Bava Metzia 22a (כב.) — the Talmud in English

And likewise

the river

Jordan [the same law applies to the other rivers as well; rather, the tanna who taught this beraita was sitting near the Jordan],

which

overflowed

its banks, and as a result

took from this one

something

and gave

the object

to that one,

whom the river brought it to—

In all three of these cases, the law is that

what he took—

he took, and what he gave—

he gave.

That is, the object belongs to the person who ultimately received it, because it is presumed that the owners despaired of recovering it.

Now,

granted

when it was taken from him by

a robber and the Jordan,

it is understandable that the object belongs to the recipient, because

he saw

them [i.e., the owner saw them]

when they took it from him—

and despaired,

and this is conscious despair.

But

when it was taken from him by

a thief, did he see him [does the owner of the object see the thief]—

and therefore

despair

? The theft is performed secretly, with no one seeing it!

Rather, it is evident from here that since, when he ultimately learns of it, he will despair, this is considered despair already now, in accordance with Rava’s statement!

Rav Pappa translated it:

What we learned in the beraita concerning “a thief” refers

to an armed bandit,

that is, a thief who took the object from him by force. If so, he despaired of the object from the outset.

We raise an objection:

If so,

the thief mentioned in the beraita—

that is a robber!

A robber, too, takes by force! Why, then, is “a robber” mentioned twice in the beraita? The Gemara explains: The tanna taught

two types of robber [two forms of robbery]:

a. An ordinary robber, who does not fear people or hide from them, but robs openly and brazenly.

b. An armed bandit, who initially hides from people and takes by force with the weapons in his possession only when the need arises.

Come and hear:

If

a river swept away

a person’s

beams [wooden beams], or

his

wood and stones [or his stones],

and placed them in another’s field, they belong to the latter [to the other person].

The reason is

because

there is publicity concerning this matter: The river swept away a person’s beams, and the owners know of it, and

the owners despaired

before the lost property came into the finder’s possession.

this matter becomes publicly known: people know that the river swept away the person’s beams, so the owners know about it and

It follows that

the reason is

because we know that

the owners despaired. But ordinarily,

in the case of another lost object, of which the owners are unaware—

no,

it is not despair, and it does not belong to its finder. This is difficult for Rava, who holds that unconscious despair is despair! The Gemara rejects this:

What are we dealing with here?

When the owners can

save

their beams, wood, and stones.

What are we dealing with here?—

Accordingly, we should infer from the beraita as follows: Only in such a case, where the owners know of their loss and did not attempt to save it, does it belong to the finder. But ordinarily, in a similar case, where the owners can save it—for example, a lost object bearing an identifying mark—but they are unaware of their loss, he is obligated to return it! As we said above, in such a case Rava concedes to Abaye that there is no despair, since the owners can recover their lost object themselves.

We raise a difficulty:

If so, say

that what we learned in the

latter clause of the beraita:

If the owners were pursuing them [the beams, wood, and stones]—

the finder is obligated

to

return

their lost property to them, because their pursuit proves that they did not despair.

And

if

the case concerns one where the owners

can

save it,

meaning that although this is an object without an identifying mark, people will nevertheless not hasten to acquire the beams, but will leave them so that their owners can come and take them,

then

why is it specifically

when the owners

pursue

their lost property that the finder is obligated to return it?

Even

if they

do not pursue it—

also

the owners have not despaired, and he is obligated to return it, since the owners rely on being able to save it on another day!

their lost property?

The Gemara explains:

What are we dealing with here?

With a case

where

the owners can

save it only

with difficulty.

If they do not hurry to save it now, they will no longer be able to save it.

Therefore, if the owners

pursue it,

this proves that

they have not despaired [they have not yet despaired].

But if they

do not pursue it—

they certainly

despaired completely.

They knew that the lost object had gone from them, yet they did not trouble themselves to save it. If so, they certainly abandoned it, and it is permitted to anyone who finds it.

Come and hear: How did they say

that

one who separates teruma without the owners’ knowledge

has

his teruma considered teruma?

If a person descended

into another’s field,

picked

produce,

and separated teruma

from it on the produce of the owner of the field

without the owners’ authorization,

if

the owner

is concerned about robbery,

meaning that he objects to the fact that the person separated teruma without his authorization, and regards this as robbery—

his teruma

of the one who descended into the field

is not teruma.

without the owners’ permission.

But if not,

if he does not object to this—

his teruma is teruma.

And how does he [the one who separated teruma]

know whether the owner is concerned

about robbery

or not?

If the owner of the field came and found him

in his field while he was separating teruma, and said to him: Go to the better ones!

That is, you should have gone to better produce and given teruma from it to the kohen!

The law is then as follows:

If

it is indeed

found

in the field that there is produce

better than it—

his teruma is teruma.

For the owner’s words prove that he is pleased with his fellow’s action; indeed, he would have preferred that even better produce be given.

But if not,

if no better produce was found, then surely when he said to him, “Go to the better ones,”

he said it angrily. That is, “It is fortunate that you did not rob me of better produce!” Therefore,

his teruma is not teruma.

And if

the owners picked

additional produce

and added it to it, in either case—

either way,

whether better produce was found or not—

his teruma is teruma,

since by this act they demonstrated that they consented to the separation of teruma.

And

now, according to Abaye,

when better produce was found—

why is his teruma teruma?

After all,

at the time he separated teruma [when the one separating teruma performed the act],

the owner did not know

about it, and therefore the owner had not consented at the time of the separation!

