Bava Metzia 17a (יז.) — the Talmud in English

For Rav Yosef bar Minyomi said that Rav Naḥman said:

if the creditor brought the debtor to court, and

they said to him

the judges:

“Go out and give him

his debt!”

and

after some time

the debtor said:

I

paid

the debt in accordance with the court’s instruction—

he is deemed trustworthy [and must take only an oath of heset].

but only with an oath imposed by the Sages].

But if

a creditor came

before us

to write

a shtar adrakhta against the debtor,

we do not write it and give it to him,

since the debtor claims that he paid the debt.

But if the judges said to him:

“You are obligated to give it to him,”

but they did not command him to pay,

and

after some time

the debtor said

the debtor:

“I paid,”—

he is not deemed trustworthy.

Rather, the creditor takes an oath and collects his debt. Since he did not pay his debt initially and the creditor had to bring him before a court, it is not his practice to pay until the court has issued a completely definitive ruling.

Therefore, if

the

creditor

comes to write

a shtar adrakhta against him,

we write it and give it to him.

Rav Zevid said in the name of Rav Naḥman: Both

when they said

“Go out and give it to him,”

and

both

when they said

“You are obligated to give it to him,” and

after some time

the debtor said

the debtor

“I paid,”—

he is deemed trustworthy .

If a creditor came to write

a shtar adrakhta against him—

we do not write it and give it to him.

Rather, if there is a distinction—

this is the distinction that can be made [if there is a basis for distinguishing, this is the basis]:

if there is a basis for distinguishing, this is the basis]:

If

they said to him

the judges:

“Go out and give it to him, and

after some time

he said, ‘I paid,’ and witnesses testify that

the creditor demanded before them that he pay him in accordance with the court’s ruling, and

he did not pay him,

since he brazenly dared to violate the court’s command in their presence,

he has been established as a denier with regard to that money .

He is thereafter no longer deemed trustworthy to say that he paid that money, unless he pays it in the presence of witnesses.

But if the judges said to him:

“You are obligated to give it to him, and

after some time

he said, ‘I paid,’ and witnesses testify that

the creditor demanded payment from him in their presence—and

he did not pay and then said

afterward

“I paid”—

he was not initially established as a denier with regard to that money

and therefore, when he later said, “I paid,” he is deemed trustworthy upon taking an oath.

What is the reason?

Because when he initially claimed that he had paid, this is not considered brazenly defying the court; rather,

he is merely trying to evade him

[the creditor].

He reasoned:

Since the court did not command me to pay, I will wait

until the Sages examine my case.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

If a person says to another:

“You have one hundred dinars of mine in your possession,”

which I lent you,

and the other

denies it and

says: “You have nothing of mine in your possession,”

and says that he never borrowed from him.

And witnesses testify that

indeed he

has

one hundred dinars belonging to the creditor, which he borrowed from him.

And

afterward

the debtor returned

the debtor

and said:

Indeed, I borrowed one hundred dinars from you, but

I paid

you that amount—

the debtor is established

the debtor

as a denier with regard to that money,

for his first claim—that he had never borrowed anything—was contradicted by the witnesses, and therefore he is not deemed trustworthy to claim that he paid it .

It was like this

[as the incident occurred],

for Shabtai, the son

of Rabbi Marinus, wrote for his daughter-in-law

[his son’s wife]

a valuable garment

[a type of important garment]

in her marriage contract,

meaning that she had brought the garment into the marriage with her dowry, and this was recorded in the marriage contract.

And he accepted liability for it

[Shabtai accepted liability for the garment] for a certain sum, so that if she became widowed or divorced, he would pay her that sum in place of his son.

In the end, she indeed became widowed or divorced, but

she lost

[the document of]

her marriage contract.

Shabtai’s daughter-in-law came to claim the valuable garment, as he had obligated himself in the marriage contract.

He said to her

Shabtai:

“This never happened,”

I never obligated myself regarding this matter.

Witnesses came

and contradicted him

and said: “Yes,”

indeed,

he wrote for her

this matter in her marriage contract.

In the end he said to them:

Indeed, I wrote this in her marriage contract, but

I paid it.

He came before Rabbi Ḥiyya.

He said to him: “You have been established as a denier with regard to that valuable garment,

and you are no longer deemed trustworthy to claim that you paid for it; rather, you must pay in the presence of witnesses.”

Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Ela said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

If

a person

was

obligated to another to take an oath, and said:

I already

took an oath, and witnesses testify that

he was required in their presence to take an oath, and

he did not take one, he has been established

as a denier with regard to that oath,

and he is no longer deemed trustworthy to say, “I took an oath” , until he takes an oath before us.

The students related it

to Rabbi Avin’s statement

before Rabbi Abbahu

[in Rabbi Abbahu’s presence].

He said to them: “It stands to reason that Rabbi Avin’s statement applies—

when he

became obligated to take an oath in court .

Since witnesses required him to fulfill the court’s ruling and he refused, he is no longer deemed trustworthy to say afterward that he fulfilled the ruling.

But

if he

obligated

his

own

self to take

an oath,

saying to another, “I will take an oath for you,” and the other demanded in the presence of witnesses that he take the oath, but he refused, and afterward he claimed that he had taken the oath for him—

he is deemed trustworthy.

Because

it is common for a person to say something impulsively

[it happens that a person says this], meaning that he does not wish to take an oath, since the court did not obligate him to do so; he obligated himself. This is not refusal and retracting, but merely postponement.

They brought Rabbi Abin’s words back before him

[they repeated Rabbi Abbahu’s statement to Rabbi Avin],

and he said to them: “I too”

[also I] meant specifically an oath to which he became obligated

in court; I said

that he is established as a denier.

It was also stated

that Rabbi Avin said his statement with regard to an oath in court:

Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Ela said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If a person was obligated to another to take an oath in court, and said, “I took an oath,” and witnesses testify that he did not

take an oath, he has been established as a denier with regard to that oath.

Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who finds a promissory note in the marketplace, and an acknowledgment of its validity is written in it

[validation],

and its date is written in it as that very day,

meaning that on the day the document was found, it was written that very day,

shall return it to its owners.

The reason is that there is no concern here:

If it is because

perhaps

he wrote it in order to borrow but did not borrow,

there is no concern for this, because

an acknowledgment of its validity is written in it,

and a court validates a document only in the presence of the litigant.

If it is because of repayment,

perhaps the debtor already paid his debt, there is no concern for this. Since the loan was made today,

for repayment on the same day,

meaning that the debtor paid his debt already on the day of the loan,

we are not concerned.

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Asi: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan say this?

Was it not you who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: A document with which one borrowed money and then repaid it may not be used for borrowing again,

because

its lien has already been forgiven

from the time he repaid the first loan. Since the document was not written for the second loan, it is like an oral loan, and he cannot collect from purchasers on the basis of this document.

And now,

when

did he repay it, and when did he borrow again?

If you say

that he repaid the first loan and borrowed the second loan

on the next day

[the day after the date written in the document]

or on another day

[or on a different day], if so,

why specifically

does he not borrow again with it because

its lien has already been forgiven? It follows that

even if this document had been written specifically for the second loan,

it would be

a

prematurely dated document,

since it was written before the time of the loan,

and we learned: Prematurely dated promissory notes are invalid!

Rather, must it not be

that he repaid the first debt and borrowed the second loan

on its day

[the day the document was written],

so apparently,

it is evident from here that

people do repay on the day of the loan

[a person may repay his debt on the day of the loan]!

He said to him

Rav Asi:

Did I say

[did I say]

that people never repay at all

on the day of the loan?! Indeed, it happens that a person repays on the same day. Rather,

I said that it is not common for people to repay on the day of the loan

[I said that this is uncommon]. Therefore, the document is returned to its owners, because we do not concern ourselves with something uncommon.

Nevertheless, it is possible that a person repays on the same day. It is regarding such a case that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that a document with which one borrowed money and then repaid it may not be used for borrowing again.

Rav Kahana said:

What Rabbi Yoḥanan said—that it is returned to its owners—applies

when the debtor admits

[when the debtor admits that he did not repay]. But if he does not admit it, we are concerned that he repaid even on the day of the loan.

And we challenge this:

If so, what is the point?

What is the novelty of the matter?

And we explain:

It might have been said:

In truth,

this one

[the debtor]

did repay him. And the reason he says, “I did not repay him,”

is

because he wants to borrow with it another time

[because he wants to borrow again with this document],

and he is concerned about the fee owed to the scribe

[he is concerned about paying the scribe’s fee, since he does not want to pay again for writing a document],

it teaches us that if so,

the creditor himself would not allow

because he reasons:

Perhaps

the Sages will hear of it

that this is a document whose lien has been forgiven—and

they will cause me a loss

[they will prevent me from collecting from purchasers], since prematurely dated promissory notes are invalid .

And we challenge this:

How does this differ from that which we learned: If one found a promissory note, if it contains a lien on property—

he may not return it, and we established it as a case in which the debtor admits, and

nevertheless he may not return it,

because

we are concerned

that perhaps he wrote it in order to borrow in Nisan, and

eventually

did not borrow until Tishrei, and he will come to collect from purchasers from Nisan until Tishrei—

unlawfully.

And we do not say

there that there is no concern, because

if so,

the document having been written in Nisan,

the creditor himself would not allow it

[he would not allow] the debtor to borrow with that document in Tishrei,

for he would say to him: “Write another document in Tishrei, lest the Sages hear

that it is prematurely dated

and cause me a loss!”

They said: There

we do not say this reasoning,

because he has

the creditor

an advantage

[a profit] in borrowing in Nisan with a document written in Tishrei,

for he can collect from purchasers from Nisan until Tishrei,

and therefore

the creditor is content

[the creditor is comfortable] with this deception.

Although, on the other hand, there is concern that the Sages will hear of the matter and invalidate the document, nevertheless, as a matter of doubt he prefers to leave the situation as it is,

and he says nothing

[and does not say anything].

That is not so

here, since the creditor has no advantage

for the creditor,

as

after all,

the document is written now

[the document was written today], and

what purchasers are there from whom he could collect

[he gains nothing by collecting from purchasers who acquired property before the time of the loan]? Therefore, since he gains nothing by having the debtor borrow again with the same document,

a document whose lien has been forgiven—

he would not allow the debtor to borrow,

but would certainly require him to write a new document.