Bava Kamma 99b (צט:) — the Talmud in English

Rava said,

the dispute can be explained in another way:

everyone

holds that

the rental payment takes effect from the beginning until the end.

And everyone

holds that

one who betroths a woman with a loan has not betrothed her.

And everyone

holds that

a craftsman does not acquire ownership through the enhancement he makes to an article.

If so, it is difficult: Why, according to Rabbi Meir, did the betrothal take effect when he gave her the bracelets?

Rather, with what are we dealing here? With a case where he added a jewel of his own to it.

That is, he made slightly more for her than she had requested.

And this is the basis of their dispute:

Rabbi Meir holds

that when he gave it to her for the purpose of betrothal,

the payment consisted of a loan and a peruta, and her intention was directed to the peruta.

Since she could be betrothed with this peruta, the betrothal takes effect.

And the Rabbis hold:

when he gave it to her for the purpose of betrothal,

the payment consisted of a loan and a peruta, and her intention was directed to the loan.

But one who betroths a woman with a loan has not betrothed her.

And

this matter is dependent

on a dispute between these tannaim:

As it was taught: “

One who says to a woman, ‘Behold, you are betrothed to me

with the payment

for the work

that I performed for you,’

has not

betrothed her.

Since he had already completed the work and returned the item to the woman, it is considered a loan, and one who betroths a woman with a loan has not betrothed her.

But if he said, “Behold, you are betrothed to me

with the payment for the work that I will perform for you

from this point onward,”

she is betrothed.

Rabbi Natan says: ‘With the payment for the work that I will perform for you’ she is not betrothed.

Since the rental payment takes effect from the beginning until the end, each and every peruta becomes a loan.

And all the more so

if he said

‘with the payment for the work that I performed for you,’

she is not betrothed, as stated above.

And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: In truth, they said that whether with the payment for the work that I performed for you, or with the payment for the work that I will perform for you, she is not betrothed.

In accordance with Rabbi Natan.

‘But if he added a jewel of his own to it, she is betrothed.’”

The Gemara explains:

What difference is there between the first tanna and Rabbi Natan?

The difference between them

is the law concerning “whether the

rental payment

takes effect from the beginning until the end.”

Between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi

there is

a difference in the case where he gave her

a loan and a peruta.

The question is whether her intention was directed to the loan or to the peruta, as stated above.

The Gemara cites another law concerning “craftsmen who cause damage”:

Shmuel said: If a professional slaughterer caused damage

[a person who gives his animal to a professional slaughterer, and it became an animal carcass through his slaughtering],

he is liable to pay.

And all the more so in the case of an ordinary, nonprofessional slaughterer.

Since

he is one who causes damage, he is negligent,

and

it is as though he had said to him:

‘Slaughter it for me from here,’ and he slaughtered it from there.

The Gemara explains:

Why does he need to say

that Shmuel also said

“he is one who causes damage”

and also

“he is negligent”?

Since

if he had said

only

“he is one who causes damage,” I would have said:

This applies only where he performs the work for payment, but where he performs it for free, it does not apply.

That is, the expression “one who causes damage” indicates that he is liable even in a case of unavoidable accident, since a person is always forewarned and is liable even if he caused damage accidentally.

Nevertheless, since this case involves a completely unavoidable accident, we do not hold a person who causes damage liable, as explained above, at the beginning of chapter HaMani'a (27b, Tosafot, s.v. “And Shmuel”). Rather, this applies only when he performs the work for payment, since this is an accident resembling theft, and a paid bailee is liable for theft.

But an unpaid bailee, who is exempt from liability for theft, is exempt even in the case of this accident.

This teaches us

that “

he is negligent,”

and he is liable even when he performs the work for free.

Rav Hama bar Gurya raised an objection

[he challenged him]

to Shmuel:

But we learned in a baraita:

“In the case of one who gives an animal to a slaughterer, and it becomes an animal carcass:

if the slaughterer was

a professional

he is exempt; if he was an ordinary, nonprofessional slaughterer,

he is liable.

And if the owner gives payment,

both the nonprofessional and the professional are liable.”

In any event, it is stated explicitly that a professional slaughterer who slaughters for free is exempt! This is difficult for Shmuel.

He said to him,

Shmuel said to Rav Hama:

“Let your mind be clouded?!”

That is, “Do you have no mind in your head?!”

One of the Sages came and raised this objection before him.

[One of the students returned and presented this question to Shmuel.]

He said to him: “Now you have taken what your colleague took

[you have taken your colleague’s objection]

, and I say to you: I follow Rabbi Meir, and you cite the Rabbis to me?!”

I hold in accordance with Rabbi Meir, so how could you challenge me from the words of the Rabbis?

And if you say: How did you know that my opinion follows Rabbi Meir?

“Why did you not examine my words carefully”

[Why did you not analyze my words carefully]?

I say, ‘He is one who causes damage, he is negligent; it is as though he had said to him, “Slaughter it for me from here,” and he slaughtered it from there,’

and

who holds this view? Rabbi Meir, who said

[the place where he said this will be explained below]

‘He should have taken it to heart.’

Therefore, certainly you should not challenge me from the words of the Rabbis!

The Gemara explains:

Which statement of Rabbi Meir

[Where did Rabbi Meir say these things]?

If you say it is this statement of Rabbi Meir

(the mnemonic is KALN

as we learned

[above 45b]:

“Its owner tied it with a halter, properly locked the door before it, and it went out and caused damage

—whether it was tame or accustomed to gore, he is liable. These are the words of Rabbi Meir.”

The plain meaning is that his reasoning is that he should have taken it to heart.

But we reject this:

There, they disagree on the interpretation of the verses.

That is, they disagree over the explanation of the verses, as explained there. It is a decree of the verse, and not because “he should have taken it to heart.”

Rather, it is this statement of Rabbi Meir, as we learned

[below, 100a]: “

One who gives wool to a dyer …

to dye it red for him, but he dyed it black; or black, but he dyed it red, Rabbi Meir says

—he gives him the value of his wool.”

The plain meaning of the reason is that he should have taken care not to cause damage.

But we reject this:

There, he damaged it intentionally,

that is, he caused the damage deliberately. This is unlike the case here, where he did not intend to damage it.

Rather, it is this statement of Rabbi Meir, as it was taught

in a baraita:

“His jug broke

in the public domain,

and he did not remove it; his camel fell, and he did not raise it. Rabbi Meir says

—he is liable for the damage they cause. And the Rabbis say

—he is exempt under human law but liable under the laws of Heaven.”

And we have established that regarding the law of

the matter of

“one who stumbles is negligent”

[that is, a person walking in the public domain with his jug on his shoulder, who stumbles and falls: Is he considered negligent or not],

it is

the matter over which they

disagree.

Rabba bar bar Hana said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: A professional slaughterer who caused damage is liable, even if he is a professional like the slaughterers of Tzippori.

And

we challenge this:

Did Rabbi Yohanan really say this?

But Rabba bar bar Hana said: There was an incident involving Rabbi Yohanan in the synagogue of Maon, and he said to him, “Go bring proof that you are an expert in slaughtering chickens, and I will exempt you.”

[An incident occurred involving a professional slaughterer who caused damage before Rabbi Yohanan, when he was in the synagogue in the settlement of Maon, and he said to the slaughterer: “Bring proof that you are a professional slaughterer, and I will exempt you.” ]

This proves that Rabbi Yohanan held that a professional slaughterer who caused damage is exempt.

And we answer:

It is not difficult; here

[that is, the incident in Maon] he had accepted the slaughtering

for free,

and therefore he was exempt.

And

here

[the statement of Rabbi Yohanan above] refers to a case where he gave him the animal to slaughter

for payment.

As in the statement of Rabbi Zeira:

One who wishes to make a slaughterer liable to him

if he causes damage

should give him a dinar in advance,

so that he will be considered a paid bailee and will be liable for the damage.

And we challenge this:

Meytivi,

but we learned in tractate Bava Batra (93b):

“One who takes

[that is, a person appointed to grind wheat, who is responsible for soaking it in water before grinding and pounding it in a mortar to remove the outer husk, so that it will become clean fine flour] and takes

wheat to be ground but does not soak it, and makes it into bran

[coarse and inferior flour]

, or middlings

[coarse flour, but less inferior than bran].

Or one who gives

flour to a baker

in order to bake bread for him, and

makes it into inferior bread

[bread that breaks when it is removed from the oven].

Or one who gives

an animal to a slaughterer, and it becomes an animal carcass—

in all these cases

he is liable, because he is like a paid worker.”

This implies that he is liable even if he is not a paid worker; rather, even when he works for free, he is liable like a paid worker.

And we answer:

Read it

[let us read] “

because he is a paid worker,”

that is, this refers only to a case where he received payment for his work.

There was a case involving a grumat'a

[in tractate Hullin, Rabbi Yosei and the Rabbis disagree about the law when one severed the large ring, which is the uppermost ring, and before completing the slaughter of the entire windpipe, angled the knife and completed the slaughter above the ring, which is not a valid place for slaughtering. This is the disqualification of hagrama, which was stated to Moses at Sinai. According to the Rabbis, even if most of the windpipe had already been slaughtered in a valid place, the animal is disqualified, since the slaughtering was completed disqualified. But according to Rabbi Yosei, if most of the windpipe was slaughtered validly, the animal is fit]

that came before Rav, and he declared it a tereifa,

in accordance with the Rabbis,

and exempted the slaughterer from paying its value.

Rav Kahana and Rav Asi encountered

[met]

that man

[the owner of the animal],

and said to him: “Rav has done two things for you.”

The Gemara explains:

What are the two things?

If you say that they were two disadvantages,

one was

that he should have deemed the animal fit in accordance with Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi Yehuda, yet he declared it a tereifa in accordance with the Rabbis; and alternatively,

if he held

in accordance with the Rabbis, he should nevertheless have imposed liability upon the slaughterer.

But is it permitted to say something of this sort?!

That is, was Rav Kahana permitted to challenge Rav’s ruling in the presence of the owner of the animal?!

But it was taught

in tractate Sanhedrin (29a): “

When

the judge leaves the Sanhedrin,

he may not say:

‘I declared him innocent, but my colleagues found him liable; what could I do, since my colleagues outnumbered me?’”

And concerning this it is said

[Proverbs 11]:

“One who goes about as a talebearer reveals a secret.”

If so, how could they challenge Rav’s ruling?

Rather,

their intention certainly was to say: Rav did two things for you

for your benefit.

One was

that he did not make you eat something involving a doubtful prohibition.

And furthermore,

he prevented you from a possible case of robbery.

For if the animal was fit, the slaughterer would be exempt.

The Gemara cites further cases concerning the law of a professional who causes damage:

It was stated

[it was said in the beit-midrash]

, in the case of one who shows a dinar to a money changer

to determine whether it is genuine, so that he can accept it from someone else,

and

ultimately, after accepting it based on the money changer’s recommendation,

it is found to be defective.

What is the law?

One teaching states

that if the money changer was

a professional, he is exempt.

But if the money changer was

a nonprofessional, he is liable.

For he is negligent.

And another teaching states:

Both a professional and a nonprofessional are liable.

Rav Pappa said: When it was taught that a professional is exempt, it was referring to cases like Nakhu and Issur,

[who were professional money changers],

who did not need to learn at all. Rather, in what did they err? They erred concerning a new coin, which at that time had just emerged from the die.

That is, they erred concerning a new coin that had just entered circulation, and they had not yet had sufficient opportunity to become fully familiar with its appearance.

There was an incident involving a woman who showed a dinar to Rabbi Hiyya

[she showed a dinar to Rabbi Hiyya so that he could examine it],

and he said to her:

“It is genuine!”

The next day she came before him and said to him:

“I showed it to others, and they told me that it was defective, and I cannot spend it”

[I showed it to others, and they told me that it was a bad dinar and that it would not circulate in the marketplace]. .

He said to Rav: “Go exchange it for her, and write in my ledger

‘This is a bad business

[this is a bad business] ’”

since I should not have examined it and caused myself to lose my property for nothing.

And

we challenge this:

What is different about Nakhu and Issur, who are exempt because they do not need to learn, whereas Rabbi Hiyya also did not need to learn

[after all, Rabbi Hiyya was fully expert in dinars, so why did he obligate himself]?

And we answer:

Rabbi Hiyya acted beyond the letter of the law.

As Rav Yosef taught:

It is stated in the Torah (Exodus 18): “And you shall make known to them the way in which they should walk, and the deed that they should do,” and we expound:

“And you shall make known to them”—