Rather, it must be that since when the owner learned of it he was pleased with it, it is as though he had been pleased with it already at the time of the separation. The same applies with regard to despair: Since when the owner learned of the lost object he despaired of it, it is as though he had despaired of it from the outset, in accordance with Rava’s statement!

Rava explained it according to Abaye [Rava interpreted the beraita in a manner that does not pose a difficulty for Abaye]: The case is not one of a person separating teruma without any knowledge or authorization; rather,

he made

the person separating teruma

his agent

to separate teruma on his behalf. Therefore, it is unnecessary for the owner to express his consent to the separation itself, but only to its manner, as will be explained below.

After all,

at the time when he separated the offering [

And we say:

It is also logically evident [that this is indeed the likely explanation], that the owner of the produce appointed him as an agent.

For if it enters your mind

that the case is

where he did not appoint him as an agent, would

under such circumstances

his teruma be teruma?

But

it is written concerning the separation of teruma: “So you too shall raise the teruma of the Lord, etc.” Since the Torah did not say, “So you shall raise,”

you,” but rather “you too,” the Merciful One stated, the additional word “too” teaches

to include

your

agent, that an agent may also separate teruma.

that the case concerns

one whom the owner did not make an agent, would

in such a case

his offering be valid?

But

it is written concerning the separation of an offering: “So shall you also separate the offering of the Lord, and so on.” Since the Torah did not say, “So shall you separate

you,”

but rather

“the Lord said: also you,”

the extra word “also” teaches

to include

the

agents of the owners,

that an agent too may separate an offering.

And since the agent was equated with the one who separates teruma, the verse is expounded further:

just as you

yourselves separate teruma

knowingly [with your knowledge and consent],

so too your agent

must separate it specifically

with your knowledge!

Rather, with what are we dealing here?

For example, he appointed

the owner of the produce

as his agent and said to him: Go [go]

and separate teruma! But he did not say to him: Separate teruma from these [produce], but merely told him to separate teruma.

And the ordinary practice of a homeowner when he separates teruma

is that he separates it from medium-quality produce [and generally, a homeowner separates teruma from medium-quality produce].

And he went,

and the agent went

and separated teruma

on his own initiative

from

the produce of the

finest quality. Since this was the case—that the ordinary practice of a homeowner is to separate from medium-quality produce, whereas the agent separated from the finest—we must determine whether, in such a case, he fulfilled the homeowner’s agency, or whether by separating from the finest he deviated from the terms of his agency.

And

afterward

the homeowner came and found him

to have separated teruma from the finest produce,

and said to him: Go to the finest!

The law is then as follows:

If there were found

produce

finer than it—

his separation is valid.

For it has become clear to us that this homeowner’s practice is always to separate from the finest produce, and this agent properly fulfilled his agency.

But if not—

his separation is not valid.

As explained above, since no produce finer than it was found, he certainly spoke in anger when he said this to him, and in fact his practice is to separate from medium-quality produce, like all homeowners. If so, this separation was not performed by his agency.

Ameimar, Mar Zutra, and Rav Ashi happened to arrive at the orchard of Mari bar Isak [they happened to come upon the orchard of Mari bar Isak on their way].

His sharecropper brought

Mari bar Isak’s sharecropper brought

dates and pomegranates and placed them before them [and placed them before them]. Mari bar Isak was not there at that time.

Ameimar and Rav Ashi ate

from the produce, whereas

Mar Zutra—

did not eat,

because he was concerned that this might involve theft.

Meanwhile

Mari bar Isak arrived,

the owner of the orchard, and

found them [and found the Sages sitting in his orchard].

And he said to his sharecropper: Why did you not bring the Sages some of those finer fruits [Why did you not give the Sages some of these fruits, which are of better quality]? Still, Mar Zutra did not want to eat from the produce.

Ameimar and Rav Ashi said to Mar Zutra: Now,

now, after Mari bar Isak’s words,

why does the Master not eat? For it was taught:

with regard to teruma:

If there were found fruits finer than it—

his separation is valid!

Since this was the case, the homeowner revealed his דעת, that he wanted the agent to separate teruma on his behalf.

Accordingly, the same applies here: Since there were in fact finer fruits there, Mari bar Isak certainly wants his sharecropper to give fruits to them.

He said to them,

Mar Zutra said to Ameimar and Rav Ashi:

This is what Rava said: They said

that

“Go to the finest”

constitutes a revelation of intent

only with regard to teruma, because it is a mitzva, and

therefore we say that

he is pleased

with what the owner of the produce separated.

But here,

in the case of Mari bar Isak—

it was because of embarrassment [because of shame]

that he said this,

that it was his wish for his sharecropper to give them fruits. But it is possible that in the depths of his heart he does not want this.

It is written in the Torah: “And if he places water on seed and some of their carcass falls upon it, it is impure for you.” We learn from this verse that produce becomes impure through contact with a creeping animal only after liquid has come upon it, for this is its preparation to receive ritual impurity. The liquid must come upon it with the consent of the owner, as will be explained below.

Come and hear:

If a person spread produce on his roof and dew fell upon it during the night, if, when the owner of the produce saw it in the morning,

the

dew was still

upon it,

and he

was pleased

that there was dew upon it—

this is

considered

within

the general principle stated with regard to the preparation of produce for ritual impurity: “And

when he gives

water upon seed, and some of their carcass falls upon it,” and the produce was thereby prepared to receive ritual impurity, because his pleasure demonstrates that this was his will.

But if

the produce dried [became dry] before its owner saw it,

even though

when he learned that dew had fallen upon it, he

was pleased

with this—