Bava Metzia 16a (טז.) — the Talmud in English

The one who says

that the reason is that

the purchaser prefers that he not be called

a

robber,

he has died — [the purchaser has died], and there is no longer anyone who will call him a robber. And since this is so, the robber intended to place it in the purchaser’s possession only during his lifetime, but not after his death.

And the one who says

that the reason is that

he prefers to maintain his trustworthy reputation, even among the sons [

also with the purchaser’s sons]

he prefers to maintain his trustworthy reputation,

and therefore the robber wants the land to remain in the possession of the purchaser’s sons.

And we raise an objection: Even according to the first reason, that he is concerned that the purchaser will call him a robber, this applies even if the purchaser dies, because

ultimately, the sons call the

purchaser’s

son a robber!

Rather, the difference between them is in a case where

the

robber

dies. According to

the one who says

that the reason is that

a person prefers not to be called a robber, once he has died

this is no longer relevant to him.

According to the one who says

that the reason is that

he prefers to maintain his trustworthy reputation, this too is so, even though he has died,

the robber;

he prefers to maintain his trustworthy reputation [

it is preferable to him that he be regarded as trustworthy even after his death]!

And we wonder: Even according to the first reason, they will disgrace him after his death, for

ultimately, they will call his sons the sons of a robber [

they will call his sons “sons of a robber”]!

Rather, the difference between them is in a case where he did not sell the stolen land, but

gave it [

the robber gave it]

as a gift.

The one who says

that the reason is that

he prefers to maintain his trustworthy reputation,

in a

gift

this reason also applies, for

he prefers to maintain his trustworthy reputation.

But according to

the one who says

that the reason is that

he prefers not to be called a robber,

when giving a gift

the robber said

to the recipient of the gift:

“What have I robbed from you?”

After all, you did not pay for the land; rather, you received it as a gift! And now the Gemara adds further details concerning this matter:

It is obvious [

this is clear] that if, before the robber took it from the owners , he then

sold it [

to another person in addition to the first purchaser], or

bequeathed it [

to one of his sons ],

and gave it as a gift [

or gave it as a gift to another], in these cases it is certainly the case that

he did not intend to establish it before the purchaser [

he did not intend to place it in the purchaser’s possession] when he took it from the owners, for he sold or gave it to someone else!

And likewise, if the robber stole the land from one of his relatives, and afterward that relative died, and the land

fell to him

the robber

as an inheritance,

since

an inheritance occurs automatically, and he did not labor on its behalf [

and the robber did not exert himself to obtain the land], his actions do not demonstrate that he prefers to maintain his trustworthy reputation. Therefore, he is merely like an ordinary heir: he reclaims it from the purchaser and gives him its value.

And if, after stealing and selling the land,

he collected [

the robber collected] the land

against his debt,

because the robbed party owed him a debt, and the robber came to him and said: “Let me collect this land that I stole from you against my debt,” the law is that

we examine [

we consider which case is involved]:

If the robbed party has

another piece of land

and he said

the robber: “Specifically

this

land

I want”

to establish it before the purchaser, this demonstrates that he intended to place it in the purchaser’s possession. For if he merely came to collect land against his debt, why did he exert himself specifically to obtain this land?

But if not,

rather, he happened to collect the land that he had stolen,

it was money that he wanted to recover [

he merely wanted to recover his money through this land], and he did not intend to place it in the purchaser’s possession.

If

the robbed party gave it to him

the robber

as a gift, Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree about it.

One says: A gift is like an inheritance, since it occurs automatically,

by the will of the giver. It does not occur because of the robber’s desire to maintain his trustworthy reputation with the purchaser.

And one says: A gift

is

like a sale. For if he had not exerted himself and prevailed upon him [

if the recipient of the gift had not exerted himself to persuade the giver to give it to him],

he would not have given him a gift.

And

for this reason he exerted himself and prevailed upon him

the robber

before him

the robbed party,

so that he would maintain his trustworthy reputation

with the purchaser.

And until when

do we say that if the robber purchased it from the robbed party, he did so because

he prefers to maintain his trustworthy reputation?

Rav Huna said: Until the time of the robber’s appearance in court.

That is, until the time when it is repossessed from the purchaser and the robber is brought to court.

But if the robber persisted in his wickedness and did not purchase it from the robbed party until this time, he revealed that he was not a trustworthy person. And even if he takes it afterward, it is certainly not his intention to place it in the purchaser’s possession .

Ḥiyya bar Rav said: Until the writ of execution reaches his hand.

