Bava Metzia 27a — the Talmud in English

Rish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Yannai: They taught this

that they are his

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in

a person who

buys from a merchant

[who bought the produce from a trader who buys produce from many people and afterward sells it to others], for it is not known from whom the produce came, and therefore the buyer does not know to whom to return the money. And a proclamation is of no benefit, since there is no identifying mark in the money.

But when he buys from a householder—

he is obligated to return it to him

the money, for it is certainly his.

And likewise a tanna taught before Rav Naḥman: They taught—

.

only when he buys from the merchant.

But when he buys from a householder—

he is obligated to return it.

Rav Naḥman said to him: Does the householder himself thresh

[the grain]? Many laborers threshed it. And since this is so, it is possible that the money fell from them; why, then, is he obligated to return it to the householder?

He said to him: Shall I erase it

[shall I remove this beraita from my version]?!

He said to him: No,

that is not what I intended! Rather,

interpret the Mishna

as referring

to a case where he threshed it through his Canaanite male slave and female slave,

for in such a case the money certainly belongs to the householder, whether it fell from him or whether it fell from his Canaanite slaves, since whatever a slave acquires, his master acquires.

Mishna:

It is written in the Scripture: “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep straying and conceal yourself from them; you shall surely return them to your brother, and so shall you do with his donkey, and so shall you do with his garment, and so shall you do with every lost object of your brother that is lost from him and you find it; you may not conceal yourself.”

The garment, too, was included among all these

[within the general statement “and so shall you do with every lost object of your brother,” as is explained in the Gemara].

And why did it go out

in a special verse, “and so shall you do with his garment”?

To compare other lost objects to it

and

to tell you: Just as a garment is distinctive

in these matters,

in that it has identifying marks,

for generally there is an identifying mark in clothing,

and

so

it has claimants,

for it was certainly made by a person and did not come from ownerless property,

so, too, every object

that has identifying marks and has claimants—

he is obligated to proclaim it.

But an object that has no identifying mark, or an object concerning which we know that its owners despaired of it, he is not obligated to proclaim it.

Gemara:

And we raise a difficulty concerning it:

What

is meant by what we learned in the Mishna,

“included among all these”?

Rava said: Included

in what is stated in the Scripture: “And so shall you do with

every lost object of your brother

and so on, you may not conceal yourself,” for this verse includes all types of lost objects, and the garment is also included in this.

Rava said:

Although it has been explained in our Mishna why the verse specified “a garment,” it is still necessary to explain

why it was necessary that the Merciful One write

and specify

the Merciful One

the other objects:

“an ox,” “a donkey,” “a sheep,” and “a garment”?

And Rava explains:

They are necessary

[the Torah needed to specify these objects], because from each of these specifications a new teaching is heard.

For if the Merciful One had written

the law of returning only with regard to

a garment, I might have said

that

this applies

to returning a lost object specifically

with witnesses concerning its body, and identifying marks concerning its body.

When there are witnesses who testify concerning the body of the lost object that it belongs to the owner of the lost object, or when he has identifying marks on the body of the lost object.

But

to return

a donkey with witnesses concerning its saddle, and identifying marks concerning its saddle,

where they testify concerning the saddle that it is his, or where he has identifying marks on the saddle showing that it is his—

I might say

that

we do not return it to him

the donkey on the basis of these identifying marks,

For this purpose

the Merciful One wrote

an additional verse,

“a donkey,”

to teach us

that even a donkey on the basis of identifying marks of the saddle.—

he returns it.

And we still remain with the need to explain:

“an ox” and “a sheep,” which the Merciful One wrote—

why are they necessary?

What novelty is there in them?

“An ox”—

to teach us

that even the shearing of its tail.

He must return even the hair at the end of its tail [if it was sheared from it].

And “a sheep”—

.

to

teach us that he must also return

its shearings

of the sheep.

And we raise a difficulty concerning it:

Let the Merciful One write “an ox”

to teach us

that even the shearing of its tail, and

we will know on our own that if he must return the shearing of its tail,

all the more so a sheep with its shearings!

