Bava Metzia 26b — the Talmud in English

Rav Nahman said: If a person

saw a sela ![](pamud.bmp "

tochnoe raspolozhenie stranitsy")

that fell from two people

among two people —

he is obligated to return it.

What is the reason?

Because

the person from whom it fell

has not given up hope of recovering it.

Since

he says to himself

the person who lost it:

“After all, no one else was with me

except this one.”

That is, no one was with me except this person who accompanied me. Therefore,

“I will seize him”

that is, I will hold this person responsible,

“and say to him: You are the one who took it!”

And I will make him take an oath imposed by the court that he did not take it.

Therefore, the person who lost the item does not give up hope immediately when he realizes that the item is missing.

Accordingly, when the finder picked it up, he became obligated to return it. Although the person who lost it will eventually give up hope, the law follows Abaye, who holds that giving up hope without knowledge of the loss is not considered giving up hope.

But

in

a case where he saw a lost item fall from among

three

people, even if it has an identifying mark,

he is not obligated to return it.

What is the reason?

Because

the person from whom it fell

certainly gives up hope. He says

to himself:

“After all, there were two people with me

that is, two other people were with me.

If I seize this one,

one of them, he

will say

that is, he will say to me:

“I did not take it.”

That is, I did not take the lost item.

And if I seize this one,

the second one, -

he will say

he too:

“I did not take it.”

Accordingly, he cannot make either of them take an oath imposed by the court, because he cannot make a definite claim against either one. He can make only an uncertain claim: Perhaps you are the one who took it. A person is not made to take an oath on the basis of an uncertain claim, except in certain cases stated in Tractate Shevuot.

This is what was meant by the statement, “Rav Nahman followed his own reasoning”: his statement here, concerning a lost item that fell from three people, accords with his reasoning above concerning an item found in an inn.

Rava said:

that

when there are three

people,

he is not obligated to return it, we said this only

when there is not

in it

in the lost item enough value for

one peruta for each and every one

of them.

But if there is in it the value of one peruta for each and every one,

meaning that the lost item is worth three perutot,

he is obligated to return it.

What is the reason?

Because

perhaps

they

are partners

in this lost item, and each trusts the others and does not suspect his companion of stealing his share. When the person who lost it feels in his pocket and does not find it, he does not give up hope, because he says to himself: “Certainly one of the partners found it, and, to my distress, he is keeping silent and is not telling me; but he will certainly return my share to me in the end.” Therefore, they

did not give up hope of recovering it

immediately when they learned that the item was missing. Accordingly, when the lost item came into the finder's possession, it came into his possession before the owners gave up hope, and therefore he is obligated to return it.

But if the lost item is not worth three perutot, he is not obligated to return it, since either way:

If all three are partners in it, there is no obligation to return a lost item, because there is not a peruta's worth to return to each one.

If the lost item belongs to one or two of them, the owners certainly gave up hope of recovering it. If it belongs to one of them, he gives up hope because he thinks that one of his companions found it. After all, he has already asked them several times, and they did not return it to him.

And if the lost item belongs to two of them, they too certainly give up hope of recovering it, because they think that when they come to the third person and demand the lost item from him, he will say to them: “I did not take it; rather, one of you stole it from the other.”

Some say

that Rava did not come to explain Rav Nahman's words, but to disagree with him. Thus

Rava said: Even though it is worth only two perutot,

so that it is not worth a peruta to each of them, nevertheless

he is obligated to return it.

What is the reason?

Because

perhaps

all three of them really are

partners

in the found item,

and

afterward

one of them relinquished his share in favor of his companion

that is, one of them waived his share in favor of his companion. Accordingly, each of the partners has a peruta's worth. Since they were originally partners, they trust one another and do not suspect one another, and it follows that the lost item came into the finder's possession before they gave up hope.

And Rava said:

If

a person saw

a

sela that fell

from another person, if he

took it before the owner gave up hope

that is, before enough time passed for the person who lost it to feel in his pocket and realize that the item was missing,

with the intention of stealing it—he

violates all of them

all the following prohibitions and positive commandments:

Because of

what is stated:

“You shall not steal,”

since he intended to steal it.

And because of

the positive commandment

“You shall surely return them,”

which is stated concerning lost property, since he took it without intending to return it.

And because of

the prohibition

“You may not disregard it,”

which is stated concerning lost property, since the meaning of this prohibition is that he must not disregard returning it, whereas this person took it with the intention of stealing it.

And although he returned it

the finder returned the lost item to its owners

after the owner had given up hope—

it is merely a gift

in general

that he gives him, and the prohibition that he committed—

he has committed it

the prohibition has already been violated.

And if he

took it before the owner gave up hope with the intention of returning it

to its owner,

and after the owner gave up hope

intended to steal it, he violates

only

the commandment “You shall surely return them.”

But he does not violate “You shall not steal,” because when he picked it up, he intended to return it.

And he likewise does not transgress on account of “you shall not be able to disregard,” for he did not disregard the lost object, but lifted it in order to return it.

And if

he waited for it

for the lost object and did not take it,

until the owners despaired—

and

then

he took it, he transgresses only on account of “you shall not be able to disregard”

alone,

for he disregarded the lost object and did not take it immediately when he saw it . But he does not transgress on account of “you shall not rob” or on account of “you shall surely return them,” for the owners had already despaired of the lost object, and it is therefore ownerless.

Rava said: This one who sees

one who saw

that his fellow’s coins fell among the sands

among the sands,

and found them and took them

and found them and took them—

does not

have an obligation to return them to him.

What is the reason?

Because

the one from whom they fell

has despaired

and has certainly despaired of the lost object .

And

even though he saw him

the finder saw the owner of the lost object

bring a sieve and sift

that he brought a sieve and sifts the sand with it, nevertheless he is not obligated to return it, because we say that the one who lost it indeed despaired of his lost object, except that

he said

in his heart:

Just as mine fell from me, so too something fell from another person, and I will find my object

just as a lost object was lost from me, so too a lost object was lost from another person, and perhaps I will find it.

Mishna:

If

he found

a person found an object that has no identifying mark

in a store

belonging to another person—

these belong to him .

Because the owners despair, since many people enter there.

And if he found

between the chest and the shopkeeper

the shopkeeper sits before the chest, takes his merchandise from it, and places it before him on top of it—and sells it. And the money that they pay him—he also places in the chest—then the find is

the shopkeeper’s.

Since everything that falls between the chest and the shopkeeper fell from the shopkeeper’s hands, it certainly belongs to the shopkeeper. And he does not despair, because other people do not enter this part of the store, and it is clear to him that he will find his lost object before others do . [And at the beginning, it concerns one who found the lost object in the part of the store in front of the chest, where the customers stand.]

The first clause concerns one who found the lost item in the part of the shop in front of the box, where the customers stand ].

And the same is the law regarding one who finds coins

before a money changer

a person who exchanges money. If he found them before the table on which the money changer and the customers place their money—

these belong to him.

For the table separates between the money changer and his customers, and if the coins belonged to the money changer, they should have been found in the place where he stands, between him and the table.

But if he found coins

between the chair

the base upon which the tabletop rests—

and the money changer, they belong to the money changer.

For in such a case, they certainly fell from him.

One who purchases produce from his fellow, or whose fellow sends him produce, and finds in it

among it

coins—

these belong to him.

And the reason will be explained in the Gemara.

But

if they were

the coins

bundled, he takes them—

and proclaims them,

because in such a case there is an identifying mark in the coins, either in the form of the knot of the bundle or in the number of the coins.

Gemara:

Rabbi Elazar said: What we learned—that one who finds [coins] before a money changer, these belong to him—means

even

if the coins were

lying on top of a table,

and not only if they were found before the table. And the reason is that those who come to exchange also place their money there, and the owner of the lost object despairs.

We learned: Before a money changer—

these belong to him.

It implies:

but

if the coins were found

on top of a table—

they are

the money changer’s,

and not as Rabbi Elazar said!

Say the latter clause: Between the chair and the money changer—

the money changer’s.

It implies:

but

if they were found

on top of a table—

they are

his,

and in accordance with Rabbi Elazar!

Rather, from this,

from our Mishna,

there is nothing to infer

it is impossible to derive this law.

And Rabbi Elazar—from this,

the law that he stated,

from where did he derive it?

Rava said: Our Mishna posed a difficulty to him

our Mishna was difficult for him. For if the law is that coins found on the table belong to the money changer,

why is it particularly that it teaches

that if he found [them]

between the chair and the money changer—

they are

the money changer’s? Let it teach

a greater novelty: that if he found [them]

on

the

table,

even though the customers also place their money there, they are the money changer’s!

Alternatively,

let it teach

“one who found [them] at the tables,”

that is, in the money changer’s house, in which case it would imply that the coins were found on the floor of the house,

as it teaches

at

the beginning

concerning a store:

one who found [them] in a store—

these are

his!

Rather,

from the fact that the tan‍nay did not teach in this way, but taught “one who found [them] before a money changer,”

infer from it

that

even

if the coins were

lying

the coins

on top of a table—

these belong to him.

For the expression “before” implies even on the table that is before him.

We learned in our Mishna:

One who purchases produce from his fellow, and so on.