Bava Metzia 17a — the Talmud in English

For Rav Yosef bar Minyomi said that Rav Naḥman said: If the lender summoned the borrower to court, and

the judges

said to him:

the judges:

Go out and give it to him

his debt! ![](pamud.bmp "

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And

after some time

the borrower said:

the borrower:

I paid

the debt in accordance with the court’s instruction —

he is deemed trustworthy [and he takes an oath of inducement].

but only with an oath imposed by the Sages].

And if

the lender came

before us

to write

a adrakhta document against the borrower,

we do not write it and give it to him,

for the borrower claims that he paid the debt.

But if the judges said to him:

You are obligated to give it to him,

but they did not command him to pay ,

and

after some time

the borrower said:

the borrower:

I paid —

he is not deemed trustworthy.

Rather, the lender takes an oath and collects his debt. Since he did not pay his debt initially, and the lender had to summon him to court, it is not his way to pay until they issue a completely decisive judgment against him.

Therefore, if

the

lender

comes to write

an adrakhta document against him,

we write it and give it to him.

Rav Zevid in the name of Rav Naḥman said: Both

when they said

“Go out and give it to him,”

and

both

when they said

“You are obligated to give it to him,” and

after some time

the borrower said

the borrower

“I paid” —

he is deemed trustworthy .

If the lender came to write

an adrakhta document against him —

we do not write it and give it to him.

Rather, if there is a distinction —

this is where there is a distinction [if there is a basis to distinguish, this is the basis for the distinction]:

if there is a basis for distinguishing, this is the basis]:

If

the judges said to him

the judges:

“Go out and give it to him, and

after some time

he said, “I paid,” and the witnesses testify against him that

the lender summoned him before them to pay him pursuant to the court, and

he did not pay him,

since he had the audacity to violate the court’s command in their presence,

he has been established as a denier with regard to that money .

And he is no longer deemed trustworthy to say that he paid that money, until he pays in the presence of witnesses.

But if the judges said to him:

“You are obligated to give it to him, and

after some time

he said, “I paid,” and the witnesses testify against him that

the lender summoned him in their presence — and

he did not pay, and he returned and said

afterward

“I paid” —

he was not initially established as a denier with regard to that money

and therefore, when he returned and said, “I paid,” he is deemed trustworthy with an oath.

What is the reason?

Because when he initially claimed that he paid, this is not considered audacity in court; rather,

he is merely evading him

[the lender].

He thought:

Since the court did not command me to pay, I will wait

until the Sages examine my case.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If a person said to his fellow:

if a person says to his fellow:

“I have one hundred dinars in your possession,”

which I lent you,

and the other

denies and

says: “You have nothing in my possession,”

for I never borrowed from you.

And the witnesses testify against him that

indeed

he has

one hundred dinars belonging to the lender, which he borrowed from him.

And

afterward

the borrower returned

the borrower

and said:

Indeed, I borrowed one hundred dinars from you, but

I paid

it to you —

he has been established

the borrower

as a denier with regard to that money,

for his first claim, that he had never borrowed, was disproved by the witnesses; therefore he is not deemed trustworthy to claim that he paid .

It was like this

[as the incident was],

for Shabtai, the son

of Rabbi Marinos, wrote for his daughter-in-law

[his daughter-in-law, his son’s wife]

a valuable garment

[a type of important garment]

in her marriage contract,

meaning that she brought the garment into the marriage as her dowry, and this matter was written in the marriage contract.

And he accepted liability for it

[and Shabtai accepted liability for the garment] for a certain sum, so that if she were widowed or divorced, he would pay her the sum in place of his son.

In the end she was indeed widowed or divorced, but

the deed

[was lost] of

her marriage contract.

Shabtai’s daughter-in-law came to claim the valuable garment, as he had become obligated in the marriage contract.

He said to her

Shabtai:

“Such a thing never happened,”

I never became obligated concerning this matter.

Witnesses came

and contradicted him

and said: “Yes,”

indeed,

he wrote for her

this matter in her marriage contract.

In the end he said to them:

Indeed, I wrote this in her marriage contract, but

I paid it.

He came before Rabbi Ḥiyya.

He said to him: “You have been established as a denier with regard to that valuable garment,”

and you are no longer deemed trustworthy to claim that you paid it; rather, you must pay in the presence of witnesses.

Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Ela said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If

a

person

was

obligated to his fellow by an oath, and said:

already

“I took an oath,” and the witnesses testify against him that

he was summoned in their presence to take an oath, and

he did not take an oath, he has been established

as a denier with regard to that oath,

and he is no longer deemed trustworthy to say, “I took an oath” , until he takes an oath before us.

The students recited it

before Rabbi Avin’s statement

before Rabbi Abahu

[in the presence of Rabbi Abahu].

He said to them: It stands to reason that Rabbi Avin’s statement —

when

he became obligated to take an oath in court .

Since he was summoned by witnesses to fulfill the court’s ruling, and he did not wish to do so, he is no longer deemed trustworthy to say that he fulfilled the ruling afterward.

But

if

he obligated

his

self

to

an oath,

as he said to his fellow, “I will take an oath for you,” and his fellow summoned him by witnesses to take an oath, but he refused, and after some time claimed that he had taken an oath for him —

he is deemed trustworthy.