Rather, Rava said: “A donkey” in the context of a pit,

the word “donkey” stated in the verse concerning liability for damage caused by a pit: “When a man opens a pit, or when a man digs a pit and does not cover it, and an ox or a donkey falls into it, the owner of the pit shall pay, and so on,”

according to

the method of

Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that one is liable for damage to vessels in a pit, and disagrees with the Sages, who hold that they expound “a donkey—but not vessels”; if so, according to his method this word is superfluous,

and

so too the word

“sheep,” which

is in the verse concerning

a lost object,

is superfluous

according to everyone—

A difficulty!

And we challenge:

And perhaps

that which is stated, “a sheep”—

to

the obligation to return the

dung

of the animal

is what it came for!

For if only “an ox” had been written, we would have thought that only the shearing of its tail must be returned. But dung, which is not significant, need not be returned. Therefore “a sheep” was stated, to teach us that even dung must be returned!

And we say:

Dung—

its owners declare it ownerless

for the one who found the animal and troubles himself with returning it.

And we challenge:

And perhaps

what the Torah wrote, “a sheep,”

to

inform us that a lost object is returned on the basis of

identifying marks is what it came for?

For it was asked of us

below: Is the returning of a lost object on the basis of

identifying marks

from

the Torah

or

or is it indeed that from the Torah one returns only on the basis of witnesses, who testify that the lost object truly belongs to the one claiming it, and only from

the Torah requires returning an item only on the basis of witnesses who testify that the lost item truly belongs to the claimant, while only

the Sages

does one also return on the basis of identifying marks?

For this reason

the Merciful One wrote “a sheep,”

to inform us

that even on the basis of identifying marks we return it.

If so, let us resolve from here that

identifying marks are from the Torah!

They said: Since the tanna taught it

the matter of

identifying marks concerning a garment, as he taught: Just as a garment is distinctive in that it has identifying marks and has claimants—

he is obligated to proclaim it; so, too, every object that has identifying marks and has claimants—he is obligated to proclaim it—

learn from it that “a sheep”—

did not come for identifying marks,

but for another matter, which we do not know.

The Sages taught:

That which is stated concerning the returning of a lost object,

“that is lost”—

comes to teach us that specifically an object considered a “lost object” must be returned,

to exclude

a lost object that is not worth a peruta,

which is not considered a lost object.

Rabbi Judah says:

This matter is learned from the word

“and you find it,”

which implies that one must return specifically something that is considered a find,

excluding a lost object that is not worth a peruta,

which is not considered a find.

What is the difference between them?

What practical difference emerges? In the end, both learn from Scripture that a lost object that is not worth a peruta need not be returned!

Abaye said:

Indeed, there is no practical difference, but

the significance of the expositions—

there is a difference between them.

That is, from where this law may be learned.

The Master,

the first tanna,

derives it [

this meaning emerges for him]

from

the words

“that is lost.”

And

if

the Master,

Rabbi Judah,

derives it from “and you find it.”

And we raised a difficulty concerning this:

But according to the one who derives it from “that is lost,”

the first tanna,

what does he do with this “and you find it,”

what does he derive from this verse

what does he learn from this Scriptural passage?

And we say:

That

same Scriptural passage

is needed for the teaching of Ravinai [

it is needed in order to learn from it the law stated by Ravinai].

For Ravinai said:

It is written concerning the returning of a lost object: “And so you shall do for every lost object of your brother that is lost from him

and you find it.”

And that which is stated in this verse, “and you find it,” in the past tense,

implies that it has come to his hand [

that it has already come to his hand]

.

And Scripture comes to teach us that the expression in this verse, “the lost object of your brother,” which implies that one is obligated to return only the lost object of an Israelite, and excludes the lost object of gentiles , does not mean only that he need not trouble himself to lift it. Rather, if it has already come to his hand, he is obligated to return it; instead, even if the lost object has already come to his hand, he need not return it, but it is permitted to him .

And according to the one who derives

the exclusion of something that is not worth a peruta

from “and you find it,” what does he do with this “that is lost”—

what does he derive from it?

