Bava Kamma 98b (צח:) — the Talmud in English

If there are witnesses who know what was written in the document [

if there are witnesses regarding the debt recorded in the document],

, let him write for him

anew

a valid document!

And it is obvious that the one who burned it is exempt, since he caused no actual damage to it.

And if there are no witnesses [

and if we have no witnesses who know what was written in the document],

how do we know?

And how could we obligate the one who burned it to pay what is written in the document ?

If so, the matter is difficult from either perspective: What did Rabba add? It is obvious that the one who burned it is exempt.

And we answer:

Rava said: Let it be referring to a case where he believes him.

That is, the one who burned it believes the injured party that this is what was written in the document. And nevertheless, he is exempt.

Rav Dimi bar Ḥinnana said: This ruling of Rabba is subject to the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis

and that is the dispute.

According to

the view of

Rabbi Shimon, who says:

“Something that causes monetary loss is considered monetary property,”

here too he

is liable

for burning another’s document.

And

according to the Rabbis, who say:

“Something that causes monetary loss is not considered monetary property,”

here too he

is not liable

for burning another’s document.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, raised an objection to this:

Say that Rabbi Shimon is heard

as saying

“Something that causes monetary loss is considered monetary property”

only

with regard to something whose essential nature is monetary property.

As

was

Rabba’s

statement,

as Rabba said:

“If one robbed leavened bread before Passover, and another came and burned it during the Festival [ and as a result the robber can no longer return the stolen leavened bread to its owner and becomes obligated to pay him its value]—

he is exempt!

Since

during

Passover

everyone is commanded to remove it.

But if he burned it

after Passover—

it is subject to the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to Rabbi Shimon, who says that something that causes monetary loss is considered monetary property,

he is liable,

since he caused the robber to pay the owners the value of the leavened bread.

And

according to the Rabbis, who say that something that causes monetary loss is not considered monetary property, he is exempt.”

Rabbi Shimon holds him liable specifically in such a case, since the leavened bread was originally monetary property. Therefore, now, even though it is worth nothing, it nevertheless causes monetary loss.

But

with regard to something whose essential nature is not monetary property,

such as documents, which were never worth money,

can we say that this applies?!

Therefore, Rav Dimi’s statement was rejected.

Ameimar said: One who adjudicates the law of dina de-garmei collects from him [

he collects from the one who burned another’s documents]

the full value of the document.

Since he caused him to lose the entire value of the document.

And one who does not adjudicate the law of dina de-garmei collects from him merely the value of the paper.

That is, he collects nothing.

There was an incident:

Rab Ashi burned another’s document in his youth ,

and Rafram compelled Rab Ashi, and collected from him as much as a beam for an image [

Rafram compelled Rab Ashi to pay everything that was written in the document].

We learned in the Mishna: “One who robbed

leavened bread, and Passover passed over it ... says to him: Here is yours before you.”

The Gemara explains:

Who is the tanna [

who is the tanna who holds] that

one says with regard to items forbidden for benefit, “Here is yours before you”?

Rav Ḥisda said: It is Rabbi Yaakov.

As it is taught:

“An ox that killed

a person and is sentenced to stoning,

if its owners sold it or consecrated it

before its verdict was finalized, the sale is valid,

or

if they consecrated it, it is consecrated.

And similarly, if they

slaughtered it—

its meat is permitted.

And similarly, if someone had been guarding it and

the guardian returned it to its owners

before its verdict was finalized—

it is considered returned.

But

once its verdict was finalized—

if

they sold it, the sale is invalid,

and if

they consecrated it, it is not consecrated,

and if

they slaughtered it, its meat is forbidden,

and if

the guardian returned it to its owners, it is not considered returned.

Since once its verdict was finalized it was forbidden for benefit, and anything destined to be stoned is considered as though it had already been stoned.

Rabbi Yaakov says: Even once its verdict was finalized,

if

he returned it to its owners—

it is considered returned.

And he can say to him: “Here is yours before you.”

Rav Ḥisda infers:

Is it not with regard to this that they disagree, as Rabbi Yaakov holds—

one says with regard to items forbidden for benefit, “Here is yours before you,” whereas the Rabbis hold—

one does not say with regard to items forbidden for benefit, “Here is yours before you”?

Rabba said to him

to Rav Ḥisda:

No!

It cannot be proved from there that Rabbi Yaakov and the Rabbis disagree regarding the issue of our Mishna.

It can be said

that

for

everyone, one says with regard to items forbidden for benefit, “Here is yours before you.”

For if so, [

that is, if we say that this is the subject of their dispute]

let them disagree with regard to leavened bread on Passover,

as in the case mentioned in the Mishna.

Rather, Rabba said: Here [

that is, the explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Yaakov and the Rabbis is]

, with regard to

the law of

“we finalize the verdict of an ox not in its presence” that they disagree.

The Rabbis hold—

we do not finalize the verdict of an ox not in its presence.

Therefore, if the guardian returned it after its verdict had been finalized, he is liable, since

the owner says to him

:

“Had you brought it to me, I would have driven it away to the marsh, but now you have handed it over to one with whom I cannot conduct a legal defense.” [

Had the ox been in my possession, I would have driven it to the marsh so that they could not finalize its verdict for stoning; now that it is in your possession, do you not know how to ensure that its verdict will not be finalized?!] And he is considered negligent in guarding it and is liable.

And Rabbi Yaakov holds—

we do finalize

the

verdict of an ox not in its presence.

If so, the guardian is exempt—

for he says to him: What could I have done [

what was in my power to do]

Ultimately, they would have finalized its verdict in its absence.”

In any event, Rabba concluded that the halakha is not as Rav Ḥisda said: This cannot be proved from here regarding our issue, and everyone agrees that with regard to items forbidden for benefit one may say, “Here is yours before you.”

But Rav Ḥisda continued searching for proofs of his position, and when

he encountered [

met]

Rav Ḥisda

Rabba bar Shmuel, he said to him: Have you learned anything regarding items forbidden for benefit [

have you learned anything concerning this matter]?

He said to him: Yes, I have learned a baraita.

It is stated in the Torah (Leviticus 5:23):

“And he shall return the stolen item

that he stole.”

But this is difficult: It would have been sufficient for it to say, “And he shall return the stolen item”;

what is the meaning of the words “that he stole”?

And from here we learn that when he returns it,

he must return it in the form in which he stole it.

From here they said:

If he

robbed a coin and it was invalidated,

or

fruit and it rotted, wine and it turned to vinegar, teruma and it became impure, leavened bread and Passover passed over it, an animal and a transgression was committed with it, or an ox before its verdict was finalized—

he says to him: “Here is yours before you.”

Since, in any event, he returns it in the form in which he stole it.

Rabba bar Shmuel proved from here:

Who is it that you heard say, “Before its verdict was finalized, yes; after its verdict was finalized, no”? The Rabbis! And yet it teaches: “Leavened bread and Passover passed over it—he says to him, ‘Here is yours before you.’”

This proves that even according to the Rabbis he can say, “Here is yours before you,” contrary to Rav Ḥisda’s attempt to make their dispute dependent on this law.

Rav Ḥisda said to him,

Rabba bar Shmuel:

If you encounter the members of the academy, do not say anything to them. [

If you meet the members of the academy, do not tell them anything, so that they will not rejoice that they have found an answer to my words] .

We learned in a baraita: “One who robbed

fruit and it rotted says to him: ‘Here is yours before you.’”

And

we raise an objection:

B

ut

we learned—“

One who robbed

fruit and it rotted pays according to the value at the time of the robbery”?

Rav Pappa said: Here, it is referring to fruit that all rotted,

in which case he cannot say, “Here is yours before you.”

Here, it is referring to fruit of which only part rotted—

and in that case he says to him, “Here is yours before you.”

Mishna:

One who

gave

an object

to craftsmen to repair, and they damaged it, they are liable

to pay.

And similarly, if he

gave a chest

a box, or a cabinet to a carpenter to repair, and he damaged it—

he is liable to pay.

And a builder who undertook to demolish a wall and broke the stones, or damaged them, is liable to pay.

A craftsman who

was demolishing

a wall

from this side, and

the stones

fell from the other side

and broke, or caused damage to others when they fell —

he is exempt. And if

they fell

because of the blow—

he is liable.

Gemara:

Rav Asi said: They taught “

He gave a chest to a carpenter ... he is liable to pay”

only

in a case

where he gave a carpenter a chest

a box, or a cabinet

in order

to drive a nail into them, and he drove a nail into them and broke them.

But

if

he gave a carpenter pieces of wood

in order

to make

from them

a chest, a box, or a cabinet, and he made from them a chest, a box, or a cabinet, and broke them, he is exempt.

That is, he pays only the value of the wood.

What is the reason?

A craftsman acquires the enhancement of the vessel.

That is, a craftsman who enhanced a vessel acquires it through the change he made, and when he returns it, it is as though he is selling him the enhancement he made in it. Similarly, if he damaged it, he is liable only for the value of the wood he received.

And we challenge this: behold,

we learned -

“If he gave it to artisans and they spoiled it,

they are liable to pay,”

and we infer -

“Is it not [

does this also refer to a case]

where he gave them wood,

and nevertheless they are liable to pay the entire amount?!

And we refute this:

No!

It refers only to a case where he gave them

a chest, box, and cabinet.

And we challenge this:

But since it teaches in the latter clause “

he gave a craftsman

a chest, box, and cabinet,” it follows [

precisely]

that

in

the first clause

the case is one where he gave the artisans

wood

only?

And we answer:

They said: It is explaining it.

That is, the latter clause comes to explain the first clause:

“How [

in what case]

does the case of one who gives artisans something to repair and they spoil it, so that they are liable to pay, apply? For example, where he gave a craftsman a chest, box, and cabinet.”

But if he gave them wood only, they pay only the value of the wood.

And this too is logically evident -

and this accords with our explanation -

for it teaches, “How.”

For if it enters your mind

that

the first clause

deals with a case where he gave the artisans

wood,

the following difficulty arises:

Now

that

it teaches us

in the first clause that even if they received

wood they are liable to pay, and we do not say, “An artisan acquires the enhancement of the vessels”; is it necessary to state this with regard to a chest, box, and cabinet?!

That is, what novelty is there in the latter clause? Surely it follows all the more so that they are liable to pay.

And we refute this:

If that is the only reason, it is not conclusive. [

This proof alone is insufficient], since it can be rejected:

the latter clause was taught to reveal the first clause.

Lest you say that the first clause refers to a chest, box, and cabinet, but not to wood,

therefore

the latter clause teaches, “a chest, box, and cabinet,”

so that you will infer:

it follows that

the

first clause

deals even with a case where he gave them only

wood, and nevertheless he is liable to pay.

Shall we say that this supports

the statement of Rav Asi? We learned below (100b):

“One who gives wool to a dyer,