Because

it is usual for a person to happen to say

[it happens that a person says this] that he does not wish to take an oath, since the court did not obligate him in this, but he himself did. And this is not refusal and regret, but merely postponement.

They brought it back before Rabbi Avin

[they repeated Rabbi Abahu’s words before Rabbi Avin],

and he said to them: “I too”

[also I] — specifically with regard to an oath to which he became obligated

in court, I say

that he has been established as a denier.

It was also stated,

that Rabbi Avin stated his words concerning an oath in court:

Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Ela said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he was obligated to his fellow by an oath in court, and said, “I took an oath,” and the witnesses testify against him that he did not

take an oath, he has been established as a denier with regard to that oath.

Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who finds a promissory note in the marketplace, and authentication is written in it

[validation],

and its date is written in it as that very day,

meaning that on the very day the document was found, on that very day it was written,

shall return it to its owners.

And the reason is that there is no concern here:

If because of

perhaps

“he wrote it in order to borrow but did not borrow,”

there is no concern for this, because

authentication is written in it,

and a court validates a document only in the presence of the litigant.

If because of repayment,

perhaps the borrower already paid his debt, there is no concern for this. Since the loan was made today,

for repayment on the day of the loan,

meaning that the borrower paid his debt already on the day of the loan,

we do not suspect it.

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Asi: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan say this?

But you are the one who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: A document with which one borrowed and repaid, he may not borrow again with it,

because

its lien had already been canceled

from the time he repaid the first loan. And since the document was not written for the second loan, it is like an oral loan, and he cannot collect from purchasers on the basis of this document.

And now,

when,

when did he repay it, and when did he borrow again?

If you say

that he repaid and borrowed the second loan

on the next day

[on the day after the date written in the document]

or on another day

[or on another day], if so,

why specifically

that he may not borrow again with it because

its lien had already been canceled? It follows that

even if this document had been written specifically for the second loan,

it would be

a

premature document,

for it was written before the time of the loan,

and we learned: Premature promissory notes are invalid!

Rather, is it not so

that you are compelled to say that the case is one in which he repaid the first debt and borrowed the second loan

on its day

[on the day the document was written],

apparently,

it is proven from here that

people repay on the day of the loan

[that a person repays his debt on the day of the loan]!

He said to him

Rav Asi:

Did I say

[did I say]

that people do not repay at all

on the day of the loan?! Indeed, it happens that a person repays on the day of the loan. Rather,

I said that people do not commonly repay on the day of the loan

[I said that this is not common]. Therefore, he returns the document to its owners, because we do not suspect something that is uncommon.

Nevertheless, it is possible that a person repays on the day of the loan. And concerning such a case Rabbi Yoḥanan said that a document with which one borrowed and repaid, he may not borrow again with it.

Rav Kahana said: What Rabbi Yoḥanan said, that he should return it to the owners, applies

to the following case:

when the debtor admits

[when the borrower admits that he did not repay]. But if he does not admit it, we suspect repayment even on the day of the loan.

And we object:

If so, what is the point of saying this?

What is the novelty in the matter?

And we explain:

Lest you say:

Indeed,

this one

[the borrower]

really did repay him. And the reason that he says, “I did not repay him,”

is

because he wants to borrow with it another time

[because he wants to borrow with this document a second time],

and he is concerned about the fee of the scribe

[and is concerned about the scribe’s fee, since he does not wish to pay again for writing a document],

it teaches us that, if so, the lender himself would not allow it

[the lender himself would not allow the borrower to do this], because

he thinks:

perhaps

the Sages will hear of it

that this is a document whose lien was canceled —

and they will cause me a loss

[and they will cause me to lose the ability to collect from purchasers], because premature promissory notes are invalid .

And we object:

What is different from that which we learned: One who finds a promissory note, if it contains a lien on property —

he should not return it, and we established it as a case when the debtor admits, and

nevertheless he should not return it,

because

we suspect

that perhaps he wrote it in order to borrow in Nisan, and

eventually

he did not borrow until Tishrei, and he will come to collect from purchasers from Nisan until Tishrei —

unlawfully.

And we do not say

there that this reasoning is applicable, that there is no concern for this,

because if so,

that the document was written in Nisan,

the lender himself would not allow

[he would not allow] the borrower to borrow in Tishrei with that document,

for he would say to him: “Write another document in Tishrei, lest the Sages hear

that it is a premature document” —

“and they will cause me a loss!”

They said: There

we do not say this reasoning,

because he has

the lender

a profit

[a profit] in that he will lend in Nisan with a document written in Tishrei,

for he will collect from purchasers from Nisan until Tishrei,

and therefore

it is preferable to him

[it is preferable to the lender] to engage in this deception.

Although, on the other hand, there is concern that the Sages will hear of the matter and invalidate the document, nevertheless, in case of doubt he prefers to leave the situation as it is,

and he said nothing

[and he does not say anything].

That is not so

here, since the lender has no profit

from it,

for

after all

the document is written today

[the document was written today], and

what does he gain by collecting from purchasers

[and he does not gain the ability to collect from purchasers who acquired property before the time of the loan], and therefore, since he gains nothing by the borrower borrowing again with the same document,

with a document whose lien was canceled —

he would not allow the borrower to borrow,

but would certainly demand that he write a new document.