He needs it for the teaching of Rabbi Yohanan.

For Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai: From where is it derived concerning a lost object that a river swept away—

that it is permitted?

As it is stated: “So shall you do for every lost object of your brother that is lost from him and you find it.”

The expression “that is lost from him” implies

one that is lost from him—

but is found by every other person

who encounters it.

Excluded

is

this

lost object that a river swept away,

which is lost from him—

and

also

is not found by every person.

And since it was necessary to write “from him,” it also wrote “that is lost.”

And the other one,

Rabbi Judah, who excludes from “and you find it” a lost object that is not worth a peruta,

this that

was said by

Ravinai—

from where does he derive it?

He derives it from

the letter vav of the word

“and you find it,”

which is superfluous, and implies that it was already found and is in his hand.

And the other one,

the first tanna, who excludes from “that is lost from him” a lost object that is not worth a peruta,

this

of Rabbi Yohanan—

from where does he derive it?

He derives it

from the word

“from him”

that is stated in that verse, which implies that it is lost specifically from him, but for other people it is found. And “that is lost” comes to exclude a lost object that is not worth a peruta.

And the other one,

Rabbi Judah, maintains that the entire expression “that is lost from him” is needed for this exposition, because the word

“from him”

by itself

does not imply to him

that it should be expounded from it.

Rava said:

There is also a practical difference between the first tanna and Rabbi Judah:

A peruta whose value decreased,

a lost object that was worth a peruta at the time it was lost, and subsequently decreased in value, so that at the time it was found it was worth less than a peruta—

there is a difference between them.

The one who says

that less than a peruta is excluded

from “that is lost,”

if so, in the case of a peruta whose value decreased,

there is a peruta’s worth,

for the expression “that is lost” implies the time of the loss, and at that time the lost object was worth a peruta.

And

if

the one who says

that it is excluded

from “and you find it”—

in such a case

there is no

peruta’s worth, for the expression “and you find it” implies the time of the finding, and at that time it had already decreased in value and was not worth a peruta.

And we raised an objection:

But according to the one who says

that it is learned from

“that is lost,”

in the end

we require

that

“and you find it” also be fulfilled—

and there is none,

for at the time of the finding it was not worth a peruta, since ultimately its value decreased!

Rather, a peruta whose value increased,

where at the time it was lost the lost object was worth less than a peruta, and afterward, at the time it was found, its value increased and it became worth a peruta—

there is a difference between them.

The one who says

that it is learned from

“and you find it”—

in such a case

there is

a peruta’s worth, since at the time of the finding it was worth a peruta!

And the one who says

that it is learned from

“that is lost”—

in such a case

there is no

peruta’s worth, since at the time of the loss it was not worth a peruta!

And we raised an objection:

But according to the one who says

that it is learned from

“and you find it,”

in the end

we require

that

“that is lost” also be fulfilled—

and there is none,

for at the time of the loss it was not worth a peruta!

Rather,

a lost object that was worth

a peruta

at the time it was lost,

whose value decreased

afterward,

and

again

its value increased

and it became worth a peruta at the time it was found—

there is a difference between them.

The one who says

that it is learned from

“that is lost”—

in such a case

there is

a peruta’s worth, since it was worth a peruta both at the time it was lost and at the time it was found.

And the one who says

that it is learned from

“and you find it,” it is required that it have the measure of a find from the time of the loss until the time of the finding.

For from the vav of the word “and you find it” it implies that there must be continuity from the time of “that is lost” until the time of “and you find it.” If so, in such a case, where there was a period between the time of the loss and the time of the finding during which it was not worth a peruta, he is not obligated to return it .

And now the Gemara returns to the question that was already mentioned above in passing.

It was asked of them

the members of the beit midrash: Is the law of returning a lost object on the basis of

signs,

without witnesses,

from the Torah

or is it,

or

perhaps only

rabbinic,

that we return it on the basis of signs, but by Torah law we return it only on the basis of witnesses?

For

what practical difference does it make?