Bava Kamma 99b — the Talmud in English

Rava said,

it is possible to explain the dispute in another manner:

everyone

holds:

the rental exists from the beginning until the end.

And everyone

holds:

one who betroths with a loan—she is not betrothed.

And everyone

holds:

a craftsman does not acquire through the improvement of the utensil.

And if so, this is difficult: why, according to Rabbi Meir, did the betrothal take effect when he gave her the bracelets?

Rather, with what are we dealing here? For example, he added a precious stone of his own for her.

That is, he did slightly more for her than she had requested.

And in this they dispute:

Rabbi Meir holds:

if he gave it to her for the sake of betrothal—

a loan and a peruta, her mind is on the peruta.

And with this peruta she can become betrothed; therefore the betrothal takes effect.

And the Rabbis hold:

if he gave it to her for the sake of betrothal—

a loan and a peruta, her mind is on the loan.

And one who betroths with a loan—she is not betrothed.

And

this matter depends

on the dispute of these tanna’im:

For it was taught: “

One who says to a woman, ‘Behold, you are betrothed to me

as payment

for work

that I performed with you’—

she is not

betrothed.

Since he had already completed the work and returned it to the woman, it is like a loan; and one who betroths with a loan—she is not betrothed.

But if he said, ‘Behold, you are betrothed to me

as payment for work that I will perform with you

from now onward’—

she is betrothed.

Rabbi Natan says: ‘As payment for work that I will perform with you’—she is not betrothed.

Since the rental exists from the beginning until the end, and each and every peruta is a loan.

And all the more so

if he said—

‘as payment for work that I performed with you,’

she is not betrothed, as above.

And Rabbi Judah the Prince says: Indeed, they said: whether as payment for work that I performed with you, or as payment for work that I will perform with you, she is not betrothed.

Like Rabbi Natan.

And if he added a precious stone of his own for her, she is betrothed.”

And the Gemara explains:

What difference is there between the first tanna and Rabbi Natan?

There is a difference between them—

the law of “the

rental

exists from the beginning until the end.”

Between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Judah the Prince—

there is a difference between them

if he gave her

a loan and a peruta.

Whether her mind is on the loan or on the peruta, as above.

The Gemara brings another law concerning “craftsmen who caused damage”:

Shmuel said: An expert slaughterer who caused damage

one who gives his animal to an expert slaughterer, and it became an unslaughtered carcass through his slaughtering],

is liable to pay.

And all the more so an unskilled slaughterer.

Since he

is one who causes damage; he is negligent,

and

it is as though he said to him—

‘Slaughter for me from here,’ and he slaughtered for him from there.

The Gemara explains:

Why does he need to say

why was Shmuel required to say both

“he is one who causes damage”

and

“he is negligent”?

Since

if he had said

only

“he is one who causes damage,” I might have said:

This applies when he works for payment, but when he works for free, it does not.

That is, the expression “one who causes damage” means that he is liable even in a case of coercion, since a person is always forewarned and is liable even if he caused damage under coercion.

Nevertheless, since here it is complete coercion, we do not make a person who causes damage liable, as explained above, at the beginning of chapter “One Who Places” (27b, Tosafot, s.v. “And Shmuel”). Rather, this applies only to one who works for payment, since it is coercion resembling theft, and a paid guardian is liable for theft.

But an unpaid guardian, who is exempt from theft, is exempt even in this case of coercion.

It teaches us—

that “

he is negligent,”

and he is liable even when he works for free.

He raised an objection

he challenged]

Rav Hama bar Gurya before Shmuel:

For we learned in a beraita:

“One who gives an animal to a slaughterer, and it becomes an unslaughtered carcass.

If the slaughterer was

an expert—

he is exempt. An unskilled slaughterer—

he is liable.

And if he gives payment—

whether an unskilled slaughterer or an expert, he is liable.”

In any event, it is explained that an expert slaughterer who slaughters for free is exempt! And this is difficult for Shmuel?

He said to him,

Shmuel said to Rav Hama:

“May your mind be defiled?!”

That is: Do you not have a brain in your skull?!

One of the Sages came; he was raising an objection to him. [

One of the students returned and raised this question before Shmuel.]

He said to him: “Now you have taken what your colleague took [

you have taken your colleague’s objection]

, and I say to you: I am Rabbi Meir, and you are quoting the Rabbis to me?!”

Do I not hold like Rabbi Meir, and how could you challenge me from the words of the Rabbis?

And if you will say: From where did you know that my view is like Rabbi Meir’s?

“Why did you not analyze my words” [

why did you not examine my words]—

“for I say: ‘He is one who causes damage; he is negligent; it is as though he said to him, “Slaughter for me from here,” and he slaughtered for him from there,’

and

who holds this reasoning? Rabbi Meir! For he said [

it will be explained below where he said it]

‘He should have taken care of himself.’

And if so, certainly one should not challenge me from the words of the Rabbis!”

The Gemara explains:

Which Rabbi Meir? [

Where did Rabbi Meir say these words?]

If you say, this is Rabbi Meir

(the mnemonic is

)for we learned:—

(above 45):

“Its owner tied it with a rope, closed the door before it properly, and it went out and caused damage—

whether it was innocuous or forewarned, he is liable. These are the words of Rabbi Meir.”

And apparently his reason is that he should have taken care of himself.

And we reject this:

There they dispute concerning the verses.

That is, they disputed the explanation of the verses, as explained there. It is a scriptural decree, and not because “he should have taken care of himself.”

Rather, this is Rabbi Meir, as we learned (below 100): “

The one who gives wool to a dyer …

to dye it red for him, and he dyed it black; black, and he dyed it red,

Rabbi Meir says—

he gives him the value of his wool.”

And apparently the reason is that he should have taken it to heart not to cause damage.

And we reject this:

There he burned it with his hands,

that is, he damaged it intentionally. Unlike here, where he did not intend to damage it.

Rather, this is Rabbi Meir, as it was taught

in a beraita:

“His jug was broken

in the public domain,

and he did not remove it; his camel fell and he did not raise it. Rabbi Meir says—

he is liable for their damage. And the Sages say—

he is exempt according to human law, but liable according to the law of Heaven.”

And we hold that in the law of

the case of

“one who stumbled is negligent” [

that is, one who walked in the public domain with his jug on his shoulder, stumbled, and fell: is he considered negligent or not],

it

is what they

dispute.

Rabba bar bar Hana said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: An expert slaughterer who caused damage is liable, even if he is an expert like the slaughterers of Sepphoris.

And

we raise an objection:

Did Rabbi Yohanan say this?

But Rabba bar bar Hana said: There was an incident before Rabbi Yohanan in the synagogue of Maon, and he said to him: “Go, bring proof that you are an expert with chickens, and I will exempt you.” [

An incident occurred involving an expert slaughterer who caused damage, before Rabbi Yohanan when he was in the synagogue in the settlement of Maon, and he said to the slaughterer: “Bring proof that you are an expert slaughterer, and I will exempt you.”]

And it is proven that Rabbi Yohanan held: an expert slaughterer who caused damage is exempt.

And we resolve:

It is not difficult; here [

that is, in the incident at Maon] he accepted the slaughtering

for free,

and therefore he was exempt.

And

here [

Rabbi Yohanan’s statement above] it is speaking of a case in which he gave him the slaughtering

for payment.

As Rabbi Zeira said:—

One who wishes to make a slaughterer liable to him

if he causes damage—

should give him a dinar in advance,

so that he will be considered a paid guardian and will be liable for the damage.

And we raise an objection:

It was taught:

For we learned in tractate Bava Batra (93b):

“One who transports [

that is, a person appointed over the grinding of wheat, upon whom it is incumbent to soak it in water before grinding and to pound it in a mortar in order to remove the outer husk, so that it will become clean fine flour] and transported

wheat to be ground, but did not soak it, and made it bran [

coarse and inferior flour], or coarse meal [

coarse flour, but less inferior than bran].

Or one who gave

flour

to a baker

in order that he bake bread for him,

and he made it pat nifulin [

bread that breaks when it is taken out].

Or one who gave

an animal to a slaughterer, and he made it an unslaughtered carcass—

in all these cases

he is liable, because he is like a paid carrier.”

And it implies that he is liable even if he is not a paid carrier, but even when he works for free he is liable like a paid carrier.

And we resolve:

Read [

let us read] “

because he is a paid carrier,”

that is, it is speaking only of a case in which he received payment for his work.

That case of the severed windpipe [

In tractate Hullin, Rabbi Yose and the Rabbis dispute the law when he severed the large ring, which is the upper one, and before he completed cutting through all of it, he angled the knife and completed the slaughter above the ring, which is not a place of slaughtering; this is the disqualification of hagrama, transmitted to Moses at Sinai. According to the Rabbis, even if he had already slaughtered most of the windpipe in the valid place, it is disqualified, since it was completed in a disqualified manner. But according to Rabbi Yose, if most of the windpipe was slaughtered permissibly, it is valid]

that came before Rav, he declared it a tereifa,

like the Rabbis,

and exempted the slaughterer from paying its value.

Rav Kahana and Rav Asi encountered [

met]

that man [

the owner of the animal], and they said to him: “Rav did two things to you.”

“Rav has done two things to you.”

And the Gemara explains:

What are the two things?

If you say that they were two disadvantages,

one was

that he should have declared it fit according to Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah, yet he declared it a tereifa according to the Rabbis; and alternatively,

if he held

like the Rabbis, he should have imposed liability upon the slaughterer.

And is it permitted to say such a thing?!

That is, is Rav Kahana permitted to challenge Rav’s ruling before the owner of the animal?!

But it was taught

in tractate Sanhedrin (29a): “

When

the judge leaves the court,

he may not say:

‘I declared him innocent, and my colleagues declared him liable, but what could I do, since my colleagues outnumbered me,’

and concerning this it is said

(Proverbs 11):

‘One who goes about as a talebearer reveals a secret,’”

and if so, how did they challenge Rav’s ruling?

Rather,

their intention was certainly to say: Rav did for you

two things for the better.

One was—

that he did not feed you a doubtful forbidden matter.

And further—

he prevented you from a doubt of robbery.

For if it is fit, the slaughterer is exempt.

The Gemara brings additional discussions concerning the law of an expert who caused damage:

It was stated [

it was said in the beit-midrash]

, one who shows a dinar to a money changer

to check whether it is good, and accepts it from his fellow,

and

in the end, after he accepted it from him because of the money changer’s recommendation,

it is found to be bad.

What is his law?

One teaching states:

if the money changer was

an expert, he is exempt.

But an unskilled money changer—

he is liable.

For he is negligent.

And another teaching states:—

whether an expert or an unskilled person, he is liable.

Rav Pappa said: When it was taught that an expert is exempt, it is referring to Nakko and Isur [

they were expert money changers],

who did not need to learn at all. But in what did they err? They erred with a new coin, which had just then emerged from beneath the die.

That is, they erred concerning a new coin that had just entered the market and whose form they had not yet had sufficient opportunity to recognize.

There was a certain woman who showed a dinar to Rabbi Hiyya [

she showed a dinar to Rabbi Hiyya so that he would examine it],

and he said to her—

“It is good!”

The next day she came before him and said to him—

“I showed it to them, and they said to me: ‘It is bad,’ and it does not circulate for me [

I showed it to others, and they said that it was a bad dinar and did not circulate in the market] .”

He said to Rav: “Go exchange it for her, and write in my notebook—

‘This is a bad business [

this is a bad business] ,’”

since I should not have examined it and suffered the loss of my property for nothing.

And

we raise an objection:

What is different about Nakko and Isur, who are exempt because they do not need to learn, whereas Rabbi Hiyya also did not need to learn? [

For Rabbi Hiyya too was fully expert in dinars, so why did he obligate himself?]

And we resolve:

Rabbi Hiyya acted beyond the strict measure of the law.

As Rav Yosef taught:

It is stated in the Torah (Exodus 18): “And you shall make known to them the way in which they shall walk, and the deed that they shall do,” and we expound:

“And you shall make known to them”—