

a matter that is common,

a matter that is likely to occur,

the Sages decreed concerning it.

A matter that is not common—the Sages did not decree concerning it.

And here too, it is a sale that is not common, for it is not the way of people to appraise movable property against movable property.

Therefore, the Sages did not decree concerning the matter, and his money acquired for him according to Torah law.

And

we object: This explanation, according to Rav Naḥman, is based on the words of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: By Torah law, money acquires movable property, and it was the Sages who nullified the acquisition by money and enacted that pulling acquires.

But,

according to Reish Lakish, who said: Pulling is explicit in the Torah,

there is certainly no distinction between an ordinary acquisition by money and exchanging the price of an ox for a cow, for an acquisition by money is entirely ineffective by Torah law, and in this there is no distinction between a matter that is not common and a matter that is common. If so, according to Reish Lakish, it is impossible to establish the Mishna as referring to an acquisition by money, and it must be referring to an acquisition through chalifin. But

this works out if

we say that Reish Lakish

agrees with Rav Sheshet,

who says that chalifin is performed with produce and with all movable property.

For then

he explains it

for the Mishna of Kiddushin

in accordance with Rav Sheshet,

that it is speaking of exchanging an ox for a cow [and not of the “price of an ox”].

Rather, if

we say that Reish Lakish

agrees with Rav Naḥman, who said: Produce does not effect chalifin,

then it is impossible to explain the Mishna as referring to chalifin, in the exchange of an ox and a cow, which are produce.

And

even in the case of exchanging the “price of an ox” for a cow, it is impossible to establish the Mishna, since according to Reish Lakish

a coin,

money,

does not acquire

by Torah law.

If so, the difficulty is:

How does he explain it,

Reish Lakish, for the Mishna?

And we conclude:

It is necessarily so

that one must say that Reish Lakish holds: Produce also effects chalifin, and

he explains it in accordance with Rav Sheshet

for the Mishna.

The Gemara says: Come and hear from the Mishna that a coin effects chalifin and is acquired through chalifin:

We learned

we learned in our Mishna:

All movable property acquires one another,

and once one pulled, his fellow acquired his.

And Reish Lakish said:

“All” the movable property that we learned comes to include,

and

this teaches us

even

if they exchanged

a purse

[a wallet]

full of coins for a purse full of coins,

they acquire one another; and necessarily he said this with regard to chalifin, and not with regard to money, for money does not acquire at all.

Infer from this: A coin effects chalifin, for through pulling the purse of coins the transaction was completed.

And infer from this: A coin is acquired through chalifin, for the second purse of coins was acquired through the acquisition of chalifin performed with the first purse.

And this is a difficulty for the one who says that a coin does not effect chalifin, and a difficulty for the one who says that a coin is not acquired through chalifin.

He explained,

he interpreted

Rav Aḥa

the words of Reish Lakish: Reish Lakish did not speak of all coins, but rather

with

a purse full of

“ankai dinars”

and

with

a purse full of “anigra

dinars,” which they exchanged for one another.

And what are “ankai dinars” and “anigra dinars”?

One

of them is a

dinar that the kingdom invalidated,

the king commanded that this dinar not be put into circulation in any of the countries of his kingdom. [But the residents of the country take it secretly.]

And one

of them is a

dinar that the country invalidated,

the residents of this country despise it and refrain from using it, while in the other countries of the king they put this dinar into circulation, since the king did not issue an order concerning it.

And since these coins are not put into circulation, they therefore do not have the status of a coin, and they acquire and are acquired through chalifin.

And it is necessary

to teach us, both with regard to a dinar that the kingdom invalidated and with regard to a dinar that the country invalidated, that they are not considered coins.

For if it had taught us

a dinar that the

kingdom invalidated

is not considered a coin, we would not have been able to derive from this dinar the law of a dinar that the country invalidated.

For we would have said: Specifically a coin that the kingdom invalidated is not considered a coin

because it is not sufficient,

it is not put into circulation

at all,

in any of the king’s countries.

But

a coin that the

country invalidated

but the kingdom did not invalidate,

since it is sufficient for it in another country,

where they do not despise this coin,

I might say:

we would say:

still

[it is still]

it is a coin

it is considered one,

and

behold,

a coin is not acquired through chalifin.

And

likewise,

if it had taught us

a dinar that the

country invalidated

is not considered a coin, we would not have been able to derive from this dinar the law of a dinar that the kingdom invalidated.

For we would have said: Specifically a coin that the country invalidated is not considered a coin,

because

in this country, at any rate,

it is not sufficient for it

this coin at all,

neither secretly nor openly.

But

a coin that the

kingdom invalidated,

but the country did not invalidate,

since it is sufficient for it,

at any rate

secretly, I might say: It is still a coin

it is considered one,

and

behold,

a coin is not acquired through chalifin.

Therefore:

it is necessary,

to teach us explicitly the law of both of these dinars, since it is impossible to derive the law of one from the law of the other.

Rabba said in the name of Rav Huna:

A person who held money in his hand and said to his fellow,

“Sell me”

this object

for

the money

“that is in my hand,”

and the seller was not particular to ask how much it was, and accepted it from the buyer,

the buyer acquired

the object with this money, and neither of them can retract.