Bava Metzia 46b (מו:) — the Talmud in English

Everything whose value is assessed in relation to another item [

Every item that, when the buyer gives it to the seller as payment, must be assessed in order to determine its value ], when the buyer gives it to the seller as a barter item, its law is that once he has given it to the seller as a barter item,

once this one has acquired,

the seller, the object,

that one becomes liable,

the buyer,

for

the accidents of

barter.

The tanna comes to teach us that movable property and produce can serve as barter, and that it is not specifically necessary to use a utensil in order to acquire through barter. Although it is stated: “A man takes off his shoe,” nevertheless, from the phrase “to confirm every matter” we learn that the acquisition can be effected with any item.

The Gemara adds:

It is also logically evident,

to interpret the Mishna in this manner, and not as referring to currency.

Since it teaches in the latter clause

of that same Mishna:

How

does the law of barter apply?

If he exchanged an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox,

once this one acquired, that one became liable for its barter.

When the latter clause says “How,” the intention of the Mishna is to explain the law stated in the first clause.

If so,

learn from it:

the Mishna is not dealing with currency, but with other movable property. Concerning this the tanna said: “How? If he exchanged an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, once this one acquired, that one became liable for its barter.”

And we raise an objection:

But according to what entered the mind

at first,

that the first clause is speaking of

currency,

and comes to teach that currency can serve as barter, if so,

what does “How?!” mean?

How would we interpret the latter clause if we were to say that the first clause deals with barter effected through currency?!

The tanna should have said: “How? If he exchanged money for a cow,” since the discussion concerns barter effected through currency?!

And we answer: The tanna came to teach two things: currency can serve as barter, and produce can serve as barter.

And

this is what he is saying:

Everything that serves as payment for another item—that is, currency—can be used for barter, and once this one acquired, that one became liable through the barter.

And produce

also

can serve as barter. How? If he exchanged

an ox

for a cow, or a donkey for an ox,

once this one acquired, that one became liable for its barter.

Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet disagreed [below, 47a] as to whether acquisition through barter is effected only with utensils or with all movable property.

The Gemara says:

D

oes this Mishna

fit the

view of

Rav Sheshet, who said: Produce

also

can serve as barter?

According to Rav Sheshet, the Mishna can be interpreted either according to the one who says that currency can serve as barter, as initially entered the mind, or according to the one who says that currency cannot serve as barter, as Rav Yehuda answered. This is because according to everyone, the latter clause of the Mishna comes to teach that produce can serve as barter.

But according to Rav Naḥman, who said:

In

the case of a utensil, yes,

it can indeed serve as barter,

but produce cannot serve as barter,

acquisition cannot be effected through it,

what does “How?!” mean?

How is the latter clause of the Mishna, which teaches: “How? If he exchanged an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, once this one acquired, that one became liable for its barter,” to be interpreted?

An ox and a donkey are considered “produce,” and not utensils. How, then, can barter be effected through them according to Rav Naḥman?!

Our Mishna makes clear that money does not acquire the purchased item; only pulling the movable property effects acquisition. The amoraim disagreed concerning the reason for this [below, 47b]:

Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains: By Torah law, money acquires, as we find with regard to hekdesh, where money acquires and pulling does not. However, the Sages enacted that the buyer should not acquire through giving money, but only through pulling the movable property. Reish Lakish maintains: Pulling is explicitly stated in the Torah, and by Torah law money does not acquire.

And we answer: According to Rav Naḥman,

this is what

the tanna of the Mishna is saying:

Although we taught that money does not acquire, but only pulling the purchased item effects acquisition, nevertheless

there are payments

and money

that

do acquire

like barter.

The Mishna should therefore be interpreted as follows: “Everything whose value is assessed in relation to another item”—all movable property that a person assesses for his fellow and gives him its assessed value in exchange for another object that the buyer possesses.

“Once this one acquired”—the first buyer, with regard to the first movable property, which he pulled, even though he did not pull it as barter but as payment, intending that it acquire for him the seller’s object in exchange for payment.

“That one became liable”—the second buyer, the one from whom the first item was pulled, who wishes to acquire an object in exchange for it as payment, becomes liable for all the accidents of barter, because his money acquired the object for him, and he consequently becomes liable for any accidents involving it.

How?

He sold him an ox for such-and-such an amount of money, and the buyer pulled the ox, thereby becoming obligated to pay him the money.

The buyer said to him: “I have a cow, which I am giving you in payment of the money that I owe you for the ox.”

The owner of the ox agreed, and

exchanged

the

value

of the

ox for the cow.

Or the value of a donkey,

where the buyer had become obligated to pay him money for a donkey that he had sold him, and he agreed to exchange that money

for an ox.

The owner of the cow has thereby become obligated to give him the cow, and neither of them may retract; likewise, the owner of the ox—the one given in exchange for the value of the donkey—has become obligated to give the owner of the donkey the ox, and neither of them may retract.

And we explain:

What is the reason of Rav Naḥman

for saying, according to his approach, that here money effects acquisition?

He follows the view of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: By Torah law,

according to Torah law,

money effects acquisition

of the purchase.

And why did

the Sages

say that pulling effects acquisition

rather than money?

It is a decree

that

perhaps

the buyer will leave the purchased movable property in the seller’s house for a long time. If a fire then breaks out in the seller’s neighborhood, he will not trouble himself to extinguish it, since the movable property is not his, and

he will say to him,

to the buyer,

“Your wheat has burned in the upper room.”

