Bava Metzia 22b (כב:) — the Talmud in English

are not subject to “when he places,”

and have not become susceptible to receiving ritual impurity.

What is the reason

[for this]?

Is it

not because we do not say

that

once it has become clear that he is now pleased with it

[that it has now been revealed that he is pleased with this], we also say that

from the outset as well he was pleased with it,

and if so, this is difficult for Rava’s position, according to which relinquishment without knowledge is considered relinquishment?

The Gemara rejects this:

It is different there,

with regard to making produce susceptible to receiving ritual impurity,

as it is written

in that context:

“When he places,” until he himself places

water upon the produce.

We raise an objection:

If so,

in the

first clause,

where the dew is still upon the produce,

also not

should the produce become susceptible, since he did not place water upon it!?

The Gemara explains:

There—

in accordance with

the explanation

of Rav Pappa.

For Rav Pappa juxtaposed the following verses: It is written, “When he places,”

which implies that the person himself places water upon the produce.

And we read

[and the vocalization of the words is]

“when it is placed,”

which implies that water falls upon the produce by itself.

How is this possible?

How can this contradiction be resolved?

Rav Pappa explains:

We require

that

“when it is placed” be

analogous to “when he places.”

Just as with “when he places,”

when the person himself places the water upon the produce, he places it

knowingly,

with awareness,

so too with “when it is placed,”

when the water falls upon the produce by itself, it must fall

knowingly,

with the knowledge of the owner of the produce. Therefore, in the latter clause, where the owner of the produce did not see that water had fallen upon it, although he was pleased, it did not become susceptible to receiving ritual impurity.

Come and hear, as Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael ben Yehotzadak: From where do we know that an item lost when swept away by a river is permitted,

even if it bears an identifying mark?

As it is written

with regard to returning a lost item:

“And so you shall do for his donkey, and so you shall do for his garment, and so you shall do for every lost item of your brother that is lost from him and you find it.”

The word “from him” is superfluous. It is expounded to teach that specifically

one whose

lost item

is lost from him—

but

still

is available to

all

other people,

so that others can find it—is obligated to return it.

Excluded

from this category is

this

lost item, which was swept away by a river,

which is lost from him, and

also

is not available to everyone,

since when it is swept away by a river, no one can save it; therefore, it is permitted.

And since the same verse teaches both the law of an item available to everyone and the law of an item not available to everyone, and the two are juxtaposed, we learn that

the prohibited case,

an ordinary lost item, which is not permitted to the finder, is

analogous to the permitted case,

an item swept away by a river, which is permitted to the finder:

Just as

an item lost in

the permitted case,

which is not available to everyone, the Torah did not distinguish

between one that bears an identifying mark and one that does not,

and in both cases

it is permitted

[it is permitted to him],

so too

an item lost in

the prohibited case,

which is available to everyone and must be returned to its owner, the Torah did not distinguish

between one that bears an identifying mark,

which its owner does not relinquish,

and one that does not bear an identifying mark

—it is forbidden.

Now, how is the case of an item available to everyone that lacks an identifying mark to be understood?

If the owner learned of the loss before the item came into the finder’s possession, then it is certainly permitted, since he took it after relinquishment!

Rather, it must be that the owner learned of the loss only after it came into the finder’s possession.

And if Rava’s statement is correct, that relinquishment without knowledge is considered relinquishment, then even in such a case it should be permitted to him! Rather, certainly, relinquishment without knowledge is not considered relinquishment, in accordance with Abaye!

A refutation of Rava!

And we conclude: Indeed, this beraita is

a refutation

of Rava.

And the halakha follows Abaye in the cases represented by ya’al kagem. ["

“Ya’al kagem” is an acronym for six halakhic principles:

A.

Y

Relinquishment without knowledge, the subject of our passage,

B. One who plots retroactively becomes disqualified, in tractate Sanhedrin,

C.

L

A lehi that stands by itself, in tractate Eruvin,

D.

K

Betrothals not delivered for intercourse, in tractate Kiddushin,

E.

G

Lack of attentiveness regarding a bill of divorce, in tractate Gittin, and

F.

MOne who deliberately eats unslaughtered carcasses is disqualified with regard to testimony, in tractate Sanhedrin].

But in the other disputes between Abaye and Rava, the halakha follows Rava.

Rav Aha, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: But once Rava has been refuted

and we rule that relinquishment without knowledge is not considered relinquishment, then

these dates blown down by the wind,

dates that the wind shakes from the tree,

how may we eat them?

It is possible that their owners do not yet know that they have fallen, and this would be relinquishment without knowledge!

He said to him: Since there are vermin that eat them

those dates immediately when they fall from the tree,

from the outset,

even before they fall,

the owners relinquish them

—those fruits that will fall from the tree.

