Bava Metzia 16b (טז:) — the Talmud in English

And therefore the Sages instituted that his words should be valid—

because of his livelihood .

But in the first clause, where he did not say “today,” but sold whatever his trap would yield over an extended period, since this does not provide his livelihood, they did not institute this enactment.

Rav Huna said that Rav said: One who says to another, “The field that I am buying that I am about to purchase,

when I purchase it—

it is purchased

for you

from now,

and I cannot retract”—

the other person acquires

the field when he purchases it, and the giver cannot retract once he has purchased it .

Rava said: Rav's statement stands to reason in

the case where he said to him:

“A field

that I am buying,”

without specification,

and he did not specifically identify a particular field. In that case, the recipient of the gift is confident, since many fields are available for purchase.

But in

the case where he said to him:

“This field

that I am buying”—

no,

his statement does not stand to reason, and the sale does not take effect. This is because the recipient is not confident, and does not believe that he will in fact purchase the field for him. We do not apply here the reasoning that it is preferable for him to maintain his credibility, since even if the giver truly wishes to purchase the field for him, the matter is not in his hands. For

who can say that its owner will sell it to him

how do we know that the owner of the field will indeed sell it to him?!

Indeed

this is an expression of an oath,

Rav said

his statement

even with regard to “this field.”

And there is proof of this: For

since, in accordance with whose view did Rav state his teaching

that the gift takes effect even though he has not yet acquired the field, and it is therefore a matter that has not yet come into the world—

It is in accordance with the view of Rabbi Meir, who says: A person can transfer ownership of a matter that has not yet come into the world.

As it was taught:

A gentile

who says to a

Jewish

woman: “Be betrothed to me after I convert,”

or a Jew who says to a gentile woman: “Be betrothed to me”

“after you convert,”

or a Canaanite slave who says to a woman: “Be betrothed to me”

“after I am emancipated,”

or a Jew who says to a maidservant: “Be betrothed to me”

“after you are emancipated,”

or a man who says to a married woman: “Be betrothed to me”

“after your husband dies,”

or one who says to a yevama: “Be betrothed to me”

“after your yavam performs halitza with you,”

or a married man who says to his wife’s sister: “Be betrothed to me”

“after your sister dies.”

In all these cases, the halakha is that

she is not betrothed,

because this is a matter that has not yet come into the world.

Rabbi Meir says: She is betrothed.

But

some of these cases mentioned in the Mishna, concerning the betrothal of a

woman—

are analogous to “this field,”

since the matter is not dependent upon him, but upon the will of another. A male or female slave cannot emancipate himself or herself, but is dependent upon the will of the master. Likewise, he has no power to kill the husband of the woman or her sister,

and

nevertheless

Rabbi Meir said: She is betrothed!

It is evident that Rabbi Meir stated his ruling even with regard to “this field,” although this is not reasonable.

The Gemara now returns to discuss the primary matter of our Mishna, concerning one who finds a promissory note:

Shmuel said: One who finds a document of acquisition

in which the borrower encumbered himself in the document even if he would not ultimately borrow

in the marketplace—

should return it to its owners,

and there is no concern involved.

For if

it were said that he should not return it

because

there is concern

that he wrote it in order to borrow but did not borrow,

there is no such concern with a document of acquisition, since

he encumbered himself

even if he would not ultimately borrow.

And if

it were said that he should not return it

because

of concern about

repayment,

perhaps the borrower had already repaid his debt,

we are not concerned about repayment. For if he had indeed repaid it

if the borrower had repaid his debt—

he would have torn it up

he would have immediately torn up the loan document.

Rav Naḥman said: My father was one of the scribes of the court of Master Shmuel

my father was one of Shmuel’s court scribes,

and I was about six or seven years old

and I was approximately six or seven years old,

and I remember

and I remember

that they would announce and say: These documents of acquisition that are found in the marketplace—

let us return them to their owners

documents of acquisition found in the marketplace should be returned to their owners.

Rav Amram said: We also learned this: Any act of a court—

it should be returned.

Rav Amram understood that “an act of a court” means a document that was authenticated in court. And since a document is authenticated only in the presence of the litigant, it is certain that there was in fact a loan . And we are not concerned about repayment.

Apparently,

it is evident from here that

we are not concerned about repayment.

Rabbi Zeira said to him: The Mishna is referring to documents of foreclosure

that is, a person produced a promissory note against another, and the court obligated him to pay, but he did not pay; they then descended upon his property, appraised one of his properties for the creditor, and wrote him a document stating that, by order of the court, it had come into his possession

and authorization

that they did not find property belonging to the borrower at that time, and they wrote a document for the creditor stating that if he found property belonging to the borrower in the future, he could collect from it—since these documents

are not subject to repayment,

there is therefore no concern in returning them to their owners.