And

since this is a rabbinic enactment, one may say:

A common matter,

something that tends to occur,

the Sages decreed concerning it.

But concerning an uncommon matter, the Sages did not decree.

And here too, this is an uncommon sale, as people do not ordinarily appraise movable property against movable property.

Therefore, the Sages did not decree concerning this matter, and his money acquired the item for him in accordance with Torah law.

And

we challenge this: This explanation, according to Rav Naḥman, is based on the words of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that by Torah law money acquires movable property, and that the Sages nullified acquisition through money and enacted that pulling effects acquisition.

But

according to Reish Lakish, who said: Pulling is explicitly derived from the Torah,

there is certainly no distinction between an ordinary acquisition through money and exchanging the value of an ox for a cow, since acquisition through money is entirely ineffective by Torah law, and no distinction can be made in this regard between an uncommon matter and a common matter. If so, according to Reish Lakish, it is impossible to establish the Mishna as referring to acquisition through money; it must necessarily be referring to acquisition through exchange. But

this works only if

we say that Reish Lakish

follows the view of Rav Sheshet,

who says that exchange can be performed with produce and with all movable property.

For then

he explains it

as referring to the Mishna in Kiddushin

in accordance with Rav Sheshet,

that it is speaking of exchanging an ox for a cow [and not of “the value of an ox”].

But if

we say that Reish Lakish

follows the view of Rav Naḥman, who said: Produce cannot effect exchange,

then it is impossible to explain the Mishna as referring to acquisition through exchange, in the exchange of an ox and a cow, which are produce.

And

even the Mishna cannot be established as referring to exchanging “the value of an ox” for a cow, since according to Reish Lakish

a coin,

that is, money,

does not acquire

by Torah law.

If so, the difficulty arises:

How does he explain it,

Reish Lakish, with regard to the Mishna?

And we conclude:

It is unavoidable

to say that Reish Lakish holds that produce can also effect exchange, and

he explains it in accordance with Rav Sheshet

with regard to the Mishna.

The Gemara says: Come and hear a proof from the Mishna, that a coin can effect exchange and can be acquired through exchange:

We learned

in our Mishna:

All movable property can acquire one another,

and once one party pulls the item, the other party acquires his item.

And Reish Lakish said: “All” the movable property that we learned comes to include

something.

And

it teaches us

even

if they exchange a

pouch

[a purse]

full of money for a pouch full of money,

they acquire one another; and you must say that he is speaking in terms of exchange and not in terms of payment, since money does not effect acquisition at all.

Learn from this: A coin can effect exchange, since the sale was completed through the pulling of the pouch containing the money.

And learn from this: A coin can be acquired through exchange, since the second pouch of money was acquired through the exchange acquisition performed with the first pouch.

The difficulty therefore arises for the one who says that a coin cannot effect exchange, and the difficulty arises for the one who says that a coin cannot be acquired through exchange.

He explained,

that is,

Rav Aḥa

explained Reish Lakish’s statement: Reish Lakish did not speak of all money, but rather

of

a pouch full of

“Anka dinars”

and

of

a pouch full of “Anigra

dinars,”

which they exchanged with one another. And what are “Anka dinars” and “Anigra dinars”?

One

of them is a dinar

that the government invalidated,

as the king ordered that this dinar not be used in commerce in any of the countries under his rule. [But the inhabitants of the country accept it secretly.]

And the other

of them is a dinar

that a state invalidated,

as the inhabitants of that state despise it and refrain from using it, whereas in the other countries of the king they use this dinar in commerce, since the king did not issue an order against it.

And since these coins are not used in commerce, they do not have the status of coins, and they can acquire and be acquired through exchange.

And it is necessary

to teach us that both a dinar invalidated by the government and a dinar invalidated by a state are not considered coins.

For had it taught us

that a dinar

invalidated by the government

is not considered a coin, we could not have derived from this ruling that a dinar invalidated by a state is not considered a coin.

For we might have said: Only a coin invalidated by the government is not considered a coin

because it is entirely unusable,

as it cannot be used in commerce

at all,

in any of the king’s countries.

But

a coin

invalidated by a state

but not invalidated by the government,

which is usable in another state,

where they do not despise this coin,

I might say,

we might say:

It is still

[still]

a coin

and is considered such,

and

therefore

a coin cannot be acquired through exchange.

And

likewise,

had it taught us

that a dinar

invalidated by a state

is not considered a coin, we could not have derived from this ruling that a dinar invalidated by the government is not considered a coin.

For we might have said: Only a coin invalidated by a state is not considered a coin

because in

this state, at least,

it is unusable

at all,

neither secretly nor openly.

But

a coin

invalidated by the government,

but not invalidated by a state,

which is usable,

at least

secretly, I might say: It is still a coin

and is considered such,

and

therefore

a coin cannot be acquired through exchange.

Therefore:

It is necessary

to state explicitly the law of both of these dinars, since the law of one cannot be derived from the law of the other.

Rabba said that Rav Huna said:

If a person is holding money in his hand and says to his fellow,

“Sell me

this item

for

the

money

that I am holding,” and the seller did not insist on asking how much it was and accepted it from the buyer,

the buyer acquires

the item with this money, and neither of them may retract.