Bava Kamma 94b — the Talmud in English

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location") There are those who

said that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar,

but

as for him

himself,

he does not hold so

he holds that change effects acquisition, as was explained in his statement concerning “one does not assess for a thief or a robber.”

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: By Torah law

by the law of the Torah—

stolen property that has undergone change

even though it has changed

is returned in its present state

as it is now, and even if it increased in value, because change does not effect acquisition.

As it is stated:

[Leviticus 5:23]

“And he shall return the stolen property that he stole”

and the meaning of “he shall return”

is: in any event

even if it changed.

And if you will say: Our Mishna

which we learned in it that he does not return the vessels that he made from the stolen wood, but rather returns the value of the wood, it follows that he acquires the stolen wood through change.

The law in our Mishna is not by Torah law, but rather this is what the Sages instituted

because of the ordinance for those who repent,

in order to make it easier for those who repent, so that they would not refrain from repenting because of the concern that they would have to return the increase in value.

And we raise an objection:

And did Rabbi Yohanan say this

that by Torah law change does not effect acquisition?

But Rabbi Yohanan said: The halakha is in accordance with an unattributed Mishna, and we learned: If he did not manage

the owners of the sheep

to give it to him

to the koen, the first shearing,

until he dyed it

all the wool—

he is exempt

from giving the first shearing, because the wool changed and he acquired it through change. It follows that Rabbi Yohanan holds that change effects acquisition, for here there is no ordinance for those who repent, and nevertheless the owner of the wool acquired it through change.

A certain scholar among the Sages, whose name was Rabbi Yaakov, said to them: For me it has been explained by Rabbi Yohanan himself:

the reason that in our Mishna Rabbi Yohanan holds that the robber did not acquire through change, but only because of the ordinance for those who repent, is that he holds that our Mishna is speaking

of a case where he stole smoothed wood and made vessels from it, which is a change that can return to its original form,

which is not a complete change, and therefore he acquires it only because of the ordinance of the Sages. But in the case of a complete change that does not return to its former state, Rabbi Yohanan concedes that even by Torah law the robber acquires the object, as was explained in the Mishna concerning the first shearing.

The Sages taught

in a beraita:

Robbers and those who lend with interest who returned

the stolen property or the interest that they took—

they do not accept from them, and one who accepts from them

does not have the approval of the Sages

there is no spirit of wisdom and piety within him, because by doing so he weakens the resolve of those who wish to return in repentance.

Rabbi Yohanan said: This Mishna was taught in the days of Rabbi.

For it was taught

in a beraita:

There was an incident involving a certain man

a robber

who sought to repent

and return all his stolen property.

His wife said to him: Empty one

[fool],

if you repent

and return all the stolen property,

even the sash

that you are wearing

will not be yours!

And he refrained

because of this

and did not repent.

At that time they said

the Sages:

Robbers and those who lend with interest who returned—

they do not accept from them,

and one who accepts from them—

does not have the approval of the Sages,

because through this he prevents them from repenting.

And we raise an objection:

It is objected

from another beraita that we learned:

Their father left them

as an inheritance

money of interest

which the father received improperly in exchange for a loan that he lent with interest,

even though they

the sons

know that they are

money of

interest—

they are not obligated to return

the money to the borrowers, because it is written, “And he shall return the stolen property that he stole,” and the sons did not steal anything; they acquired the money through a change of possession [and this beraita holds that the heir’s possession is not a continuation of the father’s possession, but is considered another possession, like the possession of an acquirer; therefore, inheritance constitutes a change of possession. Rashi].

And it is precise from the words of the beraita that only

they

the sons

are the ones who do not

need to return the money, because they acquired it through a change of possession;

but their father

if the money is still in his possession

is obligated to retur[n it]!

And how does this accord with what the Sages said, that one does not accept from those who lend with interest the interest that they took, because of the ordinance for those who repent?

And we answer:

By rights, their father too is not obligated to return

because of the ordinance for those who repent!

And the fact that it teaches

in the beraita the law that they are not obligated to return

in their case

in their case, the sons who inherited money of interest from their father,

that is

because it wished to teach in the latter clause

that the beraita wished to teach in its latter clause the law:

Their father left them

as an inheritance

a cow, a garment, or any identifiable object

that is recognizable to the public as stolen—

they are obligated to return

them

because of the honor of their father,

so that he will not always be remembered as a robber.

And this law applies specifically to heirs; therefore

the tan­nay taught the first clause as well

the law

in their case

in their case, the heirs.

And we raise an objection:

And because of the honor of their father they are obligated

the heirs

to return?

But

it is read here

[Exodus 22:27]

“And a prince among your people you shall not curse

[you shall not revile],”

and the Sages inferred that the verse speaks specifically

of one who performs the deed of your people,

but one who curses a wicked prince does not transgress this prohibition. And the same applies to honoring a father: if the father does not perform the deed of your people, there is no need to be concerned for his honor ; if so, why must the sons be concerned for the honor of their father and return the stolen property? After all, their robber father did not perform the deed of his people.

And we answer:

As Rav Pinhas said

elsewhere:

When he repented, here too

in our case, we can say that it is speaking

when he did

their father

repent

before he died, and therefore the sons are obligated to honor him.

And we ask:

If he did

their father

repent, what is it doing with him

what is the stolen property doing in his possession?

He should have returned it

he should have returned the stolen property when he repented! And we answer:

He did not manage to return it

the stolen property

before he died,

and therefore the sons are obligated to honor their father, and they are obligated to return the identifiable objects that are stolen because of the honor of their father.

Come and hear

to raise an objection from another beraita against what we learned above in the beraita, that the Sages instituted that robbers and those who lend with interest who repented do not need to return what they took:

For we learned in a beraita:

Robbers and those who lend with interest, even though they collected

the money—

they return

the money to the owners.

And we considered it: If they were

robbers, what is there of “who collected”?

What “collection” is there among robbers? After all, they do not collect money but steal it. If so,

if it was stolen

if they stole property—

stolen

is the property,

and if it was not stolen

property—

not stolen

and they are not called robbers; so why are they called robbers?

Rather, say

to explain the words of the beraita as follows:

The robbers—and who are they?

And who are those robbers? They are

those who lend with interest, even though they collected

interest—

they return

the interest to the borrowers.

If so, it is explained in the beraita that those who lend with interest are obligated to return the interest in their possession, and this is contrary to the earlier beraita, which says that one does not accept from robbers and those who lend with interest.

They said

to explain the words of the beraita here: The robbers and those who lend with interest, for their part,

return

what they took, but

one does not accept from them.

But why

do they

return

if one does not accept from them?

In order

to discharge the obligation before Heaven,

for in order that their repentance be complete, they must at least offer the borrowers and the robbed persons the possibility of receiving back what belongs to them.

Come and hear

to raise an objection from another beraita: We learned in the Tosefta [Bava Metzia 8:26]:

Shepherds

are robbers, who graze animals in the fields of others,

and tax collectors

of the king, who collect head tax and property tax and sometimes take more than is proper,

and customs collectors

who collect customs and sometimes take customs improperly—

their repentance is difficult,

because they robbed the public and do not know to whom to return it.

And they return

at the very least

to those whom they recognize

to those people whom they recognize and know that they took from them improperly.

And this is contrary to the earlier beraita, which says that one does not accept from robbers and those who lend with interest.

They said,

they said to explain the words of the Tosefta: Indeed, the shepherds, tax collectors, and customs collectors, for their part,

return

what they took improperly, but

one does not accept from them.

But why

do they

return

if one does not accept from them?

In order

to discharge the obligation before Heaven.

And we ask:

If so

if this is the law, that they need to return only in order to discharge the obligation before Heaven,

why is their repentance difficult?

Furthermore,

the words of the Tosefta in the latter clause are difficult:

Say the latter clause: And those whom they do not recognize,

that money whose owners they do not recognize, from whom they took it—

they shall use them

those monies

for public needs.

And Rav Hisda said:

What public needs shall he use the money for?

Pits, ditches, and caves

with water for drinking, which is something needed by everyone, and thus there is hope that the robbed persons will benefit from them. It follows explicitly from the beraita that he must return the stolen property.

Rather,

it must be resolved in another manner:

It is not difficult: Here

the Tosefta is speaking

before the ordinance

that they instituted for robbers, that one does not accept from them; this Mishna, which obligates one to return, was taught in the days of Rabbi. Whereas

here

in the earlier beraita, which we learned says that one does not accept from them, it is speaking

after the ordinance.

And now that Rav Nahman said:

and explained that the ordinance of the Sages that he does not return the stolen property was stated only

when the stolen property is not extant,

even say that both this and that

the Tosefta as well is speaking

after the ordinance

that the Sages instituted, that he need not return the stolen property,

and it is not difficult

the words of the Tosefta: