Bava Metzia 16a — the Talmud in English

The one who says

that the reason is that

it is pleasing to him that the purchaser not call

the purchaser

a robber, ![](pamud.bmp "

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he has died [the purchaser has died], and there is again no one who will call him a robber. And since this is so, the robber intended to place it in the hands of the purchaser only during his lifetime, but not after his death.

то есть покупатель умер], и больше некому назвать его грабителем. Поэтому грабитель намеревался оставить землю у покупателя только при его жизни, но не после его смерти.

And the one who says

that the reason is that

it is pleasing to him that he remain trustworthy, even with the sons [of the purchaser]

also with the sons of the purchaser

it is pleasing to him that he remain trustworthy,

and therefore the robber desires that the land remain in the hands of the purchaser’s sons.

And we raise an objection: Even according to the first reason, that he is concerned lest the purchaser call him a robber, this applies even if the purchaser dies, because

in the end, the sons will call him

of the

purchaser a robber!

Rather, there is a difference between them

in the case that

the robber

dies. According to

the one who says

that the reason is that

it is pleasing to a person that they not call him a robber, he has died

the robber, and this is no longer relevant to him.

According to the one who says

that the reason is that

it is pleasing to him that he remain trustworthy, so too, even though he has died

the robber,

it is pleasing to him that he remain trustworthy [it is pleasing to him to be considered trustworthy, even after his death]!

And we are astonished: Even according to the first reason, they will disgrace him after his death, for

in the end

they will call his sons the sons of a robber [they will call his sons “the sons of a robber”]!

Rather, there is a difference between them

in a case where he did not sell the stolen land, but

когда он не продал украденную землю, а

gave it [that the robber gave it]

as a gift

as a gift.

The one who says

that the reason is that

it is pleasing to him that he remain trustworthy,

in

a gift also

this reason applies, for

it is pleasing to him that he remain trustworthy.

But according to

the one who says

that the reason is that

it is pleasing to him that they not call him a robber,

when giving a gift

the robber said to him

the recipient of the gift:

“What have I robbed from you?”

For you did not pay for the land; rather, you received it as a gift! And now the Gemara adds further details concerning this matter:

It is obvious [this is plain], that if, before the robber acquired it from the owners ,

he went back and

sold it [sold it]

to another person in addition to the first, or

inherited it [bequeathed it to one of his sons ],

or

gave it as a gift [or gave it as a gift]

to another—in these cases, certainly

he did not want to establish it before the purchaser [he did not intend to establish it before the purchaser]

when he acquired it from the owners, for he sold it or gave it to another!

And likewise, if the robber robbed the land from one of his relatives, and afterward that relative died, and

it fell to him

the land

by inheritance,

since

an inheritance occurs automatically, and he did not trouble himself for it [and the robber did not trouble himself for the land], his actions do not demonstrate that it is pleasing to him that he remain trustworthy. Therefore, he is like an ordinary heir, and he goes back and claims it from the purchaser, and gives him its value.

And if, after he robbed and sold the land,

And if, after stealing and selling the land,

he collected [the robber]

the land

against his debt,

for the robbed party owed him a debt, and the robber came to him and said: “Collect the land that I robbed from you against my debt,” then the law is that

we examine [we consider what case this is]:

If he has

the robbed party

other land, and he said

the robber: specifically

this,

this land

land

I want [my desire] to collect against my debt—it is demonstrated that

he wants to establish it before the purchaser.

For if he came merely to collect land against his debt, why did he trouble himself specifically over this land?

And if not,

rather, in the case that he collected the land that he robbed,

rather, he happened to collect the land that he had stolen,

it is money that he wanted to repay [he only wanted to repay his money through this land], and he did not intend to establish it before the purchaser.

If

If

he gave it to him

the robbed party to the robber

as a gift, Rabbi Aḥa and Ravina dispute this.

One said: A gift is like an inheritance, for it occurs automatically,

through the will of the giver. And not because of the robber’s will, so that he would remain trustworthy to the purchaser.

And one said: A gift

—it is

like a sale. For if he had not troubled himself and persuaded him [if the recipient of the gift had not troubled himself to persuade the giver to give it to him],

if the recipient of the gift had not exerted himself to persuade the giver to give it to him],

he would not have given him a gift.

And

for this he troubled himself and persuaded

the robber

before him

the robbed party,

so that he would remain trustworthy

to the purchaser.

And until when

do we say that if the robber purchased it from the robbed party, he did so because

it is pleasing to him that he remain trustworthy?

Rav Huna said: Until the time of the taking to court

of the robber. That is, until the time when they seize it from the purchaser and bring the robber to court.

But if the robber persisted in his wickedness and did not acquire it from the robbed party until this time, he revealed that he is not a trustworthy person. And even if he acquires it afterward, certainly his intention is not to establish it before the purchaser .

Ḥiyya bar Rav said: Until the adrakhta reaches his hand.

That is, until the court obligates the robber to pay the purchaser, and he persists in his rebellion and does not pay, until the court writes a judgment concerning the robber’s property, that wherever they find it, they may seize it. And this is ninety days after the completion of the judgment.

Rav Pappa said: Until the days of the announcement begin.

That is, after the process of the adrakhta has been completed, and the purchaser finds land belonging to the robber, he comes to court, and they announce that anyone who wishes to purchase land should come and take it.

Rami bar Ḥama raised an objection to this [to Rav’s words, who said that if the robber purchased the field, he intended that it be established in the purchaser’s possession]:

Since, with what does this purchaser acquire this land?

—

with this document [with what did the purchaser initially acquire the land—with this document in his possession], and yet

by what means did the purchaser initially acquire the land? Through this deed in his possession], and yet

this document

is like

a potsherd [like a piece of pottery]

merely,

for at the time of the sale the land did not belong to the seller!

If so, even though the robber intended that it be established in the purchaser’s possession, nevertheless, how did he acquire it?!

Rava said to him: Let it be through his trusting him.

That is, the purchaser said to the robber at the time of the sale: “I rely upon you to see that the land will be in my possession” .

Through that benefit that he did not say to him

the purchaser

anything [a thing],

and relied upon him [upon the robber], that he

would trouble himself

and bring it to him [would trouble himself and bring him]

the land,

he resolved

the robber

in his mind

and transferred it to him [and transferred it to him] when he went back and acquired it from the original owners .

the robber

and transferred it to him [

and conveyed it to him] when he subsequently purchased it from the original owners .

Rav Sheshet raised an objection:

If a person said to his fellow:

“Whatever I will inherit from my father is sold to you,”

or he said to him:

“Whatever my trap will catch [a trap for animals, birds, or fish]

is sold to you”—

he has said nothing.

But if he said to him:

“Whatever I will inherit from my father today is sold to you,”

or he said to him:

“Whatever my trap will catch today is sold to you”—

his words stand!

And below, in the Gemara, it will be explained what practical difference there is between the first clause and the latter clause.

It is demonstrated from the first clause that since at the time of the sale the thing was not yet in his possession, the sale will not take effect even when it comes into his possession. If so, how can the robber transfer the field to the purchaser?

It is evident from the first clause that since at the time of the sale the item was not yet in his possession, the sale does not take effect even when it subsequently comes into his possession. If so, how can the robber convey the field to the purchaser?

Rami bar Ḥama said: Here is a great man—

and here is a refutation!

That is, behold, he is a great man, and corresponding to his greatness is his question!

Rava said: A great man

indeed

I see,

but

a refutation—

I do not see.

For it is possible to distinguish between the two cases:

Here—

his mind relies upon it; and here—

his mind does not rely upon it.

And Rava explains his words:

Here his mind relies upon it

of the purchaser,

for he goes

the robber and

troubles himself and brings it to him [and troubles himself and brings the land],

so that they not call him a robber.

But

here,

in the beraita,

his mind does not rely upon it

of the purchaser. For he says in his heart: Who says that the seller will inherit anything from his father? Perhaps his father will sell his property during his lifetime!

the purchaser’s. He says to himself: Who says that the seller will inherit anything from his father? Perhaps his father will sell all his property during his lifetime!

They sent it before Rabbi Abba bar Zavda [the question that Rav Sheshet raised concerning Rav’s words].

He said to them:

This

question

does not need

to enter

inside

the study hall. This question does not need to enter before the members of the yeshiva for them to resolve it, because there is no one among them who knows how to dismantle it .

Rava said: On the contrary, this question

needs

to enter

inside—

and even farther inside.

For its answer accompanies it:

here—

his mind relies upon it, and here—

his mind does not rely upon it.

As was explained.

There was an incident in Pumbedita,

where they adjudicated the law according to Rav’s words. And they raised an objection to Rav’s words from this beraita.

Rav Yosef said to them: This does not need to enter inside.

And Abaye said to him: It needs to enter inside and even farther inside.

For its answer accompanies it:

here his mind relies upon it; here

his mind does not rely upon it.

And now the Gemara returns to explain the beraita.

And what is different in the first clause,

where he said to him, “Whatever I will inherit from my father is sold to you,” and the law is that he has said nothing,

and what is different in the latter clause,

where he added and said, “Whatever I will inherit from my father today,” and then his words stand!?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

In truth, according to the basic law, the sale does not take effect at all. And the reason that in the

latter clause

the law is that his words stand is:

When he sold what he was destined to inherit from his father, the reason is that his father was in his final illness and destined to die that day, for he said

“Whatever I will inherit from my father today.”

And since this is so, he needs money for his burial and his shrouds. Therefore,

because of the honor of his father,

the Sages said that his words stand .

And since this was so, he needed money for his burial and shrouds. Therefore,

for the honor of his father,

the Sages said that his statement stands .

And likewise, when he said

“Whatever my trap will catch today,”

it is evidently a case where he needs to sell in order to sustain himself and earn his livelihood immediately [“today”].