Bava Kamma 98a (צח.) — the Talmud in English

And if it is due to the market price,

if the decrease in the price of the produce results from the decline in rainfall, which caused the crops to become more plentiful,

we do not deduct it from him.

The Gemara nevertheless continues to challenge this:

But the coin increased in value

the coin

with regard to its metal content.

The increase in the value of the coin was achieved by increasing the amount of silver metal in the coin, and it follows that there is interest in receiving more silver metal than he lent him.

Rather,

this is how one should act:

for,

as in

the case of Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, who carried out an action,

so they acted when an addition was made to the coinage:

with the coins of Agrdemis the Arab, up to ten in exchange for eight.

They approached an Ishmaelite coin merchant who had new and old coins, and calculated that eight new coins were worth ten old coins; they therefore gave the lender eight new coins instead of ten old ones.

Rabba said: One who throws another’s coin into the Great Sea is exempt.

As explained below:

What is the reason? He said—

“It is lying before you;

the one who threw it can claim: “The coin is lying before you”

; if you wish, take it.”

If he wishes, he can take it. Although he must hire a diver—called in the language of the Gemara a bar amora—to retrieve the coin from the sea, nevertheless this damage is merely indirect causation, and he is exempt.

And this applies only

when he cast the coin into

clear

water,

where he can see it,

as the coin can be seen, and he need only hire a diver to retrieve it.

But

if he threw it into

murky water,

where he cannot see it, he is not exempt.

Since in this case he is considered to have caused damage directly, by the very act of throwing the coin into the sea, for once the coin reaches the sea it is already lost.

And this applies only when he knocked it away

that is, the coin was in the owner’s hand, and this person struck his hand and knocked the coin from it,

but

if he

took it

—took it—

with his hand

and threw the coin, he is liable to pay him the cost of the diver who will retrieve it from the water.

Since by taking the coin

he robbed it.

he is considered a robber, and

he must perform restoration

he has become obligated to return the object to its owner; therefore, he must bear the expenses of restoring it.

Rava raised an objection

—he challenged

Rabba

with regard to Rabba’s statement: We learned in tractate Maaser Sheni (chapter 1, Mishna 2):

“One may not redeem

second tithe

with money that is not

in his possession.”

The Jerusalem Talmud explains

“How

is something considered not to be in his possession? For example, if

he had money in Castra,

or on the King’s Mountain

places that are distant, where caravans are not commonly found and the roads leading there are presumed dangerous,

or his purse fell into the Great Sea,

one may not redeem with it.”

It is thus clear that money found in the Great Sea is considered lost to him, even though he can hire a diver and retrieve it, contrary to Rabba’s statement ?

Rabba said: With regard to second tithe, the matter is different, for it must be “available in your hand,” as the Torah said

(Deuteronomy 14:25), “And bind up the money in your hand,” and

if the money is not actually in his hand and under his control—

that requirement is absent.

The law is not fulfilled.

The Gemara brings another law concerning this matter:

And Rabba said: One who files another’s coin

scrapes off the design on the coin, so that it is no longer accepted in commerce

, is exempt.

What is the reason? For he did nothing.

That is, no deficiency was made in the material , and the fact that it is now no longer accepted in commerce is merely indirect causation. He can say to him, “Here is your own before you.”

And this applies only

when he is exempt, only in a case

where he struck it with a hammer and flattened it.

He struck the coin with a hammer and smoothed it

, but

if

he filed it with a file

scraped off the design with a file—he is liable , since

he diminished it

directly, and this is not indirect causation.

Rava raised an objection

“

for we learned concerning a master who struck his slave and injured his tooth or his eye— "

If

he struck him in the eye and blinded it,

or

in the ear and deafened him, the slave goes free through them.”

But if he struck him

opposite his eye, and

as a result

he cannot see,

or he struck him

opposite his ear, and

as a result

he cannot hear, the slave does not go free through them.”

It is clear that if one performs an act upon the slave’s body, even though he did not diminish anything from him, nevertheless he is considered to have caused damage. Here too, if he struck the coin with a hammer and money was diminished as a result of that blow, he should be liable as one who causes damage?

The Gemara answers:

Rabba follows his own reasoning, as Rabba said—

“If he deafened his father, he is executed!

as the law applies to one who wounds his father,”

since

it is impossible to deafen without causing a wound, for a drop of blood falls into his ear.

Certainly, if he became deaf, a drop of blood fell into his ear.

Therefore, no proof can be brought from here regarding one who strikes a coin, since here there is a deficiency in the slave’s body. That is why he goes free.

And

further

Rabba said: One who mutilates

damages

another’s cow’s ear,

thereby disqualifying it for the altar, as an animal with a defect,

is exempt.

What is the reason?

Since the

cow remains as it was,

it has remained as it was

, for he did nothing.

And

if you say: It was disqualified for the altar because of the defect?

That is of no consequence, since

not all oxen stand for the altar.

Rava raised an objection

—he challenged

Rabba

with regard to Rabba’s statement: We learned:

“One who performs labor with the waters of the purification offering

for example, he weighed weights against them

, and with the cow of the purification offering,

and thereby disqualifies them through this labor,

is exempt by human law but liable by the law of Heaven.”

Rava infers that specifically if he performed

labor, he

is exempt, since

its damage is not perceptible. But “one who mutilates

another’s cow’s ear,”

whose damage is perceptible, should likewise be liable

even

by human law?

The Gemara answers:

They said: The same law applies—even one who mutilates it is exempt. And the

fact that we say “one who performs labor,” which implies specifically an act whose damage is not perceptible,

comes to teach us—

that even labor whose damage is not perceptible

nevertheless

makes him liable by the law of Heaven.

But with regard to exemption by human law, he is exempt in every case.

And

further

Rabba said: One who burns another’s document is exempt!

What is the reason? Because

he can say to him—

“I burned only paper belonging to you.”

That is, there is no tangible damage here, but merely paper.

Rami bar Hama challenged him: What are the circumstances

in which Rabba’s statement applies?