That is, until the court obligates the robber to pay the purchaser, and he persists in his rebellion and does not pay, until the court writes a judgment concerning the robber’s property, stating that wherever the purchaser finds such property, he may take possession of it. This is ninety days after the conclusion of the trial.

Rav Pappa said: Until the days of the public announcement begin.

That is, after the process of the writ of execution has concluded, and the purchaser finds land belonging to the robber, he comes to court, and they announce that anyone who wishes to purchase land should come and take it.

Rami bar Ḥama raised an objection to this [

to Rav’s statement that if the robber purchased the field, he intended that it remain in the purchaser’s possession]:

Since, by what means did this purchaser acquire this land?

Through this deed [

by what means did the purchaser initially acquire the land? Through this deed in his possession], and yet

this deed

is like

an ordinary potsherd,

like a piece of pottery,

it is,

for at the time of the sale the land did not belong to the seller!

If so, even though the robber intended that it remain in the purchaser’s possession, how did the purchaser acquire it?!

Rava said to him: Let it be through his trusting him.

That is, the purchaser said to the robber at the time of the sale: “I rely on you to ensure that the land will be in my possession” .

Through the benefit that he did not say to him

the purchaser

anything [

a thing],

but relied upon him [

the robber], that he

would exert himself

and bring it to him [

that he would exert himself and bring him the land],

he resolved

the robber

and transferred it to him [

and conveyed it to him] when he subsequently purchased it from the original owners .

Rav Sheshet raised an objection:

If a person said to his fellow:

“What I will inherit from my father is sold to you,”

or he said to him:

“What my trap will yield [

a trap for animals, birds, or fish]

is sold to you,”

he has said nothing.

But if he said to him:

“What I will inherit from my father today is sold to you,”

or he said to him:

“What my trap will yield today is sold to you,”

his statement stands!

The Gemara will explain below what practical difference there is between the first clause and the latter clause.

It is evident from the first clause that since at the time of the sale the item was not yet in his possession, the sale does not take effect even when it subsequently comes into his possession. If so, how can the robber convey the field to the purchaser?

Rami bar Ḥama said: Here is a great man

and here is a refutation!

That is, this is a great man, and in keeping with his greatness is his question!

Rava said: A great man

indeed

I see,

but

a refutation

I do not see.

For one can distinguish between the two cases:

Here —

his mind relies upon it; but here —

his mind does not rely upon it.

And Rava explains his statement:

Here, his mind relies upon it

the purchaser’s,

for he goes

the robber and

exerts himself and brings it to him [

and exerts himself and brings him the land],

so that he will not call him a robber.

But

here,

in the beraita,

his mind does not rely upon it

the purchaser’s. He says to himself: Who says that the seller will inherit anything from his father? Perhaps his father will sell all his property during his lifetime!

They sent it before Rabbi Abba bar Zavda [

the question that Rav Sheshet raised against Rav’s statement].

He said to them:

This question

does not need

to enter

inside

the study hall. This question need not be brought before the members of the academy for them to resolve it, since there is no one among them who knows how to dismantle it .

Rava said:

On the contrary, this question

does need

to enter

inside —

and

even

inside inside.

For its answer accompanies it:

Here —

his mind relies upon it; but here —

his mind does not rely upon it.

As explained.

There was an incident in Pumbedita

where they adjudicated the case in accordance with Rav’s statement. And they raised an objection [and challenged it] from this beraita against Rav’s statement.

Rav Yosef said to them: This does not need to enter inside.

And Abaye said to him: It needs to enter inside and inside inside.

For its answer accompanies it:

Here, his mind relies upon it; here

his mind does not rely upon it.

And now the Gemara returns to explain the beraita.

And what is different in the first clause,

where he said to him, “What I will inherit from my father is sold to you,” in which case the law is that he has said nothing,

and what is different in the latter clause,

where he added and said, “What I will inherit from my father today,” in which case his statement stands?!

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

In truth, according to the essential law, the sale does not take effect at all. And the reason that in the

latter clause

the law is that his statement stands is as follows:

When he sold what he was destined to inherit from his father, the case is that his father was dying and expected to die that very day, since he said

“What I will inherit from my father today.”

And since this was so, he needed money for his burial and shrouds. Therefore,

for the honor of his father,

the Sages said that his statement stands .

And likewise, when he said

“What my trap will yield today,”

it is a case where he needs to sell it in order to sustain himself and provide his immediate livelihood [“today”].