Bava Metzia 16b — the Talmud in English

And therefore the Sages instituted that his words should stand —

because of his livelihood .

But in the first clause, where he did not say “today,” but rather sold whatever his net would bring up over an extended period, since this does not provide his livelihood, they did not institute [that the sale should take effect].

Rav Huna said that Rav said: One who says to his fellow: The field that I am buying

that I am about to buy,

when I buy it —

it is acquired

for you

from now,

and I cannot retract,

he acquires

the field when he buys it, and the giver cannot retract once he has bought it.

Rava said: Rav’s matter is reasonable in

the case where he said to him:

a field

that I am buying

without specification,

and he did not specify specifically a certain field. For then the recipient’s mind is settled, since many fields are available for purchase.

But in

the case where he said to him:

this field

that I am buying —

not

are his words reasonable, and the sale does not take effect. For the recipient’s mind is not settled, and he does not believe him that he will indeed buy the field for him. And here we do not say the reasoning that it is preferable for him that he should remain reliable, since even if the giver truly wants to buy the field for him, the matter is not in his hands. For

who can say that he will sell it to him

how do we know that the owner of the field will indeed sell it to him?!

By the life of God

this is an expression of an oath, that

Rav

said

his words even with regard to “this field.”

And proof of the matter: for

now, according to whom did Rav state his teaching

according to whose method did he state his teaching, that the gift takes effect even though he has not yet acquired the field, and this is a matter that has not yet come into the world —

According to Rabbi Meir, who says: A person can transfer ownership of a matter that has not yet come into the world.

As it was taught:

A gentile

who says to a woman

Israelite:

Be betrothed to me after I convert,

or an Israelite who said to a gentile woman: Be betrothed to me

after you convert,

or a Canaanite slave who said to a woman: Be betrothed to me

after I am emancipated,

or an Israelite who said to a maidservant: Be betrothed to me

after you are emancipated,

or a man who said to a married woman: Be betrothed to me

after your husband dies,

or one who said to a yevama: Be betrothed to me

after your yavam performs halitza for you,

or a man who had been married, who said to his wife’s sister: Be betrothed to me

after your sister dies.

In all these cases the law is that

she is not betrothed,

because this is a matter that has not yet come into the world.

Rabbi Meir says: She is betrothed.

But

some of these cases mentioned in the Mishna, concerning the betrothal of a

woman —

are analogous to “this field,”

for the matter does not depend on him, but on the will of another. A male slave and a maidservant cannot emancipate themselves, but are dependent on the will of the master. And likewise, it is not in his power to cause the husband of the woman or her sister to die,

and

nevertheless

Rabbi Meir said: She is betrothed!

It is established that Rabbi Meir stated his words even with regard to “this field,” although this is not reasonable.

And now the Gemara returns to discuss the principal matter of our Mishna, concerning one who finds a promissory note:

Shmuel said: One who finds a document of acquisition

in which the borrower encumbered himself in the document even if he would not ultimately borrow

in the marketplace —

should return it to its owners,

and there is no concern in this.

For if

it were said that he should not return it

because

there is concern

that he wrote it in order to borrow but did not borrow,

with a document of acquisition there is no concern for this, for

he encumbered himself

even if he would not ultimately borrow.

And if

it were said that he should not return it

because of

the concern of

repayment,

lest the borrower had already repaid his debt,

we are not concerned about repayment. For if it were so that he repaid it

the borrower repaid his debt —

he would have immediately torn it

he would have immediately torn the loan document.

Rav Naḥman said: My father was one of the scribes of the judges of Master Shmuel,

my father was one of Shmuel’s court scribes,

and I was about six, about seven years old,

and I was approximately six or seven years old,

and I remember

and I remember

that they would proclaim and say: These documents of acquisition that are found in the marketplace —

let us return them to their owners

documents of acquisition found in the marketplace — let us return them to their owners.

Rav Amram said: We too have learned: Every court document —

this one should be returned.

And Rav Amram understood that “court document” means a document that was authenticated in court. And since a document is authenticated only in the presence of the litigant, certainly there had indeed been a loan. And there is no concern of repayment.

It follows,

it is proven from here that

we are not concerned about repayment.

Rabbi Zeira said to him: The Mishna is referring to documents of appropriation

that is, a person produced a promissory note against his fellow, and the court obligated him to pay, but he did not pay; they descended upon his property, assessed one of the properties for the lender, and wrote him a document stating that, by authority of the court, it had come into his possession

and an adrakhta

when they did not now find property belonging to the borrower, and they wrote a document for the lender stating that if he would find property belonging to the borrower in the future, he could collect from it, for these documents

are not subject to repayment,

and therefore there is no concern in returning them to their owners.