Rava said: And are these

documents of foreclosure and authorization

not subject to repayment?!

But the scholars of Nehardea said: An appraisal,

where the court appraised land belonging to the borrower for the creditor,

can revert

it reverts, meaning that if the borrower obtains money, he may give it to the creditor and reclaim the land

until twelve months of the year

until twelve months have passed; that is, within one year.

And Ameimar said

about this:

I am from Nehardea, and I hold that an appraisal can revert forever!

Whenever the borrower obtains money, he can redeem his land!

It follows that repayment is relevant even with regard to these documents. If the borrower obtains money, he pays the creditor, receives the land back, and takes the document.

If so, even if the Mishna is referring to documents of foreclosure and authorization, from the fact that we learned that one who finds them returns them to their owners, it is evident that we are not concerned about repayment!

Rather, Rava said: There

in that Mishna

is the reason

that he returns the document to its owner:

They say

that even if the borrower repaid his debt,

he is the one who caused his own loss

he caused the loss to himself.

For when he repaid it, he should have torn up his document

as soon as he repaid the debt, he should have torn up the document.

Alternatively,

even if the creditor told him that the document had been lost, he should have demanded that the creditor

write another document in its place

write another document, in which the creditor would sell the land back to the borrower.

The Gemara explains why the creditor may write a document as though he is now selling the land to the borrower:

For the primary

aspect of the

law,

after the creditor has collected the borrower’s land—

the land need not be returned

he is not obligated to return it to the borrower even if the borrower now has money with which to repay the debt.

And

only

because of “And you shall do that which is upright and good in the eyes of the Lord,”

from which it is learned that a person must act beyond the strict letter of the law—

the Sages said

that

it shall revert

the land shall return to the borrower.

This involves “the upright and the good,” since the creditor’s intention was to receive money, and he had no particular interest in seizing land. The borrower, however, desires his land, which is dear to him. Therefore, he should return his land to him and take the money.

Accordingly,

since this is so, when the creditor gives the land to the borrower in exchange for his money, it is considered as though

he is selling it from the outset

he is now selling it to him anew. Therefore, it is not an error to write a sale document for the land at this point, and

he should have

the borrower demand of the creditor

to write a sale document

to write a document of sale.

But

with regard to a promissory note, what can be said,

that

if he had indeed repaid it, he should have torn up

his document

if he had indeed repaid the debt, he should have torn up the document?!

This is not an argument. For

perhaps

when he repaid his debt,

the creditor evaded him

the creditor evaded returning the document to him.

He said to him: Tomorrow I will give it to you, as it is not with me now

I will give it to you tomorrow, since it is not currently in my possession.

Alternatively,

since the borrower must pay the expenses of the scribe who wrote the document, it is possible that at the time it was written he had no money, and the creditor paid the scribe; now

he is holding it for the scribe’s fee

the creditor is retaining the document until the borrower pays the scribe’s fee .

Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who finds a promissory note in the marketplace, even though authentication is written in it

authentication attesting that the document is not forged—

should not return it to its owners.

It is not necessary to say that where authentication is not written in it

he should not return it,

as

then

it is possible to say

that perhaps he

wrote

the document in order

to borrow, but

ultimately

did not borrow.

Rather, even

if

authentication is written in it—and what is that?—

that it was authenticated,

and a document is authenticated only in the presence of the borrower, nevertheless

he should not return it,

because

we are concerned about repayment .

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to Rabbi Abbahu: Any act of a court,

that is, an authenticated document—

it should be returned!

This proves that we are not concerned about repayment!

He said to him

Rabbi Abbahu:

Yirmeya, my son! Not all acts of a court are equal. Rather,

there it is referring to a case

where the borrower had been established as

the

denier

as having been found to be a liar on a previous occasion , and he is therefore not believed to say, “I repaid it.”

Rava said: And

is it so that

because he was established as a denier once

one time,

he will no longer repay

he will never repay

at all?!

This is not reasonable. Rather, it is certainly possible that he did in fact repay . And since this is so, the creditor who was not careful to safeguard his document will suffer the loss.

Rather, Rava said:

In the

Mishna

it is referring to

a document of foreclosure and authorization,

which are not subject to repayment,

and it is in accordance with Rabbi Zeira.

And as for “denier,”

which was mentioned in Rabbi Abbahu’s resolution,

since it has come to our attention, let us say a matter concerning it

since it has come before us, let us say something about it: