Bava Metzia 21b — the Talmud in English

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“yeiush without knowledge,”

an object that, had its owner known that it had been lost from him, he certainly would have despaired of it, but now, when the finder found it, the owners still did not know that an object had been lost from them. And when the owners learned of it, the find was already in the finder’s possession.

Abaye said: It is not yeiush,

and the finder does not acquire the find. And if the owners come and prove that they are the owners of the lost object, he is obligated to give it to them.

And Rava said:

Even in such a case—

it is yeiush,

and the finder acquired what is in his possession.

And now the Gemara explains the dispute between Abaye and Rava:

With regard to an object that has a siman—

everyone agrees that

yeiush without knowledge

is not yeiush. And even though we heard him despair in the end

even though we heard the owner of the lost object despair at the end, when he learned that it had been lost from him]—

it is not yeiush.

And the reason is

that when it came

the lost object

into his possession,

of the finder—

it came into his possession through prohibition,

because it is an object whose owner is not expected to despair,

for when he knows

the owner of the lost object

that it fell from him,

he does not despair.

Because

he says

the loser says in his heart]: Behold,

I have a siman in it [

I have a identifying mark in the lost object],

I will give the siman—

and I will take it [

I will give the identifying mark and take it] .

The early authorities wrote that the meaning is not that he took it in actual violation, for he did not intend to steal it; on the contrary, he is under an obligation to lift it, since it has a siman! Rather, the meaning is that he took it at a time of prohibition—that is, before yeiush, at a time when it was still in the owners’ possession, and it is as though he took it directly from them. And since he did not acquire it, his hand is like the owners’ hand, and he is like a bailee. If so, the object is still in the owners’ possession, and in such a case yeiush is ineffective .

Whereas

with regard to a swept-away object of the sea,

there are places on the seashore where it is the way of the sea to recede ten or fifteen parsaot twice a day, and it washes away whatever it finds there—and goes ,

and

likewise

with regard to a pool formed by a river,

where the river rises over its banks and sweeps away whatever it finds on its bank,

in these cases,

even though it has a siman

in the lost object—

the Merciful One permitted it [

the Torah permitted it], even if it came into the finder’s possession before yeiush—

as we will say later [

as will be explained in the Gemara below] .

When they dispute,

Abaye and Rava—

it is with regard to an object that has no siman.

Abaye said:

yeiush without knowledge

is not yeiush, for he did not know

the owners

that it had fallen from him,

and in actuality he did not despair!

Rava said:

In such a case

it is yeiush.

Since

for

behold,

when he knows

the owner

that it fell from him,

the lost object—certainly

he despairs,

because

he says

in his heart:

I do not have a siman in it [

I have no identifying mark in it]! Therefore it is as though

he now despairs,

for it fell from him, and once he learns of it, he no longer has his mind on it .

Mnemonic: P-M-G-Sh from M-M-K-G-T-Y K-K-S-A-Z

Come and hear

from our Mishna, where we learned that if he found

scattered produce—

it belongs to him. And the reason is that it has no siman, and therefore the owners despair of it.

And

this

when the finder found it—

the owner still did not know

of the produce

that it had fallen from him,

and this is yeiush without knowledge!?

Rather, it is proven from here that yeiush without knowledge is yeiush!

And the Gemara rejects this:

But Rav Ukva bar Hama said,

that

here we are dealing with the gathering of the threshing floor,

as was explained above,

for it is an intentional loss .

They did not fall from him; rather, he knowingly placed them there, and they are ownerless .

Ta shma

from our Mishna, where we learned that if one found

scattered coins—

they belong to him.

And

why? Did he not know that they had fallen from him!

The Gemara rejects this:

There too,

this is not despair without knowledge, but

as Rabbi Yitzhak said,

below, concerning another matter:

“A person is accustomed

to be accustomed

to feel inside his pouch

at every single hour.”

When a person carries valuables in his pouch, such as coins, he is accustomed to feel it at every hour, to check whether the coins have not fallen. And

here too,

this reasoning applies to our matter:

a person is accustomed to feel inside his pouch at every single hour,

and therefore the owner certainly knew that the coins had fallen from him before the finder found them, and this is not despair without knowledge.

Ta shma

from what we learned in our Mishna:

fig cakes and a baker’s loaves—

they belong to him.

And

why? Did he not know that they had fallen from him!

The Gemara rejects this:

There too, since they are heavy,

since fig cakes and loaves are heavy objects,

he immediately knows about them

their owner knew that they had fallen from him as soon as they fell, for he felt that the burden had become lighter upon him. If so, this is not despair without knowledge.

Ta shma

from what we learned in our Mishna:

and bundles of purple wool—

they belong to him.

And why? Did he not know that they had fallen from him!

The Gemara rejects this:

There too, since they are valuable,

since bundles of purple wool are valuable, a person carrying them is accustomed to

feel them repeatedly

at every hour, in order to make certain that they have not fallen,

and as

Rabbi

Yitzhak

said concerning coins, that a person is accustomed to feel inside his pouch at every hour.

Ta shma

from what we learned in a beraita:

one who finds coins in synagogues and in study halls, and in every place where the public is commonly found—

they belong to him, because the owners despair of them.

But he did not know

the owner

that they had fallen from him!

Rabbi Yitzhak said: A person is accustomed to feel inside his pouch at every hour,

and therefore the owner certainly knew that the coins had fallen from him before this person found them.

It is written in the Torah: “And when you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not finish reaping the corner of your field when you reap, and the gleaning of your harvest you shall not gather, and so on; for the poor and for the stranger you shall leave them; I am the Lord your God.” Here the mitzva of leaving gleanings at the time of reaping is stated. That is, if one or two stalks fell at the time of reaping, one must leave them for the poor.

However, if it is clear to us that no more poor people will come to take the gleanings, they are ownerless for everyone, and everyone is permitted to take them. We must clarify: from what time are the gleanings permitted to everyone?

Ta shma: From when are all people,

and not only the poor,

permitted to take the gleanings—

when the nemushot have passed through them.

And we say: What are the nemushot?

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Elderly people who go along in single file.

Poor elderly people who walk slowly with the support of a staff and see each and every stalk. After they have passed through the field, the other poor people despair of finding gleanings there.

Reish Lakish said:

The nemushot—that is,

those who glean after those who gleaned.

They have already gleaned in the field several times, at which point the other poor people despair.

And

it is difficult,

why

are the other people permitted to take the gleanings?

Granted that the poor people here despair,

indeed, the poor people of this place have already despaired, since they saw that the nemushot passed through it. But

there are poor people in another place

who do not know that the nemushot have already passed through the field,

for

those poor people

have not despaired

yet!

Rather, certainly despair without knowledge is despair. Therefore, since when the poor people of another place know that the nemushot passed through this field they will despair of it, this is considered as though they had already despaired now, when the nemushot passed through it, and therefore the gleanings are permitted to everyone.

The Gemara rejects this:

They said:

Indeed, it is possible to say that despair without knowledge is not despair.

Nevertheless, from the time the nemushot passed through it, everyone is permitted to take the gleanings, although the poor people of another place still do not know about this,

since there are poor people here,

therefore

those

poor people of another place—

from the outset

they despair

they despair

of the gleanings of this field.

And they say

to themselves:

the poor people there,

of this place,

are gleaning it

before us, and certainly nothing will remain for us; if so, this is despair with knowledge!

Ta shma:

If one found

figs cut for drying

figs that are cut with a knife, whose sap flows, and that are spread in the field to dry,

on the road, and even

if he found them

beside a field

in which they spread

figs cut for drying

to dry, so that it appears that they are from that field,

And likewise

if he passed beside

a fig tree

planted in the field,

leaning

whose branches lean from the field

toward the road, and he found figs beneath it,

and it is unknown whether the figs fell from this tree or were lost by one of the passersby,

they are

permitted

to the finder

on account of robbery,

for taking them does not constitute robbery.

The apparent reason is that although their owners do not presently know that they have been lost, since when they learn of it they will despair, for they have no identifying mark, this is already considered despair from now, in accordance with the words of Rava.

And

since they are ownerless produce, which everyone is permitted to take, they are

exempt from tithe,

as is the law of all ownerless property.

This law applies specifically to figs. But

with olives and carobs,

if he found them on the road beneath a tree, they are

forbidden

to take.

Apparently, this accords with Abaye, who says that despair without knowledge is not despair. If so, the first clause is difficult for Abaye, while the latter clause is difficult for Rava!

And we say:

Granted

the

first clause,

what we learned, that figs cut for drying are permitted on account of robbery—

for Abaye,

who holds that despair without knowledge is not despair—

it is not difficult.

For it is possible to say that

since

these fruits

are valuable

they are valuable—a person

feels them

at every hour. If so, as soon as they were lost, he knew of the matter, and this is not despair without knowledge.

Likewise, what we learned, that if one found figs beneath

a fig tree

leaning toward the road they are permitted on account of robbery,

also

is not difficult for Abaye, because

it is immediately known that they fell.

That is, the owners know that the nature of a fig tree is that figs fall from it, and they despair of them from the outset, since they fear that the finder will think that they fell from passersby and will take them for himself; this is despair with knowledge.

But the latter clause, for Rava,

who holds that despair without knowledge is despair—

is difficult!

For it teaches: With olives and carobs it is forbidden!

And it proves that although certainly, when he learns of it, he will despair, nevertheless, since at present he does not know, and he did not despair from the outset because olives and carobs do not ordinarily fall, they are forbidden! If so, it is proven that despair without knowledge is not despair, and this is difficult for Rava!

Rabbi Abahu said: The law of an olive is different,

the law of

an olive, since its appearance

its form

proves concerning it

from which tree it fell.

And

therefore,

even though olives fall

even though the olives fell from the tree, their owners do not despair of them, because

it is immediately known

it is known that

a person’s place—

it is the person

the person’s place is the person. That is, everyone recognizes and knows from where the olives fell and who owns the tree. And we raise an objection:

If so, even the first clause,

concerning a fig tree leaning toward the road,

, too,

the owner of the figs should not despair, for it is known that they are his! Why, then, did we learn that they are permitted on account of robbery?

Rav Pappa said: A fig—

with its falling

from the tree, immediately it

becomes repulsive,

becoming dirty and spoiled, and is no longer valuable to its owner. Therefore, since the owner of the fig tree knows that figs ordinarily fall from the tree, he despairs of them from the outset.

which is not so with olives, which are not damaged by the fall .

Come and hear: A thief who took from this one

[who stole from one person] —

and gave

his theft

to this one

[to another person],

and likewise a robber,

a person who robs by force, in broad daylight,

who took from this one —

and gave to that one,