Rav Aha said to him: And if the dates belong to

orphans

[minor orphans],

who are not legally capable of waiving their rights,

and their relinquishment is not relinquishment—

what

is the law? In such a case, the dates should be forbidden! If so, why do we not take into account the possibility that the dates fell from a tree belonging to orphans?

He said to him: A valley

[a plain]

on the land of orphans—

we do not presume it to be so.

That is, we are not required to regard the entire valley as land belonging to orphans and forbid all of it because of the doubt that it may be orphan-owned land. Rather, we follow the majority, who are not orphans.

Rav Aha said to him: And if the land

is established and known

to belong to orphans—

what

Rav Aha asked him another question:

What is the law concerning fenced groves,

date palms surrounded by a stone fence, into which vermin cannot enter? If so, their owners do not relinquish them from the outset—

what

He said to him: Indeed, in these cases the dates are

forbidden—

forbidden

[they are forbidden].

We learned in our Mishna:

Bundles in the public domain—

these belong to him.

Rabba said: Even with an item

that bears an identifying mark—

these belong to him.

And from Rabba’s statement—that even when the bundles bear an identifying mark, they belong to the finder, and we do not say that the owners do not relinquish them because they rely on the identifying mark—the Gemara infers:

Apparently Rabba maintains

that

an identifying mark likely to be trampled

by people—for example, when many people pass through that place and the object itself is low and easily trampled—

is not an identifying mark.

The reason is that the owner does not rely on the identifying mark, saying to himself: It was certainly ruined by people’s footsteps.

But Rava said: They stated

with regard to bundles, that these belong to the finder,

only in the case of an item that lacks an identifying mark.

But in the case of an item that bears an identifying mark—

he is obligated to announce it.

Apparently Rava maintains: An identifying mark likely to be trampled—

is an identifying mark.

This is because the owner of the lost item still relies on the mark and assumes that it will not be trampled.

And some teach this statement independently

[there are those who transmit the dispute between Rabba and Rava independently], and do not connect the dispute between Rabba and Rava to our Mishna. They transmit the teaching as follows:

An identifying mark likely to be trampled—

Rabba said: It is not an identifying mark.

And Rava said: It is an identifying mark.

We learned: Bundles in the public domain—

these belong to him.

But bundles

in the private domain

[for example, in a planted field, which most people do not enter, while a minority do enter it]—

he takes them and announces them.

Now,

what are the circumstances?

If they lack

an identifying mark

in them,

if so, if they were found

in the private domain—

what does he announce?

What can the finder announce? They have no identifying mark that the owner of the lost item can provide in order to reclaim it!

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case

that they bear an identifying mark.

And it teaches: In the public domain, these belong to him,

even though they bear an identifying mark

! Apparently, an identifying mark likely to be trampled—

is not an identifying mark,

and therefore these belong to the finder, and

a refutation of Rava,

who said that even when an identifying mark is likely to be trampled, it remains an identifying mark!

Rava could say to you: Actually,

it is

that they lack

an identifying mark

in them.

And as for what you said

[and what you challenged], if they lack an identifying mark,

what does he announce in the private domain?

This is not a difficulty, because one can say that the finder does not announce the name of the lost item; rather, he

announces

the

place

where the lost item was found.

Thus he announces: Whoever lost an item in such-and-such a place should come and state what he lost!

The owner of the lost item will come and say: I lost such-and-such an object there.

And

if

Rabbah said: Location—

is not an identifying mark.

It was stated:

a lost item that has no identifying mark in its body, and the only identifying mark that can be provided for it is the

location

where the lost item was found,

Rabbah said: It is not an identifying mark.

And Rava said: It is an identifying mark.

Ta shma

from what we learned in a beraita:

Bundles in the public domain—

these belong to him. In the private domain—

he takes them and announces.

And large sheaves

(large bundles),

whether in the public domain or in the private domain—

he takes them and announces.

And now,

Rabbah,

who explained in our Mishna that the reason that, when found in the public domain, these belong to him is that the identifying mark has been trampled,

how does he explain it

this beraita? What is the difference between large sheaves, for which he must announce even if they were found in the public domain?

And Rava,

who said that our Mishna is referring to a case in which the bundles have no identifying mark, but the identifying mark is the location where they were found,

how does he explain it

the beraita? What is the difference between large sheaves and bundles?

And we say:

Rabbah explains according to his approach

(according to his view)—that it is referring to a case where there is

on the

bundles

an identifying mark.

And Rava explains according to his approach—

in a manner

where he announces

the location.

And now the Gemara explains its statement:

Rabbah explains according to his approach, with regard to an identifying mark:

Bundles in the public domain belong to him—