Rava said: And these

documents of appropriation and an adrakhta,

are they not subject to repayment?!

But the scholars of Nehardea said: An assessment,

whereby the court assessed the borrower’s land for the lender,

returns

it returns, for if the borrower obtains money, he can give it to the lender and recover the land for himself

until twelve months of the year

until twelve months of the year; that is, within a year.

And Ameimar said

concerning this:

I am from Nehardea, and I hold that an assessment returns forever!

Whenever the borrower finds money, he can redeem his land!

It follows that repayment is relevant even with these documents. For if the borrower obtains money, he pays it to the lender, receives the land back, and takes the document.

And if so, even if the Mishna is speaking of documents of appropriation and an adrakhta, from the fact that we learned that one who finds them returns them to their owners, it is proven that we are not concerned about repayment!

Rather, Rava said: There

in that Mishna,

this is the reason

that he returns the document to its owner: because

they say

even if the borrower repaid his debt,

he is the one who caused himself the loss

he caused the loss to himself.

For at the time that he repaid it, he should have torn his document

immediately at the time that he repaid the debt, he should have torn the document.

Alternatively,

even if the lender claimed to him that the document was lost, he should have demanded of the lender

to write another document in its place

to write another document, whereby the lender again sells the land to the borrower.

And the Gemara explains why the lender can write a document as though he is now selling the land to the borrower:

For

the essence of the

law,

after the lender collected the borrower’s land —

the land need not be returned

he is not obligated to return it to the borrower, even if he now has money with which to repay.

And

only

because of “And you shall do that which is upright and good in the eyes of the Lord,”

from which verse they learn that a person must conduct himself beyond the letter of the law —

it is that the Sages said that

it should return

that it should return, the land to the borrower.

the land shall return to the borrower.

And there is “the upright and the good” in this, since the lender’s intention was to receive money, and he had no particular interest in seizing land. Whereas the borrower desires his land, which is dear to him. Therefore he should return his land to him and take money.

Therefore,

since this is so, when the lender gives the land to the borrower in exchange for his money, this is considered as though

he is selling it from the outset

selling it to him now from the beginning, and therefore it is not an error if they now write a deed of sale for the land, and

it was incumbent upon him

the borrower to demand of the lender

to write a deed of sale

to write a deed of sale.

But

with regard to a promissory note, what can be said, that

if

it were so that he repaid it, he should have torn

his document

for if he indeed repaid, he should have torn the document?!

This is not an argument. For

perhaps

at the time that he repaid his debt,

he was evading him

the lender evaded returning his document to him.

For he said to him: Tomorrow I will give it to you, for it is not with me now

tomorrow I will give it to you, since it is not in my possession now.

Alternatively,

since the borrower must pay the expenses of the scribe who wrote the document, it is possible that at the time of the writing he did not have money, and the lender paid the scribe, and now

he is holding it for the scribe’s fee

the lender is withholding the document in his possession until the borrower pays the scribe’s fee.

Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who finds a promissory note in the marketplace, even though it contains authentication

authentication, testifying that the document is not forged —

should not return it to its owners.

It is not necessary to say where it does not contain authentication

that he should not return it,

for

then

it is possible to say

that perhaps he

wrote

the document in order

to borrow, but

ultimately

did not borrow.

Rather, even

if

it contains authentication, and what is that —

that it was authenticated,

and yet a document is authenticated only in the presence of the borrower, nevertheless

he should not return it,

because

we are concerned about repayment .

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to Rabbi Abbahu: Every court document,

that is, an authenticated document —

this one should be returned!

It is proven that we are not concerned about repayment!

He said to him

Rabbi Abbahu:

Yirmeya, my son! Not all court documents are equal. Rather,

there it is speaking

for example, where the borrower had been established as

the borrower

a denier

one who had been found to be a liar on another occasion , and therefore he is not believed to say, “I repaid.”

Rava said: And

does

because he had been established as a denier once

one time,

he no longer repaid

he no longer repays

at all?!

This is not reasonable. Rather, certainly it is possible that he indeed repaid. And since this is so, the lender who was not careful to safeguard his document will lose.

Rather, Rava said:

In

the Mishna

it is speaking

of a document of appropriation and an adrakhta,

which are not subject to repayment,

and in accordance with Rabbi Zeira.

And as for a denier,

which was mentioned in Rabbi Abbahu’s answer,

since it has come to our hand, let us say a matter concerning it

since it has come to our hand, let us say some matter concerning it: